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 Introduction  
 
1. The Definition of Lay Participation  
 
“Conceptual clarification is…an indispensable precursor to meaningful normative 
discussion and debate”.1 At the outset of this thesis it is necessary to formulate a 
definition of lay participation. While there is no universal definition of lay 
participation,2 borrowing Jackson and Kovalev’s interpretations, the term could be 
defined as “the participation of citizens who are non-professional judges in making 
decisions in…trials”. 3  Jackson and Kovalev further interpret that: “Lay, or 
non-professional, judges can deliberate and reach the verdict independently like jurors 
and lay magistrates in the common-law tradition, or together with professional judges 
like lay assessors in the continental European tradition.”4 Following this definition, lay 
participation in this thesis then “refers to all forms of non-professional adjudicators”5 
participating in trials and making decisions.    
 
2. Aims of the Study 
 
About two decades ago, McCabe, facing decreasing interest in research concerning 
                                                        
1 Paul Roberts, “Comparative Criminal Justice Goes Global”, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 
Vol.28, No.2, 2008, at 382. 
2 For example, Lempert believes that lay participation in the academic field of researching 
administration of justice indicates “official citizen participation in judging the legal implications of 
allegedly untoward behavior”, see Richard O. Lempert, “The Internationalization of Lay Legal 
Decision-Making: Jury Resurgence and Jury Research”, Cornell International Law Journal, Vol.40, 
2007, at 482. 
3 John D. Jackson & Nikolay P. Kovalev, “Lay Adjudication and Human Rights in Europe”, The 
Columbia Journal of European Law, No.1 of Vol.13, 2006/2007, at 84. 
4 Ibid.  
5 Ibid.  
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the jury system, questioned whether jury research was dead.6 However, if it was true 
that jury related research experienced a decline during a certain period of the twentieth 
century, it appears that research into the jury trial and other forms of lay participation 
has been reinvigorated over the past two decades. As a matter of fact, the recent 
developments of lay participation across the world reveals a preservation, reform and 
revival of the system, which has not only demonstratively reaffirmed the rationalities of 
lay participation, but has also generated a considerable body of literature concerning the 
ways in which different forms of lay participation actually work in practice, as well as 
the legal and political functions of lay participation.7 As Vidmar observes, “the topic of 
lay participation is an important one, and has been gaining attention in various parts of 
the world.”8 Likewise, Lempert suggested recently that “[t]he global spread of juries 
and related institutions has opened new vistas for research…into institutions that 
involve ordinary citizens in legal decision-making.”9    
Although it appears that “[l]ay input into legal decisions is a research frontier”,10 
the area of lay participation in China11 is far from being a well-researched academic 
domain, at least in terms of the availability of literature in English.12 As a matter of fact, 
lay participation in mainland China predominantly takes the form of lay assessors who 
                                                        
6 Sarah McCabe, “Is Jury Research Dead?”, Mark Findlay and Peter Duff (ed.), The Jury Under 
Attack, (Butterworths, London, Sydney 1988), at 38. 
7 See the subsequent Chapter 1 for details.  
8 Neil Vidmar, “Juries and Lay Assessors in the Commonwealth: A Contemporary Survey”, 
Criminal Law Forum, Vol. 13, No.4, 2002, at 386.   
9 Supra note 2  
10 Ibid.  
11 The scope of this thesis in confined to analysing and discussing the situation of lay people’s 
participation in judicial decision making in the People’s Republic of China (also traditionally called 
“Mainland China”). The special areas of Taiwan, Macao, Hong Kong that have separate and 
different legal systems are beyond the scope of the thesis. 
12 According to my research, there have been only a few English articles published over the last two 
decades which discuss the situation of lay participation in China, these being: Yue Ma, “Lay 
Participation in Criminal Trials: A Comparative Perspective”, International Criminal Justice Review, 
Vol.8, 1998, at 74-94; and Landsman and Zhang in their co-authored paper, see Stephan Landsman 
and Jing Zhang, “Lay Participation Comes to Japanese and Chinese Courts”, UCLA Pacific Basin 
Law Journal, Vol.25, 2007-2008, at 179-227.     
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sit jointly with professional judges in mixed tribunals to adjudicate on criminal, civil 
and administrative cases. Chinese lay assessors are on an equal footing with their 
professional colleagues. In other words, they must participate in all of the 
decision-making of the mixed tribunal, including not only factual issues but also legal 
ones. To many Western scholars and practitioners alike, the logistics of how this form 
of lay participation has operated in China over the years remains a mystery. Although 
there are some similarities between China’s mixed tribunal system and its counterpart 
in other jurisdictions, China’s has unique characteristics in this regard, such as the 
court-dominated selection of lay assessors, not ensuring a majority position for lay 
assessors in mixed tribunals, and limiting the case categories under which lay assessors 
can be used.13 Hans has offered criticism that “despite an extensive body of scholarship 
on the functioning of the jury system, there is limited scholarly work on how alternative 
methods of using laypersons in legal decision-making operate in practice.”14 Anderson 
and Nolan further suggest that “research on the functioning of mixed courts is a 
relatively small part of jury literature.”15 This highlights the need for a comprehensive 
and critical examination of the mixed tribunal system in China, in order to enrich the 
body of research into lay participation worldwide. Moreover, in light of the fact that 
“the global spread of juries and related institutions has opened new vistas for research”, 
“there are scholars around the world who believe that the time is ripe for coordinated 
cross-national research into institutions that involve ordinary citizens in legal 
decision-making”. 16  However, little has been written in English on the situation 
                                                        
13 See Chapter 3 for details.  
14 Valerie P. Hans, “Lay Participation in Legal Decision Making”, Law & Policy, Vol.25, No.2, 
2003, at 83-84. 
15 Kent Anderson and Mark Nolan, “Lay Participation in the Japanese Justice System: A Few 
Preliminary Thoughts Regarding the Mixed Tribunal System (saiban-in seido) from Domestic 
Historical and International Psychological Perspective”, Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 
Vol. 37, 2004, at 982. 
16 Supra note 2.   
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regarding lay participation in China, a country which is home to almost one-quarter of 
the world’s population, and this has created a barrier for those comparative lawyers 
unable to read Chinese literature who wish to research the topic. This creates a further 
need for a comprehensive review of lay participation in China, in order to provide a 
relatively rounded report to which international comparative jurists and practitioners 
can make reference. 
On the other hand, in contrast with the scarce research concerning lay participation 
in China in Western countries, this issue has recently generated rather heated debate 
among Chinese scholars. From the 1980s until the promulgation of The Lay Assessor 
Act in 2004 (The LAA 2004), the mixed tribunal system, as the sole approach for 
Chinese people to participate in the administration of justice after 1949, when the 
People’s Republic of China was established by the Chinese Communist Party, has faced 
a withdrawal of legislative support, coupled with only a sparing and problematic use in 
practice.17 For example, Chinese lay assessors, though possessing powers and rights 
which are equal to those of professional judges, 18  never function as effective 
participants and counterweight to the latter, 19  have been widely and trenchantly 
criticized for their very passive attitudes and very limited contributions during trials.20 
In the past decade, in response to a decline in the mixed tribunal system and to the 
Chinese authorities’ attempt to re-invigorate it by enacting The LAA 2004, a number of 
scholarly materials on lay participation in China have surfaced, and three schools of 
thought can be identified from these.  
The opponents of lay participation openly advocate strong opposition to the mixed 
tribunal system and have even gone so far as to totally object to lay participation in 
                                                        
17 See Chapter 3 for detailed discussions.  
18 See Stephen C. Thaman, “The Resurrection of Trial by Jury in Russia”, Stanford Journal of 
International Law, Vol.31, 1995, at 67.  
19 See ibid.  
20 See Chapter 3 for detailed discussions.  
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China, for three principal reasons: the worldwide decline in lay participation, the 
absence of an historical tradition, and the current unsuccessful experimentation with the 
mixed tribunal system. For instance, Chen advocates abolishing the mixed tribunal 
system and lay participation in China from the perspective that lay participation has 
been and is declining worldwide.21 Shen states that the mixed tribunal should be 
abolished since the tradition of lay participation has not been present historically in 
China.22 Likewise, Zhang and Zhou throw doubts on preserving lay participation in 
China, on the grounds that Chinese citizens may lack the traditional desire to participate 
in government and politics. 23  Wei further attacks lay judges’ participation in 
adjudication on the premise that it conflicts with China’s culture and tradition because 
Chinese civilians, who historically have an extreme reverence for professional authority, 
would rather accept an incorrect decision by a professional judge than a correct 
judgment by a lay decision-maker.24 Moreover, some scholars such as Yu and Cheng 
suggest that since the employment of lay assessors in mixed tribunals has proved 
largely unsuccessful, they should be dismissed and replaced by professional judges and 
that lay participation in China should be suspended.25  
The supporters of jury, on the other hand, have embraced the view that lay 
participation should be preserved in China, but suggest that the mixed tribunal should 
be replaced without delay by an alternative such as a jury system, since tribunals have 
                                                        
21 See Chen Guiming, Litigation Justice and the Procedural Safeguards, (The Fazhi Press of China, 
Beijing, 1996), at 36. 
22 Shen Jungui, “A Negative Observation about the Mixed Tribunal System in China”, Chinese 
Lawyers, No.4, 1999, at 14; see also Wang Limin, A Study on Judicial Reforms in China (The 
Publishing House of Law, Beijing 2000), at 388-389.    
23 Zhang Demiao and Zhou Youyong, “Conditions and Methods of Realising Judicial Fairness in 
China Today”, Jurisprudence Review, No.1, 1999, at 2.   
24 Wei Min, “Shall the Mixed tribunal System Be Suspended: The Developmental Direction of the 
Mixed Tribunal System, Gansu Social Sciences, Vol.4, 2001, at 31and 32.    
25 Yu Hanping, “Should China Abolish Lay Participation?”, Legal Review, No.1, 1989, at 52-54; 
Cheng Chunhua, “The Abolishment of Lay Participation in China”, see the official website of the 
Civil-Law Research Association of China, at 
http://www.civillaw.com.cn/article/default.asp?id=21800, last visited on 4 November 2009. 
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proved ineffective. For instance, Hu supports sweeping reforms such as abandoning the 
current mixed tribunal system and replacing it with a jury system26, a view upheld by 
other scholars who support juries.27  
The advocates of lay assessors claim that the role of lay assessors in China should 
be preserved, but also urge substantial reform. For example, He, the noted Chinese 
criminal justice scholar, asserts that, balancing the pros and cons of the mixed tribunal, 
it should be preserved whilst recognising that reforms need to be initiated in order to 
reconstruct it.28 Ding and Sun, inspired by the workings of the jury system, propose that 
the duty on China’s lay assessors to decide on legal issues should be removed.29 Other 
proponents of the mixed tribunal system present a series of arguments in favour of its 
continuation, such as its role in safeguarding justice in judicial proceedings, preventing 
corruption in the judicial arena and improving the efficiency, transparency, 
independence, democratisation and legitimacy of the judiciary as a whole.30  
It appears that the views of all three schools may have merits. In terms of the 
administration of justice in some democracies, “there has been a trend towards 
                                                        
26 Hu Yuhong, “The People’s Law Court and the Mixed Tribunal System – The Judicial Democracy 
in the Views of Classic Authors, Tribune of Political Sciences and Law (Journal of China 
University of Political Sciences and Law), Volume 23, No.4, 2005, at155.    
27 See, for example, Chen Shaolin, “The Ideas of Improving China’s Mixed Tribunal System”, 
Legal Review, No.4 of 2005, at 78-83; Zhang Pinze, “The Mixed Tribunal System and the Reform 
of Criminal Trial Mode in China”, Journal of the Central Institute of the Political-Legal 
Management Cadres, Vol.2, 1999, at 14-17; Yang Ming and Zhang Hao, “Shall China Introduce a 
Jury System?”, Journal of Liaoning University (Philosophy and Social Sciences), Vol. 4, 2005, at 
152-156.   
28 He Jiahong, “A Historical and Comparative Study of the Mixed Tribunal System in China”, 
Jurists, No.3, 1999, at 78.  
29 Ding Yisheng and Sun Lijuan, “A Comparative Study on the Applicable Area of the Chinese 
Mixed Tribunal System and Its Counterparts in the Western Countries”, Jurisprudence, Vol.11, 
2001, at 3.   
30 See, for example, Zuo Weimin and Yin Yaoshan, “The Mixed Tribunal System in China: A 
Comparison, Reconsideration and Forecast”, Social Sciences Study, Vol.2, 2001, at 88; Shi Ying, 
“The Contemporary Destiny of the Mixed Tribunal System: Ideas Inspired by the Interrelationship 
Between Justice and Democracy”, Journal of Liaoning University, Vol.6, 1999, at 55-56; Xie 
Youping and Wan Yi, “The Judicial Impartiality and Civilian Participation: A Theoretical Study on 
the Mixed Tribunal System”, Journal of Gansu Institute of Political Sciences and Law, Vol.4, 2003, 
at 12; Ding and Sun, ibid, at 9.       
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replacing amateurs with professionals in the twentieth century”.31 For instance, in 
England where the modern jury originated, juries have been nearly abandoned in civil 
cases while their use in criminal cases becomes increasingly sparing due to the 
sustained growth of criminal trials and the government’s growing interest in efficiency 
and crime control.32 It is also true that in the past Chinese citizens were excluded from 
the royal courts, which were entirely under the sway of the emperors.33 In light of this, 
the three reasons given by the opponents of lay participation for abolishing lay 
participation in China are not unreasonable at all. Meanwhile, the jury supporters’ 
proposal to replace the problematic mixed tribunal system with the classic jury seems 
forward-looking and inspirational, while the lay assessor advocates’ view of preserving 
but reforming the current mixed tribunal system appears conservative, but more 
compatible with the Chinese Government’s latest move toward extending the use of lay 
assessors, rather than introducing the jury trial, as embodied by the promulgation of The 
LAA 2004. To sum up, the controversies among Chinese scholars are perplexing, whilst 
deciding which school is correct and clarifying the prospects for lay participation in 
China are likely to be a fascinating issues with both academic and practical 
significance.  
Considering the context alluded to above, the impetus for creating this thesis 
mainly comes in response to two factors. On the one hand, taking into account the fact 
that academic projects on lay participation in China written in English have been very 
scarce, this thesis, conducting as it does a comparatively full review of lay participation 
in China, can be expected to enrich the body of work in this area and provide 
international comparative lawyers with referential literature about how the most 
                                                        
31 Irving F. Reichert, “The Magistrates’ Courts: Lay Cornerstone of English Justice”, Judicature, 
Vol.57, 1973-1974, at 138. 
32 Sally Lloyd-Bostock and Cheryl Thomas, “Decline of the ‘Little Parliament’: Juries and Jury 
Reform in England and Wales”, Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol. 62, at 7-8. 
33 See Chapter 2 for details.  
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populous country in the world has employed lay participation and what the prospects 
for its future are. On the other hand, this thesis attempts to, within the framework of the 
worldwide development of lay participation, comprehensively study the history, status 
quo and prospects for lay participation in China, in order to respond to the views of the 
three schools of Chinese scholars and clarify which one is correct.  
In 1905, China, for the first time in its history, initiated an experiment involving 
the introduction the modern form of lay participation, a jury system, from England, 
although this effort quickly faded.34 Exactly one century later, the Chinese Communist 
Party, on 1st May 2005, decided to formally resuscitate the form of lay participation in 
China today: the mixed tribunal system, by implementing The LAA 200435, and on 1st 
October of the same year, I started my Ph.D research on lay participation in China. 
These coincidences might add some extra weight to the implications of this thesis.  
 
3. Methodology  
 
This thesis is by and large a library-based research, and the materials to which this 
thesis makes reference mainly include articles, books, cases and some online documents. 
In order to support an exploration of the position of lay participation in China today, in 
Chapter 4, I conducted a field study in China between December 2006 and June 2007, 
with two categories of information collected, including: (1) data gathered from both 
official and restricted-circulation sources such as archives, libraries and websites, and 
(2) original empirical data gathered through a questionnaire survey across nine courts.36  
Some characteristics of the judicial system in China are unique. This thesis 
therefore has struggled to find and create English equivalents for some of the Chinese 
                                                        
34 See Chapter 2 for details.  
35 See Chapter 3 for details.  
36 See Chapter 4 for more details about the methodology of this fieldwork.  
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expressions, so I have made reference to a range of English literature created by both 
Western and Chinese scholars, in order to seek a balance between the different 
terminologies used, and in order to realise both technical accuracy and colloquial 
familiarity. However, there is still a possibility that some terminology in this thesis is 
imperfect or maybe even a little convoluted. In terms of translating some of the statutes 
and articles written in Chinese, I have made every effort to find the official English 
versions. Where no official translation was available, my rationale has been to follow 
the original text as strictly as possible. However, this does not mean that a 
word-for-word method of translation has been adopted, but rather, where a meta-phrase 
may confuse English native speakers, eloquence and ease of understanding has been 
given priority over strict accuracy. However, given that there may be inaccuracies, I 
take full responsibility for any that do occur.   
 
4. A Brief Introduction to China’s Court System  
 
Before discussing an institution that is subordinate to China’s judicial 
administration system, it seems necessary to embark on a very brief introduction of the 
judicial system itself, in order to provide a more understandable context for 
non-Chinese readers. As a matter of fact, in the People’s Republic of China (or P. R. 
China, founded by the Chinese Communist Party in 1949), “judiciary” or “judicial 
organs”, under the widest linguistic dimension, comprises courts, public prosecutors’ 
offices, the police and judicial administrative departments (normally called the Justice 
Department or Bureau, set up on a city and provincial basis, which is in charge of the 
local Bar and prisons under the administration of the local government). In contrast, in 
its narrowest sense, a reference to China’s judiciary means only the country’s court 
 9
system,37 which is actually composed of a four-tier hierarchy, namely: (1) the local 
court (or ‘basic-level court’), which is established on a county or urban-district basis, (2) 
the regional court (or ‘intermediate court’), which is established in various metropolitan 
centres and administrative regions, (3) the provincial high court, which is established in 
various provinces and in four large metropolitan centres including Beijing, Shanghai, 
Tianjin and Chongqing, and (4) the Supreme Court, which is situated in Beijing.38 The 
adjudicative bodies in Chinese courts come in three forms: (1) the single-judge panel 
(normally seen in the local courts and only applicable to minor criminal offences and 
simple civil disputes), (2) the all-judge tribunal composed of between three and seven 
judges (three in the local and regional courts, and three to seven in the provincial high 
courts and the Supreme Court), and (3) the mixed tribunal composed of judges and lay 
assessors of three to seven people (three in the local and regional courts, and three to 
seven in the provincial high courts and the Supreme Court; for judges to outnumber lay 
assessors in a mixed tribunal is lawful).39 In China there is no other form of lay 
participation, such as the jury trial or lay magistracy. 
 
5. Structure of the Study  
 
This thesis is comprised of the following chapters. To respond to the argument that 
lay participation has lost its vitality and is dying out as a practice worldwide and 
therefore China’s return to a lay participation system is unlikely to be a good choice, 
Chapter 1 of this thesis firstly outlines the situation of lay participation worldwide 
                                                        
37 See Guo Chengwei and Song Yinghui (eds.), A Study on the Contemporary Judicial Systems (The 
Legal Publishing House, Beijing, 2002), at 1-2.   
38 See Article 2 of The Organizational Act of Chinese Courts 1983.  
39 See Article 46 of The Act of Administrative Procedure 1989, Article 40 and 41 of The Act of 
Civil Procedure 1991, Article 62 and 147 of The Act of Criminal Procedure 1996 and Article 3 of 
The Lay Assessor Act 2004.  
 10
because, only after understanding the global position in terms of lay participation, can 
the thesis properly evaluate the current situation and prospective development of the 
system in China in an informed and correctly oriented way. Chapter 2 will set out the 
historical background to the growth of lay participation in China, by recounting the 
various forms of and experiments with lay participation throughout China’s history, 
attempting to both verify the authenticity of the allegations insisted by the opponents of 
lay participation that China lacks an historical tradition in lay participation, and present 
a relatively comprehensive review of lay participation in China from an historical 
perspective. Chapters 3 and 4 will study the status quo of the sole form of lay 
participation in China today, the mixed tribunal system, which was formally established 
by the CCP on mainland China in 1949. As well as briefly reviewing the vicissitudes of 
the mixed tribunal system and its role at different stages, Chapter 3 will more 
importantly provide detail on the achievements and unresolved weaknesses of the 
newly enacted Lay Assessor Act 2004; while Chapter 4, to strengthen the theoretical 
analysis from Chapter 3, will, based on fieldwork conducted in China, further 
empirically assess the practical situation of the mixed tribunal system after the reforms 
initiated by the promulgation of The LAA 2004. To further clarify whether China 
should continue with lay participation, Chapter 5 will look into the contributions that 
lay participation could potentially make to Chinese society and concludes, by virtue of 
combining the arguments from the previous four chapters, whether lay participation 
deserves a place in modern China. In light of this conclusion and taking into account 
the fact that the specific form of lay participation that a country chooses is linked to the 
historical, political, and social context thereof,40 Chapter 6 will analyse the current 
political and social context in China, a context which may exercise constraints on the 
                                                        
40 See supra note 14, at 88. 
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scope and future development of lay participation in this country, and will then offer 
some proposals in regard to the prospective orientation of developing lay participation 
in China, from a realistic perspective.  
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Chapter 1   
Lay Participation: A System Facing Worldwide Decline? 
 
1.1 Introduction   
 
The Lay Assessor Act of China 2004 (the LAA 2004) met with objections from 
the very beginning. Opponents of lay participation suggested that the system conflicts 
with the modern trend for judicial professionalization and so has been in worldwide 
decline. China’s move toward resuscitating lay participation by activating the mixed 
tribunal system was therefore said to be at odds with mainstream legal development 
and so would be unadvisable.1  
Such an allegation challenges the rationality of China’s move toward 
encouraging lay participation on the basis that it has lost vitality globally. This is not a 
groundless allegation. The jury trial, the most classic representative of lay 
participation in the Anglo-American system of criminal justice, has been in a steady 
retreat and is no longer enshrined as a “sacred cow”.2 It has become limited to only 
serious criminal offences in almost all commonwealth countries3 and has even been 
abolished altogether in some.4 Where lay participation is retained, research often 
points to its lack of significance and its limited impact on decisions. For example, 
                                                        
1 See e.g. Chen Guiming, Litigation Justice and the Procedural Safeguards, (The 
Fazhi Press of China, Beijing, 1996), at 36; Yin Fucheng, “The Questionable Mixed 
Tribunal System in China ”, Journal of the Industrial University of Inner-Mongolia,  
Vol.13, No.1, 2004, at 72-75. 
2 See David Corker, “Trying Fraud Cases Without Juries”, Criminal Law Review, 
April 2002, at 284.  
3 See generally Neil Vidmar (ed.), World Jury Systems (Oxford University Press, 
2000); Neil Vidmar, “Juries and Lay Assessors in the Commonwealth: a 
Contemporary Survey”, Criminal Law Forum,Vol.13, No.4, 2002, at 392-400.  
4  See e.g. Neil Vidmar, “Juries and Lay Assessors in the Commonwealth: a 
Contemporary Survey”, Criminal Law Forum,Vol.13, No.4, 2002, at 391-397.  
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several studies on the mixed tribunal system which has been widely used in civil-law 
countries have almost unanimously reported the impotence and limited contribution of 
lay judges.5 Furthermore, according to Skyrme, the lay magistracy has lost most of its 
significant roles in some jurisdictions.6 However, is such evidence really sufficient to 
justify the conclusion that lay participation is overwhelmingly in decline? 
Despite the generalization that lay participation is declining while judicial 
professionalization rises, there have been, remarkably, some opposite moves. 7  
Besides China, a number of other countries have recently introduced or reintroduced 
the jury or the mixed tribunal system.8 Moreover, even in those countries where the 
jury has been sparingly used, it would be incorrect to conclude that lay participation 
has been declining altogether. In England and Wales, for example, lay magistrates 
                                                        
5 A variety of studies imply that lay assessors are perceived as neither active nor 
crucial participants in the mixed courts. For a list of the literature, see Sanja Kutnjak 
Ivkovic, “An Inside View: Professional Judges’ and Lay Judges’ Support for Mixed 
Tribunals”, Law & Policy, Vol.25, No.2, 2003, at 101. Further, more recent 
investigations in Russia, Croatia, Germany, and Sweden, have also documented the 
above allegation. See Stefan Machura, “Fairness, Justice, and Legitimacy: 
Experiences of People’s Judges in South Russia”, Law & Policy, Vol.25, No.2, 2003, 
at 125; Sanja Kutnjak Ivkovic, “Mixed Tribunals in Croatia”, International Review of 
Penal Law (Vol. 72), (Érès, Ramonville Sainte Agne 2001), at 71; Arnd Koch, “C.J.A 
Mittermaier and the 19th Century Debate about Juries and Mixed Courts”, 
International Review of Penal Law, Law (Vol. 72), (Érès, Ramonville Sainte Agne 
2001), at 353; Walter Perron, “Lay Participation in Germany”, International Review 
of Penal Law (Vol. 72), (Érès, Ramonville Sainte Agne 2001), at 193; Stefan Machura, 
“Interaction between Lay Assessors and Professional Judges in German Mixed 
Courts”, International Review of Penal Law (Vol. 72), (Érès, Ramonville Sainte Agne 
2001), at 457; Christian Diesen, “The Advantages and Disadvantages of Lay Judges 
from a Swedish Perspective”, International Review of Penal Law (Vol. 72), (Érès, 
Ramonville Sainte Agne 2001), at 363. 
6 According to Skyrme, this has happened in Scotland, Northern Ireland, Australia, 
Canada, New Zealand, and the islands of the Caribbean; lay magistracy has even been 
abolished in Ireland.  See Thomas Skyrme, The Changing Image of the Magistracy, 
(2nd edition, Macmillan Press, London 1983), at 214-223.  
7 See Valerie P. Hans, “Lay Participation in Legal Decision Making”, Law & Policy, 
Vol.25, No.2, 2003, at 87.   
8 See more detailed discussion below.  
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handle over 90% of criminal cases,9 and various administrative tribunals involving 
lay adjudicators decide on a large number of civil disputes annually,10 despite of the 
sparing use of jury trials. Such marked reversals of the trend complicate the panorama 
of lay participation.  
In light of the information above, it appears that the current worldwide position 
of lay participation is far from clear-cut. Before discussing China’s specific issues, it 
therefore necessary to briefly look into the recent development of lay participation to 
clarify whether it is overcoming its previously overwhelming and irreversible decline. 
If it is true that lay participation is dying out, China’s return to lay participation will 
be a mistake and so any subsequent research into boosting such lay participation in 
China will be inadvisable. In other words, only after the global position of lay 
participation is understood, can this thesis evaluating the current practice and 
prospective development of lay participation in China be correctly oriented.  
This chapter will be divided into five Sections. The first four look into the 
different modern models of lay participation one by one, including the sparingly-used 
classic jury in the world’s established democracies, the problematic mixed tribunals in 
various civil-law countries, the effective lay magistracy in England and other 
countries, and the important administrative tribunals in the United Kingdom. Each 
part not only briefly describes the ebb and flow of each model of lay participation, but 
also presents an analysis followed by a forecast as to prospective development. In 
response to the growth of lay participation in diverse countries experiencing transition 
from authoritarianism to democracy, the fifth section discusses this trend, analyzing 
                                                        
9 Sean Enright and James Morton, Taking Liberties: The Criminal Jury in the 1990s, 
(Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London 1990), at 2, quoted from John Hostettler, The 
Criminal Jury Old and New: Jury Power From Early Times to the Present Day 
(Waterside Press, Sheffield, 2004), at 13.  
10 Gary Slapper and David Kelly, The English Legal System (Tenth Edition) 
(Routledge-Cavendish, London 2009), at 393-394. 
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the common context and reasons accountable for this growth, and its inspirations. 
Based on the five sections, the conclusion summarizes the general developmental 
trend of lay participation worldwide.  
 
1.2 The jury’s demise in established democracies    
 
It is remarkable that the jury trial, the classic model of lay participation, has been 
experiencing decline in the world’s established democracies through the past decades, 
a fact regarded by some Chinese scholars as the most convincing evidence of the 
decline of lay participation worldwide.11 By contrast, however, some authors in China 
propose the introduction of juries into this country to replace the current mixed 
tribunal system.12 It is necessary to briefly analyze the current situation of the classic 
jury in the world’s leading democracies in an attempt to clarify the developmental 
trend of this system.13    
 
1.2.1 Widely existing but sparingly used jury system 
 
The jury trial currently exists in a number of leading Western countries such as 
                                                        
11 See e.g. supra note 1. 
12 See e.g. Hu Yuhong, “The People’s Law Court and the Mixed Tribunal System – 
The Judicial Democracy in the Views of Classic Authors, Tribune of Political 
Sciences and Law (Journal of China University of Political Sciences and Law), Vol. 
23, No.4, 2005, at 155; Chen Shaolin, “The Ideas of Improving China’s Mixed 
Tribunal”, Law Review, No.4 of 2005, at 78-83; Zhang Pinze, “The Mixed Tribunal 
System and the Reform of Criminal Trial Mode in China”, Journal of the Central 
Institute of the Political-Legal Management Cadres, Vol.2, 1999, at 14-17; Yang 
Ming and Zhang Hao, “Shall China Introduce a Jury System?”, Journal of Liaoning 
University (Philosophy and Social Sciences), Vol. 4, 2005, at 152-156. 
13 To save length of our research, the criminal jury will be taken as the example.  
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England and Wales,14 the United States,15 Australia,16 New Zealand,17 Canada,18 and 
Scotland. 19  It also exists in other western democracies such as Denmark, 20  
Belgium,21 Norway,22 Switzerland,23 Austria,24 and Malta.25 In addition, over forty 
other countries and dependencies around the globe, albeit to different extents, also 
preserve the jury trial.26 Remarkably, however, both England and United States along 




                                                        
14 Catherine Elliott and Frances Quinn, English Legal System (Pearson Education 
Limited, Harlow, 2000), at 149. 
15 See Gregory E. Mize and Paula Hannaford-Agor, “Jury Trial Innovations Across 
America: How We Are Teaching and Learning From Each Other”, Journal of Court 
Innovation, Vol.1, 2008, at 229. 
16 See Michael Chesterman, “Criminal Trial Juries in Australia: From Penal Colonies 
to a Federal Democracy”, Neil Vidmar (ed.), The World Jury System (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2000), at 125-165.   
17 Neil Cameron, Susan Potter, and Warren Young, “The New Zealand Jury: Towards 
Reform, Neil J. Vidmar (ed.), World Jury Systems (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2000), at 167- 210.  
18 Neil J. Vidmar, “The Canadian Criminal Jury”, Neil J. Vidmar (ed.), World Jury 
Systems (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000), at 211-248.   
19 Peter Duff, “The Scottish Criminal Jury: A Very Peculiar Institution”, Neil Vidmar 
(ed.), The World Jury System (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000), at 249-281. 
20 See Stanley Anderson, “Lay Judges and Jurors in Denmark”, The American 
Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 38, 1990, at 839-864. 
21 Philip Traest, “The Jury in Belgium”, International Review of Penal Law (Vol. 72), 
(Érès, Ramonville Sainte Agne 2001), at 27.  
22 See Neil J. Vidmar, “A Historical and Comparative Perspective On the Common 
Law Jury”, Neil Vidmar (ed.), The World Jury System (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2000), at 3. 
23 Ibid. 
24 John D. Jackson & Nikolay P. Kovalev, “Lay Adjudication and Human Rights in 
Europe”, The Columbia Journal of European Law, No.1 of Vol.13, 2006/2007, at 95.  
25 Ibid. 
26 Supra note 22; and Edmundo Hendler, “Lay Participation in Argentina: Old 
History, Recent Experience”, Southwestern Journal of Law&Trade in the Americas, 
Vol.15, 2008, at 4.    
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1.2.1.1 Eroding province of the jury trial27  
 
In England and Wales, the jurisdiction of magistrates’ courts has been 
increasingly expanded,28 with summary offences including gradually wider categories 
of crime.29 The Criminal Justice Act in 1977 deprived defendants accused of public 
order offences and criminal damage below £200 of the right to jury trial. The 
Criminal Justice Act of 1988 extended the jurisdiction of magistrates’ courts to 
include wider offences such as taking a car without the owner’s consent and common 
assault and battery. The vast province of magistrates’ courts can be illustrated by the 
fact that magistrates today now deal with some 97% of criminal cases.30 Recently, the 
right to trial by jury has even been limited in certain categories of the most serious 
crimes. The jury trial in complex fraud cases, for example, has now been strictly 
                                                        
27 To save length of our research, the situation of the criminal jury in various 
countries will be taken as the example. 
28  Criminal offences in England and Wales fall into one of three categories. 
“Summary offences”, i.e. the least serious offences, are tried only in the magistrates’ 
courts where juries are not used. The most serious crimes are “indictable only” and 
must be adjudicated in the Crown Court where jury trials are available but only 
applicable to defendants who plead not guilty. Between these two extremes are 
so-called “triable either way” cases which can be tried in either the magistrates’ courts 
or the Crown Court, granting the magistrates and the defendant the right to opt for 
trial in the Crown Court or not. Similarly, if either party elects a trial in the Crown 
Court whilst the accused pleads not guilty, the case will be tried by a jury. It is 
remarkable that over the past decades, the lines between the different categories of 
criminal offences have been substantially adjusted, effectively eroding the province of 
jury trials. See Sally Lloyd-Bostock and Cheryl Thomas, “Decline of the ‘Little 
Parliament’: Juries and Jury Reform in England and Wales”, Law and Contemporary 
Problems, Vol. 62, 1999, at 15.  
29 The Criminal Justice Act in 1977 deprived defendants accused of some public 
order offence and criminal damage below £200 of the right to choose trial by jury. 
The Criminal Justice Act of 1988 extended the jurisdiction of magistrates’ courts to 
include wider offences such as taking and driving away a car without the owner’s 
consent and common assault and battery. In 1998, the Government published a 
consultation paper proposing to remove the right to jury trial for additional offences 
such as some categories of theft. See John Hostettler, The Criminal Jury Old and New: 
Jury Power From Early Times to the Present Day (Waterside Press, Sheffield, 2004), 
at 127; and ibid, at 16-17. 
30 Supra note 9. 
 18
circumscribed and subjected to the discretion of the judges under S.43 of the Criminal 
Justice Act 2003 which provides that in long or complex fraud cases, judge-only trials 
may be allowed in particular circumstances.  
The United States has been the major venue where the criminal jury is used, 
accounting for the majority of all criminal jury trials in today’s world.31 However, the 
jury trial is also in retreat in this country. The criminal jury in American was never 
without opposition. Yet it is only during the last decades that the opposition has begun 
to win out. Evidence suggests that courts now try to encourage guilty pleas, thereby 
reducing the instances of jury trial which is believed more expensive, lengthier and 
responsible for the congestion of courts.32 As a result, most criminal cases now do not 
go to jury trial. In New York, for instance, the felony arrest charges reaching trial 
have now declined to about 2 per cent of all felony arrests.33  
Besides the leading common law countries such as England and the United 
States, the deflated power of the jury has been evident in other common law countries 
as well. New Zealand, for example, has similarly sparing use of criminal juries to 
England,34 while in New South Wales in Australia, less than 1 percent of criminal 
cases are brought to juries. 35  In Northern Ireland, professional Diplock courts 
replaced juries in 1973 in cases involving terrorism crimes.36 The jury trial has 
therefore failed to flourish and the official policies on jury trials in criminal cases 
                                                        
31 See Harry Kalven and Hans Zeisel, The American Jury (Phoenix Edition) (The 
University of Chicago Press, Ltd., London 1971), at 12-13. 
32 Hans Zeisel, “Jury Research in the United States”, Nigel Walker and Annette 
Pearson (ed.), The British Jury System (The Institute of Criminology, Cambridge, 
1975), at 41.  
33 Ibid.  
34 Supra note 17, at 203. 
35 Supra note 16, at 131.  
36  John D. Jackson, Katie Quinn, and Tom O’ Malley, “The Jury System in 
Contemporary Ireland: In the Shadow of a Troubled Past”, Neil Vidmar (ed.), The 
World Jury System (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000), at 290.  
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have become decidedly abolitionism in modern Ireland since it cannot be entrenched 
in the local culture.37  
 
1.2.1.2 Changes to the jury’s traditional model  
 
In England, besides the jury’s increasingly limited case range, there have been 
also the structural changes on the part of the jury.38 Historically, juries should produce 
unanimous verdicts, but in 1967 majority verdicts were introduced of ten to two (or 
nine to one if the jury has been reduced during the trail) to address the problem of 
hung juries and consequent re-trials.39 Other changes may include the disappearance 
of the peremptory challenge. Up to seven peremptory challenges were reaffirmed by 
Juries Act 1974; the number was reduced to three in 1977 and abolished totally in 
1988, with only challenges for cause being preserved.40   
Due to cost-cutting and efficiency concerns, the traditional mode of jury trial has 
been experiencing substantial changes as well in America. According to a study in 
2007, seven states have started to use the downsized jury in felony trials and 
thirty-three in misdemeanor trials. 41  The principle that jury verdicts should be 
unanimous can be dated back to the fourteenth century, if not before.42 It has, 
                                                        
37 Ibid. 
38 See Mark Findlay and Peter Duff, “The Politics of Jury Reform”, Mark Findlay 
and Peter Duff (ed.), The Jury Under Attack (Butterworths, London, Sydney 1988), at 
209.   
39 Supra note 14, at 158. 
40 Peter Thornton, “Trial by jury: 50 years of change”, Criminal Law Review, 
September, 2004, at 694.  
41 G. Thomas Munsterman and Paula L. Hannaford, “Reshaping the Bedrock of 
Democracy: American Jury Reform During the Last 30 Years”, The Judge’s Journal, 
Vol. 36, 1997, at 7; see also Richard O. Lempert, “The Internationalization of Lay 
Legal Decision-Making: Jury Resurgence and Jury Research”, Cornell International 
Law Journal, Vol.40, 2007, at 477. 
42 See Landsman, “The Civil Jury in America”, Law and Contemporary Problems, 
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however, been limited in the name of avoiding hung juries to improve efficiency in 
various jurisdictions. According to Munsterman and Hannaford’s study in 1997, 
Oregon and Lousiana have permitted non-unanimous verdicts in felony criminal trials 
while Oklahoma has permitted them for misdemeanor trials.43  
Remarkably, moves towards a smaller jury or majority verdicts have been found 
in many jurisdictions where the jury trial has been preserved, such as Scotland,44 New 
Zealand,45 Australia,46 and a number of common-wealth jurisdictions.47 
 
1.2.2 Reasons for the jury’s demise         
 
It is arguable that the basic functions of lay participation have two intertwined 
threads. The first is the decision-making function: lay people, as temporary 
adjudicators, directly participate in the judicial proceedings to make decisions 
independently or in association with the professional judge(s); the second is the 
political/democratic function such as: allowing lay judges from the community to 
                                                                                                                                                               
Vol.62, 1999, at 302; see also supra note 28, at 8.  
43 Munsterman and Hannaford, supra note 41, at 8; also see Landsman, ibid. 
44 Scotland is probably the first jurisdiction where majority rule has been accepted. 
By the end of 18th century, the simple majority verdict was sufficient for a valid 
verdict in order to avoid a hung jury. See supra note 19, at 269.  
45 New Zealand Law Commission has also stated its provisional view that if the 
current hung juries crisis cannot be overcome, it will recommend introducing majority 
verdicts. See supra note 17, at 202.  
46 That a criminal jury verdict must be unanimous is maintained and reinforced in 
only three Australian jurisdictions, namely New South Wales, Queensland, and the 
Australian Capital Territory. In the other five major Australian jurisdictions, majority 
verdicts are authorized by the statute subject to significant limitations. See supra note 
16, at 153.  
47 According to Neil Vidmar’s survey, among 35 common-wealth jurisdictions which 
have preserved the jury trial, most of them apply juries to serious criminal offences 
only whilst at least 16 use downsized juries composed of 7 or 9 jurors and 21 allow 
majority verdicts. For more details, see supra note 4.   
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dispense justice embodies the spirit of direct democracy,48 and protects against 
potential arbitrary justice under the control of the state,49 and “the corruption and 
partiality of the judges”50 etc. However, it appears that both of these two functions 
have been questioned in modern established democracies. 
 
1.2.2.1 The questioned decision-making function of the jury 
 
The alleged disadvantages of the jury as an adjudicative body fall under six main 
headings: the questionable competence of the jury, diligence, rationality, leniency, 
efficiency and economy. 
Attacks on juries’ competence have been based on the argument that the 
complexity of criminal and civil cases today is so high that a group of randomly 
chosen lay people are unlikely to fully understand the evidentiary and legal issues.51   
On one hand, even proponents of the jury admit that the complexity of a case 
may occasionally chanllenge the jury’s collective competence;52 and that increasing 
and increasingly complicated scientific issues have been further tax the jury’s 
competence. 53  Some research, on the other hand, “highlighted the very real 
difficulties a jury has in digesting facts, filtering out irrelevant material, and analysing 
                                                        
48 See more discussion below.  
49 John Hostettler, The Criminal Jury Old and New: Jury Power From Early Times to 
the Present Day (Waterside Press, Sheffield, 2004), at 145.  
50 Sir Partick Devlin, Blackstone Lecture, Oxford, 18 November 1978, quoted from 
ibid, at 154.  
51 Valerie P. Hans, “U.S. Jury Reform: The Active Jury and the Adversarial Ideal”, 
Saint Louis University Public Law Review, Vol.21, 2002, at 86. 
52 See William Young, “Summing Up to Juries in Criminal Cases - What Jury 
Research Says about Current Rules and Practice”, Criminal Law Review, Oct, 2003, at 
672 
53 See Robert D. Myers, Ronald S. Reinstein, and Gordon M. Griller, “Complex 
Scientific Evidence and the Jury”, Judicature, Vol. 83, 1999-2000, at 152.   
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evidence”.54 Moreover, there have been horror stories where jurors without the 
experience and knowledge necessary to evaluate complicated evidence simply chosen 
to ignore it.55 In addition, empirical research reveals that jurors may misunderstand 
the law, which can influence their deliberations.56  
The jury has been under attack for not only its alleged incompetence but also 
bias and irrationality.57 Lord Woolf opined that ‘the variety of prejudices that jurors 
can have are almost unlimited’.58 Ferguson also observed that in criminal cases, “a 
juror may be biased due to a dislike of the accused’s class, accent, habits, occupation, 
or physical characteristics”; and “prejudice may have been fostered by pre-trial 
publicity, adverse to the accused”.59  
Misconduct by the jury, such as jurors’ horse-trading over the verdict for 
returning to their work more quickly60 and jurors abstaining from voting61, have 
                                                        
54 John Carruthers, “Are Juries Safe?”, Scottish Law Times, Vol.25, 2001, at 220. For 
example, questions are raised about whether a criminal jury can properly evaluate 
complex evidentiary questions, such as those presented in insanity defenses or 
scientific evidence in sexual assault cases; and the role of juries in high-tech civil 
cases has raised “sparked extensive scholarly debate and increasing skepticism”. See 
Neil J. Vidmar, “Empirical Research and the Issue of Jury Competence”, Law & 
Contemporary Problems, Vol.52, 1989, at 2 and Kimberly A. Moore, “Judges, Juries, 
and Patent Cases: An Empirical Peek Inside the Black Box”, Michigan Law Review, 
Vol.99, 2000-2001, at 365. 
55 Valerie P. Hans, “The Jury’s Response to Business and Corporate Wrongdoing”, 
Law & Contemporary Problems, Vol.52, 1989, at 177.   
56  For example, a study in New Zealand indicates that fundamental 
misunderstandings about the law occurred during deliberation in 35 out of the 48 
trials. See Jenny McEwan, “Evidence, Jury Trials and Witness Protection - the Auld 
Review of the English Criminal Courts”, International Journal of Evidence & Proof, 
Vol.6, No.3, 2002, at 173. Moreover, mock jury studies and interviews with actual 
jurors after trials in America indicate that jurors often misunderstand the law that the 
court has told them to apply. See Robert F. Forston, “Sense and Non-Sense: Jury Trial 
Communication”, Brigham Young University Law Review, 1975, at 601 and 606. 
57 Supra note 38, at 209. 
58 R v Abdroikov [2005] EWCA Crim 1986, [2005] 4 All ER 869 at [29].  
59  Pamela R. Ferguson, “The Criminal Jury in England and Scotland: The 
Confidentiality Principle and the Investigation of Impropriety”, International Journal 
of Evidence & Proof, Vol. 10, No. 3, 2006, at 192. 
60 [2002] EWCA Crim 1236, quoted from supra note 59, at 195. 
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occasionally been revealed. “The knowledge that jurors are effectively unaccountable 
for their behaviour in reaching a verdict does little to encourage jury propriety”.62 
These “horror stories” have further justified the government’s decision to place 
further circumscription on the province of juries. 
It has been widely recognized that jury trials are generally more lenient since, by 
contrast to their professional colleagues, jurors are generally more inclined to 
acquit.63 For example, in England, forty percent of contested trials before a jury 
resulted in acquittal;64 another survey in England indicated that “cases in which 
judges would have acquitted, but in which the jury convicted, were ‘very rare’, but 
estimates of the number of cases in which the jury acquitted but the judge would have 
convicted varied from 3 to 10 per cent”.65  
                                                                                                                                                              
Packer categorized the different criminal processes into two models: the Due 
 
61 [2005] UKHL 12, [2005] 1 WLR 704, quoted from ibid. . 
62 Supra note 59, at 196. 
63 See Harry Kalven and Hans Zeisel, (1966), at 157, quoted from Stephan Landsman 
and Jing Zhang, “Lay Participation Comes to Japanese and Chinese Courts”, UCLA 
Pacific Basin Law Journal, Vol.25, 2007-2008, at191. 
64 Julie Vennard, for example, found that in a sample of offences triable either way, 
the chances of acquittal were significantly higher in the Crown Court with jury trials 
applied than in the magistrates’ court without juries. See Julie Vennard, “The 
Outcome of Contested Trials”, in David Moxon ed., Managing Criminal Justice 
(1985), at 126, 129-31, quoted from supra note 28, at 15. 
65 W. R. Cornish, The Jury (Allen Lane The Penguin Press, London, 1968), at 22. 
American juries are inclined to acquit in close cases whilst their professional 
counterparts opted to convict as well. See generally Landsman and Zhang, supra note 
12, at 191. Jurors’ tendency towards acquittal has also been noted in Russia since its 
recent introduction of a jury system, see Inga Markovitz, “Exporting Law Reform-But 
Will It Travel?”, Cornell International Law Journal, Vol.37, 2004, at 107. For 
another vivid example, the history of Japanese criminal justice has seen long-standing 
judge-directed inquisitorial courts since the Tokugawa era, whilst the acquittal rate 
has been as exceedingly low as 1% or so; however, between 1928 and 1943 when 
Japan was adopting a jury system, the acquittal rate in jury cases reached 15.4%, the 
astounding peak through this country’s history, see Landsman and Zhang, supra note 
12, at181. For more details about juries’ acquittal rate, see Michael Zander, “Juries 
Decisions and Acquittal Rates”, Nigel Walker and Annette Pearson (ed.), The British 
Jury System (The Institute of Criminology, Cambridge, 1975), at 31-37.  
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Process Model and the Crime Control Model.66 Baldwin and McConville suggested in 
1981 that the English system fell into the latter model.67 This conclusion has recently 
been verified by Padfield who points out that Baldwin and McConville’s concerns are 
“as valid today as they were then (or is the situation significantly worse)”.68 Tonry 
suggests that the Unite States has adopted the same crime-control policies and politics 
as well during the past quarter of a century.69 According to Packer, the high rate of 
apprehension and conviction is required in order to operate the crime control model 
successfully.70 It appears that the criminal jury’s comparatively high acquittal rates 
threaten this ideal and inevitably disturbs some politicians on the basis that many 
criminals are set free by the jury, though the question that might be asked is not how 
many guilty defendants are set free by juries but how many innocent defendants are 
convicted by judges.71 
 “[T]he 1980s saw the ‘ascendancy of economy’ over efficiency and 
effectiveness, resulting in a ‘managerial myopia’ and concerns over short-term 
managerial innovation at the expense of a long-term focus. Much of the 
Government’s agenda for reform has been inspired by the ‘three Es’ – economy, 
efficiency and effectiveness”.72 The requirements of ‘economy’ and ‘efficiency’ may 
not be labeled ‘Ought ’, nor are they to be taken in that sense, since the introduction 
of managerialism into the justice system itself has been widely criticized. 73  
                                                        
66 Packer H, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
1968), at 153.  
67 Nicola Padfield, Text and Materials On the Criminal Justice Process (Fourth 
Edition) (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008), at 10. 
68 Ibid.  
69 Tonry, M, Punishment and Politics: Evidence and emulation in the making of 
English crime control policy, (Willan Publishing, Cullompton, 2004), at 22.   
70 See supra note 66, at 158. 
71 Supra note 49, at 136.   
72 Supra note 67, at 7. 
73 See Jones Carol, “Auditing Criminal Justice”, The British Journal of Criminology, 
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Nonetheless, there has been trend towards shifting the ideal of rational justice and 
‘rule of law’ to ‘managerial justice’. 74  In this context, both ‘efficiency’ and 
‘economy’ may represent what many governments practically expect or request from 
the justice system. 
Moreover, the criminal control model seeks the speedy criminal procedure at the 
cost of less resources.75 As Packer summarized, that “[t]he [crime control] model that 
will operate successfully must be an administrative, almost managerial model” to 
realize the three “Es”.76 In response to such requests, in practice, “government 
business plans, or the annual reports of key criminal justice agencies … see key 
performance indicators and measures of success, which put great emphasis on 
financial and time saving”.77   
It appears that jury trials conflict with the three “Es”. Research reveals that the 
jury trial normally takes more time and money than the single-judge panel.78 For 
example, while a contested case tried in an English magistrates’ court costs £1,500, 
the estimated cost will be £13,500 if the case goes to the Crown Court and is tried by 
a jury.79 Research also indicates that professional judges may be more efficient than 
juries.80 
                                                                                                                                                               
Vol.33, 1999, at 199, quoted from supra note 67, at 29.  
74 See ibid.   
75 See supra note 38, at 210.  
76 Supra note 66, at 159.  
77 Supra note 67, at 7. 
78 See T.M. Honess, M. Levi and E.A. Charman, “Juror Competence in Serious 
Frauds Since Roskill: A Research-based Assessment”, Journal of Financial Crime, 
Vol.11, No.1, 2003, at 18.  
79 Catherine Elliott & Frances Quinn, English Legal System (2nd edition, 1998), at 
137, quoted from supra note 28, at 16.   
80 For example, as suggested by Taskier, “the typical bench trail usually has an earlier 
trial date than a jury trial. It is also goes faster (where uninterrupted). Judges don’t 
need quite the same patient coddling and teaching as a jury. There is no lengthy voir 
dire and jury selection, no jury instructions, no verdict forms, and no notes from the 
jury to be pondered and cryptically answered. Basic issues that must be explained for 
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The jury’s disadvantages in terms of economy and efficiency have raised diverse 
criticisms. Critics, for example, claim that: “the law and lawyers have contrived to 
make jury trial so expensive and lengthy, compared with the very speedy affair it was 
in Blackstone’s day, that it is a luxury we cannot afford”.81  
 
1.2.2.2 The jury’s waning political/democratic function   
 
Historically, the jury “is seen by many people as of cardinal importance in 
society since, despite its flaws, it enables accused persons to be judged fairly”.82 In 
England, for example, juries expressed the popular will in ordeals, distinguished 
between unpremeditated killing and murder, refused the imposition of the death 
penalty for non-violent theft under the ‘Bloody Code’, set free political offenders 
against the arbitrary Government,83 and worked as a deterrence to the professional 
judges’ corruption and partiality. Likewise, the jury trial, in the history of the United 
States, has been appreciated as a bulwark against the British royal tyranny.84 
However, while the jury trial did historically play a part in preventing political 
abuse of the courts in some countries, that type of abuse is now extremely uncommon 
in the world’s established democracies.85 In England, for example, “justice may be 
                                                                                                                                                               
a jury can take but a moment for an experienced judge. Exhibits can be prepared in 
advance for the judge.” See Paul R. Taskier, “Judge or Jury?”, Litigation, Vol. 24, No. 
1, 1997-1998, at 20.  
81 Penny Darbyshire, “An Essay on the Importance and Neglect of the Magistracy”, 
Criminal Law Review, Sep 1997, at 628. For other criticisms, see e.g. Vidmar, supra 
note 54, at 2; and Roger W. Kirst, “Finding A Role for the Civil Jury in Modern 
Litigation”, Judicature, Vol. 69, 1985-1986, at 333.  
82 Supra note 49, at145.  
83 Ibid.  
84 See Landsman, supra note 42, at 288. 
85 Cornish, supra note 65, at 127. 
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more just now and more thorough”.86 Lord Devlin also pointed out, “[experience] in 
the courts shows that judges today are generally much more fair-minded than 50 years 
ago, and certainty exhibit nothing of the judicial tyranny of many in earlier times”.87 
The practical opportunities for the jury to represent the public to fight against an 
undemocratic government have become increasingly small.  
To sum up, the jury’s political/democratic function of protecting against judicial 
tyranny are now more like a sheathed sword, which has symbolic deterrent power but 
less opportunity to be drawn out in established common-law democracies. The jury’s 
waning significance in fighting against injustice and tyranny in the modern 
democracies, in return, accelerates its demise.  
 
1.2.3 The jury trial – doomed to decline?   
 
As discussed above, there are multiple reasons for the jury’s demise in modern 
established democracies. However, is it safe to conclude, based on these reasons, that 
the jury trial is doomed to irreparable decline? Fortunately, research has presented 
solid justifications in favour of the jury’s continuance.   
 
1.2.3.1 The jury – a qualified adjudicative body     
 
As seen above, a series of attacks on the jury’s competence, rationality, diligence, 
leniency, economy and efficiency form the main foundation of its demise in some 
western democracies. However, research, bolstered by empirical materials, has 
                                                        
86 Supra note 40, at 690. 
87 Sir Partick Devlin, Blackstone Lecture, Oxford, 18 November 1978, quoted from 
supra note 49, at 154.  
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refuted these attacks.      
First of all, research to date addresses the issue of jury competence in three ways: 
(1) the jury’s ability to decision making is generally sound; (2) the jury’s occasional 
incompetence should be largely attributed to the problematic “trial management” 
rather than jurors’ lack of wisdom; and (3) there still is great potential to improve the 
jury’s competence to acclimatize itself to the increasing complexity of modern trials.  
-- Generally sound ability of the jury   
Numerous arguments have been made against the jury’s competence. It seems 
that some of them “do not hold up well when confronted with empirical evidence”.88   
Kalven and Zeisel’s Chicago Jury Project found that judges and juries agreed 
with each other in 78 percent of cases, whilst the jury favored the defendant and the 
plaintiff evenly in the cases of disagreement. Where a disagreement occurred, the jury 
was approximately six times as likely to favor the defendant as the prosecution. 
Kalven and Zeisel found that disagreements between judges and juries were mainly 
because of the different set of values that the juries applied in deciding the case rather 
than the jury’s failure to comprehend the evidence. In terms of awarding damages, the 
jury averagely awarded about 20 percent higher than what the judge normally did. 
Kalven and Zeisel concluded that this revealed that the jury, on the whole, was 
competent in making appropriate decisions.89 Besides, a series of other empirical 
projects have verified juries’ ability to understand both facts and evidence.90  
                                                        
88 Richard O. Lempert, “Citizen Participation In Judicial Decision Making: Juries, 
Lay Judges and Japan”, Saint Louis-Warsaw Transatlantic Law Journal, 
Vol.2001-2002, at 7.  
89 Supra note 15, at 190. 
90 See, for example, Mario Nigro, “The Influence of Judicial Discretion on the 
Decline of Civil Jury Trials in Ontario”, Advocates Quarterly, Vol.24, 2001, at 351; 
Neil J. Vidmar and Shari Seidman Diamond, “Juries and Expert Evidence”, Brooklyn 
Law Review, Vol.66, 2000-2001, at 1180; Neil J. Vidmar and Regina A. Schuller, 
“Juries and Expert Evidence: Social Framework Testimony”, Law & Contemporary 
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-- Reasons for the jury’s occasional incompetence  
It is undeniable that jurors may encounter difficulties in trials. However, research 
has shown that it may not be fair to attribute these difficulties to ignorance. 
The empirical study conducted by the Center for Criminology at Middlesex 
University in England revealed that more than half of jurors participating in the study 
did not fully understand what was happening in court, many were uncertain about 
“reasonable doubt”, how to ask the judge a question and whether they were allowed to 
take notes. 91  Likewise, research in New Zealand suggests that the occasional 
incompetence of juries, such as misunderstanding the laws, could be attributed not 
only to the varying educational backgrounds of jurors, but also to the deficient way in 
which the jurors are prepared for their court duties and in which the facts and the law 
are presented to them.92 In addition, research in America indicates that it is the 
jury-unfriendly trial process rather than the fact-finding quality of jurors themselves 
that should be blamed for the alleged incompetence of some jurors.93 In short, it is 
                                                                                                                                                               
Problems, Vol.52 1989, at 176; and Lloyd-Bostock and Thomas, supra note 42, at 40. 
91 Supra note 40, at 689-690. 
92 See supra note 17, at 203. Another study in New Zealand verified this finding by 
revealing that fundamental misunderstandings about the law occurred in deliberation 
in 35 out of the 48 trials, but the judge’s failure to provide adequate and 
understandable (e.g. using plain language rather than legal jargons) information about 
basic legal terms may be responsible for such misunderstandings. See McEwan, supra 
note 56, at 173. Further, William Young pointed out that “many practical aspects of 
the criminal trial process rest on unrealistically high assessments of juries’ powers of 
analysis, comprehension and recall”; “jurors are unlikely to have had experience in 
breaking down complex factual controversies into issues of manageable size”; and 
“all of this requires input from the judge”. See supra note 52, at 689. 
93 For example, jurors are often instructed on the law in language so complex that 
even a law student would have difficulty in understanding it and in many U.S. courts, 
jurors are further handicapped because they only hear the instructions on the law and 
do not receive written copies of them. See Robert P. Charrow and Veda R. Charrow, 
“Making Legal Language Understandable: A Psycholinguistic Study of Jury 
Instructions”, Columbia Law Review, Vol.79, 1979, at 1306; and Anne Bowen Poulin, 
“The Jury: The Criminal Justice System’s Different Voice”, University of Cincinnati 
Law Review, Vol.62, 1994, at1377, and 1411-1419. Linder also observed that: “Jurors 
often are bewildered by the procedures involved with their service. They are required 
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arguable that “the ‘problem’ that needs addressing is not the ability of jurors to cope 
but rather investigation and prosecution practices and trial management”.94   
-- The potential to improve the jury’s competence    
Research indicates that it is unfair to criticize juries themselves for 
incompetently perform their adjudicative duties,95 as there are systematic deficiencies 
on the part of the trial process itself which have blockaded the juries from performing 
their duties appropriately.96 If jurors are expected to perform their court duties in a 
more satisfactory way, it seems that there is much to be done to make jurors fully 
understand their function and be devoted to the process.97 In practice, a number of 
countries have undertaken measures to reform the trial process to facilitate jurors’ 
effective participation. These reform measures include allowing jurors to present 
judges with written questions, allowing jurors’ note-taking, permitting jurors to 
discuss the case during the trial, providing jurors with extra instructions before the 
start of a trial, supplying jurors a written copy of instructions, and rewriting 
instructions in plain English etc.98   
                                                                                                                                                               
to follow rules that accommodate the admission of evidence or lawyers’ conduct 
rather than the jurors’ needs or behavioral factors. While listening to days or weeks of 
conflicting evidence, they are directed not to discuss the case or ask questions. They 
are then locked in a room with instructions that are often confusing and told to reach a 
decision”. See Rex K. Linder, “President’s Page: A Time for Jury Innovation”, 
Defense Counsel Journal, Vol.65, 1998, at 455. 
94 Stephen Wooler’s report on the Jubilee Line case reinforces these arguments, see 
Sally Lloyd-Bostock, “The Jubilee Line Jurors: Does Their Experience Strengthen the 
Argument for Judge-only Trial in Long and Complex Fraud Cases?”, Criminal Law 
Review, 2007, at 272.  
95  Phoebe C. Ellsworth, “Are Twelve Heads Better Than One?”, Law & 
Contemporary Problems, Vol.52, 1989, at 224. 
96 See ibid.  
97 See supra note 40, at 690.  
98 See Landsman, supra note 42, at 298-300. For example, allowing jurors to take 
note and send questions to the trial judge have been adopted in England and Wales, 
see Bostock and Thomas, supra note 42, at 34; between 2004 and 2006 the National 
Center for State Courts of America conducted three related studies of jury practices in 
state and federal courts throughout the United States. Combined, the studies make up 
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Although some of these measures have been controversial, 99  it is widely 
acknowledged that jurors can function better with more appropriate help and it is also 
necessary to provide juries with more assistances.100 Moreover, a series of studies 
have proved that more active participation in trial proceedings and provision of tools 
such as notes and pre-instructions could significantly improve jurors’ competence.101 
For example, it has been proved that pre-instructed jurors recalled more probative 
(case-related) facts and fewer non-probative statements than post-instructed jurors.102 
Research also suggests that jury aides such as note taking and discussion amongst 
jurors can enhance juror comprehension and result in more legally appropriate 
decisions.103   
                                                                                                                                                               
the State-of-the-States Survey of Jury Improvement Efforts, a first-ever effort to 
survey the entire field of jury issues and practices from state and local jury reform and 
improvement efforts to in-court use of tools aimed at improving juror comprehension 
and participation – including note-taking, juror questions and providing jurors with 
written instructions, see supra note 15, at 189. For the reforms in America, also see 
Juan Castaneda, “The Jury’s Dilemma: Playing God in Solving the Problems Lurking 
in America’s Courtrooms”, Defence Counsel Journal, Vol.72, 2005, at 388; Burkhard 
Schafer and Olav K. Wiegand, “Incompetent, Prejudiced and Lawless? A 
Gestalt-psychological Perspective on Fact Finding in Law as Learning”, Law, 
Probability & Risk, Vol.3, No.2, 2004, at 98.  
99 For example, there have been concerns that the more active role of the jury in the 
trial process may bring the adversary system more in line with Europe’s inquisitorial 
approach, see supra note 51, at 96, and Landsman, supra note 42, at 298. 
100 See Judyth W. Pendell, “Enhancing Juror Effectiveness: An Insurer’s Perspective”, 
Law & Contemporary Problems, Vol.52, 1989, at 312.   
101 See, for example, Shari Seidman Diamond, Neil J. Vidmar, Mary Rose, Leslie 
Ellis, and Beth Murphy, “Inside the Jury Room: Evaluating Juror Discussions During 
Trial”, Judicature, Vol.87, 2003-2004, at 54-59; J. Donald Cowan, Jr. Thomas M. 
Crisham, Michael B. Keating, Gael Mahony, Debra E. Pole, Michael A. Pope, 
William W. Schwarzer, and John R. Wester, “What Attorneys Think of Jury Trial 
Innovations”, 192 Judicature, Vol. 86, No. 4, 2003, at 192; and James P. Levine and 
Steven Zeidman, “The Miracle of Jury Reform in New York”, Judicature Vol. 88, No. 
4, 2005, at 178; Larry Heuer and Steven Penrod, “Increasing Juror Participation in 
Trials Through Note Taking and Question Asking”, Judicature, Vol.79, No.5, 1996, 
at 262.  
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“The central argument for seeking alternatives to jury trial has not been the 
burden on jurors but rather concern about their competence”.104 However, if jurors are 
generally able to perform their duties well and their occasional incompetence derives 
not from their intelligence but largely from “the shortcomings in our investigation and 
trial process”105 which could be substantially improved, the argument for seeking 
alternative to replace jury trial needs to be reconsidered.    
Opponents of the jury attack jurors’ alleged irrationality and prejudice. However, 
it appears that empirical studies do not support this allegation. Research in America 
reveals that “the majority of jurors appeared to understand what was expected of them 
and most performed without undue influence from extraneous factors”.106 In England, 
Baldwin and McConville’s research indicates that “the verdicts of juries are 
influenced much more by the weight of the evidence presented in court, tempered by 
consideration of ‘equity’ in a particular case, than by any variations in the prejudices, 
attitudes or background of individual members of the jury”.107 Moreover, juror biases 
in civil cases have gained little significant support from research to date.108  
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108 For example, research lends support to the reality that in either personal injury, 
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on Trial: The Civil Jury and Corporate Responsibility (New Haven, London, Yale 
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Injury Damage Award”, Ohio State Law Journal, Vol.19, 1958, at 158 and 178, 
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unfounded”; and “juries seem as ‘accurate’ in their decision making as judges are, as 
measured by appellate affirmation rate”. See Moore, supra note 94, at 368. In addition, 
in response to criticism that the jury, out of bias, awards excessive damages to 
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Responding to the attacks on jurors’ questioned diligence in performing their 
duties, diverse research demonstrates that “juries are generally diligent, and, if given 
the right assistance, are usually collectively willing and able to determine cases on the 
evidence and in accordance with the law as laid down by the judge”.109 According to 
Penny Darbyshire and her colleagues’ research for Lord Justice Auld’s Review and 
more recently Roger Matthews and his colleagues’ interviews of 361 discharged 
jurors in 5 Greater London courts, “jurors generally consider jury trial important, 
derive satisfaction from jury service, and take their task as jurors very seriously”.110   
A survey conducted in New Zealand in 1999 indicates that the majority of jurors 
perform their duties conscientiously by referring to the evidence and directions they 
are given.111 Moreover, this survey also suggests individual emotions of jurors are 
normally overridden by the collective decision-making, which indicates that the jury 
generally performs in the way it has been expected to.112   
As concluded by William Young, in light of a series of empirical research in 
England and Wales, Canada, New Zealand and Australia, “the strength of the jury 
system lies in the collective understanding, recall and diligence of the jury as a whole 
and that in most (but not all) cases, inadequacy, misunderstanding, predisposition or 
prejudice on the part of individual jurors do not adversely impact on the ultimate 
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109 Supra note 52, at 689. 
110 Supra note 94, at 258.  
111 New Zealand Law Commission, “Juries in Criminal Trials: Part 2”, Preliminary 
Paper, No. 37, 1999, available at www.lawcom.govt.nz, quoted from McEwan, supra 
note 56, at 168.  
112 Supra note 56, at 171. 
 34
determination”.113  
The jury’s comparatively high acquittal rates may be unwelcome due to their 
incompatibility with crime control policy. However, research has revealed various 
reasons that justify the jury’s alleged leniency.    
First, Bankowski challenged the attacks on the jury’s higher acquittal rates on the 
basis of the coherence theory of truth and the methodology applied by the critics who 
question the jury’s acquittals. According to Bankowski’s coherence theory of truth, 
“truth is particular to, and constructed within, specific modes of life and the ‘truth’ of 
one mode cannot be judged against the ‘truth’ of another”.114 Based on this theory, 
the “truth” believed by a policeman that “he did it” does not necessarily lead the jury 
to find their “lay truth” that “he is guilty”.115 Bankowski also observed that a series of 
empirical studies116 unanimously indicated that legal experts, mainly lawyers or 
judges, have rather frequently questioned the juries’ verdicts. However, Bankowski 
contended that it might not be a perfect methodology to commission a lawyer who 
“accepts the prevailing courtroom norms of legal rationality and who is willingly 
incorporated into the social order of the courtroom and the trial” to appraise whether 
juries’ acquittal rates are too high or too low.117   
Second, according to Kalven and Zeisel, the comparatively higher acquittal rates 
of the jury could be interpreted as jurors applying a more stringent standard about 
what is beyond a reasonable doubt. 118  Likewise, Lempert suggests that jurors’ 
leniency bias may not necessarily conflict with the law’s standards whilst, contrarily, 
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professional judges may subconsciously embrace a presumption of guilt other than a 
presumption of innocence as they see mainly guilty defendants.119   
Third, in an attempt to interpret the high acquittal rates of juries in England, 
Cornish commented that:  
“It must be remembered that some 85 per cent of prosecutions for indictable 
offences are siphoned off into Magistrates’ Court, and of the rest, nearly two-thirds 
end in pleas of guilty. Juries are left to deal with the remaining small proportion, 
and it would be not unreasonable to expect those that remain to include many of the 
cases in which there is some real element of doubt concerning the accused’s 
guilt”.120    
Fourth, Vidmar contended that there is no data to show that jury acquittal rates 
are unreasonably high.121 Freeman directly points out that to ask whether too many 
defendants having been acquitted by the jury is almost meaningless.122   
Based on these arguments, it seems unpersuasive to blame the jury simply for 
their comparatively higher acquittal rates.   
As seen above, another premise on which the jury was attacked is its lack of 
efficiency and cost-effectiveness. However, scholars have offered counterarguments 
to justify these aspects of the jury.  
First, as Lempert pointed out, cost concern cannot be used to illegitimate the 
application of juries since the cost of operating a jury system is trivial when compared 
to other investments. For example, the cost of the civil jury system in America 
nationwide was only approximately equal to that of buying two jet fighters and the 
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overall cost of both the civil and criminal jury system in 1986 was only one-sixtieth of 
the cost of a new space shuttle.123 This argument directly challenges the government’s 
moves toward limiting the use of the jury trial in order to save money.  
Second, as discussed above, it is in the context of the rise of “managerial justice” 
addressing the “Three Es” that the jury trial has been facing its demise; however, 
there is a rejection of administrative efficiency as the prime value of the judicial 
process.124 Critics have pointed out that some delays are unavoidable and necessary 
for seeking justice.125 Moreover, proponents of the due process model argue that the 
protection of the factually innocent deserves the loss in efficiency.126 The due process 
model requests further “strands” which also adversely affect efficiency, such as the 
need to maintain civil liberties and the necessity of preventing the abuse of 
administrative or executive powers.127 In short, in spite of either the crime control 
model or the due process model, it is arguable that “[s]omewhere the balance has to 
be struck between fairness and thoroughness without sacrificing justice to expediency 
or cost considerations”.128  
Third, as criticized by Bankowski, although it might seem reasonable to limit or 
remove jury trials to save time and money, when looking at it further, the concerns 
relating to economy and efficiency are no more than the politicians’ value choices 
when confronting the conflict between the efficiency embraced by the legal experts 
and the democracy enshrined by the lay people.129 A government may favour the idea 
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of efficiency rather than democracy.130 When the subject matter changes, for example, 
to “national security”, politicians may prefer as many jet fighters as possible, at all 
costs, in either time or money. “This is how in practice the rule of law works and what 
a system of organization based on it means”.131   
 
1.2.3.2. The important political/democratic function of the jury  
 
As mentioned above, the jury trial has two intertwined functions: the judicial 
decision-making function on one hand and the political/democratic function on the 
other. While the jury’s political/democratic function historically played an important 
role in fighting against judicial tyranny, this role is less critical in modern 
democracies with a more reliable judicial system, which may provide a reason for the 
jury’s demise in some countries. The political/democratic function of the jury is by no 
means an uncontroversial issue. Rather, the arguments about the positives and 
negatives of the jury, including its political/democratic role, have involved some of 
the great names of political and legal philosophy.132 Some classic authors’ arguments 
have been recently reviewed and developed by modern scholars, indicating that the 
jury’s political/democratic function is still considered important today.  
An essential dispute over the democratic role of the jury centers on whether 
“direct democracy” as embodied in the jury should be supported? “Indeed, much of 
the structure of representative government supports and reinforces the idea of the 
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citizen as a passive player”.133 However, proponents of direct democracy contend that 
it would be groundless for people “to be entrusted with electing their governments 
and making laws but not with how to apply them”.134 Moreover, some scholars 
maintain that the people’s appeal to direct democracy deserves support in light of 
concern over human rights.135 Whether civic direct participation in justice should be 
supported or not is largely an ideological issue, which would continue “both to attract 
and to repel us precisely because it exposes the full range of democratic vices and 
virtues”.136 It seems certain, however, that the following merits of allowing jurors 
randomly selected from the community to make judicial decisions are hard to be 
denied.    
-- To ensure judicial independence  
Probably the most important characteristic of the jury is that it is “a randomly 
chosen and representative sample of the community”.137 “[I]ts impartiality and its 
independence from the State are bolstered by the fact that it represents a randomly 
selected cross-section of the populace”.138 Such a characteristic, coupled with the 
jury’s immediate dismissal after each verdict, gives the jury its unique independence. 
In contrast to the jury’s independence from political pressure, “[p]olitical pressure 
might be put upon the courts either through a deliberate directive from the 
government to the judges, or because the judges have a general sympathy with the 
                                                        
133 Anna Coote and Deborah Mattinson, Twelve Good Neighbours: The Citizen As 
Juror (The Fabian Society, London, 1997), at 1.  
134 Carmen Gleadow, “Spain’s Return to Trial by Jury: Theoretical Foundations and 
Practical Results”, Saint Louis-Warsaw Transatlantic Law Journal, Vol.2001-2002, at 
57.  
135 See supra note 24, at 90.  
136 Jeffery Abramson, We, the Jury: The Jury System and the Ideal of Democracy, 
(Basic Books, New York, 1994), at 1 and 2.  
137 Peter Duff, “The Hong Kong Jury: A Microcosm of Society?”, International & 
Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol.39, No.4, 1990, at 882.   
138 Ibid. 
 39
government”.139 As Baldwin and McConville caution: “although serious criticism 
might be leveled against the jury on the grounds of arbitrariness, prejudice and the 
like, one may nevertheless state with confidence that the very unpredictability of the 
institution is the surest evidence of its genuine independence”.140  
As Cornish observed, concern regarding the jury’s independence may arise even 
in modern established democracies most obviously in criminal offences with political 
implications such as sedition, treason, riot and unlawful assembly.141 He adds that 
“[g]iven that the state is entitled to suppress conduct which is seriously prejudicial to 
itself or to the peace of its citizens generally, one might still expect a jury truly 
concerned with protection of individual liberty to make a stand in two situations: 
where the state appears to be prosecuting for a political offence on a basis of 
unreliable evidence; and where it is necessary to extend the law so as to bring the 
accused within its prohibitions”.142   
-- To display the legitimacy of government   
Besides the jury’s preventive role in repelling potential political pressures to 
ensure the impartiality of the decision making,143 the wide social cross-section of 
jurors also has the legitimisation function.144 “Seeing justice done is equally as 
important to most people as an elusive certainty in the correctness of the conviction or 
acquittal. Any judgment by a cross-section of society is far more satisfactory than a 
system of justice that depends on the State for the selection of its fact-finders as well 
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as its investigator, prosecutor and sentencer”.145   
The jury’s proponents contend that the jury’s role in legitimising criminal justice 
makes sense not only to the public but also to defendants. “A conviction by a jury is 
usually something that even a convicted defendant can live with, however he may 
resent it. He feels he has a better chance of being understood by a jury and that there 
is some justice in that. The decision of a less representative tribunal may ultimately do 
little to rehabilitate an offender and may serve to increase his sense of separateness 
from society in general”.146 Moreover, jury trial can effectively impact those who 
participate in the judicial process,147 such as jurors themselves. Empirical studies have 
shown that most of jurors changed their opinions on the justice system favorably.148  
In short, it can be argued that “[m]eaningful jury input into criminal justice is a 
leadi
.2.4 The jury’s prospects in established democracies  
eemingly, almost each reason given for the demise of the jury trial in the 
estab
                                                       
ng indicator of the genuine legitimacy of our government”,149 since the jury 
demonstrates that within the criminal justice system respect is paid to the people’s 





lished democracies can be countered by research to date suggesting that the jury 
has a qualified and, via further reforms, could be a better adjudicative body whilst its 
political/democratic function today and plays an important role. However, will such 
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favourable research promote a bright future for the jury trial?   
It is unpersuasive to contend that democratic governments have failed to notice 
that 
 
                                                       
the above research is favourable to the jury and mistakenly enacted laws to 
suppress its use. As observed by Stephen Daniels, the attacks and reforms on juries 
should be understood as “an integral part of a concerted campaign aimed at the 
enactment of substantial changes” in the entire justice system that would benefit 
certain interest groups, rather than be “understood and evaluated in a political 
vacuum”.151 He specifically added that “[t]he political strategy underlying the attacks 
on jury competence undercuts the substance of such criticisms”.152 Baldwin and 
McConville also observed: “[i]t is clear that arguments about the retention or the 
abolition of the jury are at base, political in nature.”153 In the context that the jury trial 
is too inextricably linked with value judgments and policy choice of politicians,154 
“[t]ailoring the jury’s role is a never ending process of balancing inherently 
conflicting policies”,155 such as politicians’ choice of preferring “crime control” or 
“due process”, and of whether to allow the people not only to “join in the Big 
Conversation”, but also to “make the Big Decision”. 156  When this has been 
understood, it is unsurprising that the jury trial has been facing its demise, irrespective 
of the largely favorable outcomes of academic research detailed above. As long as 
there is political distaste against juries, 157  there will be more moves towards 
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repressing the jury, probably based upon inadequate evidence.158    
To make it more specific, in any jurisdiction which is “increasingly developing 
a … justice system operated by technicians and administered by professionals whose 
major concerns are efficiency, cost and expedition”,159 “[t]here will be continued 
pressure for ‘modernisation’ of the jury, primarily founded upon the values 
emphasized by the crime control model of criminal justice and backed by the ‘law and 
order’ lobby, and various reforms will be suggested. Some of these will be adopted 
and by this means the role of the jury will be further limited”.160 On the contrary, 
when the policy makers’ value judgment become more inclined to “due process”, it is 
not impossible that the situation will reverse. It has been reported, for example, that 
the Supreme Court of America has “worked aggressively in recent decades to increase 
(or perhaps restore) the status of the jury in the criminal justice system”, and “these 
themes have grown even stronger in the last decade”.161    
Another factor which politicians must consider is that the total removal of the 
jury trial would have to confront the public’s diffuse support for the jury. For example, 
two recent surveys in England and Wales reveal that the public widely supports the 
jury system. One 2002 survey found that over 80 per cent of the public trusted a jury 
to come to the right decision and that trial by jury is fairer than being tried by a judge. 
The other in 2003 reveals that: not only white but also non-white members of the 
public highly trust the jury system.162 Citizens’ supports for the jury trial have also 
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been verified by research in other countries as well.163 In short, the jury trial will 
likely continue to confront its ebb and flow with the changing “political discourse”164 
which, however, cannot totally ignore the people’s will.    
 
1.3 Mixed Tribunals – An Ineffective Model of Lay Participation?    
 
Besides the classic jury, the mixed tribunal system in which lay assessors and 
professional judges sit side by side to making judicial decisions is another 
representative and influential model of civic participation in the administration of 
justice prevalent in quite a number of countries with civil-law tradition. This system 
has also been adopted by China as its almost exclusive model of lay participation.165 
However, it has been widely reported in many countries that lay assessors perform 
their duties too passively to make substantial contributions to judicial decision making. 
Could this be regarded as another sign of the overwhelming decline of lay 
participation as some Chinese scholars have alleged?166     
 
1.3.1 A widely used model of lay participation  
 
The mixed tribunal system is actually a variation of the jury. France first 
introduced the English jury system but found it unable to produce “uniformly 
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satisfactory results”.167 In 1943, the criminal jury was abolished and replaced by a 
new institution: “nine laymen (later reduced to seven), still called jurors, were 
required to sit together with three judges as one bench to decide questions of guilt and 
punishment jointly”.168  
Germany experienced similar change. In 1924, as the replacement for the 
criminal jury, a lay assessor court, namely Schoffengerichte, composed of three 
judges and six lay assessors, was established to adjudicate the most serious criminal 
offences; and a smaller version comprising one judge in association with two lay 
assessors was created to decide on the medium-range offences.169 In Germany, lay 
assessors with rights and tasks equal to judges, can sit together with judges to 
participate in almost all criminal trials in local, district, and high courts.170 
Likewise, a number of other countries have also introduced mixed tribunals in 
various forms.171 According to Jackson and Kovalev’s recent comprehensive review, 
these countries include Norway, Finland, Demark, Italy, Austria, Hungary, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Portugal, Iceland, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, 
Macedonia, Poland, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Ukraine and Greece.172 Neil Vidmar’s 
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comprehensive research reveals that lay assessors exist in many Commonwealth 
countries in other continents.173  
 
1.3.2 The questionable effectiveness of mixed tribunals  
 
Like other models of lay participation, the mixed tribunal aims to introduce the 
community’s voices into the judicial process. However, research suggest that, in 
practice, mixed tribunals in diverse countries confront “substantial difficulties” in 
achieving this objective mainly due to the two reasons: lay assessors’ widely-reported 
impotence in performing their adjudicative duties on one hand, and the problematic 
representativeness of lay assessors which makes them unable to represent the 
community.174 
 
1.3.2.1 Do lay assessors effectively participate in trials?  
 
In mixed tribunals, lay assessors sit side by side with professional judges and 
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normally have equivalent duties and powers. However, research in diverse countries 
has found that lay assessors act very passively in the trials, infrequently: asking 
questions during trials, making comments of merit, reading case files, disagreeing 
with professional judges, and exercising their rights to outvote judges.175  
 
1.3.2.2 Do lay assessors effectively represent the community?  
 
The problematic representativeness of lay assessors forms another criticism of 
the mixed tribunal system. In Norway, for example, the composition of lay assessors 
indicates “clear overrepresentation of middle-class citizens” and “significant 
underrepresentation of lower-class citizens”.176 According to Jackson and Kovalev, 
lay assessors in Denmark, Sweden, Germany and Norway are politically active 
members from the community, whilst in Finland, certain social groups such as 
pensioners and students are overrepresented.177 The limited representativeness of lay 
assessors directly raises concerns about whether they truly represent the community.   
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1.3.3 Reasons for the mixed tribunal’s ineffectiveness  
 
As seen above, the mixed tribunal is an important model of civic participation in 
justice which has been widely used in numerous countries. However, where lay 
assessors are neither able to represent the communities they come from nor able to 
effectively participate in trials, this model will inevitably fail to affect true lay 
participation. So what are the reasons for these weaknesses? It appears that both the 
impotence and narrow representativeness of lay assessors should be attributed to 
problematic trial management and imperfect institutional design in legislation.  
 
1.3.3.1 Lay assessors’ participation under the sway of judges    
 
Empirical research from Russian and Croatia indicates that professional judges’ 
attitudes toward mixed tribunals can substantially impact lay assessors’ effective 
participation. Professional judges who are enthusiastic about mixed tribunals are 
likely to facilitate lay assessors’ participation and vice versa.178 This rule has also 
been testified to by the studies conducted in Germany. In practice, judges could exert 
impact on lay assessors’ participation by the following means.  
-- To command lay assessors’ cognitive tools  
First of all, lay assessors’ knowledge of cases may be largely subject to 
professional judges’ cooperation. The presiding judge of a mixed tribunal normally 
has to be a professional judge who conducts various trial activities including directing 
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at 89.      
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the lay assessors’ participation.179 In practice, presiding judges are committed to 
provide lay assessors with varied cognitive tools to help the latter to understand cases, 
such as giving lay assessors oral or written instructions, answering their questions, 
and allowing them to get access to investigative dossiers etc.  
However, it seems that in some countries the judges are not active in performing 
their duties in this regard. Research in Poland, for example, indicates that some 
professional judges neither provide the lay assessors with any relevant case 
information nor explain legal issues to them.180 Likewise, Stefan Machura’s study in 
Russia reveals that professional judges actually “frame the participation” of the lay 
assessors. He observed that if the professional judge(s) in a mixed tribunal 
understand(s) the position of the lay assessors by granting the latter enough 
opportunities for questions, the lay assessors may perform more actively in the trial, 
and vice versa.181 In addition, research in Germany indicates that “criminal trial 
outcomes are powerfully influenced by the dossiers prepared by prosecutors”.182 
However, it has been reported that these case dossiers are provided only to the 
professional judges 183  and the lay assessors are rarely given enough time and 
opportunity to study these case dossiers.184  
Without sufficient cognitive tools to comprehend cases well, lay assessors would 
be unlikely to effectively participate in trials.  
-- To control lay assessors’ participative opportunities  
Second, contrary to the deliberation process in the jury system where the judge is 
                                                        
179 See Stefan Machura, “Interaction between Lay Assessors and Professional Judges 
in German Mixed Courts”, International Review of Penal Law (Vol. 72), (Érès, 
Ramonville Sainte Agne 2001), at 457.   
180 Los, supra note 175, at 453. 
181 Supra note 178, at 146-147.  
182 Supra note 174, at195.  
183 Ibid.  
184 See supra note 179, at 452.  
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excluded, the professional judge in a mixed tribunal participates in and virtually 
chairs the deliberation. Research indicates that the extent to which lay assessors can 
contribute to the decision making largely depends on the “deliberation atmosphere” 
which the professional judges create.185 For example, lay assessors “need more time 
to understand a case compared with professional judges who are legally educated and 
already have had similar cases earlier in their careers”.186 However, whether the lay 
assessors in a mixed tribunal will be granted “more time” largely depends upon the 
judges’ patience and will.187 Research in Russia reveals that an “authoritative judge” 
could silence the lay assessors by simply not leaving them enough deliberation 
time.188 Moreover, as a Russian judge has revealed, “a real, professional judge first 
asks the lay assessors their opinions, then deliberations [between the lay assessors and 
the judge] begin. But, if the judge really wants to convict the defendant, the judge will 
speak first and convince the lay assessors”.189 
-- To affect lay assessors’ participative enthusiasm  
Third, although they may avoid directly violating the law to deprive the lay 
assessors of their participative opportunities, judges can practically adversely affect 
the lay assessors’ participative enthusiasm to indirectly hold back the latter’s 
participation. In Germany, for example, lay assessors often complain that they are 
asked by the presiding judge: “are there any questions?” in a tone which makes it 
more than clear that such questions are not welcome.190 Polish research indicates that 
professional judges rarely gave their lay colleagues any directives to stimulate the 
                                                        
185 Supra note 178, at 125. 
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latter to participate in the deliberations actively.191  
In short, the research above reveals that the extent to which lay assessors can 
effectively participate in trials depends upon not only their own enthusiasm and 
competence, but also professional judges’ cooperative willingness to facilitate lay 
assessors’ participation. It would be an important issue in prospective reforms to 
protect against professional judges’ improprieties in trial management which impede 
lay assessors’ effective participation.  
 
1.3.3.2 Lay assessors’ passive obedience determined by institutional design     
 
As discussed above, lay assessors may hesitate to disagree with professional 
judges or to outvote them.192 Lay assessors’ deference to judges could be attributed to, 
inter alia, three reasons deriving from problematic institutional design.  
-- Judges’ higher managerial status provided by law   
“Procedural rules provide the professional judges with a more active trial 
role”.193 As mentioned above, the presiding judge of a mixed tribunal normally has to 
be a professional judge who conducts various trial activities including chairing the 
court session and the deliberation, and directing the lay assessors’ activities.194 These 
procedural rules effectively raise professional judges to a position of leadership in 
spite of the law stating that lay assessors and judges are equals. As a rule of thumb, 
lay assessors may respect this leadership and thus cultivate their deference to judges.   
-- Lay assessors’ obedience to judges due to reasoned verdicts  
“[A]n additional factor that propels the professional judge into a leadership 
                                                        
191 Los, supra note 175, at 453. 
192 Ivkovic, supra note 175, at 447-448.  
193 Ibid, at 447.  
194 See supra note 179, at 457.  
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position is the legalistic nature of the decision”.195 In contrast to the jury’s secret and 
general verdicts without giving reasons, the verdict of a mixed tribunal has to 
elaborate the reasons on which the verdict has been based.196 Furthermore, the verdict 
is appealable upon the request of the defendant.197 These two factors determine that 
decisions of mixed tribunals must be made as per the existing law,198 otherwise they 
may be overturned by the appeal courts. This need to base verdicts on existing legal 
rules allows professional judges to further consolidate their leading position in mixed 
tribunals, since it is they, as legalists, who are more able to apply various legal rules 
and interpret the legal reasoning in each verdict. In other words, to produce the 
reasoned verdict required by the law, the mixed tribunal has to technically rely on the 
professional judge(s). In this context, professional judges become “‘first among 
equals’ during legal decision-making because of their specific status characteristics, 
such as legal education and experience in deciding legal cases”.199               
-- Unattainable independence of lay assessors  
The procedure used to assign lay assessors’ duties in some countries is not 
conducive to ensuring the independence of lay assessors. For example, in Russia, 
“each lay assessor reports to the same courtroom … for the term of his service (which 
can last months)” and “[n]aturally, he develops relationships with the judges and 
prosecutors who appear regularly there”,200 “similar to the way grand jurors in the 
United States are sometimes accused of being beholden to the prosecutor they see 
regularly”.201 This relationship may make lay assessors reluctant to challenge the 
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professional judges and increase their passive obedience.    
As summarized by Ivkovic, “[t]he professional judges’ active role mandated by 
procedural law…and their higher status in the tribunal all contribute to an atmosphere 
in which the professional judges’ voice commands.”202  
-- The small number of lay assessors  
The existing research indicates that the small number of lay assessors in a mixed 
tribunal might be another factor of affecting their effective participation. For example, 
a classic SchÖffen court in Germany is composed of one professional judge and two 
lay assessors.203 In many other countries such as Croatia and Norway, the model of 
1(judge) +2 (lay assessors) has been applied in composing a mixed tribunal.204 
Kalven and Zeisel’s research in 1966 found that in American juries a lone holdout 
virtually never hangs a jury because the pressure to capitulate and comply with the 
majority is too strong. Stefan Machura suggests that this particular finding is 
applicable for mixed tribunals as well as other sorts of small group process. 
According to him, there is limited likelihood that any one of these two lay assessors 
would stand up to the professionals with whom they work.205   
-- The incompetence of lay assessors  
Lay assessors in mixed tribunals decide on both questions of fact and questions 
of law. It may be argued that “in order to fulfil their adjudication duties effectively, 
independently, and equally with professional judges, they should have an opportunity 
to become familiar with major concepts of substantial and procedural law before they 
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203 Cornish, supra note 65, at 269. 
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commence their duty”.206 However, a number of countries do not provide any training 
for lay assessors.207 Due to lay assessors’ lack of legal knowledge,208 professional 
judge may easily dominate in courtrooms when it comes to questions of law209 and 
lay assessors have to defer to their professional colleagues.  
 
1.3.4 The prospects for mixed tribunals 
 
For the above reasons, notwithstanding that lay judges may outnumber judges 
and could legally dominate the decisions,210 the majority of lay judges seldom trumps  
the minority of professional judges211 by virtue of professional judges’ control over 
lay assessors’ effective participation, lay assessors’ deference to judges due to the 
latter’s superiority in legal knowledge and managerial status, and lay assessors’ weak 
voice due to their small number and incompetence in deciding on questions of law. It 
seems that some of the weaknesses of mixed tribunals are embedded into the very 
nature of tribunals – “the mingling of lay and law-trained judges within a single 
decision-making body” 212  where professional judges dominate not only 
administratively but also technically. Thus, what are the prospects for the mixed 
tribunal? Will the mixed tribunal’s weaknesses lead to its continuing decline or even 
abolition? It appears that the prospects for mixed tribunals will depend upon, inter 
alia, three factors that follow.  
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1.3.4.1 The potential to improve the mixed tribunal system  
 
As seen above, it appears that some weaknesses of mixed tribunals are associated 
with “the mingling of lay and law-trained judges within a single decision-making 
body”. However, it could be argued that these weaknesses are not unconquerable.   
First, the extent to which the assessors in a mixed tribunal can effectively 
participate in the trial largely depends upon the cooperation of the professional judges 
in the mixed tribunal, since the latter are commissioned to preside over trial processes. 
It may be argued that in order to improve lay assessors’ independence and check on 
judges’ improprieties, an extra position – “lay assessors’ clerks (legal counsel)” could 
be established in mixed tribunals. Lay assessors’ clerks would be selected from 
lawyers favoring lay participation and be independent from the courts where they 
work. Their duties would be: to provide legal advices to lay assessors when the latter 
confront any questions of law to protect against professional judges’ passivism in 
perform such duties; on the other hand, to oversee professional judges’ other 
improprieties in impeding lay assessors’ participation such as refusal to awarding 
sufficient deliberation time.  
Secondly, since reasoned verdicts allow professional judges to further 
consolidate their dominance in mixed tribunals because of their legal knowledge, one 
possible measure against this dominance, borrowing from the jury trial, would be not 
to require mixed tribunals to render reasoned judgments. Meanwhile, where the mixed 
tribunal produces a guilty verdict, the judges who agree with the guilty verdict could 
help the lay assessors craft the decision; or where the judge disagrees, the lay 
assessor’s clerk could assist the lay assessors in drafting the decision, with the 
professional judges’ dissents attached.         
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Thirdly, to avoid long-term cooperation between professional judges and lay 
assessors, requesting lay assessors to serve for a number of years without the 
prohibition of re-election, as Germany does, 213  should be reconsidered. On the 
contrary, terms of service for lay assessors could be limited to a single trial (as 
adopted by France, Portugal and Switzerland214) or to a few days per annum for one 
or two years (e.g. five days per annum for two years in Denmark215).  Moreover, the 
French model of mixed tribunals adopts the secret ballot rule. In other words, “lay 
judges have the freedom to express their final decision on the defendant’s guilt 
according to their convictions and anonymously from the professionals, as well as 
from one another”.216 It may be argued that this secret ballot could eliminate lay 
assessors’ hesitation at challenging professional judges. 
Fourthly, to improve lay assessors’ competence to decide on questions of law, 
besides providing them with clerks, Jackson and Kovalev suggest “it is important that 
lay judges are given some training to prepare them for this task”. They add that “such 
training could include specific lectures on evidence, criminal law, and criminal 
procedures by legal experts”.217  
Fifthly, in response to the weak voice of lay assessors in mixed tribunals, there 
are possibilities for reform. For example, Japan has recently introduced a mixed 
tribunal system under which the proportion between lay assessors and judges has been 
increased to 4:1 and 6:3.218 Besides increasing the lay assessors’ number in a mixed 
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tribunal, the French law attempts to increases the weight of lay voice by providing 
that at least fifty-five percent of the lay assessors should vote for a conviction. These 
methods are expected to stimulate lay assessors to influence the verdict.219 In addition, 
empirical data suggests that non-unanimous juries do not function as well as their 
unanimous counterparts, since “majority rule juries virtually always cease serious 
deliberations once they have reached the required majority for decision”.220 Jackson 
and Kovalev suggest that “the need for unanimity becomes greater the smaller the size 
of the jury”.221 To substantially add weight to lay voice, unanimous verdicts for 
conviction may be another effective method. Where each lay assessor’s vote has a 
substantial impact on the trial outcome, her sense of responsibility might increase and 
stimulate more active participation.      
 
1.3.4.2 Political/democratic functions of lay assessors  
 
Besides the potential to reform the mixed tribunal system, any alterations to the 
system must take into account its democratic/political functions.  
First, contrary to professional judges, lay assessors are free from organizational 
restrictions and only sit in court temporarily. They therefore are not as vulnerable to 
the state’s direct influence and control as professional judges who hold their standing 
positions at the courts and receive their incomes from the state. Second, lay assessors 
from the community could help with overseeing judicial proceedings and deterring 
professional judges from overt arbitrariness, corruption or bias. Third, by participating 
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in trials, lay assessors witness the whole judicial process. Their firsthand experience 
of the fairness of the courts may educate them and promote the legitimacy of the 
judiciary. Finally, the presence of lay assessors in trials may help to make the 
atmosphere of the courtrooms more relaxed since the litigants could communicate 
with lay assessors in layman’s terms rather than legal jargon.222  
The political functions above add weight that justifies the preservation of lay 
assessors rather than their abolition. As reviewed by Ivkovic, “[w]hile most authors 
who have written about mixed tribunals discuss negative characteristics of trials by 
mixed tribunals, they all agree that the political function of mixed tribunals is 
considerably more important, and that this function by itself justifies retaining the 
system”.223  
 
1.3.4.3 Support for mixed tribunals  
 
In spite of the acute attacks on the impotence of lay assessors, empirical research 
reveals that the mixed tribunal system obtains diffuse support in various countries.    
The studies of Casper/Zeisel, Klausa and Rennig in Germany in 1990s 
demonstrate that professional judges, lay assessors, and the public positively 
evaluated the current state of lay participation. Only a few German scholars objected 
to the mixed tribunal system and called for its abolition.224 According to the research 
findings in Sweden,225 Denmark,226 and Croatia,227 the mixed tribunal system has 
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received relatively diffuse supports by citizens.   
Taking into account all the above three factors, mixed tribunals, embedded in the 
justice system of various countries for decades, would be unlikely to decline toward 
abolition or replacement by “professional jurists” with “absolute decision-making 
power”.228 Moreover, one extra function of mixed tribunals is in saving money by 
cutting the number of professional judges,229  since otherwise more professional 
judges would be needed to take the position of lay assessors. 
 
1.4 Effective Lay Magistracy  
 
While the aforementioned factors, such as the jury’s demise and the passivity of 
lay assessors, form evidence more or less to support the allegation that lay 
participation is facing worldwide decline, counterevidence challenging this is found in 
other models of lay participation, such as lay magistracy and administrative tribunals 
still playing considerable roles in judicial decision making in some countries, and in 
lay participation experiencing a rise in a number of transitional countries. The 
following three sections will look at this.  
 
1.4.1 Lay Magistracy -- Backbone of British criminal justice  
 
Lay magistrates in Britain can be traced back to the Justice of the Peace Act 
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1361.230 They do not have to have any legal qualifications, though they undertake a 
training process covering the practical skills involved in performing their duties.231 
Candidates for lay magistrates are usually nominated to the local Advisory Committee 
by local political parties, voluntary groups, trade unions and other organizations, as 
well as by personal application.232 As the backbone of the English criminal justice 
system, approximately 30, 000 lay magistrates hear about 97 per cent of criminal 
cases.233 An estimated 1.74 million defendants appeared before magistrates’ courts in 
2007.234 It was suggested that if the situation were otherwise the criminal justice 
system would choke on its volume of work.235  
The widely acknowledged advantages of lay magistrates include their 
comparatively low costs, weight of numbers and local knowledge to ensure fair 
decision making.236 For example, it was said that replacing lay magistrates with 
professional judges would produce an estimated expense of ￡100 million a year in 
paying the latter’s salaries alone.237 Magistrates usually sit in threes, which by 
contrast to a single judge sitting alone, is more likely to ensure a balanced view, 
impartiality and appropriateness of decision making. Furthermore, a lay magistrate 
must live within 15 miles of the court in which he sits,238 making him more familiar 
with local life than a professional judge and capable of judging cases according to the 
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local particulars.239   
 
1.4.2 Prospects for lay magistrates in the U.K.  
 
“The future of the magistracy is a sensitive topic”240 and the following factors 
have to be taken into account.  
 
1.4.2.1 The economic advantages of lay magistrates  
 
The results of Morgan and Russell’s report were largely in favour of lay 
magistrates. In addition to the fragmentary estimations such as replacing lay 
magistrates with professional judges producing an estimated expense of ￡100 
million a year in paying the judges’ salaries alone,241 and the estimation of the Home 
Office Research and Planning Unit that the costs of a contested trial by lay 
magistrates is ￡1,500 and a guilty plea case is only ￡500 compared to costs rising 
to ￡13,500 and ￡2,500 in the Crown Court, Morgan and Russell conducted a more 
detailed study comparing the costs between lay and stipendiary magistrates, indicating 
that the costs of an appearance before lay magistrates is ￡52.10 whereas ￡61.78 
before stipendiary magistrates. They also revealed that stipendiaries can cost more 
when considering factors such as their more stringent sentences that may increase 
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costs for the Prison Service. 242  “The cost of the justice system is a frequent 
preoccupation of governments”.243 For such reasons, lay magistrates continue to be 
appreciated by the British Government.  
 
1.4.2.2 The progress which has been made by reforms  
 
The lay magistracy has not been immune from attacks which mainly concern its 
inconsistency, 244  bias towards the police, 245  selective background, 246  and 
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inefficiency. 247  However, reformative measures and further studies have been 
undertaken to address the above attacks on lay magistrates. For example, it is 
suggested that more detailed and regularly updated guidelines, more training and 
supervision by the higher courts could improve the consistency of lay magistrates’ 
judgments. 248  Furthermore, in response to the limited representativeness of lay 
magistrates, there have been a series of reforms,249 some of which have at least 
partially taken effect. As Lord Falconer declared in 2003, “the ethnic make up of the 
magistracy countrywide is close to the national average for cultural representation per 
head of population”,250 though there are still concerns as to class mix and regional 
variations in age and ethnicity which await being addressed. 251  Providing lay 
magistrates can be really competent adjudicators and reflect the composition of a 
multicultural and multiracial society, a criminal justice system involving participation 
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by lay justices will be significantly legimitised and probably win widespread public 
support.    
 
 
1.4.2.3 The entrenched tradition of lay justice  
 
It seems that the growing numbers and status of stipendiary magistrates and the 
increasing magisterial powers of justices’ clerks may indicate “a marked shift towards 
the professionalisation of the magistracy”.252 However, the lay magistracy is an 
ancient tradition, premised on people’s will for voluntary public service, the ideal of 
local people dispensing local justice,253 and “an awareness of the dangers of allowing 
single judges to sit and administer justice unaided in the criminal courts”.254 This 
tradition also accords with the government policy encouraging active citizens in an 
active community.255 Taking into account the above, as Morgan and Russell suggested, 
“the nature and balance of the contribution made by lay and stipendiary magistrates 
could be altered so as better to satisfy … different considerations without prejudicing 
the integrity of a system founded on strong traditions and widely supported”,256 whilst 
“that could only be done, in the short-term at least, by continuing to make extensive 
use of lay magistrates”.257  
 
1.4.3 Lay magistrates in other countries  
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Lay magistrates have been employed to deal with summary matters by many 
other Common Law jurisdictions, although their sentencing powers are limited to 
financial or other community-based penalties. 258 A lay magistrate sitting alone has 
been used in Scotland for judging minor criminal matters as well as in New Zealand 
for preliminary hearings. In some sparsely populated areas of Australia, lay 
magistrates also sit alone to deal with minor matters.259 The English lay magistrate 
model was in wide use in the US, though salaried professional judges gradually took 
over lay magistrates’ jurisdiction. The Federal Magistrate’s Act of 1968 actually 
removed lay magistrates from federal courts, but paid lay judges, in some states, still 
preserve their offices by sitting alone to judge minor civil cases and non-custodial 
criminal offences.260  Moreover, lay judges also sit as panels in Scotland. In New 
Zealand, fully trained and salaried lay magistrates have been introduced to sit in 
panels of two to try non-custodial cases, according to the District Court Amendment 
Act 1998 which replicates its counterparts in other South Pacific states such as 
Western Samoa, Tonga and the Cook Islands in an attempt to respond to the 
overrepresentation of Maori and other ethnic minority members amongst defendants 
and make the criminal justice system representative of a multi-ethnic society.261   
 
1.5 Administrative tribunals in the U.K.  
 
Beside the lay magistracy, lay people in England participate in judicial decision 
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making via administrative tribunals as well.   
 
 
1.5.1 Another important model of lay participation  
 
The history of tribunals can be dated back to as early as 1799.262 However, their 
significant growth in Britain occurred after the World War II when the Government 
more often intervened in people’s lives to extend various social benefits to a wider 
constituency. The supply/withdrawal of welfare benefits, by its nature, is largely 
discretionary so that it can easily bring about complex controversies concerning 
people’s varied rights to education, employment, and medical care etc. Taking into 
account the vast workload and expertise involved in these potential disputes, various 
tribunals were therefore established and experienced fast development.263 Up to the 
beginning of this millennium, there were almost 70 different types of administrative 
tribunals in the U.K. coupled with domestic tribunals dealing with disputes within 
particular professions.264 The various tribunals decide almost one million cases each 
year, six times the contested civil caseloads handled by the county court and the High 
Court combined.265  
The element of lay involvement in tribunals is apparent. Tribunals comprise 
usually of three members, two of whom are lay adjudicators, sitting with the legally 
trained chair. In spite of their non-lawyer nature, they are actually not ‘lay’ at all in 
terms of their expertise with regard to the disputes in question. They could, for 
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example, be doctors in the Medical Appeal Tribunal. Now that lay adjudicators of 
tribunals have specialized knowledge regarding the disputes, they are able to play an 
active role in decision-making with the advice of the legally-trained chairperson.266 
Although it was controversial whether the nature of tribunals is administrative or 
adjudicatory,267 the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 “confirms the place 
of tribunals as part of the judicial system, rather than as an appendage of the 
administration”.268 Furthermore, tribunals’ position as equivalent to a court has been 
practically upheld by the judicial precedent Pickering v Liverpool Daily Post and 
Echo Newspaper where the tribunal’s proceedings were held to subject to the law of 
contempt.269         
 
1.5.2 Tribunals under attack  
 
Like all other methods of lay participation, the tribunal system has encountered 
criticisms, mostly pointing to their questionable independence, procedural fairness 
and representativeness.  
 
1.5.2.1 The questioned independence of tribunals  
 
As Sir Andrew Leggatt pointed out, a central problem of tribunals was the 
unguaranteed independence of administrative tribunals from their sponsoring 
                                                        
266 Supra note 10, at 395. 
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departments since where a Department of State provides funds and other facilities and 
appoints some of its members, the tribunal can hardly realize its independence in 
practice and guarantee its impartial position to adjudicate cases.270  
 
1.5.2.2 The questioned procedural fairness of tribunals  
 
Other concerns look at whether ‘due process’ or procedural fairness can be 
ensured in tribunal proceedings. For example, one criticism involved the lack of 
uniformity with regard to appeals from tribunals since different provisions of the 
statues under which various tribunals operate established dissimilar appeal rules, 
granting or depriving claimants of rights of appeal and providing for different appeal 
bodies such as a further tribunal, a minister or a court of law. Moreover, another 
attack on tribunal proceedings is the absence of publicity, which may raise concerns 
with respect to the transparency of cases of public importance. An additional 
procedural issue is that with chairpersons of tribunals being lawyers, tribunal 
proceedings have become increasingly formal, creating more difficulties for lay 
members to represent them effectively. In response to this, the subject of the 
complaint may employ legal representation, which may threaten equality where the 
complainant cannot afford representation.      
 
1.5.2.3 The questioned representativeness of tribunals  
 
Furthermore, it was established that the members of many tribunals were drawn 
disproportionately from professionals and managers, the elderly and males, the 
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so-called “stage army of pluralists” who were involved in a wide range of social, 
political and voluntary agencies, or even magistrates or councilors.271 This raises 
concerns with regard to whether the tribunal system offers a fair opportunity for each 
citizen to participate in decision making.    
 
1.5.3 Reforms to tribunals and their prospects  
 
In response to the condemnations above, Sir Andrew Leggatt initiated an 
all-sided review of the tribunal system as whole. According to his report, the 
Tribunals, Court and Enforcement Act 2007 (TCEA 2007) introduces a series of 
reforms. For example, to rectify the problem that different Departments of State 
provide administrative support for their affiliated tribunals which potentially affects 
independence, the Act (apart from allowing the Employment and Asylum and 
Immigration tribunals to remain independent) subsumes all tribunals to create a new 
unified system composed of two tiers – the First-tier Tribunal and the Upper Tribunal, 
which take over the jurisdiction of existing tribunals. A decision made by the First-tier 
tribunal is appealable to the Upper Tribunal whilst the latter’s decision can be 
appealed to a court of law, which should resolve the lack of uniformity of appeal 
rules.272         
The effectiveness of the reforms initiated by TCEA 2007 remains to be seen. 
However, various tribunals will hopefully continue to play an important role in 
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dispute resolution, since besides the above moves toward improvements in the 
independence and impartiality of tribunals, it has been widely acknowledged that 
compared with ordinary courts, tribunals have obvious advantages. First, in spite of 
certain tribunals (e.g. the employment tribunal) confronting escalating caseloads and 
struggling with efficiency,273 tribunals are generally quicker to hear cases compared 
with the congested court system. Second, dispute resolution via tribunal is 
cost-effective and less intimidating for disputing parties, without having to involve 
professional judges, courts’ infrastructure, legal representation, strict court procedures, 
and court fees. Third, as pointed out above, lay members of tribunals may have 
particular expertise in disputed fields, creating a better prospect of resolving disputes 
effectively and appropriately based on specialized insight, by contrast to an 
adjudicatory body composed exclusively of professional judge(s) with only legal 
expertise. Fourth, access to tribunals could be easier than getting a case filed in the 
ordinary courts. In addition, unlike tribunals, litigation could create greater public 
attention, which is undesirable for the disputing parties seeking to protect their 
privacy.274  
In short, although research has suggested that “the choice between tribunals and 
courts has been influenced by the interplay of various factors” including “political 
considerations”,275 tribunals will be unlikely to face abolition in Britain since it 
appears that they are compatible with the modern justice principles of “three Es”.        
 
1.6 The Growth of Lay Participation in the ‘Transitional’ Regimes  
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By contrast to the marked decline of certain models of lay participation in some 
established democracies, it is remarkable that there are proposals to introduce or 
resuscitate lay participation in a number of countries experiencing the transition from 
authoritarianism to democracy, which creates two opposing trends in the use of lay 
participation worldwide.  
 
1.6.1 Increasing interest in lay participation  
 
1.6.1.1 The jury’s reinstatement in Russia   
 
Trial by jury was first introduced into Russia during Alexander II’s judicial 
reforms in 1864. Despite the subsequent legislative attempts to remove political and 
press crimes from the jury’s jurisdiction, it survived almost half century until its 
abolition by Bolsheviks in 1917.276 As early as in 1989, Gorbachev suggested the 
reintroduction of the jury trial, together with adversarial criminal procedure.277 With 
the collapse of the authoritarian Soviet Union, on 16 July 1993, a jury system was 
reintroduced in post-communist Russia to establish “a more democratic, less 
state-dominated justice system”.278 The Constitution of the Russia Federation adopted 
on December 12, 1993 also formalized trial by jury. By the end of 2004, the criminal 
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jury has been introduced nationwide in Russia, except for Chechnya.279   
 
1.6.1.2 Japan’s introduction of a new twin system of lay participation  
 
Japan first introduced the criminal jury in 1928 to detract from a totalitarianism 
regime,280 but the system was abolished in 1943.281 In 2004, the Japanese government 
enacted the Act Concerning Participation of Lay Assessors in Criminal Trials, which 
created a new mixed tribunal system (or “quasi-jury”), indicating the “return to an 
affirmative role for common citizens in determining the culpability of their peers”.282 
By May 2009, Japan had started to implement this new mixed tribunal.283 
 
1.6.1.3 The reintroduction of the jury in Spain  
he Code of Criminal Procedure of 1872 and the Law on the Jury of 1888 
estab
                                                       
 
T
lished jury trials in Spain. Juries were actually implemented between 1888 and 
1923, and then again between 1931 and 1936 after suspension by the Primo de Rivera 
dictatorship.284 In 1995, the Spanish government revived criminal juries by enacting 
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the 1995 Spanish Jury Law,285 after their absence for almost 60 years.286 Since May 
1996, criminal juries started to be applied in practice.287  
 
1.6.1.4 New developments to lay participation in Argentina  
espite the Argentine Constitution 1893 mandating the jury trial, it has not yet 
been
.6.1.5 Growing trend in other transitional countries  
esides the aforementioned countries, there are proposals to introduce or 
 
D
 established.288 Since the beginning of the 1990s, Argentina has initiated criminal 
justice reforms aimed at suppressing the inquisitorial features of the justice system 
and introducing an adversarial model for proceedings. Lay assessors were expected to 
be neutral arbitrators and desirable alternatives to replace the “investigating judges”. 
Since 1991, Cordoba province in Argentina first introduced a mixed tribunal 
system. 289  Moreover, since 2004, a series of attempts to introduce the 
Anglo-American jury system have been conducted by the federal government of 
Argentina. Within five years, all crimes punishable by a maximum of eight years 
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citate lay participation in a number of other post-authoritarian countries.  
Following Russia’s introduction of the jury trail, Uzbekistan has star
riment with the jury.291 Furthermore, other members of the post-communist 
group such as Azerbaijan, Georgia and Ukraine, will very possibly introduce the 
classic jury system.292 Besides Japan, the trend of resuscitating lay participation has 
been sweeping across other Asian nations such as South Korea,293 Thailand,294 and 
Taiwan. 295  Following Argentina’s moves toward resuscitating jury trial, other 
Latin-American countries, such as Mexico,296 Venezuela,297 and Bolivia,298 have also 
                                                        
291 See supra note 178, at 123-150; Nemytina, supra note 276, at 365-370; Thaman, 
supra note 276, at 233-260.   
Defense of South Korea announced that it would 
em in its army, in an attempt to “increase public trust in 
rade Court, Labor Courts, and Juvenile and Family 
een decided not by juries but by 
292 Supra note 24, at 120.   
293 In 2005, the Ministry of 
introduce a military jury syst
military tribunals”. Since 2007, South Korea has initiated a five-year pilot program to 
experiment with public participation in trials. Although the final format for lay 
participation will not be determined by 2012, it might be more akin to the 
Anglo-American classical jury system. See Fukurai, supra note 218, at 316 and Eric 
Seo, “Creating the Right Mentality: Dealing with the Problem of Juror Delinquency in 
the New South Korea Lay Participation System”, Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational 
Law, Vol.40, 2007, at 265-266.  
294 Lay assessors with career professions have been recently introduced into the 
Intellectual Property and World T
Courts in Thailand, as a result of “the growing influence of western ideas about law”. 
See Frank Munger, “Constitutional Reform, Legal Consciousness, and Citizen 
Participation in Thailand”, Cornell International Law Journal, Vol.40, 2007, at 464.  
295 In Taiwan, legal reformers are seeking greater access for ordinary citizens in the 
legislative process. See Hiroshi Fukurai and Zhuoyu Wang, “Civic Participatory 
Systems in Law in Japan and China”; the article presented at the LSA annual 
conference at Berlin 2007, material with the author.  
296 Mexico had a long history of jury trials prior to the end of its revolution in 1929. 
However, since then, nearly all criminal cases have b
judges, in spite of Mexico’s Constitution which prescribes a jury trial (Article 20, 
Section 7). However, the Supreme Court of Mexico has recently drafted an initiative 
to revive jury trials and introduce adversarial proceedings in criminal cases. See ibid.  
297 The Criminal Procedure Law 1897 in Venezuela introduced the jury, but this law 
was abolished in 1915. Remarkably, The Organic Criminal Procedure Code enacted 
in 1999, endeavoured “to replace the old inquisitorial system with an adversarial one” 
and introduced a nine-member jury to adjudicate criminal cases punishable by 
imprisonment of more than sixteen years, and a mixed tribunal system composed of 
one professional judge and two lay assessors to decide on criminal cases punishable 
by imprisonment of above four years. Although jury trials have been suspended since 
 74
undertaken measures to boost lay participation.     
 
1.6.2 Reasons for the growth in lay participation  
 
Jurisdictions where the jury trial or other alternative forms of lay participation 
have been introduced or resuscitated share common political features and can be 
generalized as “transitional societies”. All of the countries have experienced the 
dictatorships prior to their moves toward reviving lay participation. Russia, 
Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Ukraine, all belonged to the so-called Soviet 
Bloc and experienced one-party rule by the communists until 1991 when the Soviet 
Union collapsed.299 Until the late 1970s when guerrilla forces supported by Soviet 
Union withdrew from Latin America, military rule was prevalent in this continent.300 
Japan had long experienced the Liberal Domestic Party’s one-party domination.301 
Both South Africa and South Korea have experienced authoritarian rule as well before 
their resuscitation of lay participation. 302  Moreover, from 1936 to 1995, Spain 
experienced General Franco’s “controlling measures”.303 When authoritarian rule 
ended in these countries, they initiated a wave of political transition, aiming at the 
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accelerated democratization and wider liberalization. 304  It is in the process of 
demoractic transition305 that those countries have revived or newly introduced lay 
participation. 
This common context produces some common reasons for their growing interest 
in lay participation. Anderson and Nolan suggest that these reasons could be classified 
into three categories: to promote a more democratic society, to produce better justice, 
and miscellaneous other reasons.306  
 
1.6.2.1 To promote a more democratic society  
 
“In the minds of some [formerly authoritarian or one-party dominating regimes], 
juries and democracy went together”.307 This rationale that lay participation promotes 
democracy may intertwine, inter alia, two threads. First is the idea of direct 
democracy which could be illustrated from two aspects. On one hand, democracy can 
be defined as government by the people, exercised either directly or through elected 
representatives. 308  Judicial decision making, which is related to the award or 
deprivation of citizens’ property, freedom or even life, is an important act or process 
of national governing, especially the control and administration of public interest in a 
country. To grant this governing power directly to individual citizens rather than 
elected representatives embodies the spirit of direct democracy – making just 
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decisions directly by the people. On the other hand, in the process of applying specific 
legal rules to specific cases, common citizens who participate in the proceedings are 
effectively granted opportunities to “voice consent or dissent with those norms 
devised in other political forums such as Parliament”.309 The jurors in some countries 
may even nullify unpopular laws. Lay judges’ scrutiny of laws may be regarded as 
another form of direct government by the people – screening unjust laws directly by 
the people. The second is the democratic education of the general population. Via 
making judicial decisions or voicing their views on legal norms, the citizens called for 
court duty will “learn about and become interested in the judicial system” and 
probably then other governmental affairs. To sum up, most of these transitional 
countries favor lay participation since they believe that it promotes “grassroots 
democratic involvement” and develops “a greater democratic consciousness in the 
general population”.310       
-- To encourage direct civic involvement in government  
It appears that the policy of “allowing greater political freedom”311 paved the 
way for rapid growth of lay participation in those countries confronting the political 
transition from authoritarianism to democracy. As observed by Lempert, the 
reintroduction of jury trials in Russia and Spain is “not just a move toward a more 
democratic, less state-dominated justice system, but is also a symbol of each country’s 
aspirations for freer, more democratic government”.312 Hans also points out that these 
experiments with reintroducing juries “underscore the current-day search for ways of 
give citizens more of a say in the operation of their societies”.313 Likewise, the revival 
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of lay participation in some Latin-American countries is due to the “urgent task of 
engaging Latin American citizens in the political decision-making process” to “restore 
a fundamental human right to the disadvantaged of Latin America, one which 
frequently had been silently trampled”.314  The introduction of lay participation in 
Thailand directly reflects the social changes in this country, such as “deepening 
liberal democratic values”, 315  the increasing public demand for “participatory 
representative institutions of governance” and “the transparent rule of law”.316 The 
Japanese government expects that the introduction of lay participation will “promote a 
more democratic society by engaging the public and providing an alternative political 
forum”.317  
-- To strengthen citizens’ democratic consciousness   
The democratic nature of lay participation can be seen not only as “a sign of 
democracy” but also as “a school of citizenship”.318 Those countries with growing 
interest in lay participation expect that it will not only democratize their regimes and 
legal systems but also inspire the citizens’ democratic consciousness. For example, 
although Japan established a democratic regime after World War II, “in Japanese 
society of the 21st century, it is incumbent on the people to break out of the excessive 
dependency on the state that accompanies the traditional consciousness of being 
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governed objects, develop public consciousness within themselves, and become more 
actively involved in public affairs”.319 Likewise, “[l]ife under communism bred a 
sense of loneliness, a distrust of one’s neighbors, a Hobbesian kind of disengagement 
from public life. Retreat into the privacy of one’s self and one’s family was safer than 
venturing into the public square”.320 To inspire citizens’ democratic consciousness 
was a critical commitment of the post-communist governments.   
It appears that the revival of lay participation has occurred in company with the 
resurgence of democracy321 in those countries which have been committed to free 
themselves from totalitarian pasts.322 At least, lay participation has been used to flaunt 
those countries’ moves “from more authoritarian to more open and democratic 
regimes”.323 When the desire for democracy has been extend to the judicial systems, it 
“lent new significance to pre-existing mechanisms providing for lay participation”.324  
 
1.6.2.2 To produce ‘better’ justice  
esides concerns with displaying the democratic foundations of their regimes, it 
seem
 state tyranny  
ishment has long been a central instrument 
                                                       
 
B
s that these countries have resuscitated lay participation in an attempt to produce 
a better form of justice.  
-- Protection against
“[P]olitically motivated criminal pun
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of a
icial corruption  
uthoritarian control”.325 According to Lempert’s study, Russia, Spain, South 
Africa, South Korea and Japan, all confronted this problem of judicial arbitrariness.326 
“While the example of Western Europe makes it clear that juries are not essential to 
democratic governance, they are antithetical to rigid authoritarian rule”.327 Needless 
to say, to disperse the power of making judicial decisions to a group of jurors 
randomly selected from the community may substantially undermine the state’s 
authoritarian control over justice, which, in contrast, would have easily reached into 
professional judges via political and administrative affection. In light of this, it is 
unsurprising that moves toward civic participation in justice have occurred in the 
post-authoritarianism countries which are trying to establish a criminal justice 
institution antithetical to authoritarian justice to prevent judicial arbitrariness and 
party control.328   
-- To check jud
Ivkovic notes that, “[t]he level of public support is especially crucial in countries 
in transition that are emerging from the legacy of communist regimes and are 
unaccustomed to public accountability”. He adds, “[c]orruption of public officials and 
widely shared perceptions about its extent are serious threats to the integrity of public 
officials that diminish the level of public support for both the institutions and the 
leaders”.329 It seems that in some transitional countries, corruption also infects the 
judiciary. For example, Russia reports prevalent corruption in diverse fields including 
the judiciary.330 Confronting such problems, transitional regimes hope that lay judges, 
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representing the community, can “watch the fairness of the trials”331 and “serve as a 
deterrent safeguard”332 to “check on state corruption”.333  
-- To realize the transition from inquisitorial justice to adversarial justice  
ons, 
such
criminal justice is considered incompatible with advanced 
proc
                                                                                                                                                              
The classical adversarial trial by jury has developed a series of modern noti
 as the presumption of innocence, to ensure procedural fairness in criminal 
proceedings. However, most of the aforementioned transitional countries including 
Russia,334 Spain,335 Japan,336 Argentina,337 South Korea,338 Mexico,339 Venezuela,340 
and Bolivia,341 adopted the inquisitorial model of justice during their authoritarian 
era.  
Inquisitorial 
edural notions. For example, practices in some transitional countries indicate that 
professional judges with inquisitorial duty may have bias in favour of police and 
prosecutors and can easily impair “the equality of arms”.342 Furthermore, in some 
countries, the dossiers presented by the prosecutors before the trial might substantially 
affect the professional judges and subsequent oral testimony is rendered worthless.343 
 
Коррупция в России переросла в угрозу национальным интересам, Независимая 
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In response to such procedural unfairness, a number of countries have undertaken 
reform by establishing an adversarial model, with the jury trial being introduced by 
some. This can explain why “the reappearance of juries has mostly occurred in the 
inquisitorial soil”.344 These jurisdictions expect that to increase ‘adversaliaziation’ of 
the criminal procedure may benefit the quality of justice.345 
-- To legitimise the justice system    
It appears that most of the countries with growing interest in lay participation 
have
rocedural unfairness which may affect 
the l
participation in their justice systems. For example, the Japanese reforms seek “to 
 been confronting a crisis in legitimacy in justice. For example, in Japan, there 
were “concerns about public disenchantment with an elite judicial corps viewed as out 
of touch with ordinary life and the judiciary’s mishandling of a series of cases that 
have resulted in miscarriages of justice”.346  
Besides factors such as corruption and p
egitimacy of justice, some countries believe that the very independence of the 
judiciary often makes them sometimes isolated from the community and unpopular.347 
By contrast, “[c]itizen participation, through juries or lay judges, may … increase 
legitimacy under the right conditions”,348 since “it is the stamp of public approval that 
comes with a jury verdict, which serves to make credible the actions of the state”.349  
Effectively, lay participation helps “close the gap between judicial independence and 
popular legitimacy”.350 For this reason, some countries decided to encourage civic 
                                                                                                                                                               
supra note 293, at 267.  
344 Thaman, supra note 276, at 259.  
r more details about the miscarriages of justice in Japan, 
, at 110. 
345 Supra note 287, at 411.  
346 Supra note 174, at 180; fo
see 187-188 of the paper above.  
347 Supra note 294, at 466. 
348 Ibid, at 461.  
349 Supra note 189
350 Supra note 294, at 466. 
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devote plentiful resources in a way that brings a remote judicial system closer to the 
people, responds to their expectations, and earns their trust”351.  Democratisation and 
legitimisation of the criminal justice process have also been the primary rationale for 
South Africa to introduce a mixed tribunal system.352  
 
1.6.2.3 Miscellaneous other reasons  
 
A number of scholars in such countries as Japan, Korea and Russia have received 
their legal education in the United States. Some of them returned to their home 
coun
rticipation 
and increasing professionalization of legal decision making, there have been some 
surpr
                                                       
tries with admiration of the American models of legal procedure including the 
jury. They, especially those taking the key judicial positions, have been exerting 
significant influence in their home countries’ introduction of lay participation.353   
 
1.6.3 Inspiration from lay participation in transitional countries  
 
It appears that “[a]lthough the broad picture is one of declining lay pa
ising moves in the opposite direction”.354 Where, therefore, does the growing 
interest in encouraging lay participation in a number of transitional countries leave us? 
Besides calling our attention to the fact that “[d]emocratic urges are popping up all 
over and among even the humblest citizens”,355 we should also draw attention to the 
 
ut the reasons for Japan’s revival of lay participation, see 
vic, supra note 175, at 431. 
351 For more discussion abo
Joseph P. Nadeau, “Judicial Reform in Japan”, The Judges’ Journal, Vol. 44, 2005, at 
35.   
352 Ivko
353 Lempert, supra note 41, at 479.  
354 Supra note 7. 
355 Supra note 322, at 177. 
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“new energy and expectations in traditional settings [of lay participation]”.356   
It is still unsafe to conclude that lay participation can definitely work well to 
boost the judicial reforms aimed at democratisation and liberalisation in these 
trans
                                                       
itional societies. For example, in Spain, the well-known case of Mikel Otegi 
shocked the Spanish public and gave rise to concerns about whether the 
newly-introduced jury trial could survive in a multi-ethnic society.357 By contrast, 
sources do indicate that the introduction of lay participation in some transitional 
countries has produced more or less positive effects. For example, the 
newly-introduced lay participation through mixed tribunals in Argentina has acquired 
diffuse supports from the people.358  Although in most of the cases, the mixed 
tribunals reached unanimous verdict, the citizens’ awareness of participating in 
judical process and commitment to legal decision-making have been increasing.359 
Moreover, in spite of the fact that jury trials in Russia have been criticized by certain 
governors, mass media and representatives of law enforcement who believe that some 
verdicts rendered by juries that were too mild and over scrupulous about accusatory 
evidence360, the re-adoption of the jury has positively influenced legal theory and 
practice. On one hand, the lenience of jurors has mitigated the asperity of the 
Criminal Law 1996. On the other hand, some adversarial procedures and ideas have 
been applied to traditional inquisitorial proceedings.361 
 
tegi, a young Basque nationalist, murdered two Basque policemen and 
 Reasons for Reintroducing Trial by Jury in Russia”, 
t 253.  
356 Ibid.  
357 Mikel O
was acquitted on March 7, 1997, on the grounds of diminished capacity caused by 
intoxication and uncontrollable rage provoked by alleged previous police harassment. 
For more details about this case, see Thaman, supra note 276, at 236.  
358 See supra note 26, at 29.  
359 See supra note 26, at 8. 
360 Sergey A. Pashin, “The
International Review of Penal Law (Vol. 72) (Érès, Ramonville Sainte Agne 2001), at 
257.    
361 Ibid, a
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As Thaman suggested, “[t]he reappearance of juries on the inquisitorial soil…is 
an important phenomenon”.362 He added that “[i]t breathes life into the overly written, 
over
pments in lay participation across the world have generated a 
considerable body of literature concerned with the ways in which different forms of 
lay 
ave been facing marked decline in scope and effectiveness. 
How
                                                       
ly bureaucratic structure of European criminal jurisprudence and makes European 
jurists rethink the procedural and substantive tenets upon which their criminal justice 
systems are based.” 363  This inspiration may be applied to diverse transitional 
countries other than Europe. The successful resuscitation of lay participation in these 
countries may encourage reforms in other countries aiming for domocratisation and 
liberalisation in their justice systems.    
 
1.7 Conclusion  
 
The recent develo
participation work in practice and the legal and political functions of lay 
participation. It would be impractical to exhaustively discuss them all. However, by 
conducting a brief review, it appears that the current situation of lay participation 
globally is mixed indeed.  
It is undeniable that certain models of lay participation such as the jury trial and 
the mixed tribunal system h
ever, the jury’s demise largely derives from political reasons rather than from the 
system’s convincing inherent irrationality, and almost any ineffective practices of the 
jury and the mixed tribunal have great potential to be corrected. Moreover, the jury 
still plays a considerable role in trying serious crimes in diverse countries364 and 
 
 note 276, at 259.  
ote 14, at 149.  
362 Thaman, supra
363 Ibid.  
364 Supra n
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mixed tribunals are preserved in many others. Combining the facts of the still 
effective lay magistracy and administrative tribunals, especially the robust rise of lay 
participation in a number of transitional countries, it is no more than an illusory image 
that lay participation has lost its vitality and is in irreversible global decline. Rather, it 
appears that different models of lay participation ebb and flow in different countries 
with their “own distinctive political, cultural and jurisprudential heritage”.365  
Besides clarifying the current situation of lay participation in the world, it can be 
argued, by incorporating all the above information, that the destiny of lay 
parti
depends upon the value choices of the government. Where the government seeks 
demo
cipation may depend on, inter alia, the following factors.  
 
1.7.1 The government’s value choices   
 
It can be argued that the ebb and flow of lay participation in a country largely 
cratization and liberalization for its regime and wishes to build this ideal into its 
justice system, lay participation may be given great support, and vice versa. For 
example, according to Lempert, the revival of the jury trial in some transitional 
countries “is not just a move toward a more democratic, less state-dominated justice 
system, but is also a symbol of each country’s aspirations for freer, more democratic 
government”; while the continuing demise of the jury trial in some common-law 
countries such as England, is “a sign of that country’s centralization of governmental 
power and an increasingly efficiency-oriented bureaucracy”.366   
                                                        
365 Paul Roberts, “Comparative Criminal Justice Goes Global”, Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies, Vol.28, No.2, 2008, at 384. 
lly Lloyd-Bostock and Cheryl Thomas also suggest that 
. Many commentators have stressed the 
366 Supra note 88, at 14. Sa
“to seek sound justification for reform in terms of the jury’s rationality, competence, 
or efficiency may be to miss the point
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Besides the government’s value choice in terms of ideology, the destiny of lay 
parti
onents of crime 
contr
particular difficulty facing those who wish to remove lay participation as a whole is 
cipation may swing like a pendulum with the government’s changing value 
judgment in choosing the specific model of justice, such as the “crime control” or 
“due process”. Where the former dominates, the government, with “a heightened 
political concern about court efficiency and delays”,367 could prefer to streamline 
criminal proceedings and encourage “a more intricate meshing of criminal justice 
agencies”,368 aimed at “producing more convictions and cutting costs”.369 Making 
inroads into lay participation therefore will be favoured by the government,370 since 
lay participants representing the community rather than the government may become 
an unwelcome hurdle, especially taking into account their potentially higher costs, 
lower efficiency and leniency in conviction.371 By contrast, when the model of “due 
process” prevails, civic participation which increases further supervisory strands in 
the judicial process may be given more importance to better maintain civil liberties 
and prevent the abuse of administrative or executive powers.372    
“Generally speaking, in the modern democratic state, prop
ol values rarely launch a full frontal attack on the values of due process. 
Lipservice, at least, must be paid to formal legal rationality”.373 Meanwhile, the 
                                                                                                                                                               
importance of understanding the jury in terms of politics and the organisation of 
power”. See Lloyd-Bostock and Thomas, supra note 42 at 40. 
367 Seago, supra note 251, at 632. 
368 Supra note 67, at 28.   
369 Supra note 49, at 153. 
370 See ibid, at 131. 
371 For above for this inclination of jurors; and a similar trend has also been reported 
by some jurisdictions with mixed tribunals applied in Poland, see Stanislaw Pomorski, 
“Lay Judges in the Polish Criminal Courts: A Legal and Empirical Description”, Case 
Western Reserve Journal of International Law, Vol. 7, 1975, at 206, quoted from 
supra note 174, at 191-192.  
372 See Packer 1968, at 164.  
373 Supra note 38, at 225. 
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that “the institution is seen as having immense symbolic importance”,374 and it 
“demonstrates that within the criminal justice system respect is paid to the ‘rule of 
law’, or ‘due process’”.375 In light of this, “there are few signs that the demise of the 
laity in justice, even if recommended, would be politically acceptable”.376 In those 
transitional countries anxious to flaunt their newly-established democratic regimes, 
“due process” might be prized more to exhibit the emphasized civil liberties in the 
judicial proceedings, creating advantageous opportunities for lay participation’s 
growth.    
 
1.7.2 The effectiveness of lay participation itself   
d as lay adjudicators who, 
repre enting the community, participate in judicial decision making to dispense 
justic
      
 
As mentioned above, lay participation could be define
s
e and realize direct democracy. Lay participation is therefore expected to 
achieve three functions: (1) participation of the community represented by lay 
participants, (2) judicial decision making by lay participants, and (3) direct democracy 
in judicial area by lay participants. However, all of the models of lay participation, as 
seen above, have experienced diverse attacks which could be divided into three 
categories and leveled against its three expected functions: attacks on the 
decision-making function of lay participation, attacks on the political/democratic 
function of lay participation, and attacks on the community-representing function of 
lay participants.  
 
                                                  
374 Supra note 38, at 226.  
375 Ibid.  
376 Seago, supra note 251, at 651. 
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1.7.2.1 The decision-making function of lay participation  
ts’ competence in 
making correct decisions. It seems that there are three threads to guard the 
decis
st argument in favor of juries is that, 
at lea
 
There have been many arguments given against lay participan
ion-making function of lay participation.  
First, some attacks “do not hold up well when confronted with empirical 
evidence”.377 For example, “perhaps the stronge
st when they are asked to find facts, citizens serving as jurors usually do a good 
job”. 378  The comparative leniency of lay participants 379  may conflict with the 
government’s ideal of crime control, but there is no data to suggest that this leniency 
is wrong. In response to those attacks on lay participants’ incompetence, an additional 
argument is that “every part of our criminal justice system – judges, prosecutors, 
police – has been under attack as being corrupt or incompetent”.380 There has been 
little empirical evidence verifying that lay participants are less capable of fact finding 
and decision making compared with a single professional judge or a few professional 
judges.381 Before identifying a convincing alternative to replace lay participation, it 
would be unreasonable to remove the system.    
Second, all humans and human institutions make mistakes.382 It cannot be denied 
                                                        
377 Supra note 88, at 7; see also supra note 162, at 416-417.  
“Jury of Twelve – No Accident”, Insurance 
 and Cheryl Thomos, “Juries and Reform in 
88, at 13 
378 Supra note 88, at 7 
379 See e.g. Los, supra note 175, at 455. 
380 John T. Burke and Francis P. Smith, 
Counsel Journal, Vol. 42, 1975, at 213.  
381 See, for example, Sally Lloyd-Bostock
England and Wales”, Neil Vidmar (ed.), The World Jury System (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2000), at 90; Neil J. Vidmar, “The Performance of American Civil Jury: 
An Empirical Perspective”, Arizona Law Review, Vol. 40, 1998, at 849; T. M. Honess, 
M. Levi, and E. A. Charman, “Juror Competence in Processing Complex Information: 
Implications from a Simulation of the Maxwell Trial”, Criminal Law Review, Nov 
1998, at 763.  
382 Supra note 
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that 
that there is still great potential to “improve” or 
“mo
voting rights, all of which would reduce judges’ control over lay assessors and may 
         
lay participants’ comprehension may have been chanllenged by increasingly 
lengthy and complex cases.383 In response to this, there could be two potential 
remedies: to exert greater control over lay decision making, and to design techniques 
to improve lay participants’ comprehension. 384  It could be argued that only 
undertaking the first remedy would be inadvisable since research has proved that lay 
participants’ incompetence could be largely attributable to exogenous reasons such as 
the faulted procedural design in terms of trial administration rather than their own 
insipience. For example, a jury is only as good as the material put before it,385 whist 
the material often comprises “convoluted and technical language, the dry and abstract 
presentation of the law, and the hard-to-understand jury instructions etc”;386 the 
absence of or insufficient training should be at least partly responsible for lay 
assessors’ poor legal knowledge.  
Third, research has revealed 
dernise” lay participation via various changes.387 For example, providing jurors 
with more cognitive facilities and assistance by “turning courtrooms into 
classrooms”,388 may be effective at reorientating and updating juries in a context of 
increased caseloads and case complexity. Besides continuous refinements, the specific 
model(s) of lay participation may need radical overhauls. For example, to stimulate 
lay assessors’ participation in mixed tribunals, substantial reforms may need to be 
adopted to eliminate their exclusive reliance on judges, strengthen both their 
administrative and technical independence, and significantly add weight to their 
                                               
383 See Munsterman and Hannaford, supra note 41, at 8. 
384 Ibid. 
385 Supra note 40, at 699.  
386 See supra note 15, at 190-191. 
387 Supra note 38, at 211. 
388 Supra note 53, at 152.   
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invoke politicians’ careful scrutiny.     
 
1.7.2.2 The political/democratic function of lay participation  
‘the consent of the governed’ and that all citizens should have the opportunity to 
parti
                                                       
 
The basic justification for citizen participation is that “government is based on 
cipate in the governmental decisions that affect their lives”.389 This theory itself 
could be controversial and raise ideological contests with regard to whether “direct 
democracy” is necessary and better than representative democracy in the judicial area. 
Moreover, the political function of certain models of lay participation, for example, to 
“allow popular ‘justice’ by jury nullification to defeat any unpopular national law”, 
which was historically important in some democracies, has been gradually waning.390 
Some democratic countries today do not employ lay participation in judicial decision 
making whatsoever.391 In spite of all the above, however, it is widely acknowledged 
even in the established democracies that “there is a perceived political danger in 
leaving legal decision making exclusively to a narrow, professionally trained elite”,392 
which “hint at the enduring attractions of lay participation in the law”,393 so long as 
lay participation continues to exercise its long-standing right to reach a verdict not 
only based on conscience, against the letter of the law, but also occasionally in 
defiance of government.394  
Furthermore, “[t]he lay participation/community conscience symbolism is 
 
389 Florence R. Rubin, “Citizen Participation in the State Courts”, The Justice System 
Journal, Vol. 10, No.3, 1985, at 295.   
390 Supra note 81, at 333.  
391 Supra note 242, at 100. 
392 Supra note 7. 
393 Ibid. 
394 See Lloyd-Bostock and Thomas, supra note 42, at 40. 
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e system needs a contact point with the community,396 in an attempt to promote 
its legitimisation.397 Where lay participants are “in some way representative of the 
community”,398 “the power of ‘community symbolism’ is difficult to ignore”.399  
Some potential political/democratic functions of lay participation seem even 
more attractive to those transitional countries in the process of establishing th
cratic regimes, such as: the people’s sovereignty of directly deciding public 
affairs (direct democracy); preventing state repression and safeguarding judicial 
independence; educating the public and cultivating their ideologies of democracy and 
justice; promoting the legitimacy of the judiciary; realizing rule of law and protecting 
human rights; preventing professional judges from being arbitrary, corrupt or biased; 
bridging the gap between the legal formalism and the civic communities.400 Although 
some of them are controversial indeed, they form enduring attractions for transitional 
countries experimenting with varied democratic tools.   
 
1.7.2.3 The representativeness of lay participants  
“[L]ay participation…is often seen as a way to strengthen democracy or to 
 
                                                        
395 Supra note 144, at 4. 
396 Quoted from Ric Simmons, “Re-Examining the Grand Jury: Is There Room for 
Democracy in the Criminal Justice System?”, Boston University Law Review, Vol. 82, 
Feb 1999, at 75.  
397 See supra note 15, at 190. 
398 supra note 144, at 3. 
399 Ibid.  
400 See supra note 132, at 4; or more recent commentaries, see generally Valerie P. 
Hans and Neil J. Vidmar, Judging the Jury (Perseus Books, Cambridge, 1986); 
Jeffery Abramson, We, the Jury: the Jury System and the Ideal of Democracy, (Basic 
Books, New York 1994); James Gobert: Justice, Democracy and the Jury, (Ashgate 
Publishing Ltd., Dartmouth, 1997); Neil J. Vidmar (ed.), World Jury Systems (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2000); supra note 24, at 87-93; Ivkovic, supra note 163, at 
95-97; and Seago, supra note 251, at 651.  
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legit f ordinary lay participants, 
if genuinely representative the community, giving judgement on the facts of cases 
reali
                                                       
imate justice”.401 It is generally accepted that a group o
ze the tenet of ‘trial by one’s peers’ and legitimise judicial proceedings.402 
However, the mixed tribunal system, lay magistracy and administrative tribunals all 
confront the same problem of whether lay adjudicators can really represent the 
community. Besides, in spite of the extended qualifications of jurors, 403 it appears 
that in practice, certain social spectrums have been under-represented in juries. In 
England, for example, it has been reported that in juries, “there still appears to be an 
under-representation of women and ethnic minorities”;404 in the United States, white 
and middle-class citizens tend to occupy most of the seats of the juries whilst black 
Americans, by contrast, are seriously under-represented.405 Lempert contended that:  
This imbalance has the effect of not only undermining the legitimacy of a 
given proceeding for an individual black accused, for example, but of 
undermining the institution of the jury to the black community at large. This 
challenge to the institutional legitimacy of the jury may, over time, contribute 
to lack of confidence in the wider criminal justice process for that 
 
401 Supra note 319, at 151. 
402 See supra note10, at 285.  
403 In England, prior to 1974, for example, only those between 21 and 60 years of age 
who were on the register of electors and owed certain assets were qualified to be 
summoned as jurors, whereas since April 1974, the property limits have been 
abolished and the age range has been increased to between 18 and 65 under Section 
25 of The Criminal Justice Act 1972. Some categories of persons are entitled to be 
excused as of right while others are ineligible to serve; persons ineligible include 
those connected with the administration of law and justice; clergymen; members of 
any religious order in a monastery and persons suffering from mental illness. See 
Edward Clarke, “The Selection of Juries, Qualification for Service and the Right of 
Challenge”, Nigel Walker and Annette Pearson (ed.). The British Jury System, (The 
Institute of Criminology, Cambridge, 1975), at 46-47.   
404 Lloyd-Bostock and Thomas, supra note 42, at 21. 
405 Lempert, supra note 41, at 38. 
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community.406 
Lempert’s theory may be actually applicable to all models of lay participation
 fundamental la
. 




ing scrutiny and reform. 
                                                       
ficantly affect public confidence in the fact that lay arbitrators represent the 
public themselves and so undermine the legitimacy of the system.  
In response to this problem, there have been varied moves towards improving the 
representativeness of lay participants in various models of lay parti
ury and lay magistracy. For example, besides the aforementioned changes to the 
imbalanced composition of lay magistrates in England, in response to the problem 
that certain social spectrums have been under-represented in juries because of their 
avoidance of the jury duty,407  “making the juror’s experience less onerous” to 
encourage people to actively participate in trials has been adopted by some countries. 
In America, a one day/one trial system has been widely established, whereby no juror 
serves for more than one day or one trial; in some states, jurors’ pay has been 
substantially increased; and the voir dire process has been simplified and its length 
has thus been largely shortened etc.408 It is foreseeable that more juror-friendly 
administrative reforms might be initiated to attract more enthusiastic participation by 
the public to realize the “fair cross-section” of jurors.409 
To sum up, each function of lay participation, legal, political, or 
community-representing, would experience continu
 
406 Ibid. 
407 See, for example, Robert Walters and Mark Curriden, “A Jury of One’s Peers? 
Investigating Underrepresentation in Jury Venires”, Judges Journal, Vol.43, 2004, at 
17.  
408 See, for example, David E. Kasunic, “One Day/One Trial: A Major Improvement 
in the Jury System”, Judicature, Vol.67, 1983-1984, at 79.  
409 Hiroshi Fukurai and Edgar W. Bulter, “Organization, Labor Force, and Jury 
Representation: Economic Excuse and Jury Participation”, Jurimetrics Journal, 
Vol.32, 1991-1992, at 50.  
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Reso
the jury and the mixed tribunal system have received 




                                                       
urces for lay participation are, and will continue to be, limited. “It will be vital to 
ensure that the resources at present in the system are working as hard and effectively 
as they can to achieve high standards of service”.410 However, as long as these 
functions are still considerable and cannot be replaced by other alternative institutions, 
lay participation deserves its continuance.       
 
1.7.3 Civic support  
 
As seen above, both 
not be welcome by the government since they introduce the community’s voice 
into important judicial decision-makings. However, so long as these amateurs, as a 
disinterested adjudicative body independent of the government, are competent to 
represent the community, sift material, weigh up the evidence, assess people, and 
serve as a democratic and educative “bridge” between the public and the courts,411 
they would continue to be give “high marks” by the public.412 Public opinion in 
support of “the continuance of a fundamentally lay and local system” will carry some 
weight to protect against this system’s arbitrary abolishment by the government.413 
“The dilemma of whether justice should be administered by highly formalized 
and professional legal bodies or by informal peer proceedings” has been botheri
 western industrial democracies and developing societies”.414 They “have been 
 
410 Peter W. Ferguson, “The Modern Criminal Jury”, Scottish Law Times, Vol. 35, 
ote 251, at 650.  
447.   
2008, at 231.    
411 Seago, supra n
412 Supra note 41, at 478-479. 
413 Supra note 49, at 151. 
414 Los, supra note 175, at 
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struggling for years with the issue and have had mixed results”.415 Some models of 
lay participation, in some countries, have shrunk in scale and application; others still 
thrive in spite of frequent innovations. It is unlikely that this dilemma will disappear 
in the future,416 taking into account pairs of unresolved paradoxes and intertwined 
threads: democratization or centralization of judicial power, “crime control” or “due 
process” in criminal justice, imperfect lay participation but unavailable alternative to 
it, and undeniable weaknesses of lay participation but unremitting efforts to improve 
this system etc. In light of this fact, the allegation that China’s moves toward 
resuscitating lay participation collides with the global decline of lay participation 
proves to be too simplistic to be advisable. On the contrary, as a transitional country 
expecting a more democratic society and better justice,417 it is time, to situate China’s 
experience of lay participation firmly within the latest developmental framework of 
lay participation globally so as to correctly scrutinize China’s current situation418 and 
find out what lessons China can borrow from other countries.419 For example, China’s 
recent move towards resuscitating lay assessors may indicate Chinese government’s 
value choice of appreciating lay participation which may deserve a position in China 
if this system could achieve its effectiveness and obtain civic supports in this 
country.420  
                                                        
415 Ibid.    
416 Ibid.    
417 See Chapter 5 for more discussion.  
418 See Chapter 3 and 4 for more discussion.  
419 See Chapter 5 for more discussion. 
420 See Chapter 6 for more discussion.  
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Chapter 2   
A Historical Overview of Lay Participation in China  
 
2.1 Introduction  
 
The prevalent view among China’s academic community is that lay participation 
did not exist in China until the Chinese Communist Party introduced the role of ‘lay 
assessor’ into its legislative framework early in the 1930s.1 In addition to this denial of 
the existence of lay participation in China’s history, some scholars further base their 
objection to the modern growth of lay participation on the argument that such a system 
has been historically absent in China, and is at odds with the traditional culture in the 
country. Indeed, Zhang and Zhou contend that Chinese people have been historically 
“so devoid of the tradition and consciousness in participating in politics” that this 
provides little soil for the recognition of lay participation in China even today.2 Wei 
adds that lay participation hardly has a promising future in China because: on the one 
hand, modern forms of lay participation, either juries or lay assessors, are “incompatible 
with Chinese tradition”, and that civilians have been in “idolatry to professional 
authority”, so that they “would rather accept incorrect decisions by professional judges 
than correct judgments by lay judges”; and on the other hand, Chinese citizens may 
                                                        
1 See, for example, Zhang Junxia, “A Brief Discussion about the Mixed Tribunal 
System in China”, Journal of Hebei Polytechnic College (Edition of Social Sciences), 
Vol.6, No.3, 2006, at 56; Zhang Guangjie and Wang Chingting, “The History, Context, 
Theory and Law: An Analysis of the Mixed Tribunal System in China from Four 
Perspectives”, Journal of the Nanjing Industrial College (Edition of Social Sciences), 
No.2, 2005, at 18-19; Zheng Haorong, “Reforms of the China’s Mixed Tribunal 
System”, The Legal Application (Journal of the Training College of Chinese Judges), 
Vol.178, No.1, 2001, at 42; Jiang An, “China’s Mixed Tribunal System and Its Judicial 
Reform”, Legal Sciences Review, Vol.98, No.6, 1999, at 79.   
2 Zhang Demiao and Zhou Youyong, “Conditions and Methods of Realising Judicial 
Fairness in China Today”, Jurisprudence Review, No.1, 1999, at 2.  
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resist serving as lay adjudicators, to “judge and punish their neighbours”, because this 
conflicts with their traditional culture of “preserving harmony between neighbours and 
peace of the local community”.3   
Historians recognize that China’s ‘ancient’ history can be traced back to the 21st 
century BC when the first slave regime, the Xia Dynasty, was established and, further, 
that it ended in 1840 when the Opium Wars broke out. The contemporary history of 
China is therefore seen as the period after 1840.4  In actuality, there is evidence, 
though scattered and fragmentary it may be, which indicates that lay participation did 
play a part in China’s ancient history. As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes suggests, the 
basis of law is neither logic nor reasoning, but human experience instead.5 If lay 
participation did exist in China’s past, it would be advisable to review its history, in 
order to look into how each variety of lay participation operated, evolved, functioned 
and exerted an influence on society. This may help clarify whether Chinese society 
does indeed lack the tradition of civic participation in legal decision making, and has a 
culture incompatible with lay participation; all of which may help us to better 
understand the status quo and the potential prospects for lay participation in this 
country.  
This chapter is divided into four sections. Part 2.2 looks at the so-called ‘Three 
Deliberations’ during the slavery dynasty: Zhou (1046 AD – 256 AD), a system under 
which important legal cases were presented to a city assembly for civilians to deliberate 
and vote upon. Section 2.3 studies lay participation in feudal China (221 BC – 1911 
AD), looking at the prevalent ‘clan justice’, which involved the wide involvement of 
                                                        
3 Wei Min, “Shall the Mixed tribunal System Be Suspended: The Developmental 
Direction of the Mixed Tribunal System, Gansu Social Sciences, Vol.4, 2001, at 31 and 
32.       
4 See Wang Yumin, An Introduction of China’s History and Geography – Vol. I (The 
People’s Education Press, Beijing, 1985), at 3.   
5 See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Common Law, (Macmillan, London, 1882), at 1.   
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lay judges, and China’s experiment with the modern jury trial. Section 2.4 reviews the 
various forms of lay participation that existed under the Nationalist Government regime 
(1912 – 1949), including a mixed tribunal system which existed in name only, a 
distorted jury system for suppressing political dissidents, and the commercial arbitration 
courts which virtually played the role of first-instance trials for commercial cases. 
Section 2.5 discusses the predecessor to the current lay assessor system in China, the 
so-called ‘People’s Lay Assessor System’ created by the Chinese Community Party 
during its revolutionary era.        
 
2.2. The ‘Three Deliberations’ During the Zhou Dynasty (1046 AD – 256 AD) 
 
Academic literature indicates that the democratic politics of regimes built upon 
slavery actually gave birth to public participation in legal decision making, for some 
ancient western civilizations. The ancient city-state of Athens developed the so-called 
Heliaea of the Thesmothetae (meaning “Assembly as a Court”) after the Solon Reforms 
(594 BC) and so had a legal system that included an adjudicative body similar to the 
modern grand jury, composed of 500 civilians.6 Similarly, in ancient Rome in 450 BC 
there was the practice of entrusting 30 to 40 civilians to form a jury to handle criminal 
cases.7 Whilst the existence of these examples of lay participation in ancient western 
democracies has long been recognised, lay participation during China’s Zhou Dynasty 
has largely been ignored. However, this Chinese form of lay participation was known as 
‘Three Deliberations’.   
                                                        
6 Vincent Farenga, Citizen and Self in Ancient Greece: Individuals Performing Justice 
and the Law (Cambridge University Publishing House, New York, 2006), at 318; and 
Chen supra note 27, at 41.  
7  Wang Yizhen, The Civil Procedure Laws of Foreign Countries, (The Beijing 
University Press, Beijing 1990), at 44. 
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2.2.1 Features of the ‘Three Deliberations’   
 
‘Three Deliberations’ was actually a special judicial process involving lay 
participation initiated by judges (the Xiao Sikou and Si Ci) of the Supreme Court and 
was applicable to complicated criminal cases and those potentially involving capital 
punishment.8 According to the noted historian and expert on the Zhou Dynasty, Jia, 
where a judge encountered difficulties in either (1) measuring the penalty, (2) fact- 
finding, (3) recognising mitigating circumstances, or (4) applying the law, the case 
would be submitted to the Supreme Court where the ‘Three Deliberations’ process 
would be applied.9 According to Zheng, another expert studying the history of the Zhou 
Dynasty, the process was implemented for all offences potentially incurring capital 
punishment. As Zheng stated, “the defendant would not be executed unless the ‘Three 
Deliberations’ process convicted him and sentenced him to death.”10   
Any case with the ‘Three Deliberations’ process applied to it was presided over by 
a judge of the Supreme Court, and involved a jury composed of ministers, officials and 
civilians, to decide on factual and legal issues.11 Jia describes the working process of 
the ‘Three Deliberations’ process as: “ministers, officials in association with civilians 
sat on the left, right and front side of the courtroom respectively, hearing the trial and 
after due deliberation voting in a sequence of ministers first, officials second and 
civilians last to make a judgement”. Since the jury was composed of jurors from three 
different classes, the case was said to have been thrice deliberated. This is why the 
                                                        
8 Zhang Jinfan, The History of China’s Judicial Systems (The Press of the People’s 
Courts, Beijing, 2004), at 3-4.   
9 Ibid, at 3. 
10 Gao Chao and Ma Jianshi, The Interpretation of Historical Records of Criminal 
Laws in Past Chinese Dynasties (The People’s Press of Jilin, Changchun 1994), at 140. 
11 Supra note 8, at 3 and 4.  
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process was known as the ‘Three Deliberations’. Zheng further clarifies that a ‘Three 
Deliberations’ jury had jurisdiction over “conviction, acquittal, penalty measurement, 
commutation and pardon”.12 It therefore appears that a jury involved in the ‘Three 
Deliberations’ had a much wider jurisdiction, including as it did law application, than 
did a regular jury.     
Jia also states that those eligible to be ‘Three Deliberations’ participants had to be 
educated ministers of noble descent, incumbent officials and civilians of good morality.   
Unfortunately, the available literature recording this special judicial process is at 
best scattered and fragmentary, omitting as it does a few of its important characteristics, 
such as the respective number of participating ministers, officials and civilians, and 
their proportion, the specific selection process for these jurors, and the decision-making 
and voting principles.13 However, in light of the above, an adjudicative body analogous 
to a jury can be said to have existed in China’s ancient history. Furthermore, according 
to Rites of the Zhou Dynasty,14 the classic text published approximately two thousand 
years ago and recording the history of the Zhou Dynasty, the ‘Three Deliberations’ 
process was adopted in the 11th century BC, even earlier than Heliaea of the 
Thesmothetae in ancient Athens, or the jury in ancient Rome.15 
 
 
                                                        
12 Cao Shujun, “A Study on the Judicial System of the Zhou Dynasty of China”, Legal 
Sciences Review, Vol.5 of 1927, at 232.    
13 Other materials discussing the ‘Three Deliberations’ include, for example, Zhang 
Demei, The Exploration and Choice – A Study on the Legal Transplantation in the Late 
Period of Time of the Ching Dynasty (The Tsing Hwa University Press, Beijing 2003) 
at 288, and Chen Gang, 100 Years’ Evolvement of the Civil Procedure Law of China, 
(The Fazhi Publishing House of China, Beijing 2004), at 462. 
14 Other translations may be “Zhou Li” or “Zhou Rites”.  
15 See Zhou Gongdan, The Rites of the Zhou Dynasty – Justice and Judge [Qiu Guan], 
published in the East Han Dynasty (25 AD – 220 AD), quoted from Yang Tianyu, The 
Interpretation and Commentary of Rites in the Zhou Dynasty (The Ancient-Literature 
Press of Shanghai, Shanghai 2007), at 112.  
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2.2.2 Reasons for the Emergence of the ‘Three Deliberations’  
 
As the first known form of lay participation in China’s history, the development of 
the ‘Three Deliberations’ was by no means haphazard, but instead was a result of the 
particular social-political context in the country at that time.  
First of all, statutory law had not come into being yet, since during the Zhou 
Dynasty common law dominated. The uncertainty of common law enhanced the 
complexity of legal application and decision making. Seeking advice from 
well-educated officials and tapping the intelligence of the masses was a practical 
solution to overcome these difficulties in judicial practice, especially in terms of 
complicated cases and cases with far-reaching social implications.16  
Secondly, the Zhou Dynasty followed the system of seigneur politics, under which 
various lords were tasked with establishing a number of manors over which they had 
domain and in which they exercised both administrative and judicial powers.17 In an 
attempt to centralize judicial power, the central government required these lords to 
submit complicated cases and those cases potentially incurring capital punishment, to 
the Supreme Court. To legitimise this centralization, the ‘Three Deliberations’ was 
invented to demonstrate that all the complicated and important cases would be 
collectively decided by diverse stratums, rather than through autocratic justice.18  
Thirdly, the prevalence of the ‘Three Deliberations’ tallied with the idea of 
‘kingcraft’ as enshrined by the Zhou Dynasty; that of “Merciful Ruling, Virtue and 
Prudential Punishment Infliction.”19 According to Wang, this idea involved several 
                                                        
16 Zhen Qin and Zhen Ding, The Textbook of the Chinese Legal History (The Law 
Publishing House, Beijing 1998), at 57.   
17 Ibid, at 58. 
18 Supra note 12, at 232.  
19 Wang Jilun, The ‘Merciful Virtue and Prudential Punishment’ (The Youshi Cultural 
 102
doctrines. “Merciful Ruling Virtue” indicated that (1) governors should exhibit due 
diligence in ruling the country and improve their virtue by strictly disciplining 
themselves and avoiding misgovernment, and that (2) they ought to show their mercy 
by observing public opinion, favouring and enriching the people. “Prudential 
Punishment Infliction” implied that (1) each offence had individual unique 
circumstances and should be carefully analysed and treated, and that (2) punishment 
should be reasonable and moderate rather than cruel. 20  The process of ‘Three 
Deliberations’ introduced civilian participation into justice, introducing in fact the 
principle of “observing public opinion”. By incorporating the knowledge and 
intelligence of ministers, officials and common people, the ‘Three Deliberations’ 
satisfied the principle that each case “should be carefully analysed and treated” as well. 
In addition, the collective decision making helped to prevent inappropriate and cruel 
punishment.  
 
2.2.3 Its Functions and Impacts  
 
As mentioned above, the available literature on ‘Three Deliberations’, no doubt 
due to the historical period in which it occurred, is too fragmentary to present a full 
evaluation of its function. Based on the scattered material available, however, it appears 
that the ‘Three Deliberations’ played a substantial role in history of the Zhou Dynasty.  
First, it helped to legitimise judicial proceedings. Rites of the Zhou Dynasty 
records that: “by taking into account public opinion, ‘Three Deliberations’ can produce 
advisable verdicts and sentences satisfying both upper and lower social hierarchies”.21 
                                                                                                                                                               
Enterprise Corporation Ltd, Taipei 1990), at 225.   
20 Ibid.  
21 See supra note 15, at 114.   
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The use of ‘Three Deliberations’ ensured quality and impartiality of justice, as well as 
introduced diverse voices and intelligence into the legal system, and as Jia comments, 
“without ‘Three Deliberations’ deciding conviction, commutation and pardon, injustice 
might occur due to decision-making in parochial outlook.” 22  Further, ‘Three 
Deliberations’ brought democracy to the judiciary. Jia comments that the ‘Three 
Deliberations’ “embodied decision making by the community and delivered public 
wills.”23 The eminent theorist Su Shi also highly commends the institution of ‘Three 
Deliberations’, as it “made the lower hierarchies of the community involved and their 
voices heard [in the judicial process].”24  
As the first form of lay participation in China’s history, the democratic elements of 
‘Three Deliberations’ have long impressed legal scholars. Shen Jiaben, the noted 
jurisprudent and Chairman of the Committee of Legal Reform of China in the 
beginning of 20th century, likened ‘Three Deliberations’ to the classic jury, making the 
famous suggestion that “‘Three Deliberations’…accords with the theory of ‘execution 
by peers’ advocated by Mencius and the jurisdiction of the Western jury. Today, both 
the West and East apply jury which is actually a counterpart of a Chinese ancient 
institution.”25 In referring to the ‘Three Deliberations’ process, Shen was attempting to 
persuade the Emperor to introduce the jury system into China, to modernize and 
democratize the judicial system.26  
Shen did not make a detailed comparison between the ancient ‘Three 
                                                        
22 Jia Gongyan and Zheng Xuan, The Annotation of Etiquettes in the Zhou Dynasty 
(The Chunghwa Press, Beijing 1980), at 34.   
23 Ibid.  
24 Su Shi, “Ode of the ‘Three Deliberations’ Which Seeks the Public Wills”, Collected 
Works of Su Shi –Vol. I (The Chunghwa Press, Beijing 2008), at 197. 
25 Guo Chengwei, A Study on the Codification of the Criminal Procedure in the Late 
Period of Time of the Ching Dynasty and the Initial Stage of the Republic of China (The 
Press of the Police College of China, Beijing, 2006), at 252.  
26 See below for more details.  
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Deliberations’ and the modern jury that prevails in Anglo-American jurisdictions. 
However, he recognised that the admittance of common people to the judicial 
decision-making process engendered democratic spirit. Collective decision-making 
among diverse hierarchies of citizens, including ordinary civilians, demonstrated a 
respect of public opinion, while applying ‘Three Deliberations’ to all complicated and 
serious cases demonstrated prudential and humane judicial practice. Taken individually 
as well as collectively, these factors demonstrate that ‘Three Deliberations’ was 
comparable to the modern idea of the jury.   
‘Three Deliberations’ remained popular until the breakdown of the Zhou Dynasty 
and the formation of the Qin Dynasty in 221 BC. The latter abolished the slavery 
regime and established the first united feudal country in China.27 Since this change in 
governmental style resulted in the disappearance of the specific socio-political context 
that had fostered public participation in justice, ‘Three Deliberations’ was not 
transferred to the new judicial system.   
 
2.3 Lay Participation in Feudal China (221 BC – 1911 AD)  
 
The Qin Dynasty ended in 206 BC. Since then, more than ten dynasties followed 
one after another until 1911 when the last, the Ching Dynasty, was overthrown.28 
During this feudal era, spanning over two thousand years, lay participation in China 
was mainly embodied as the popular practice of “clan justice”, throughout the feudal 
period and up to the experiment with the jury trials at the beginning of 20th century.   
 
                                                        
27 Supra note 8, at 3 and 4.  
28 A supreme court was almost established in each dynasty, having different names 
though, see supra note 8, at 50, 87, 194,271,306-310, and 389-398. 
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2.3.1 The Prevalent “Clan Justice” 
 
2.3.1.1 The Context of “Clan Justice”: Royal Justice with Lay Participation 
Excluded    
 
An independent judicial system was never established in feudal China, since local 
governors at different levels appointed by the Emperor, in addition to handling 
administrative affairs, also acted as judges. Effectively, county governors, eparchy 
governors and provincial governors, acted as the first, second and third layers of 
judicial practice respectively, and they, in association with the Supreme Court normally 
established at the central government level,29 constituted the royal judicial system that 
had the statutory jurisdiction to decide on any civil and criminal cases.30 At every level 
of the royal justice system, lay participation was entirely absent due to particular 
social-political reasons.   
-- The Emperor’s Emphasis on an Absolute Control over Justice 
The imperial monocracy established by the Qin Dynasty was continued by the 
subsequent dynasties. The traditional dynastic governments generally engaged in rule 
through autocracy and absolutism, until the overthrow of the Ching Dynasty in 1911.31 
At the core of the imperial autocracy was the Government, headed by the Emperor and 
comprised exclusively of his followers, which exercised unlimited power over 
legislation, justice and administration. In terms of judicial power, all judges, from the 
county level to the Supreme Court were appointed directly by the Emperor himself and 
were unconditionally bound by his leadership, in an attempt to ensure the Emperor’s 
                                                        
29 Ibid, at 13,50-51,85-89; 86-89;194-197;270-272;306-315;389-398.  
30 Ibid, at 51, 89, 273, and 400.  
31 M.Ulric Killion, “Post-WTO China and Independent Judicial Review”, Houston 
Journal of International Law, Vol. 26, No.3, 2004, at 522.   
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absolute control over justice.32 Sima, the noted Chinese historian, notes the ambition of 
Chinese Emperors to remain the sole legal authority: “all cases under the sun, big or 
small whatsoever, subject to the royal decision”.33 It therefore seems unimaginable that 
the Emperor would permit civilian participation in royal courts and the associated 
sharing of power that would prevent the administration of justice from being his 
exclusive domain.  
-- The Illiterate Citizens Justifying the Absence of Lay Participation   
The Emperor’s control over education and knowledge provided a significant 
barrier to the use of lay participation. Chinese Emperors believed that well-educated 
citizens would be harder to control due to their enlightened and forward-looking 
thoughts whereas, in contrast, illiterate and uneducated citizens were more likely to be 
submissive. Due to this belief, free education was unavailable throughout China’s 
feudal history.34 A number of private schools (the so-called Si Shu) had been set up but 
were only available to the few rich people able to afford the fees35. This lack of 
educational opportunities resulted in a very high rate of illiteracy in China. For example, 
until 1949 (38 years after the end of the last feudal dynasty), approximately 90% of the 
national population was illiterate.36  The existence of an overwhelmingly illiterate 
population justified the Emperors’ distrust of lay participation, since a judge, especially 
one serving in the royal judicial system, had to be able to read and write if he was to be 
able to adjudicate wisely on important and complicated cases.  
-- The Elitist Politics at Odds with Lay Participation  
In parallel to this policy of limiting education was the existence of an elitism 
                                                        
32 Supra note 8, at 2. 
33 Ibid, at 3.  
34 Guo Bingwen, The History of Educational Systems in China (The Educational Press 
of Fujian, Fuzhou, 2007), at 9. 
35 Ibid, at 21. 
36 Ibid, at 63. 
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which was entrenched in the form of the ‘royal examination’, used for anyone seeking 
selection for an official post (the so-called Ke Jew Examination). Every candidate had 
to get through several rounds of examinations before he could be appointed a position 
in any of China’s administrative, judicial, legislative or even military departments. The 
examinations tested not only the candidates’ knowledge and skills but, more 
importantly, their loyalty to the Emperor.37 It was through these examinations that the 
Emperor selected knowledgeable and loyal servants to help him with the administration 
of the country. Such strict examinations ensured that all of the officials were drawn 
from the minority well-educated section of the population. Given that the 
overwhelming majority of the population were illiterate, the officials were ‘elite’ indeed, 
at least in terms of their educational background. Bureaucrats holding various 
government positions gradually grew an officialdom, where their shared backgrounds 
of good education and examination success were commonly appreciated, eventually 
engendering an elitist form of politics.  
A by-product of this elitism was that common people were generally seen as being 
inferior and were often referred to using derogatory terms such as “stupid people”, 
“grass people” or “base-bred people”.38 This sense of superiority exhibited by the 
bureaucrats meant that they would never risk breaking up their elite organisation 
through the admittance of common people to the mechanisms of justice. In such 
circumstances, any modern form of lay participation, such as the jury, one that 
“represents a basic democratic belief in the intelligence of its citizenry to decide and to 
                                                        
37 For detailed discussion about the royal examination for official selection in ancient 
China, see Wang Bingzhao and Xuyong, Studies on China’s “Ke Jew” System (The 
Hebei People’s Publishing House, Shijiazhuang, 2002).   
38 Shi Zhisheng and Xu Jianxin, A Study on Social Hierarchies in Ancient Countries 
(The Social Sciences Publishing House of China, Beijing, 2003), at 9 and 24.   
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rule”,39 would be considered to infringe upon the incumbent system of elitist politics.  
--The “Disciplinarian” Ideal of Confucianism Repelling Lay Participation   
To fully understand the common people’s exclusion from the royal justice system, 
it is important to bear in mind the influence of Confucianism.  
Traditional China was characterized throughout almost its entire feudal history by 
a remarkably close and enduring relationship between the imperial dictatorship and the 
philosophy of Confucianism. As a matter of fact, the original doctrine of Confucianism 
emphasises the desirability of balance and harmony in the community and between 
individuals, and encourages people to reform imperfect societies. However, 
Confucianism was modified during the Han Dynasty (206 BC to 207 AD) to fit in with 
the existing feudal monocracy.40 New Confucianism advocated the inherent hierarchy 
in China’s society which began with the Emperor and extended downward to the 
common people. Being subordinate to this hierarchy, each citizen was asked to fulfil his 
or her responsibility to preserve the order and harmony of the community and to 
maintain the ideal “disciplinarian” society.41  
Confucianism certainly granted the different classes different responsibilities. The 
Emperor and his officials, classified as the supreme and upper classes, assumed the 
“responsibilities” of national administration while the common people, classified as the 
lower classes, were liable for respecting and submitting unconditionally to 
government.42 In other words, according to Confucianism, the social position of the 
                                                        
39 Rita James Simon, The Jury and the Defense of Insanity (Little, Brown and 
Company, London, 1967), at 4 and 5. 
40 Supra note 31. 
41 Thomas B. Stephens, Order and Discipline in China: the Shanghai Mixed Court 
1911-1927 (University of Washington Publishing House, Washington 1992), at viii.   
42 See, for example, Robert H. Lin, “On the Nature of Criminal Law and the Problems 
of Corruption in the People’s Republic of China: Some Theoretical Considerations”, 
New York Law School Journal of International and Comparative Law, Vol.10, No.1, 
1989, at 7-8. 
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common people could be “enriched with such doctrines as unconditional loyalty to 
Emperor and State”.43  In light of the obedience and disciplinarian philosophy of 
Confucianism, there was neither a place for law in the Latin sense of the term, nor for 
private legal rights as guaranteed by law, and there were only duties and mutual 
compromises governed by the ideas of order, responsibility, hierarchy and harmony.44 
In this case, “it is unimaginable that citizenry who were supposed to be disciplined by 
the Emperor were entitled to participate in royal government and share national 
power.”45  
 
2.3.1.2 Clan Justice Coexisting with Royal Justice   
 
As seen above, royal justice totally excluded lay participation. However, it is 
remarkable that China experienced the coexistence of two forms of justice – royal 
justice and clan justice during its feudal era. In contrast to royal justice, with lay 
participation excluded, various clan courts formed a parallel hierarchy of justice and did 
involve lay participants.   
-- Features of Clan Justice  
The clan, consisting of a number of families tracing their decent from a common 
ancestor, was the traditional social unit in rural China. The origins of the clans can be 
traced back to remote antiquity, when productivity was too low to enable a single 
person or family to survive the harsh conditions, and so families claiming a common 
ancestor lived in a village together for safety and collectively worked the land. In an 
attempt to stabilize clan order, various clans developed a system of customary law and 
                                                        
43 Supra note 31.       
44 Supra note 41.  
45 Zhang Jinfan, The Legal History of the Ching Dynasty (The Law Publishing House, 
Beijing, 1994), at 703.  
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established their own courts to dispense justice inside clans. The exact number of clan 
courts in China was too vast to accurately calculate. According to Zhang’s investigation, 
in Jiangxi Province alone (there were eighteen provinces in China then46), 8994 clan 
courts had been established by 1764,47 a fact that illustrates well the prosperity of clan 
justice.48 The clan courts had the following features:   
(1) Dominated by Lay People     
Clan courts were established within each clan and were staffed by clan members 
who served in their judicial positions on a part-time basis.49  
The Yu clan (note - all clan members had Yu as their common family name) in 
Huanshan County of Anhui Province, for example, enacted its own clan law, and 
providing that: “the clan court shall be composed of one chieftain, three assessors, three 
supervisors and ten bailiffs”; “the chieftain, assessors, and supervisors shall all be 
elected by the clan assembly from the reputable, just, honest candidates”; “the bailiffs 
are to be served in turn by male clan members aged between 20 and 50 on an annual 
basis”; and “when the court opens, the chieftain presides, the assessors adjudicate, the 
supervisors oversee, and the bailiffs execute”.50 As another example, the Zhao clan in 
Zhenjiang County, Jiangsu Province, had approximately 200 members during the late 
17th century. Its clan court was headed by a general chieftain presiding over the trials 
and assisted by eight deputy chieftains and four assessors drawn from the wise and just 
villagers, to adjudicate the cases jointly, plus four villagers serving as the bailiffs in 
charge of court order and execution. All of the staff of the clan court were elected by 
                                                        
46 For China’s geography at that time, see, for example, N. Ginsburg (ed.), The Pattern 
of Asia (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1958), at 155-238.  
47 Supra note 45, at 118. 
48 See below for more discussion about the clan justice.  
49 See Li Jiaofa, “The Clan Justice in Ancient China”, Legal and Commercial Studies, 
Vol.4, 2002, at 135.  
50 Ibid, at 144.  
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the clan assembly.51  
It appears that clan courts, though staffed by lay clan members, featured specific 
roles and working practices. The usual trial venues for the clan courts were the clan 
temples where all other important clan public affairs, such as worship and assembly, 
took place.52 Perhaps remarkably, similar prosecution mechanisms existed within some 
of the clans. When a criminal offence occurred, the father or elder brother of the suspect 
was liable for reporting to the clan court and initiating a prosecution, otherwise they 
would be charged with concealment.53 In addition, in terms of civil disputes, the 
procedure was very flexible. A clan court, for example, could on its own initiative 
summon the parties in dispute to mediate the issue before they instituted litigation.54 It 
is clear that the entire procedure of clan justice was dominated by lay people and 
excluded professional roles entirely.    
(2) Wide Jurisdiction  
A clan court normally had jurisdiction over any civil disputes between clan 
members, as well as over a wide range of criminal offences committed within the clan 
(for example, incest, extramarital liaisons, gambling, theft, robbery and bodily injury), 
except those very serious crimes (such as manslaughter, political offences, offences 
involving the members of other clans, and offences with far-reaching social 
implications) which had to be brought before the County Governor to apply for royal 
justice.55 Further, clan courts had the judicial power to impose a series of punishments, 
                                                        
51 Supra note 45, at 118.   
52 Gao Qicai and Luo Chang, “A Study on Patriarchal Judicial Systems in the Ancient 
Chinese Society”, Journal of Huazhong Normal University (Humanities and Social 
Sciences), Vol. 45, No.1, 2006, at 86. 
53 See supra note 49, at 139. 
54 See Li Jiaofa, ibid, at 143; and supra 52, at 86.  
55 See Li, ibid, at 138. 
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including reprimand, forfeiture, ‘stripe’56, expulsion from the clan, or even capital 
punishment (executed in various ways, such as forced suicide, burial alive and 
drowning).57  
(3) Recognition by the Royal Government  
As mentioned above, county governors were theoretically the statutory first 
instance for any civil and criminal cases, including those occurring inside clans,58 a fact 
seemingly in conflict with the jurisdiction of clan justice. In reality, however, each 
feudal dynasty in China’s history acquiesced to, or at least publicly acknowledged the 
validity of, clan justice.59 So, on one hand, none of the feudal dynasties forbade the clan 
courts from adjudicating on internal cases, effectively acquiescing to their judicial 
power, but on the other hand, the validity of clan justice was openly acknowledged by 
the Government in two ways. First, the clans were allowed to submit their customary 
law, including court rulings, to the Government for approval and recording. The 
Government was pleased to do so as long as the clan law did not conflict with national 
interests. Decisions made by clan courts with reference to clan law became legitimate 
legal decision once they had obtained formal ratification by the Government. 60  
Secondly, it was traditional in feudal China for the Royal Government to collect 
representative judicial precedents in order to compile law reports to guide subsequent 
judicial practice. Remarkably, these law reports often contained decisions made by the 
                                                        
56 A stroke from a whip, rod, etc. 
57 For more discussions about the punitive power of clan justice, see Xu Yangjie, The 
Historical Review of the Clan System in the Song Dynasty and Ming Dynasty (The 
Chunghwa Publishing House, Shanghai, 1995), at 224-225; Fei Chengkang, “The 
Punishment of the Family Law”, Politics and Law, No.5, 1992; Zhu Yong, A Study on 
the Clan Law in the Ching Dynasty (The Educational Press of Hunan Province, 1987), 
at 98; and Liu Liming, The Contract, Ordeal and Gamble (The People’s Press of 
Sichuan, Chengdu 1993), at 15. 
58 Supra note 8, at 51, 89, 273, and 400.   
59 Supra note 52, at 85. 
60 Shi Fengyi, Clans and People’s Statuses in Ancient China (The Press of Social 
Sciences Literature, Beijing, 1999), at 52-58.  
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clan courts, a fact that demonstrates the Government’s ratification of the clans’ law and 
their justice.61 For these two reasons, in spite of the county governors still statutorily 
holding jurisdiction over cases occurring inside clans, the de facto jurisdiction over 
these cases can be seen to have been executed by clan courts, resulting in the 
coexistence of clan justice and royal justice.  
-- Why the Door was Open to Lay Participation at the Grassroots Level    
Clan courts held significant judicial power, as evidenced by their legitimate 
jurisdiction over a wide variety of cases and their implementation of various forms of 
punishment. According to Sprinkle, the clan courts could be categorized as “the lowest 
level in the court hierarchy”.62 Meanwhile, as mentioned above, each position in a clan 
court was staffed by a clan member who had neither administrative nor political 
affiliation with the Royal Government. The entire judicial procedure was totally 
dominated by lay people rather than professional judges. In light of this, it would be 
justifiable to conclude that clan justice demonstrated a particular form of civic 
participation in the judiciary. It appears that the approach to lay participation differed 
greatly between the approach of the royal judicial system and that of clan justice. Lay 
participation was entirely excluded by royal justice whilst the various clan courts were 
dominated by lay people – the clan members themselves. This practice was apparently 
incompatible within the context of judicial power monopolized by the Royal 
Government. The reasoning behind the imperial monocracy’s tolerance of the existence 
of clan justice thus becomes an interesting issue.         
                                                        
61 Chen Keyun, “The Consolidated Clan Rule in the Towns and Villages of Hui County 
in Ming Dynasty and Ching Dynasty”, Studies on China’s History, No.3, 1995, at 47-55; 
Zhen Ding, “The Clan System and China’s Traditional Legal Culture”, The Legists, 
No.2, 2002, at 22-23.   
62 S. Sprinkle, An Introductive Study on the Legal System of the Ching Dynasty – An 
Analysis from the Sociological Perspective (translated by Zhang Shoudong, The Press 
of the College of Political Sciences & Law, Beijing, 2000), at 120.  
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(1) Clan justice under the Control of the Royal Government  
Although the clan courts were allowed to decide a wide range of cases, royal 
justice still held jurisdiction over the most serious cases, such as political offences, 
those which potentially endangered the regime. For example, although clan justice 
operated alongside royal justice in deciding on cases inside clans, all the serious cases, 
such as political offences, the complicated cases involving more than one clan, and 
cases appealed from clan courts, were still subject to the jurisdiction of royal justice.63 
Meanwhile, despite clan courts seemingly being officially approved to decide cases 
within the clans, the Royal Government never actually enacted any statutes to 
specifically legitimise the clan courts’ jurisdiction.64 Without statutory legitimisation, 
the clan courts were merely an expedient measure for delivering judicial power at a 
lower level, whilst the County Governors were statutorily still the legitimate first 
instance for any civil and criminal cases.65 In this way, whenever the Government 
wanted it, royal justice could be triggered to immediately take over the clan court’s 
jurisdiction and issue a decision. Besides, decisions made by clan courts had no judicial 
finality and were reviewable based upon appeal. In this way, any undesirable judgments 
made by clan justice could be reversed by royal justice, so, effectively, even clan justice 
was subject to the strict control of the Royal Government.    
(2) The Result of the Governmental Recognition of Clan Laws  
The Government sought to maintain the clan economy (as the economic basis of 
the nation) by recognizing clan justice and ensuring the loyalty of clan members. As 
mentioned above, a clan needed to unite each family and all individual members into a 
cohesive group to guarantee the productivity and survival of the clan. China was 
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comprised of numerous clans. The clan-based natural economy thus represented the 
foundation of the national economy. After centuries of evolution, the clans had all 
developed their own customary law to adjust and regulate behaviours of clan members, 
and to stabilize clan order. Being fully aware of the importance of the clan economy as 
the primary source of the national revenue, the Government paid close attention to the 
security and stability of clans. Compared with enacting statutory law to incorporate and 
replace diverse customary laws of various clans, the Government’s recognition and 
acceptance of these customary laws were a more convenient and realistic solution. 
Given that clan customary laws had been accepted by the Government, clan justice 
which executed them was hence acknowledged.66     
(3) In Consideration of Saving Judicial Resources  
In the national administrative hierarchy of feudal China, the lowest level was the 
county. There were 1587 counties during the Han Dynasty, 1573 during the Tang 
Dynasty, 1135 during the Song Dynasty, 1385 during the Ming Dynasty and 1300 
during the Ching Dynasty. During the Han Dynasty, there were 60 million people in 
China, while this number rose to 400 million during the Ching Dynasty.67 Given these 
national population numbers, each county might have been home to thousands of 
citizens. As mentioned above, in each county, there was only one governor who was 
tasked with both administrative and judicial duties, and thus could be expected to be 
extremely overworked. However, it seems that these county governors were not crushed 
by their workloads, mainly due to their being largely “indebted to clan courts that 
remedied the shortage of judicial staff in grass-root governments”.68 The role of clan 
justice in helping the Royal Government to save judicial resources was appreciated and 
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was in no small part the reason behind its official recognition. 
(4) To Legitimise the Imperial Regime 
The origins of the clans in China can be traced back to 3160 BC, much earlier than 
the establishment of the first feudal dynasty, the Qin dynasty, in 221 BC.69 After 
centuries of growth and development, some clans had a large number of members and 
great influence in the local community. With a county governor and a few 
administrative staff in place at the local level, it would have been unwise for the 
Emperor to arbitrarily exert power and thus risk offending these influential clans. 
Placating the clans by granting them conditional autonomy, including judicial power, 
over internal affairs, was a more advisable method of imposing and legitimising the 
imperial regime.70  
(5) The Compatibility of Clan Laws with the Imperial Regime  
In an attempt to secure the survival of clans, clan laws rarely challenged royal 
authority nor disobeyed national interest. On the contrary, clan law normally vindicated 
the imperial regime. For example, the customary law of the Chen clan in Yimen County 
provided that “taxes are critical requisites for the government and nation which shall be 
duly and fully paid irrespective of any difficulties”. Likewise, the customary law of the 
Wu clan in Shanyin County provided that “full payment of taxes is the principal duty of 
each family and shall be well planned and duly completed; any violation will be 
brought to the [clan] temple to measure punishment without remission”.71 By enacting 
such laws, the clan justice system endeared itself to the imperial regime and helped to 
guarantee its continuing existence.  
-- Significance and Impact of Clan Justice  
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(1) A Democratic Symbol in Ancient China    
Besides helping to stabilize clan order, remedying the shortage of judicial staff and 
legitimising the royal regime which, as mentioned above, were all beneficial to the 
Government, clan justice also resulted in the existence of an element of democracy in 
judicial proceedings. The lay judges of a clan court were normally elected by the clan 
members.72 The clan court of the Yu clan in Huanshan County of Anhui Province, for 
example, was composed of one chieftain as presiding judge, three assessors, three 
supervisors and ten bailiffs. The chieftain, assessors and supervisors were all elected by 
the clan assembly, while the role of the bailiffs was fulfilled by male clan members 
aged between twenty and 50 in turn, on an annual base.73 Furthermore, as well as being 
elected by clan members, lay judges in clan courts could be impeached or dismissed by 
clan members as well. For example, the law of the Yao clan in Ancheng County 
provided that: “any chieftain presiding over the clan court can be dismissed by the clan 
assembly via ballot for his confirmed slothfulness and injustice”. 74  Meanwhile, 
democracy was also found in the decision making process of clan justice. For example, 
the clan court of the Yu clan in Huanshan County of Anhui Province applied the voting 
principle of simple majority to decision making.75 The law of the Xing clan in Hefei 
City of Anhui Province provided for a clan assembly with the participation of all clan 
members and that voting by all the attendants should be applied to decide on any 
important case.76 These provisions demonstrate a democratic model of justice for all.  
According to Zhang and Zhou, Chinese people in feudal times were “so devoid of 
democratic tradition and consciousness of participating in politics” that this provides 
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74 Ibid, at 139. 
75 Ibid, at 144. 
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little fertile ground for the recognition of lay participation in China even today.77  
They did not define the meaning of the word “politics” in their argument, and so it 
could be argued that the “politics” they mention refers only to governmental activities 
that, as mentioned above, bordered on the repressive and autocratic. On the other hand, 
however, you have the idea that Thomas P. O’Neill, long-time Speaker of the House in 
the U.S. Congress, once articulated, that “all politics is local”.78 When considering the 
politics of the local community, the politics of the clan,79 the argument of Zhang and 
Zhou can be questioned since clan members frequently and fully accessed public affairs 
inside clans. From this perspective, it seems that Chinese people have had a long 
tradition of participating in democracy and politics, at the grassroots level at least.    
(2) A Symbol Indicating Chinese Citizens’ Receptiveness to Lay Justice  
In addition to some legal scholars throwing doubt on the democratic tradition and 
consciousness of the Chinese citizenry, others totally oppose pushing lay participation 
in China, due to the Chinese people’s supposed resistance to lay decision-making. Wei, 
for example, questions the feasibility of building lay participation in China, on the 
premise that the modern forms of lay participation, such as either the jury or lay 
assessor, are “incompatible with Chinese tradition”, effectively suggesting that Chinese 
civilians have been so accustomed to the tradition of “idolatry to professional authority” 
that they “would rather accept incorrect decisions by professional judges than correct 
judgments by lay judges” and that they are not willing to “judge and punish their 
neighbours” since this may break their traditional culture of “preserving harmony 
between neighbours and peace of the local community”. 80  Again, this argument 
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conflicts with the documented and historically important role clan justice has had in 
effectively resolving disputes.  
As mentioned above, clan courts were granted de facto jurisdiction over most of 
the civil and criminal cases inside clans. Any decision made by a clan court was open to 
appeal to the local County Governor.81 For example, the Chen clan law in Yimen 
County provided that “any dispute between the clan members, big or small, shall be 
brought to the clan court for a decision. Any irresolvable issue can then be appealed to 
the local government”.82 However, according to Li’s research, the decisions made by 
the clan courts were rarely appealed by the case parties.83 The lay judges of the clan 
courts, despite having neither professional legal education nor official appointment, 
imposed their authority well. They firstly “established their convincingness with their 
prestige”84 since the lay judges of the various clan courts were all directly elected by 
the clan members from their respectable and trustworthy peers, through a democratic 
process.85 Moreover, lay judges, living together with the case parties in the same 
community and “understanding the circumstances [of the case] and the feelings [of the 
parties], were able to mitigate conflict and resolve disputes by appeasing the parties”.86  
The idea that the system of clan justice was effective in resolving disputes and 
putting down conflicts is verified by the fact that Chinese people historically and 
voluntarily obeyed lay decision making rather than demonstrating ”idolatry to 
professional authority”87 so long as the lay authority was judged trustworthy. Based on 
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the above, it appears that Wei did not base his argument upon a sound understanding of 
historical practices. It would be logical for people to worship professional authorities 
because of their special knowledge and skills, and this may justify the first part of 
Wei’s idea of the people’s “idolatry to professional authority”. However, this does not 
necessarily mean that Chinese people have traditionally placed exclusive trust in 
professional judges for legal decision-making, especially when considered against the 
longstanding tradition of clan justice, where lay judges dominated and their decisions 
were predominantly accepted.  
Further, all of the judges serving at clan courts were clan members, peers and 
neighbours of the case parties, a fact which, in association with the lengthy history of 
clan justice, challenges Wei’s argument of Chinese civilians’ unwillingness to “judge 
and punish their neighbours”.88 Wei further argues that judging and, in particular, 
dispensing punishments to neighbours resulted in a level of offence and disharmony 
that conflicted with the prevalent Confucian idea of preserving community unity and 
the relationships between each individual.89 However, in light of the successful practice 
of clan justice, it seems that if a decision was made by a group of impartial and 
trustworthy peers of the parties involved and took into account “the circumstances [of 
the case] and the feelings [of the parties]”,90 it was far more likely to appease the 
parties, than to offend them and disrupt the harmony of the community.  
Clan justice was prevalent until its abolition by the Chinese Communist Party in 
1949, when the People’s Republic of China was established and the centralization of 
judicial power followed. However, the Communists, inspired by the far-reaching 
influence of clan justice, preserved the mediation function of clan justice by 
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establishing ‘the People’s Mediation Committee’ in each village, where a clan normally 
dwells. The working mechanism of clan justice has been largely passed on. In each 
People’s Mediation Committee, the reputable and just villagers, normally elected by the 
villagers, are seated on a part-time base to mediate disputes inside the village.91 In 1998, 
there were 9.8 million mediation committees with 9.17 million mediators in China, and 
5.27 million cases successfully resolved,92 a figure almost equal to the caseload of 5.72 
milion cases received by all of the law courts in China in the same year.93 Seemingly, 
lay people have continued to play a significant role in dispute resolution in China. This 
again verifies that idea that, in terms of legal decision making, Chinese people do not 
necessarily appreciate professional authority as “the entire Chinese society submits to 
concrete authorities”.94   
 
2.3.2 The Aborted Attempt to Introduce Juries  
 
2.3.2.1 Context of the Jury Experiment  
 
The decade 1902 to 1911 saw the fall of the last feudal dynasty and a movement 
towards reform and legislation. Actually, since the mid-nineteenth century, a number of 
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western “powers” had invaded China with varying levels of success. Some forced the 
Ching Government to sign a series of unequal treaties, whilst others went so far as to 
proclaim their consular jurisdiction due to the unpalatable existence of cruel 
punishments and the absence of human rights in China, a fact that caused much 
embarrassment for the Ching authorities.95 England, the United States, Japan and other 
countries promised to abandon their consular jurisdiction as long as China would 
undertake legal reforms to modernize its judicial system, abolish cruel punishments and 
restore human rights. Bowing to this pressure, the Ching Government committed to 
initiate a package of reforms to modernize its legal system, borrowing ideas and 
practices from the western democracies.96   
In 1905, the Committee of Legal Reform chaired by Shen Jiaben and Wu Tingfang 
sent a delegation to Japan to conduct a feasibility study for introducing Japanese law. 
“Interestingly, at that time, Japan was treated as a western country and believed that it 
had successfully learned the legal system from western countries.”97 Shen and Wu 
specifically stated that Japan was selected as their model since “as a neighbouring 
country in Asia, Japan has the situation and language similar to China’s, which will 
significantly facilitate us to borrow and introduce its law; since the very beginning of 
Japan’s legal reform, it commissioned the officials to go to France, Britain and 
Germany to study the advanced legal systems of the European countries, through which 
a series of modernized statutes combining the virtues of various western jurisdictions 
have been promulgated”.98 In 1906, the Committee of Legal Reform presented The 
Code of Criminal and Civil Procedures (Draft) which copied almost exactly its 
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Japanese counterpart.99 
Remarkably, The Code of Criminal and Civil Procedures 1906 (Draft) embodied 
27 articles (from Article 208 to Article 234) that introduced a jury system and specified 
the relevant mechanisms, such as jurors’ selection, summons, deferrals and exemptions, 
challenges, instruction and deliberation.100 The jury to be established under this draft 
code exhibited a few particular features. First, the jury was to be applied to both 
criminal and civil cases.101 Secondly, those qualified to be jurors were to be drawn from 
the narrow pool of the wealthy and respectable citizens, retired officials or ex-service 
officers, businessmen, school teachers and landlords; while common citizens were to be 
excluded102. Third, the proposed criminal and civil jury was composed of twelve and 
six jurors respectively,103 while fourthly, in terms of decision-making, the simple 
majority principle was to be applied to all civil disputes and common criminal cases, 
with unanimity required for serious offences, those potentially incurring the death 
penalty.104     
In reality, the criminal procedure law of Japan at that time had not yet introduced a 
jury system.105 It is thus interesting that the Chinese legislators attempted to insert an 
Anglo-American style jury system into this Japanese influenced draft code. 
Incorporating the jury system into the code was actually advocated by Wu Tingfan, the 
Deputy Chairman of the Committee of Legal Reform, who had studied in the UK for 
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years and qualified as a barrister.106 In an attempt to obtain support from the supreme 
ruler, Wu and Shen delivered a special plea to persuade the Emperor to approve the 
draft code. In their plea the jury system was particularly commended:  
“After carefully comparing and reviewing the legal systems of Europe and 
America, there are two traditional systems that are prevalent in various 
Western counties that should be urgently introduced – one is the jury and the 
other is the lawyer – both of which have been absent in the current legal system 
and are critical for rescuing China from humiliating exterritorial measures.”107  
Seemingly, the reformers expected the jury to be one of the methods through 
which China’s judicial system could be modernized, as well as accepted by the western 
countries.   
 
2.3.2.2 Abolition and Impact of the Jury Experiment  
 
The Code of Criminal and Civil Procedures 1906 (Draft) was forwarded to various 
superior officials and local governors for examination. However, the feedback that was 
received was by and large critical and negative. The overwhelming opinion was that the 
draft code “dramatically conflicted with the Chinese legal tradition and [its application] 
would be unrealistic”.108 Actually, the real reason behind the code’s negative reception 
was that the local governors were unwilling to see the judicial power that had been 
monopolized by them and their ancestors for thousands of years, shared by common 
people.109 Confronted with such strong objections, the Ching Government declined to 
implement the draft code and returned it to the Committee of Legal Reform for 
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reconsideration. On 24th January 1911, the Committee came up with The Code of 
Criminal Procedure (Draft). This new Code lacked any provisions for the 
implementation of a jury system and, in fact, totally excluded lay participation.110 The 
brave attempt to introduce juries into China was thus aborted.  
“Institutions flaunted during the legislative reforms of the Ching Dynasty were 
scarcely unimpaired”.111 The unsuccessful bid to introduce the jury into China is further 
evidence of the Ching Government’s hesitation to accept the widespread use of lay 
participation. In spite of its failure, the jury experiment “has far-reaching influence in 
the legal history of China”. 112  It shocked the conservative bureaucrats with its 
eye-opening, modern perspective, and left “indelible footmarks in the history of 
China”.113 Guo, the noted scholar specialising in studying China’s legal history, points 
out that “the criminal justice reform in the Republic of China (1912-1949) followed the 
footmarks of the Ching Dynasty” and even “the reform in China today has been largely 
its inheritance and development”.114 In 1927, the Republic of China, absorbing the 
lesson of the aborted jury experiment, issued The Lay Assessor Act 1927 that 
abandoned the jury and replaced it with the role of continental lay assessors. This post 
of continental lay assessors would later inspire the Chinese Communist Party to 
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2.4 Lay Participation under the Nationalist Government（1912 – 1949）  
 
A widespread public desire for a new governmental regime and order eventually 
resulted in a revolution in October of 1911 and the ousting of the imperial dictatorship. 
The Chinese Nationalist Party (the ‘Kuomintang’) seized power and ruled the Republic 
of China until 1949 when it lost the civil war to the Chinese Communist Party and was 
driven out of mainland China to Taiwan. During the four decades of Nationalist 
Government rule, lay participation continued to exist in China. 
 
2.4.1 A Mixed Tribunal System Existing in Name   
 
The modernization and reform of the Chinese legal system through the 
transplanting of Western laws started during the late period of the Ching Dynasty and 
continued during the tenure of the subsequent Nationalist Government. In 1927, The 
Lay Assessor Act, which borrowed the mixed tribunal system from Germany, was 
enacted.116 In light of the Act, Chinese courts at all levels adopted mixed tribunals to 
decide both civil and criminal cases. Each mixed tribunal was to be composed of one 
professional judge and two lay assessors, with the latter having the jurisdiction to 
decide on both factual and legal issues, just as a professional judge did.117   
During the 38 years of the Nationalists’ rule, they were continually forced to fight 
a number of political opponents. Between 1915 and 1916, one formidable warlord 
attempted to found a new dynasty while, in 1917, another sought to restore the Ching 
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Government. Once the Nationalists had succeeded in putting down these two rebellions, 
a number of provincial governors initiated a series of internal wars lasting for around 
another decade, in an attempt to establish local autocracies independent of the Central 
Government.118 Through cooperation with the Communists, the Nationalists defeated 
the provincial governors and consolidated nationwide power in 1927. However, that 
same year, cooperation between the Communists and the Nationalists broke down and 
decades of civil war between these two parties followed, until 1949. Stability and order 
during the Nationalist regime was shaken, not only by civil wars, but also by the 1931 
to 1945 war the aim of which was to expel Japanese invaders.119 In spite of the 
Nationalists’ attempts to introduce aspects of the modern, Western legal systems into 
China, it seems that “over much of the country, the government’s writ did not run; in 
war-time conditions, corruption and arbitrary military justice were more common than 
orderly judicial procedure”.120 Before the Chinese people had the chance to get to 
understand and accept the brand-new laws and judicial systems imported from the West, 
“law schools were being evacuated, courts burned, and the centres of government 
moved away”121 during the uninterrupted wars. In light of these events, The Lay 
Assessor Act 1927, though enacted throughout China, was largely suspended.122 In 
spite of this, however, the Act is still notable as the first statutory instrument to 
introduce lay assessors into China. More importantly, the Act inspired the Chinese 
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Communist Party to establish their counterpart, the mixed tribunal system, in 1932.123 
After the Communists seized power nationally, this system continued to be preserved, 
and still survives today.124       
 
2.4.2 The Commercial Arbitration Court – the De Facto First Instance for 
Commercial Cases    
 
Commercial arbitration, as an alternative dispute resolution applicable to 
commercial cases, seems beyond the scope of the administration of justice. However, 
commercial arbitration during the Nationalist Government had some unique facets that 
resulted in it being the actual first instance of commercial cases.  
 
2.4.2.1 Context of the Introduction of Commercial Arbitration   
 
The Ching Government actually introduced commercial arbitration in 1904, by 
enacting The Brief Regulation of Chambers of Commerce. Article 15 of the Regulation 
stated that a merchant could submit the commercial dispute to the chairman of the local 
chamber of commerce, who should then summon the directors of the chamber to 
arbitrate the dispute in due course. In accordance with the Regulations, a number of 
chambers of commerce were constituted in various Chinese cities. Some, in big cities 
such as Shanghai, Tianjin, Suzhou and Chengdu, even specially recruited “a group of 
influential merchants, well versed in local trading customs and conventions, to compose 
a court of arbitration”.125 Documentary evidence indicates that these lay arbitrators 
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played a significant role in resolving commercial disputes. Taking the Chamber of 
Commerce of Suzhou as an example, between 1905 and 1906 the arbitration court 
received approximately 70 cases and over 70% were successfully resolved, while from 
1905 to 1911 more than 380 cases were handled.126  
After the establishment of the Nationalist Government, greater importance was 
attached to commercial arbitration, due to the unsuccessful court reforms. The court 
reforms, as part of a package of legal reforms during the late Ching Dynasty, were 
initiated in 1906.127 Before that, as mentioned above, there had been no independent 
court system in China, as all cases were subject to the jurisdiction of various local 
governors holding both administrative and judicial powers at the same time. However, 
this reform was interrupted by the start of the Nationalist revolution in 1911. Soon after 
the Nationalists established their regime, the modernization and reform of the court 
system was placed on the agenda again and a four-level court hierarchy was established: 
the primary court, the regional court, and a high court situated in each county, 
metropolitan city and province respectively, with the Supreme Court located in the 
capital city. However, these reforms encountered insurmountable difficulties in 
practice.  
Various local governments reported that they were unable to afford the 
establishment of the local court system due to a shortage of both funds and legal 
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professionals. For example, in Jiangsu Province alone, there were approximately 400 
counties and cities, and the same amount of courts needed to meet the requirements of 
the reform scheme. However, “in 1903, the law schools were opened in this very old 
continent for the first time in its history”.128 Up to 1910, there had been only two law 
schools in China.129 As Cheng Dequan, the Governor of Jiangsu Province complained, 
“the qualified [judge] candidates have been exhausted whilst the budget [for 
establishing the court system] has got no assured source”.130  
By the end of 1912, only 89 primary courts and 26 regional courts had been 
established throughout China, far from the numbers required by the reform scheme.131 
Being aware of the impracticability of the reforms, on 16th March 1913, 34 provincial 
governors jointly proposed to the Central Government that the establishment of regional 
courts and primary courts be suspended. One year later, the Nationalist Government 
accepted this proposal and enacted The Regulation of County Governors Administering 
Judicial Affairs 1914 (Provisional) and The Procedural Regulation of County 
Governors Adjudicating Cases 1914 (Provisional) acts. According to these, all regional 
courts and primary courts were cancelled, as county governors regained the judicial 
power they had enjoyed during the feudal era. 132  Judicial professionalism and 
independence was thus stymied by reality in China.  
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Invasion by western countries after the late nineteenth century had brought to 
China advanced scientific techniques and had largely stimulated the industry and 
commerce of the country.133 This rapid commercial development was accompanied by 
a rising number of commercial disputes, which bothered local governors tasked with 
both administration and justice, so much so that “the government had to rely heavily on 
the social resources to resolve disputes.”134 These conditions resulted in commercial 
arbitration, which had been introduced during the Ching Dynasty, being preserved and 
further developed by the Nationalist Government.    
 
2.4.2.2 Actual First Instance for Commercial Cases   
 
On 28th January 1913, The Regulation of Arbitration Courts (amended on 28th July 
1913 and 19th November 1914) bill was enacted, according to which, each chamber of 
commerce had to establish an arbitration court. 135  On 8th September 1914, the 
Government also enacted The Detailed Working Regulation of Arbitration Courts. 136 
In accordance with these two regulations, each arbitration court consisted of one 
chairman, nine to twenty arbitrators selected from reputable merchants in the local 
business community, two to six investigators and two to six clerks and writers.137 The 
chairman and arbitrators were “elected by ballot for two-year terms, and receive[d] a 
nominal salary”.138 Most remarkably, arbitration courts had the jurisdiction to arbitrate 
two kinds of case: (1) cases petitioned by disputing parties, and (2) cases rendered by 
                                                        
133 See Zhu, supra note 126, at 297. 
134 Fu, supra note 125. 
135 Ruan Xiang (ed.), China Yearbooks (Vol. I) (The Commerce Publishing House, 
Shanghai 1928), at 1579. 
136 Ibid, at 1581.  
137 Fu, supra note 125. 
138 Lockenour, supra note 125, at 258. 
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local governors. In light of this regulation, when a local governor received a 
commercial litigation instituted by the plaintiff directly, without arbitration in advance, 
he could persuade (in practice, force) the parties to reach an arbitration agreement and 
then remand the case to the arbitration court.139 For example, between 1914 and 1917, 
31.7% of the cases handled by the arbitration court affiliated to the chamber of 
commerce in Suzhou City were directed there by the local governors.140 Commercial 
arbitration thus became almost compulsory rather than an optional proceeding. Also in 
light of The Detailed Working Regulation of Arbitration Courts, either of the parties 
could appeal the arbitration decision to the local governor within a stated time limit, 
otherwise it became effective and had judicial enforceability.141 Due to the compulsory 
nature and enforceability of commercial arbitration, it differed from other forms of 
alternative dispute resolution (ARD) for commercial cases, and was instead the first real 
legal action dominated by lay judges, as the arbitrators were drawn from local 
merchants.    
 
2.4.2.3 Functions and Impact 
 
Documentary evidence indicates that when the official judicial system did not 
function well, commercial arbitration, involving as it the participation of lay people, 
became an alternative and effective option for resolving disputes and restoring justice. 
On the one hand, and in contrast with local governors who “were never natives of the 
place where they held office, and so were ignorant of local customs and therefore 
                                                        
139 Fu, supra note 125. 
140 See Zhu, supra note 126, at 297-298; and Ma, supra note 126, at 285-286. Please 
note that many governmental archives recording history of this era are fragmentary 
probably due to the damages of the unceasing wars.      
141 Fu, supra note 125. 
 133
unable to give a fair decision based on these customs”,142 lay arbitrators were “well 
versed in local customs and usages”143 and so were able to make more appropriate 
decisions. On the other hand, injustice in the judicial area was rampant as “the officials 
were more interested in the fee than in a just decision”.144 Lay arbitrators, as peers of 
the parties in dispute, were all elected from the ranks of reputable merchants and served 
on a two-year basis, ensuring their incorruptibility and impartiality. This accounted for 
the fact that “although the decisions of these courts are not binding, yet the parties very 
seldom appeal”.145  
Limited information illustrating the operation of these arbitration courts in China 
survives. By 1915, there were 57 arbitration courts in the whole country whilst by 1934, 
33 more had been established.146 In terms of their caseloads, the arbitration court of 
Suzhou City, for example, handled at least 60 cases per year between 1914 and 1917.147 
Seemingly, the arbitration courts contributed greatly to the resolution of commercial 
disputes and to the conservation of judicial resources. Fu suggests that “the government 
relied heavily on arbitration courts in resolving disputes and alleviating local governors’ 
caseloads.”148 The important role of the arbitration courts has also been recognised by 
Lockenour who points out that the arbitration courts “might with accuracy be 
considered a part of the Chinese court system” because “literally thousands of cases 
were decided every year in China by these courts”.149   
 
 
                                                        
142 Lockenour, supra note 125. 
143 Ibid.  
144 Ibid.  
145 Ibid. 
146 Supra note 135, at 1575. 
147 See Zhu, supra note 126, at 297-298; and Ma, supra note 126, at 285-286. 
148 Fu, supra note 125. 
149 Lockenour, supra note 125, at 258.  
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2.5 The Mixed Tribunal System under the Communist Regime (1930 – 1949)  
 
By the end of 1920s, the Chinese Communist Party had occupied remote regions 
(the so-called “Revolutionary Bases” or “Soviet Areas”) of China and established its 
regime (the so-called “Red Regime” or “Soviet Regime”).150 When implementing their 
legal system, the Communists incorporated “Soviet Russian and Mongolian legal rules 
into traditional Ching law, Republic of China [the Nationalist Government] legislation, 
and Japanese and European law and procedure, as well as innovations within the 
Chinese revolutionary movement itself”.151 In 1932, The Composition and Working 
Regulation of the Ministry of Justice (Provisional) was enacted and a mixed tribunal 
system was introduced. In light of the Regulation, any court tribunal had to be 
comprised of one judge and two lay assessors; mixed tribunals were to be applied in all 
common criminal and civil cases; lay assessors were to be nominated by various 
associations of common people, such as farmers’ guilds and labour unions and each 
citizen with the right to vote could be nominated; during the period they were in place, 
lay assessors were paid by their employer as normal; a lay assessor had the equivalent 
power of a professional judge, that is, he or she decided on both factual and legal issues; 
and a simple majority rule applied in decision-making.152  
 
2.5.1 Implementation and Context  
 
                                                        
150 Supra note 8, at 566. 
151  Marc Rosenberg, “The Chinese Legal System Made Easy: A Survey of the 
Structure of Government, Creation of Legislation, and the Judicial System Under the 
Constitution and Major Statutes of the People’s Republic of China”, University of 
Miami International & Comparative Law Review, Vol.9, 2000-2001, at 229.  
152 Supra note 8, at 566. 
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Little information survives regarding the implementation of the mixed tribunal 
system under the Communist Government between 1932 and 1949 but it seems that the 
introduction of lay assessors during this period occurred in three phases.  
After the Communists established their regime, their first important task was to 
legitimise their rule. In terms of the judicial system, they invented a slogan of “justice 
of the people” in an attempt to win support from the public, and the mixed tribunal 
system was believed to be “an important measure” to help maintain popular support.153 
In this context, from the enactment of The Organisational and Operational Regulation 
of the Ministry of Justice 1932 (Provisional) to the end of 1934, when the Communists 
lost an important battle and were driven out of most of their territory by the Nationalist 
army, the mixed tribunal system was said to “exhibit the people’s nature of justice.”154    
The Communists gradually restored their forces between 1937 and 1945, as the 
Nationalist Government was occupied with the war against the Japanese. In various 
regions occupied by the Communists, the mixed tribunal system was re-adopted to 
“unite the people” and “consolidate the regime”.155 A noteworthy feature of this system 
during this period was that different regions enacted different regulations to engender 
diverse practices. For example, in some regions, the lay assessors were nominated by 
the masses through associations such as farmer’s guilds and labour unions; whilst in 
others, the lay assessors were directly selected by the courts themselves, or elected by 
the public. Meanwhile, in some regions lay assessors served on a fixed tenure base and 
were summoned to participate in trials in turn; while in other places, cases involving 
farmers, workers, civil servants, soldiers or marriage disputes were adjudicated upon by 
the specific lay assessors temporarily designated by the farmer’s guild, labour unions, 
                                                        
153 Ibid, at 572. 
154 Ibid.  
155 Ibid, at 588. 
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the Government, the army or women’s associations.156      
The war against Japan ended in 1945 with the ending of World War II. The civil 
war between the Nationalists and Communists then broke out again, lasting until 1949, 
when the latter won and occupied the whole of the Chinese mainland. During the war, 
once the Communists seized a territory they established their regime immediately, in 
order to consolidate their reign. The mixed tribunal system, as a tool enabling “justice 
of the people”, was instituted in each area.157    
 
2.5.2 Functions and Impact   
 
Due to the lack of material recording details of the implementation of the mixed 
tribunal system, it is impractical to evaluate the extent to which the institution helped to 
realize “justice of the people”.158 However, in light of the fact that it was fully 
implemented by the Communists, the institution seems to have helped “consolidate the 
regime”.159 No doubt due to its legitimising function, the mixed tribunal system was 
preserved by the Communists when the People’s Republic of China was founded in 
1949 and it continues to be in force up to the present day.160  
 
 
2.6 Conclusion  
 
Contrary to the prevalent view that lay participation had been absent in China until 
                                                        
156 Ibid.  
157 Ibid, at 605.  
158 Ibid, at 572.  
159 Ibid, at 572 and 588.  
160 See the subsequent chapter for more discussion.  
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the mixed tribunal system was introduced by the Communists during the 1930s, it has 
actually existed in various forms for thousands of years, and throughout the country’s 
history. Although civic participation in legal cases at the royal courthouses was absent 
in feudal China, due to the imperial monocracy, restricted educational provision, elitism, 
Confucian obedience and disciplinarian philosophy, lay people were in fact allowed to 
dispense justice in other ways, such as at the jury-like ‘Three Deliberations’. Also, clan 
justice existed, an activity dominated by lay judges, and commercial arbitration courts 
sat, the court of first-instance for commercial disputes. These can all be considered as 
alternative forms of lay participation, since they involved civic participation in judicial 
decision-making. Meanwhile, since the beginning of the last century, China has been 
trying to introduce modern forms of lay participation taken from various western 
democracies, including an experiment with the Anglo-American jury and an attempt to 
recreate the mixed tribunal system from Germany. In reality, it seems that Chinese 
society has never been without lay participation in one form or another.   
Some legal scholars expand their arguments to suggest that it would be difficult to 
implement lay participation in China, since civilians lack the tradition of participating 
in politics and accepting lay decision-making. Again, this argument conflicts with the 
history of lay participation in China. The ‘Three Deliberations’ process specifically 
allowed members of the public to participate in deciding complicated and important 
cases, whilst the clan justice system that was prevalent for thousands of years endorsed 
Chinese civilians’ devotion to politics within the local community. Moreover, the 
available materials unanimously indicate that the different forms of lay participation in 
China’s history, whether the ‘Three Deliberations’, clan justice or the commercial 
arbitration courts, were met with support rather than resistance from both citizens and 
the legislature. It is therefore questionable to oppose lay participation in China on the 
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grounds that people have traditionally been unreceptive to it.   
Besides being well adapted to the particular social-political context, as indicated 
by the documentary evidence, the survival and popularity of these forms of lay 
participation in China can also be attributed to the recognised virtues of the practice. By 
introducing the participation of common people from the “lower social hierarchies”,161 
a judicial proceeding became legitimate, as “it embodied decision making by the 
community and delivered public wills.”162 The collective decision making of the peers 
from the same community, those who understood “local customs”, 163  “the 
circumstances [of the case] and the feelings [of the parties],164  demonstrated the 
intelligence of the masses and helped to ensured a just decision was reached. The 
different forms of lay participation, whether the public election of lay judges or 
majority rule in terms of deliberation and voting, engendered a democratic spirit among 
the people. Meanwhile, lay people’s participation helped to resolve disputes, which 
significantly alleviated the caseloads of the professional judges and thus whittled down 
judicial costs. In addition, and in contrast to the corruption of professional judges as 
frequently reported throughout China’s history,165 little evidence has been found to 
indicate corruption among lay participants, a fact which further serves to verify the 
greater inclination towards justice and the impartiality of lay judges.            
It is undeniable that China, when compared with some western democracies, has a 
shorter history of implementing modern forms of lay participation, such as the jury. 
Nonetheless, in light of the above overview, it can be concluded that China does have a 
                                                        
161 See supra note 15, at 114. 
162 Supra note 22, at 34.   
163 Lockenour, supra note 125. 
164 Supra note 86, at 84. 
165 For more details about judicial corruption during China’s history, see Sun Shaobin, 
A Study on Judicial Corruption in China and the Possible Solutions (The Qunzhong 
Press, Beijing 2006), section 3 of chapter 1, at 17-29. 
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tradition of civic participation in the judiciary, and that the different forms of lay 
participation have played a significant role in the legal system. It would therefore be 
somewhat arbitrary to call for the abolition of lay participation in China based on 
historical and traditional factors.  
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Chapter 3 
Lay Participation in China Today: Shadow or Substance (I) 
-- Evolution of the Current Mixed Tribunal System and a Theoretical Study on its 




As mentioned previously, opponents have based their objection to the preservation 
of lay participation in China on three arguments: (1) the system has by and large lost its 
vitality in the world, (2) the traditional culture required to help develop and maintain 
this system has been absent in China, and (3) the experimentation with lay participation 
in China today, the mixed tribunal system, has proved to be ineffective over the past 
half century or so. The previous two chapters demonstrated that lay participation is still 
very much alive today, both from a worldwide perspective and based on its presence 
and popularity in China over time, a fact which challenges the first two arguments that 
lay participation is in decline worldwide and is at odds with China’s traditional culture.  
However, though the first two arguments against lay participation have been 
proved to be questionable, over the last two chapters, it remains uncertain whether the 
third argument is justified or not. In order to fully understand the situation regarding lay 
participation in China, it is necessary to study its current status, something I will 
explore in this and the next chapter. Section 3.2 of this chapter briefly reviews the 
organic development of the mixed tribunal system – the exclusive form of lay 
participation in China today, from its establishment in 1949 and up to the 1990s when it 
suffered a dramatic decline, and will clarify the context within which The Lay Assessor 
Act 2004 (The LAA 2004), an Act which has attempted to resuscitate the mixed 
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tribunal system, came into being. Although it seems at first sight that The LAA 2004 
shows the Chinese Government’s willingness to continue with lay participation in 
China, a number of questions are still valid, for example, as the only method open for 
Chinese citizens to participate in the judicial process, can the reformed mixed tribunal 
system demonstrate its legitimacy when the judiciary is so dominated by CCP allies? 
Can lay participation’s objectives be achieved, that is, to boost the public’s democratic 
participation in justice; and, can Chinese lay assessors, regulated by the new Act, move 
beyond the passivism that has overshadowed their function for so long? In response to 
these questions, Part 3.3 will critically examines the reform measures brought about by 
The LAA 2004 and will discuss their pros and cons, based on a theoretical analysis, 
which will be further verified and strengthened by the empirical study presented in the 
next chapter.  
 
3.2 Fluctuating Development between 1949 and 2004   
 
As suggested in the previous chapter, in an attempt to emphasise the democratic 
nature of the Communist regime, and inspired by their political opponents the 
Nationalist Party, who instituted a mixed tribunal system similar to that used in 
Germany, the CCP introduced their own counterpart in the 1930s which was largely 
borrowed from the Soviet model.1 The civil war between the CCP and the Nationalist 
Party entered its final stage in 1949. With the Communists seizing the majority of 
China’s territory, they started to develop a new regime: the People’s Republic of China 
(P. R. China). In September 1949, one month before the formal foundation of P. R. 
                                                        
1 Wang Kanghan, “A Brief Review of the Improvements of the Mixed Tribunal 
System”, see article published on the official website of the Supreme Court of China: 
http://www.hicourt.gov.cn/theory/artilce_list.asp?id=2853&l_class=3, last visited on 13 
Oct 2008.  
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China, the CCP introduced a provisional constitutional law, The Republic Charter 1949, 
which set down their theories of government. It is remarkable that the mixed tribunal 
system, listed as a basic judicial tenet, was stipulated within this law. Over the sixty 
years since then, this system has experienced a turbulent history that can be divided into 
four phases.  
 
3.2.1 Preliminary Development and the First Peak (1949 – 1966)     
 
3.2.1.1 General Situation  
 
It appears that the CCP attached great importance to the mixed tribunal system 
during the two decades following the establishment of the new regime, as evidenced by 
the creation of a series of laws and regulations in the 1950s and 1960s to bolster its 
effective implementation. Article 75 of The Republic Charter 1949 elevated the use of 
lay assessors to a constitutional principle by providing that “courts apply lay assessors 
to adjudicate cases in accordance with law”. Conforming to this mandate, The 
Organisational Regulation of Chinese Courts 1951 (Provisional), The Constitutional 
Law 1954, The Organisational Act of Chinese Courts 1954, The Supreme Court’s 
Notice of Incorporating the Selection of Lay Assessors into the General Election 1963, 
coupled with a variety of guiding regulations enacted in the mid 1950s,2 jointly 
established the legislative foundation to implement the mixed tribunal system, although 
                                                        
2 See, for example, The Justice Ministry’s Reply to the Inquiry that Whether Lay 
Assessors Are Entitled to Perform Judge’s Duties Temporarily (1956), The Supreme 
Court’s Reply to the Inquiry that Whether A Civil Case Deliberated by the Mixed 
Tribunal Already Shall Be Re-deliberated If the Case Has Been Conciliated by the 
Judge Alone (1957), The Justice Ministry’s Reply to the Inquiry that Whether A Lay 
Assessors Can Conciliate Cases Alone (1957), and The Supreme Court’s Reply to the 
Inquiry that Whether Lay Assessors Can Preside Over Court Conciliations Alone 
(1957). 
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there was still no special and integrated lay assessor code.  
In light of these aforementioned laws and regulations, the mixed tribunal system in 
China at that time exhibited the following features: all first-instance cases had to go 
through lay assessment in principle, except for “simple civil cases, minor criminal cases 
and cases otherwise prescribed by law”,3 allowing the jurisdiction of China’s lay 
assessors to reach its historically widest scope.4 In the meantime, Article 6 of The 
Organisational Regulation of Chinese Courts 1951 (Provisional) granted lay assessors a 
jurisdiction equal to professional judges, save for the ability to act as the presiding 
judge on a mixed tribunal. Furthermore, The Supreme Court’s Notice of Incorporating 
the Selection of Lay Assessors into the General Election 1963 clarified the selection 
process for lay assessors, so that each court had to independently select and nominate 
lay assessor candidates from the local community and generate a short list of nominees, 
with the local electorate then using the short list submitted by the court to decide on 
who should be appointed as a lay assessor. The tenure of each lay assessor was two 
years without any restraint on reappointment.      
There have been very few (either scholarly or official) documents that portray an 
integrated picture of how the mixed tribunal system operated during the 1950s and 
1960s. It seems that the institution enjoyed prosperity in the mid-1950s, as evidenced 
by the total number of lay assessors at that time, which reached a peak of about 200,000 
(approximately 0.05% of the national population then) in 1956,5 which was nearly four 
times the number in 2008: 55,6816 (amounting to only 0.0004% of the national 
                                                        
3 See Article 8 of The Organisational Act of Chinese Courts 1954.   
4 See further details below.  
5  See The Regulation of the Quota, Tenure and Selection of Lay Assessors, 
promulgated by the Ministry of Justice on 21 July 1956.   
6 The Statistical Office of the Supreme Court of China, “Lay Assessors in the Last 
Three Years – An Investigation of the Implementation of the Mixed Tribunal System”, 
The People’s Court Daily, 6 May 2008. 
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population7). Meanwhile, as indicated by a number of historical archives held by local 
governments, the lay assessors were widely used to adjudicate in criminal cases. For 
example, the archives of Chongming County of Shanghai City reveal that in 1956, 121 
out of 162 criminal cases (74.69%) adjudicated by the county court employed the 
mixed tribunals with participation of lay assessors, whilst 154 out of 276 (55.8%) civil 
cases were handled in the same way. Each mixed tribunal employed by this court was 
composed of one judge and two lay assessors.8 The archives from Taihu County of 
Jiangsu Province show that, from October 1955 to April 1956, 86% of the criminal 
cases subject to the jurisdiction of the county court used mixed tribunals as did all the 
95 criminal cases decided by the court from May 1956 to November 1956.9   
 
3.2.1.2 Reasons for Wide Use of Lay Participation  
 
The exact reasons why lay participation was championed by the CCP during the 
first decade after the establishment of the new regime have not been officially revealed. 
However, based on the social-political context then, it is possible to understand their 
reasoning.  
Despite the CCP announcing the nationwide establishment of its regime in 1949, 
the civil war against the Nationalist Party did not actually end until the mid 1950s. Even 
in the areas where the Communist Government had been instituted, battles against the 
                                                        
7 The National Statistical Bureau of China, “The Statistical Bulletin of National 
Economy and Social Development in China in 2008”, available at the official website 
of China’s government, http://finance.people.com.cn/GB/8876392.html, last visited on 
5 March 2008. 
8  The Chongming County Government, “Historical Archives of the Chongming 
County”, available on the official website of the Chongming County Government, at 
http://www.shtong.gov.cn/node2/node4/node2250/node4426/node16052/node62096/ind
ex.html, last visited on 19 September 2008. 
9 See the historical archive on the official website of the Taihu County Government, at 
http://www.thx.gov.cn/mysite.php?u=dzb&Id=2493, last visited on 19 September 2008. 
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remaining armed forces of the Nationalist Party broke out from time to time.10  
Effectively, before the mid 1950s, the CCP was not yet firmly entrenched in China and 
so the party sought methods to secure and legitimise its rule over the country, including 
in the judicial domain. In light of the fact that the CCP continued to openly deride the 
despotism of its opponent: the Nationalist Party,11 it was anxious to promote the 
democratic nature of its own regime. In terms of the judicial domain, the Communists 
invented a slogan – ‘the people’s justice’ - utilising a suggestion made by Dong Biwu 
(the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of China at that time) of “approaching the 
community, serving the community, regularising the community and securing the 
community”.12 The mixed tribunal system, involving as it did “justice as executed by 
the community”,13 seemed to fit well within this concept of “the people’s justice”.  
On the other hand, before 1952, the judges appointed by the Nationalist 
Government had been initially largely retained after the CCP took over the national 
power, as the party was unable to build its own court system and foster Communist 
judges overnight. However, around mid-1952, a nationwide campaign to “reform the 
legal system” was launched by the CCP Government. The judges who served the old 
regime were proclaimed to lack “ideological and political purity and a proper 
class-consciousness”. They were therefore by and large dismissed or even accused of a 
                                                        
10 See the official report, “The Situation of the Initial Stage of the P. R. China and the 
First Conference of the ‘United League’”, see the official website of the Committee of 
the Political Consultancy, at 
http://cppcc.people.com.cn/GB/34961/56107/56109/56117/3919169.html, last visited 
on 16 September 2008.         
11 See, for example, Yang Tianshi, “The Preface of ‘The History of the Kuomintang’”, 
Study Times, 16 September 2008, at 16.   
12 Dong Biwu, The Collected Edition of Legal and Political Articles of Dong Biwu 
(The Law Publishing House, Beijing, 1986), at 229.    
13 See Xu Ershuang, “Values of the Mixed tribunal System in China”, see the article on 
the official website of the Supreme Court of China, at 
http://www.hicourt.gov.cn/theory/artilce_list.asp?id=2785&l_class=7, last visited on 16 
September 2008. 
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“counter-revolutionary” offence and imprisoned. Communist cadres and other activists 
with “proper political attitudes and social status” were instead installed into the 
courts.14 However, it was unrealistic to staff all the courts with Communists, those who 
had had a legal education only in the short term, although many demobilized soldiers, 
workers, and other people politically affiliated to the CCP had been appointed as judges 
after a short period of legal training.15 From 1949 to 1956, China’s courts handled 
approximately 6,000,000 criminal cases and 8,500,000 civil cases. The conflict between 
the shortage of eligible judges and this huge caseload proved severe.16 In this context, 
lay participation was therefore seen as one of the remedies and the lay assessors were 
expected to “introduce new blood into the judicial organs” to help with the overstocked 
caseloads.17   
 
3.2.1.3 Genuine Democratic Participation by the People?   
 
Despite its growth, the mixed tribunal system appeared to be more a political token 
than an efficacious mechanism to implement substantial lay participation, since the 
jurisdiction of the lay assessors was strictly circumscribed.  
In the first place, lay assessors, as stated above, were only involved in 
                                                        
14 See Stanley B. Lubman, Bird in a Cage – Legal Reform in China after Mao 
(Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1999), at 47 and 48.   
15  See, for example, Shi Liang, “A Report about Completely Reforming and 
Mobilizing Chinese Courts of All Levels”, Xin Hua Monthly, September 1952, at 33.   
16 See supra note12, at 228. 
17 See He Bin, “Concepts and Definitions of Justice during the Initial Stage of the P. R. 
China”, see the author’s blog at http://qzone.qq.com/blog/622007831-1215610437, last 
visited on 19 September 2008; for the situation of the shortage of judges, see, for 
example, The Harbin City Government of Heilongjiang Province, “Historical Archives 
of Harbin City of Heilongjiang Province”, available at the local government’s official 
website, at http://dqw.harbin.gov.cn/ 
http://218.10.232.41:8080/was40/detail?record=90&channelid=42961&presearchword, 
last visited on 19 September 2008.  
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first-instance trials, all the judgments of which, according to Article 11 of The 
Organisational Act of Chinese Courts 1954, were open to appeal by either the 
defendants or the public prosecutors, effectively making the lay decision-making 
devoid of finality.  
Secondly, all the lay assessors were selected by the courts rather than randomly 
drawn from a general list of the citizens. Given that China’s courts were all under the 
political and administrative leadership of the CCP,18 the representativeness of the lay 
assessors was certainly open to question. I have been unsuccessful in unearthing 
statistical data indicating the composition of the lay assessors at that time, though it 
appears that “political accountability” was given much importance in the selection of 
lay assessors. As a matter of fact, before 1954, lay assessors were basically selected by 
the courts from mass associations, such as those unions of workers with close political 
relationship with the CCP or the local garrisons commanded directly by the CCP.19 For 
example, according to Ding Xiuxiang, who served as a lay assessor between 1956 and 
1957, he was appointed due to his “clean personal history” and his “upholding the 
country and the CCP”.20 In another example, the historical archives of Li Jing County 
of Shandong Province indicate that the lay assessors serving at the county court were all 
selected by the court from governmental departments such as the Women Association, 
the Organisational Department, the Department of Discipline Examination and the Civil 
Department.21 Such overly emphasized political accountability apparently prejudiced 
                                                        
18 See more details below.   
19 He Jiahong, “A Historical and Comparative Study of the Mixed Tribunal System in 
China”, Jurists, No.3, 1999, at 78.    
20 Ding Xiuxiang, “The Committee of the Political Consultancy Nominating Me to Be 
a Lay Assessor”, Ding’s memoirist published at the official website of the Committee 
of the Political Consultancy of the Pudong District of Shanghai City, 
see http://www.pdzx.gov.cn/infoAction.do?method=detail&news_id=3614, last visited 
on 17 September 2008.   
21 See The Li Jing County Government, “Historical Archives of Li Jing County”, 
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courts’ impartiality in selecting lay assessors, undermining the virtue of lay 
participation and making it a privilege of political activists in favor of the CCP, rather 
than a right to be equally exercised by all common people.       
To sum up, it appears that the application of lay assessors at this stage was under 
the strict oversight of the ruling party, who appreciated its merits as a method of 
political propaganda and of handling the extremely heavy caseload of the courts.  
 
3.2.2 Abdicant Courts but Surviving Lay Assessors (1966-1978)  
 
China was thrown into turbulence and lawlessness over the decade of the Cultural 
Revolution from 1966 to 1976. Under the anarchist doctrine that all forms of 
government are oppressive, undesirable and abolishable, the slogan “Smashing the 
Police, Public Prosecutors and Courts” became prevalent. The entire judicial system, 
including the courts, was accordingly subverted, with all the judges dismissed.22  A 
popular opinion in China’s academia is that during the Cultural Revolution the lay 
assessors retreated with the breakdown of the court system.23 This actually was not the 
case.  
When the CCP realized that the extreme anarchism was endangering its regime, it 
                                                                                                                                                               
available at the local government’s official website, at 
http://www.lijin.gov.cn/Detail.aspx?k=5345, last visited on 17 September 2008.  
22 See, for example, supra note 8; the historical archive on the official website of the 
Harbin City of Heilongjiang Province on the official website of the Harbin Municipal 
Government, at http://dqw.harbin.gov.cn/ 
http://218.10.232.41:8080/was40/detail?record=90&channelid=42961&presearchword, 
last visited on 19 September 2008.   
23 See, for example, Yang Kai, “The Institutional Reconstruction: An Analysis and 
Discussion about Reforms and Improvements of the Mixed Tribunal System”, see 
article on the united official website of China’s courts, at 
http://www.chinacourt.org/html/article/200410/28/136592.shtml, last visited on 18 
September 2008; Lin Wei, “Values of the Mixed Tribunal System in China”, see the 
article on the official website of the Qingtian County Court, at 
http://www.qtfy.gov.cn/show.asp?id=1348, last visited on 19 September 2008.  
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commissioned the army to institute a military government and take over national power, 
including justice.24 The disappearance of courts did not result in the end of lawsuits. On 
the contrary, confronting the dismissal of professional judges, the military government 
had to struggle with heavy caseloads. For example, according to the official statistics, 
there were approximately 1.2 million criminal cases filed during the decade of the 
Cultural Revolution. 25  In some regions, the military government readopted lay 
assessors to help with the caseloads, although these lay participants were known as 
‘community representatives’ rather than lay assessors. According to some archives 
preserved by the local governments, criminal cases, in absence of the law courts, were 
adjudicated by special mixed tribunals composed of the temporary judges appointed by 
the military governments, in association with “the community representatives” 
nominated by the local community.26 The scattered and fragmentary records from this 
turbulent period make it unrealistic to look into the specific selection process of these 
‘community representatives’ and the concrete working mechanism of these special 
‘mixed tribunals’. However, lay assessors certainly did not die out during this era.   
 
 
3.2.3 Transitory Rise (1978 – 1982)  
                                                        
24 See, for example, The Resolution of Concentrating Force to Actualize the Task of 
Supporting the Leftists, Farmers, Workers, Military Governance and Military Training” 
1967, promulgated by the CCP Headquarters on 19 March 1967; supra note 9; supra 
note 22; and The Wuhan City Government of Hubei Province, “Historical Archives of 
Wuhan City”, available at the official website of the local government, at 
http://www.whfz.gov.cn/shownews.asp?id=43395, last visited on 19 September 2008. 
25 Cui Shengyuan, “The 4th Special Report in Memory of the 30th Anniversary of the 
‘Reform & Open’ Policy – My Memory of the 8th Nationwide Conference on the Work 
of the People’s Justice”, see The People’s Court Daily, 7 June 2008.  
26 See, for example, “Historical Dossiers of Jiangsu Province – Chapter of Justice”, at 
the official website of the Government of Jiangsu Province, at 
http://www.jssdfz.gov.cn/dfz/detail?templet=detail5.jsp&id=18&searchword=ID=1197
425369593 AND 陪审 AND XML_ID=18, last visited on 18 September 2008.    
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The death of Mao Tse Tung in 1976 marked the conclusion of the disastrous 
Cultu
 as an 
essen
                                                       
ral Revolution and was followed by the rise of a more open leader, Deng Xiaoping, 
to the position of CCP Chairman. The Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central 
Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, held in December 1978, was 
epoch-making in the legal history of China. At this meeting, “Restoring Democracy and 
the Legal System” was declared to be a major goal of the Party. According to the new 
party line, the entire judicial system was to be returned to the format it has been in prior 
to 1966. The mixed tribunal system was accordingly resurrected by legislation.  
The Constitutional Law 1978 restored lay assessors’ participation in justice
tial judicial principle.27 The Organisational Act of Chinese Courts 1979, as its 
predecessor The Organisational Act of Chinese Courts 1954, re-demarcated the 
jurisdiction of lay assessors to first-instance trials only, except for simple civil cases 
and minor criminal cases with the one-judge tribunal applicable and the cases otherwise 
provided by law.28 Another remarkable milestone in the history of lay participation in P. 
R. China is that The Act of Criminal Procedure 1979 for the first time specifically fixed 
the quantitative dominance of lay assessors in mixed tribunals, in contrast with the 
previous practice where the laws remained silent on the exact proportion of judges to 
lay assessors in mixed tribunals, notwithstanding the fact that lay assessors in practice 
outnumbered the judges on occasion. 29  Article 105 of this Act provided that a 
first-instance case in a basic-level court or intermediate court should be adjudicated by 
a mixed tribunal composed of one judge and two lay assessors, except for cases 
launched by private prosecution and minor criminal offences, which should both be 
 
27 See subsection 2 of Article 41 of The Constitutional Law 1978.  
28 Article 9 of The Organisational Act of Chinese Courts 1979.   
29 See, for example, supra note 8. 
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adjudicated by a lone judge; a first-instance case in provincial high courts or the 
Supreme Court should be adjudicated by a mixed tribunal with the participation of one 
to three judges and two to four lay assessors. This attempt to use lay assessors in 
first-instance cases and confirm the quantitative dominance of lay assessors in mixed 
tribunals resulted in lay participation in China reaching its highest level yet.     
The revival of the mixed tribunal system after those turbulent times occurred for 
three
                                                       
 reasons. As well as the desire to return to the customary practices used before the 
Cultural Revolution, to legitimate the regime was again of the utmost importance for 
the CCP after the Cultural Revolution, which caused much dissatisfaction due to its 
undemocratic nature and caused huge suffering for the Chinese people.30 Meanwhile, a 
shortage of professional judges troubled Chinese justice again after the Cultural 
Revolution. As a matter of fact, all the judges in China were dismissed and some were 
even banished to rural areas or factories to receive so-called “thoughts rehabilitation” 
during the Cultural Revolution.31 In the meantime, almost all of the law schools in 
China were closed during this decade and did not reopen until 1977, resulting in a sharp 
decrease in the number of law graduates.32 Due to these two factors, China again 
suffered a shortage of judges at the end of 1970s.33 The slogan “the people’s justice” 
was therefore recalled to encourage lay participation and in order to assist short-handed 
courts.34      
 
 
30 The Research Department of the Party History of the CCP Headquarters, The Brief 
, “Tasks and Purposes of the Legal Education in China”, Legal 
he People’s Justice and Justice by the People”, He Yongjun (ed.), 
History of the Chinese Communist Party (The Publishing House of the CCP History, 
Beijing 2001), at 93.   
31 Supra note 22.  
32 See Zhang Liang
Daily, 31 August 2008. 
33 Supra note 22.  
34 Xie Hongfei, “T
The Discontinuity and Continuity – The Construction of Chinese Courts (1978-2005), 
(The Publishing House of Social Sciences, Beijing 2008), at 1.    
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3.2.4 Durative Decline (1982 – 2004)  
nfortunately, the re-emphasis on lay participation did not last long and was 
disru
.2.4.1 Legislative Regression  
he participation of lay assessors in the judicial process was firstly removed from 
the c
mixed tribunal optional and at the discretion of each court, providing instead that 
     
 
U
pted by the professionalization of judges soon thereafter. Deng Xiaoping, the 
Chairman of the CCP as he then was, brought forward a party policy entitled the ‘Four 
Modernisations’ at the beginning of the 1980s, which included the modernisation of 
industry, agriculture, science and technology, and of national defence. In response to 
this, the Chinese authorities initiated reforms to improve the quality of governmental 
staff at the beginning of the 1980s. “Youthfulness, Knowledgeability and 
Professionalisation” were advocated as necessary characteristics for government 
officials, as they were believed crucial to the goal of the Four Modernisations policy.35 
Conforming to this reform, as supported by the ruling party, elitism and professionalism 
were addressed in the judicial domain as well.36 Lay participation seemingly conflicted 
with this trend - towards an exclusively professional judiciary, and so was no longer 





onstitutional mandates by The Constitutional Law 1982. The legislative decline 
came not alone but in pairs. The Act of Civil Procedure 1982 (Provisional) made the 
                                                   
35 See Deng Xiaoping, Selected Articles of Deng Xiaoping (Vol. II), (The People’s 
Publishing House, Beijing 2001) at 326. 
36 Hu Yuhong, “The People’s Law Court and the Mixed Tribunal System – The 
Judicial Democracy in the Views of Classic Authors, Tribune of Political Sciences and 
Law (Journal of China University of Political Sciences and Law), Volume 23, No.4, 
2005, at 155.    
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“first-instance civil cases shall be adjudicated by the collegial panel composed of either 
judges exclusively or of lay assessors and judges, except for simple civil cases, to be 
adjudicated by single-judge tribunals”. The Organisation Act of Chinese Courts 1983 
further generalised the flexible application of lay assessors to a wider dimension. 
Subsection 2 of Article 10 of this Act stated that all first-instance cases should be 
adjudicated by the collegial panel composed of either judges exclusively, or of judges 
and lay assessors, and simple civil cases, minor criminal cases and cases otherwise 
provided by law should be adjudicated by the single-judge panel. In addition, The Act 
of Administrative Procedure 1989, The Act of Civil Procedure 1991 and The Act of 
Criminal Procedure 1996, all remained in line with The Organisational Act of Chinese 
Courts 1983.  
Besides a substantial decrease in the jurisdiction of lay assessors, the quantitative 
dominance of lay assessors in mixed tribunals was also forced to yield to the will of the 
courts. In contrast to The Act of Criminal Procedure 1979, which called for a majority 
lay assessors in mixed tribunals, The Act of Criminal Procedure 1996 made a 
remarkable amendment such that first-instance cases in basic-level courts and regional 
intermediate courts should be adjudicated by a panel composed of either three judges or 
of a three-member-mixture of judges and lay assessors, first-instance cases in provincial 
high courts or at the Supreme Court should be adjudicated by a collegial panel 
composed of three, five or seven judges, or of a three-member, five-member or 
seven-member mixture of judges and lay assessors. In other words, a three-member 
mixed tribunal, in light of this Code, might be composed of two judges in association 
with one lay assessor, or two lay assessors together with one judge, instead of the 
compulsorily two lay assessors and one judge as stipulated by The Act of Criminal 
Procedure 1979; likewise, a five-member or seven-member mixed tribunal would be 
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valid, even with only one lay assessor present.     
Additionally, The Act of Civil Procedure 1982 (Provisional), The Organisational 
Act of Chinese Courts 1983, The Act of Civil Procedure 1991 and The Act of Criminal 
Proc
ative regression, it seems that the mixed tribunal 
system had proved problematic in practice.  
essment was also accompanied by the 
decre ice. Since the mixed tribunal had been 
down
                                                       
edure 1996 all unanimously reiterated the same standpoint – restricting the 
jurisdiction of lay assessors to first-instance cases and making any lay decision made by 
a mixed tribunal reviewable, and thus lacking finality.  
 
3.2.4.2 Problematic Practice  
 
Aside from the desire for legisl
-- Total Suspension or Sporadic Use     
The legislative withdrawal of lay ass
asing application of lay assessors in pract
graded to optional and dependent upon each court’s will, a number of courts 
actually ceased to use it entirely from the mid-1980s. For instance, two out of seven 
basic-level courts in Yangzhou City had suspended the use of lay assessors by 2005.37 
In another example, 83% of the first-instance cases in Jiangsu Province between 1981 
and 1983 were adjudicated by mixed tribunal, but in contrast, the proportion dropped to 
72% between 1984 and 1987. Since 1988, there have been no further reports regarding 
the use of lay assessors in this province.38 It has also been noted by a number of 
academic publications and official materials that the mixed tribunal system has been in 
 
37 See the news report, “The Brief Implemental Situation of the Mixed Tribunal System 
in Various Courts in Yangzhou City”, The People’s Court Daily, 24 April 2006.  
38 See supra note 26. 
 155
very limited use since the mid-1980s.39   
In addition to its suspension in some courts, in more recent years lay participation 
has 
ganisational Act of Chinese Courts 1983 
prov
                                        
been excluded outside of specific court levels and case categories. According to 
Wei and Wang’s study, in terms of civil or administrative cases, the mixed tribunal has 
been basically applied exclusively in the lower courts, such as the local courts and 
regional intermediate courts, whilst the provincial high courts have never employed the 
mixed tribunal in any first-instance trial until 1999, despite the fact that legislatively it 
has been applicable to any first-instance cases, whatever the court level.40  
-- Poor Benefits for Lay Assessors    
Subsection 1 of Article 39 of The Or
ides that the courts are liable to pay appropriate subsidies to lay assessors, whilst 
leaving the specific payment amount blank. In practice, some lay assessors are paid 
very humble sums. According to an official newsletter, a basic-level court in Beijing 
City only pays a daily subsidy of RMB 1.6 Yuan (approximately sixteen UK pence) to 
each lay assessor, at a time when this sum was insufficient even to buy a day-return bus 
ticket. It has been reported that the lack of benefits directly undermines the enthusiasm 
and commitment of some lay assessors.41   
                
39 See, for example, Wei Min, “Shall the Mixed tribunal System Be Suspended: The 
Developmental Direction of the Mixed Tribunal System”, Gansu Social Sciences, Vol.4, 
and 
 Tribunal System and Its Counterparts in the Western Countries”, 
2001, at 31 and 32; Wang Minyuan, “The Mixed Tribunal System and Its 
Improvements”, Legal Studies, Vol. 4, 1999, at 31; and the news report, “Foundations 
of Reforming the Setting of Lay Assessors’ Function”, China Daily, 4 Dec 1999.   
40 See Wei Min, “The Reform Direction of China’s Mixed Tribunal System from the 
Perspective of Sino-American Comparison”, Social Sciences, No.11, 2001, at 35; 
Wang, ibid, at 31. 
41 See Ding Yisheng and Sun Lijuan, “A Comparative Study on the Applicable Area of 
the Chinese Mixed
Jurisprudence, Vol.11, 2001, at 12; the news report, “Lay Assessors Accompany rather 
than Adjudicate and Full-time Lay Assessors Need to be Removed”, at the official news 
website of Chinese government”, see 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2004-04/02/content_1398688.htm, last visited on 2 
March 2009; this reality has been reported as well by the Pengzhou Court of Sichuan 
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It would be unfair to merely blame the courts for their economy. As a matter of 
fact, China’s courts have always been far from financially independent. The budget of 
each court in China has to be approved and the funds are appropriated by the Finance 
Department of the local government.42 It has been reported that a number of local 
governments have stopped providing funds to the courts for maintaining lay assessors 
since the law no longer compulsorily requested the application of mixed tribunals. After 
losing this financial support, some courts have had to use lay assessors sparingly and 
have been unable to pay them generous subsidies.43   
-- Appearance of ‘Full-Time’ and ‘Long-Serving’ Lay Assessors    
‘Long-serving’ and ‘full-time’ lay assessors have been two remarkably abused 
practices, involving lay people who have served at courts for many years or even on a 
full-time basis.  
(1) The Prevalence of ‘Full-Time’ and ‘Long-Serving’ Lay Assessors 
In fact, irrespective of the decline in use of lay assessors, the conflict between the 
workload and a shortage of professional judges was never resolved in China during the 
1980s and 1990s. For example, in 1978, there were approximately 70,000 judges in 
China and this number doubled to 156,000 in 1998.44 In contrast, the caseload for all 
China’s courts increased ten-fold over the same two decades, starting from 
                                                                                                                                                               
Province and the Jingjiang Court of Jiangsu Province, see Wang Dide, “An Analysis of 
the Operational Situation of the Mixed Tribunal System in the Pengzhou Court”, 
available at the official website of the Pengzhou Court of Sichuan Province: 
http://www.pzfy.org/Article/gzdt/qkfy/200608/977.html, last visited on 14 December 
2007; and Gao Yujun, “Problems with Using Lay Assessors and the Possible Solutions”, 
available at the official website of the Jingjiang Court of Jiangsu Province: 
http://www.jsfy.gov.cn/cps/site/jsfy/lilunyanjiu/dc_content_a2007110830351.htm, last 
visited on 14 December 2007.    
42 See further discussion in Chapter 5.  
tudy on Judicial Reforms in China (The Publishing House of 
43 Supra note 39, at 32. 
44 See Wang Limin, A S
Law, Beijing 2000), at 31; see also Yu Jun, “Do Easterners Really Hate Lawsuits? – An 
Analysis of the Low Litigation Rate in Contemporary China and Japan”, Social 
Scientists, No.3, 2000, at 78.    
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approximately 500,000 in 1978 and reaching 5.39 million by 1998.45 Suffering from 
this high workload, plus the fact that simple civil cases and minor criminal offences had 
to be adjudicated by a single-judge panel according to the procedural laws then,46 some 
courts complained that the collegial panel of three judges was by no means an 
economical form of manpower use and could not ease the courts’ workload. The use of 
mixed tribunals with lay judges, though not demanded by the law, was therefore 
preserved by some courts essentially for the sake of alleviating their workload, since lay 
assessors were able to replace judges as tribunal members.47 Driven by this desire to 
spread their caseload between more people, rather than by a wish to encourage lay 
participation itself, it seems that the courts’ practice of using lay assessors substantially 
distorted what was originally intended in law.  
Some of China’s courts reemployed the same lay assessors for years or even 
deca
                                                       
des.48 For example, Jiang Shifeng served at the Court of Xingguo County of 
Jiangxi Province for thirteen years from 1993 to 2006, and participated in 720 cases in 
total;49 Ma Hao was appointed as a lay assessor by the Court of Fengtai District in 
 
45 See Xu Qianfei, “An Evaluation and Analysis of Chinese Judges’ Quality”, People’s 
 
n Shangqiu City”, see the official website of China’s courts, 
Justice, Vol.9, 2001, at 9. 
46 See Article 40 of The Act of Civil Procedure 1991 and Article 174 of The Act of 
Criminal Procedure 1996. 
47 See, for example, Cui Hailin and Wang Zhi, “A Survey Report on the Working 
Situation of Lay Assessors i
at http://www.chinacourt.org/html/article/200806/06/306182.shtml, last visited on 26 
September 2008.  
48 See, for example, Xiao Yang, “The Speech on the First Conference of Chinese Lay 
Assessors”, see the official united website of China’s courts at 
http://www.chinacourt.org/html/article/200709/03/262886.shtml, last visited on 28 
September 2008, or the official website of the Chinese Communist Party of China, at 
http://cpc.people.com.cn/BIG5/64093/64094/6210478.html, last visited on 28 
September 2008.  
49 See the news letter, “The Story about An Excellent Lay Assessor – Jiang Shifeng”, 
at the united official website of China’s courts at 
http://gzzy.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=8417, last visited on 28 September 
2008.  
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Beijing in 1994 and participated in over 2000 trials up until 2nd January 2004.50 What is 
worse, some courts chose to recruit unemployed people or pensioners as lay assessors 
and allocated heavy caseloads to them, effectively transforming them into full-time 
court employees. Sun Bozong, for example, was employed as a lay assessor by the 
Court of Shapingba District of Chongqing City in 1998 after he became unemployed 
due to the bankruptcy of his company. Until 2005, he lived on his income from the 
court. During this seven-year period, he participated in approximately ten cases each 
month whilst the highest number was five cases within one week, an even heavier 
workload than some of the professional judges in the same court. Because he needed to 
participate in trials, one after another, he had to work at the court all day long during 
weekdays.51 A more radical practice was reported by the Court of Wuhou District in 
Chengdu, Sichuan Province, where eight lay assessors were appointed in 2003 and were 
requested to work at the court four days a week within their two-year tenure. The court 
in return paid them monthly wages. It was admitted by the court that “the majority of 
the eight lay assessors were pensioners”.52 As documentary evidence has revealed, this 
phenomena of full-time lay assessors and lay assessors serving for many years was 
rather popular across the whole country.53  
                                                        
50 See the newsletter, “Shall the Mixed Tribunal System Turn Left or Right?”, at the 
official website of China’s governmental organisations, at 
http://www.chinaorg.cn/lrrd/01_lldt/2004-03/09/content_5019503.htm, last visited on 
28 September 2008. 
51 See the newsletter, “Lay Assessors Pay out Both Labour and Money and Proceed 
Difficultly – the Phenomenon of Unbalanced Allocation of Caseloads Is Prominent”, 
see the official news website of Chinese authority, at 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2005-11/14/content_3776737.htm, last visited on 27 
September 2008.   
52 The court did not reveal the exact number of the pensioner lay assessors. See the 
newsletter, “Shall the Mixed Tribunal System Turn Left or Right?”, at the official 
website of China’s governmental organisations, at 
http://www.chinaorg.cn/lrrd/01_lldt/2004-03/09/content_5019503.htm, last visited on 
28 September 2008. 
53 Supra note 39, at 33. 
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As well as the distorted intentions behind the use of full-time lay assessors, there 
ed a series of deep-seated reasons responsible for their occurrence.  
First, the term “selection of lay assessors”, in China’s judicial pr
lved two parts: (1) each court “selected” the lay assessors from the local 
community to form a lay assessor pool for its use, whilst each lay assessor had to serve 
on the basis of a fixed tenure which was normally two years, prior to The Lay Assessor 
Act 2004, and (2) when a mixed tribunal needed to be formed, the court “selected” a 
specific lay assessor from the pool and designated him or her to participate in the trial.54 
Before The Lay Assessor Act 2004, Article 38 of The Organizational Act of Chinese 
Courts 1983 provided that lay assessors should be elected by local electorates. However, 
this provision was largely abandoned and, in practice, it became the norm that many 
courts made their own choices and (rather than randomly from a general list of the 
citizens such as the electoral register, as some common-law jurisdictions do55) selected 
the lay assessors from the local community, without any checks.56 In other words, the 
courts had total freedom to decide who was selected.57   
                
54 See Huang Suying, “A Brief Analysis of Problems of the Mixed Tribunal System 
and Possible Solutions”, the official website of China’s courts, at 
g/html/article/200807/22/313160.shtmlhttp://www.chinacourt.or , last visited on 3 
e Court of China, “The Interpretation of the Draft of The Lay Assessor 
se People’s Congress for the latter’s 
March 2009.  
55 R. Gwynedd Parry, “Random Selection, Linguistic Rights and the Jury Trial in 
Wales”, Criminal Law Review, Oct 2002, at 807.  
56 The Suprem
Act 2004”, this Interpretation, together with the Draft of Lay Assessors Act 2004, was 
submitted to the Standing Committee of the Chine
reference and deliberation on 2 April 2004, available at the official news website of 
China’s government: 
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/14576/28320/32776/32780/2445485.html, last visited 
on 3 March 2009; and supra note 39, at 33. 
57 For example, an official report from the Supreme Court of China revealed that 
before The LAA 2004, 41.5% of the lay assessors were directly selected by the courts 
while 23.7% were nominated by the relevant organisations and appointed by the courts 
after reporting to the corresponding standing committees of the local People’s 
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Secondly, unlike in some common-law countries where refusal to attend court for 
jury service without a lawful excuse may be classed as contempt of court, there was no 
punishment for such behavior in China. In the absence of such a compelling reason to 
attend, coupled with the humble subsidies, it was common for lay assessors in 
employment to be reluctant to perform their duties in court. Some of them even chose 
to evade court service by regularly asking for exemption or deferral.58 In this case, 
some courts, having the unbounded discretion of selecting lay assessors, gave up 
recruiting those lay assessors who were in employment, and instead exclusively 
selected those pensioners and other unemployed people who were more responsive and 
available.  
Thirdly, in contrast to some countries where the workload of each lay assessor was 
strictly circumscribed, (for example, Russian lay assessors serves no more than two 
weeks per year, whilst each German lay assessor serves only eight times each year at 
the criminal court of Bochum, and four times in Frankfurt.59), there was no such 
limitation in Chinese law. This left the courts free to overuse a lay assessor if they so 
wished.  
Fourthly, given that some local governments refused to provide funds for 
     
maintaining lay assessors, then in an attempt to axe expenses involved in selecting, 
                                                                                                                                                          
Congresses, with few lay assessors elected by the local electorates. See the Supreme 
Court of China, “The Interpretation of the Draft of The Lay Assessor Act 2004”, this 
Interpretation, together with the Draft of Lay Assessors Act 2004, was submitted to the 
Standing Committee of the Chinese People’s Congress for the latter’s reference and 
deliberation on 2 April 2004, available at the official news website of China’s 
government: http://www.people.com.cn/GB/14576/28320/32776/32780/2445485.html, 
last visited on 3 March 2009.  
58 See the newsletter, “Lay Assessors Pay Out Both Labour and Money and Proceed 
Difficultly – the Phenomenon of Unbalanced Allocation of Caseloads Is Prominent”, 
see the official news website of Chinese authority, at 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2005-11/14/content_3776737.htm, last visited on 27 
September 2008.  
59 Stefan Machura, “Fairness, Justice, and Legitimacy: Experiences of People’s Judges 
in South Russia”, Law & Policy, Vol.25, No.2, 2003, at 128 and 134.  
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train
d massive caseloads to them, effectively 
trans
islation and also to absence of financial support. According to The 
Supr
-serving lay assessors were 
comm 60 they 
                                        
ing and managing lay assessors, some courts endeavored to limit the number of lay 
assessors and allocated the entire workload to a few people, rather than retain a large 
pool of them.  
Due to the above four reasons, courts sometimes recruited only a few pensioners 
or other unemployed people, then allocate
forming them into full-time court employees, such as what happened to Sun 
Bozhong.    
The practice of having long-serving lay assessors can be attributed to the 
problematic leg
eme Court’s Notice of Incorporating the Selection of Lay Assessors into the 
General Election 1963, the tenure of each lay assessor was normally two years, without 
the limitation of reappointment. Needless to say, dismissing the old lay assessors and 
selecting new recruits every two years was much less convenient than simply 
reappointing the old assessors. In the meantime, training new lay assessors was 
expensive and so was highly undesirable, especially since the Government placed ever 
greater financial restrictions on the courts. In these circumstances, some courts were 
inclined to reuse the same lay assessors and refused to replace them with new blood for 
many years. As indicated by the case of Sun Bozhong, the phenomena of both full-time 
and long-serving lay assessors was concurrent and linked.  
(3) The Adverse Impacts of ’Full-Time’ and Long-Serving Lay Assessors 
Notwithstanding the fact that these full-time and long
ended by some courts for their contribution to the overloaded caseload,
                
60 See, for example, Xiao Yang, “The Speech on the First Conference of Chinese Lay 
Assessors”, see the official united website of China’s court  at s
http://www.chinacourt.org/html/article/200709/03/262886.shtml, last visited on 28 
September 2008, or the official website of the Chinese Communist Party of China, at 
http://cpc.people.com.cn/BIG5/64093/64094/6210478.html, last visited on 28 
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also brought with them various problems.   
The full-time lay assessors endangered the representativeness of lay assessors. As 
mentioned above, to ensure the responsiveness and availability of lay assessors, some 
courts preferred to select pensioners and the unemployed. This may have undermined 
the cross-sectional nature of the lay assessor pool. What is worse, the pool may have 
not changed for years or even decades, due to the endless reappointment of certain 
assessors.  
One of the merits of lay participation, one that has been widely acknowledged, is 
that, in contrast to case-hardened judges, lay assessors are normally more sensitive, 
responsive and patient in trials, because they “are selected for a period of several years 
and are only occasionally summoned to the courts to serve on a particular day”.61 
Rarely entering into the courtroom, each trial could be a whole new story for them.62 
However, after having assumed a heavy caseload, one equivalent to that of a judge, and 
after serving for years or even decades, the lay assessor will probably act “out of 
routine”, like a judge, with his or her sensitivity and enthusiasm eroded.63   
Another value of the mixed tribunal is the check and balance function of lay 
participants. Lay assessors are expected to prevent potential injustice handed out by 
both judges and courts, entities that are “bound by organisational restrictions” and thus 
“susceptible to the state’s direct influence.”64 In contrast, a lay participant from the 
community, and without administrative affiliation to the court, may be free of these 
“organisational restrictions”. However, where a lay assessor works full-time and lives 
on the income from the court, a financial bondage is likely to be established. With the 
                                                                                                                                                               
September 2008. 
61 Sanja Kutnjak Ivkovic, “An Inside View: Professional Judges’ and Lay Judges’ 
Support for Mixed Tribunals”, Law & Policy, Vol.25, No.2, 2003, at 95. 
62 Ibid, at 96.  
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid, at 95. 
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risk of losing a good income, the lay assessor may have to bend his or her behaviour to 
satisfy the court, his employer, and become “susceptible to” the court’s (and indirectly 
the State’s) “direct influence”. 
Meanwhile, the check function of lay participants also embodies the idea that they, 
as an independent party representing the community, enter into the courtroom and the 
judge’s chamber to oversee the judicial proceedings and prevent potential misconduct 
by the judge. For the successful realisation of this function, the independence and 
impartiality of the lay participants is necessary. However, once the lay assessors work 
together with their professional colleagues on a day-to-day basis, for several years, they 
might gradually form alliances which may counteract any potential role as an 
independent check. It has been revealed that after Russian lay assessors report to the 
same courtroom for a long period of time, they may be inclined to “became dedicated to 
their respective judge.”65 In the USA, grand juries are also said to “become dedicated to 
a prosecutor with whom they regularly work.”66 Likewise, it has been reported in China 
that concerns such as “maintenance of human relationship”, “office politics” and “face 
saving” can hold back the lay assessors from impeaching their professional colleagues, 
even when they have found the latter’s conduct to be akin to lawbreaking.67   
In addition, acting as a lay assessor and participating in the administration of 
justice is the right of each Chinese citizen. The prejudice in favour of pensioners and 
the u
                                                       
nemployed in the selection of lay assessors resulted in a deprivation of the rights of 
 
65 John C. Coughenour “Reflections on Russia’s Revival of Trial by Jury: History 
Demands That We Ask Difficult Questions Regarding Terror Trials, Procedures to 
Combat Terrorism, and Our Federal Sentencing Regime”, Seattle University Law 
Review, Vol.26, 2002-2003, at 406. 
66 Ibid.   
67 The newsletter, “Shall Lay Assessors Work Full-time”, see the on-line news report 
of the website of the official TV station of China, at 
http://www1.cctv.com/news/china/20040105/101426.shtml, last visited on 28 
September 2008.  
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other citizens. Unlimited reappointment of these assessors served to worsen the 
situation.      
-- The Passivism of Lay Assessors   
A judicial adage, popular in China in the 1980s and 1990s, is that “Lay assessors 
acco  [cases]”, and this captures succinctly and 
accu
 sometimes criticised for their 
“pas
inappropriate compensation as mentioned above.  
ourt of 
                                                       
mpany [judges] rather than adjudicate
rately the very inactive role of the lay assessors.68  
On one hand, lay assessors were said to remain silent like puppets during trials and 
deliberations.69 On the other hand, lay assessors were
sive obedience to the judge in the deliberation, which has transformed the 
deliberation into the judge’s speech instead of the group discussion of the mixed 
tribunal”.70 In an investigation into the deliberation records of a sample of 50 cases, the 
lay assessors said nothing but “yes, I agree” in 42 (84%) cases; whilst in the other eight 
(16%) of cases, the lay assessors totally agreed with the judges, presenting only some 
supplementary ideas.71    
This passivism on the part of the lay assessors can be attributed to a series of 
reasons beyond that of their 
The first possible reason was that the lay assessors encountered practical 
difficulties in performing their duties. As revealed in a report of the Supreme C
 
68 See, for example, the newsletter, “China Will Renovate the Mixed Tribunal System 
and Resolve the Problem of ‘Accompanying Rather Than Adjudicating’”, available at 
the official news websites of Chinese government: 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2004-04/02/content_1398688.htm, last visited on 15 
Oct 2008; and the newsletter, “Zhao Weizhong: From ‘Not Adjudicating But 
Accompanying’ to ‘Not Only Accompanying But Adjudicating’”, at the official website 
of China’s courts: http://www.chinacourt.org/html/article/200701/08/229756.shtml, last 
visited on 15 Oct 2008.   
69 Newsletter, “The Mixed Tribunal System Faces Four Difficulties”, Legal Daily, 8 
May 2008.  
70 He Bing, “Merits of the Mixed Tribunal System”, The People’s Court Daily, 25 
April 2005.   
71 Ibid.  
 165
Chin
ulgation of The Lay 
Asse
ions upon the behavior of lay 
asses
                                                       
a, 51.8% of the lay assessors serving at the courts of Shanghai City admitted that 
they always had problems in understanding the specific legal points of the cases.72 
Needless to say, a lay assessor cannot be expected to participate fully and effectively 
in a trial if they lack a clear understanding of the case itself.   
The problem of insufficient instruction being given to the lay assessors seems to 
have been another reason for their inactivity. Before the prom
ssor Act 2004, only subsection 2 of Article 38 of The Organisational Act of 
Chinese Courts 1983 stipulated that a lay assessor had the same jurisdiction and duties 
as a judge, except for when acting as the presiding judge in a mixed tribunal. However, 
except for this provision, there was no other law or regulation to specify the duties and 
rights of lay assessors in detail. Besides, according to Zhao and Du’s investigation, 
numerous courts did little to instruct the lay assessors what to do and not to do in 
practice. Without knowing their specific duties and rights, the lay assessors may have 
chosen to remain silent or follow the judge’s lead.73   
In addition, as stated above, punishments such as contempt of court were not 
established in China, so there were insufficient restrict
sors. The penalties that could be imposed for a lay assessor’s impropriety, such as 
evading court service and sleeping during the trial, included only warnings, criticism 
or at most suspension. These were, of course, far less of a deterrent than a charge of 
contempt of court would be. Furthermore, being suspended lay assessment might 
actually have been what the lay assessor who failed in their duties was hoping for.   
As mentioned above, the tenure of lay assessors in China was two years without a 
 
72 Newsletter, “The Mixed Tribunal System Faces Four Difficulties”, Legal Daily, 8 
May 2008.  
73 Zhao Xingwu and Du Hui, “The Investigation of the Implemental Situation of the 
Mixed tribunal system in the Courts of Nanjing City”, The People’s Court Daily, 23 
May 2006. 
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reappointment restriction, nor a restriction on workload. Where a lay assessor assumed 
a hea
ssessor Act 2004 -- Real Change or Rhetoric?   
 in 
China experienced an unsteady evolution after 1949. Further, all of the norms 
regu
                                                       
vy caseload and kept working for years (for example Ma Hao who participated in 
2000 trials within ten years.74), it would have been highly unlikely that his or her 
enthusiasm would not have diminished over time. As Shen Deyong, the then Vice 
Chief-Justice of the Supreme Court of China, pointed out, “overwork undermined the 
participant interests of the lay assessors which have already been affected by their 
poor subsidies”.75 
 
3.3 The Lay A
 
In light of the above discussion, it can be seen that the mixed tribunal system
lating lay assessors were scattered across provisional regulations and varying laws 
regarding court organisation and judicial proceedings, rather than in a special and 
integrated statute. Over the last two decades of the twentieth century, the application of 
lay assessors was in a state of continuous decline, a decline accompanied by very 
inconsistent practices. For this reason, and as mentioned in the introduction of the thesis, 
since the late 1990s there has been some controversy regarding the continuance of the 
mixed tribunal system, and even lay participation as a whole in China, and three 
schools have thus surfaced, first those who advocate the entire suspension of lay 
participation, those who wish to replace lay assessors with juries, and those who wish to 
preserve lay assessment but improve the mixed tribunal process. However, it is striking 
that at the beginning of the new millennium, the first special act regulating the 
application of lay assessors, The Lay Assessor Act 2004, was enacted and came into 
 
74 See supra note 52.  
75 See supra note 58. 
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force on 1st May 2005, just a century after China’s first experiment at introducing the 
jury in 1906. This seems to signal that in the maelstrom of controversies about lay 
assessors and lay participation, the Chinese authorities, neither embracing the full 
abolition of the mixed tribunal system, nor initiating revolutionary reform by replacing 
it with the jury, have taken a moderate path by adhering to the renaissance of the mixed 
tribunal system. However, it is debatable as to how far the Act has actually secured the 
future of the institution, or even successfully addressed the perceived problems. To 
fully understand this Act, its particular context must be reviewed.    
 
3.3.1 The Context of Enacting The LAA 2004: Legitimacy Crisis for the 
Judiciary  
May 1999, the Supreme Court of China submitted The Motion on 
Refo ing the Mixed Tribunal System to the Chinese People’s Congress for 
delib




eration. The official materials published by the Chinese authorities, besides going 
some way to admitting the ineffectiveness of the old system, did not specify any other 
reason for reviving lay assessors, but instead unanimously presented well-used 
arguments such as the need to: democratise the judiciary, enhance the people’s 
oversight over the judiciary, and improve the impartiality of the judiciary.76 Without 
further study, it is impossible to conclude whether the Chinese authorities, via The LAA 
                
76 See, for example, Xiao Yang (the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of China then), 
“Insisting on Innovating the Mixed Tribunal System and Enhancing Judicial 
Impartiality”, The People’s Daily, 5 June 1999; and see the Supreme Court of China, 
“The Interpretation of the Draft of The Lay Assessor Act 2004”, this Interpretation, 
together with the Draft of Lay Assessors Act 2004, was submitted to the Standing 
Committee of the Chinese People’s Congress for the latter’s reference and deliberation 
on 2 April 2004, available at the official news website of China’s government: 
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/14576/28320/32776/32780/2445485.html, last visited 
on 3 March 2009.    
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2004, genuinely intends to render more democracy to the civilians and increase 
openness and justice in the judicial arena. However, in light of the above discussion, the 
misuses of lay assessment have become so obvious as to attract acute academic 
criticism, which certainly might have discomposed China’s authorities. Meanwhile, it is 
clearly true that enhancing the legitimacy of the judicial system has become critical to 
China’s leaders since the end of last century.   
 
3.3.1.1 Legitimacy Crisis Domestically  
 
Ivkovic observes that: “the level of public support is especially crucial in countries 
in transition that are emerging from the legacy of communist regimes and are 
unaccustomed to public accountability. Corruption of public officials and widely shared 
perceptions about its extent are serious threats to the integrity of public officials that 
diminish the level of public support for both the institutions and the leaders.”77  
Unfortunately, this appeared to be the case for China at the end of last millennium.  
China’s transition from a planned economy to a market one has caused a rush for 
mon
            
ey across all walks of life, something which even judicial organs have been unable 
to escape from. For instance, 438 cases of miscarriage of justice were found and 460 
judicial officials were punished for corruption in Heilongjiang Province alone, between 
1993 and 1996.78 An official report published by the Supreme Court of China illustrates 
that from 1998 to 2004, about 8,000 judges and other court employees (accounting for 
approximately 2.7% of the entire court staff) were punished for lawbreaking 
                                            
77 Supra note 61, at 94. 
78 Liu Junhai, “The Legal Reforms in China”, Jean Jacques Dethier (ed.), Governance, 
Decentralization and Reform in China, India and Russia (Kluwer Academic Publishers, 
Boston 2000), at 395.  
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behaviour.79 This level of corruption can sow seeds for social and political tension, can 
threaten the very fabric of a society, and undermine the effectiveness of a state, plus the 
political legitimacy of a government. Corruption in the judicial domain may even be 
more critically damaging than in other governmental apparatuses, because of the very 
nature and function of the judiciary. Courts are the direct law enforcement apparatus of 
a state, and it is through courts that a state can deprive its citizens of liberty, property 
and even life. Judicial corruption might turn the rule of law into the rule of individuals 
pursuing their own private interests, which may largely destroy public confidence in the 
judiciary’s ability to implement law, weakening the viability and effectiveness of a 
legal system and finally destabilizing the social order. These theories have been verified 
by a series of social surveys in China. As one of the leading media sources in China, 
The News Weekly of China conducted a survey among 504 citizens in 2001, generally 
inquiring of the respondents’ evaluations of four legal occupations, including lawyers, 
public prosecutors, the police and judges. The survey found that 59.7%, 22.6%, 8.9%, 
and 8.7% marked “satisfactory” against the above four legal professions, respectively.80 
Disturbingly, Chinese judges were ranked at the bottom of the list, with only 8.7% of 
the respondents seeing them as “satisfactory”. This negative image of China’s judges 
can be testified to by another, larger investigation initiated by the Zero Investigation 
Company in Beijing. For this investigation, 5,679 respondents residing in the four 
metropolitan cities of Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou and Wuhan participated. Of these, 
40.7% gave negative evaluations of Chinese judges, coupled with a burst of criticisms 
                                                        
79 Xiao Yang, “The Working Report of the Supreme Court of China 2005”, available at 
http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/bm/2005-03/18/content_197161.htm, last visited on 14 
Dec 2007.  
80 Zhang Jingping, “Chinese Judges Encounter the Crisis of Public Trust”, China News 
Weekly, No.44 of 2001, available at the official news website of Chinese government 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2001-11/28/content_137242.htm, last visited on 14 
Dec 2007.   
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as to their disorder, incompetence, injustice and bureaucracy.81      
Aside from the CCP monopoly on coercion and military force, a crucial factor in 
determining the prolonged rule and survival of the Party is the level of popular support 
it maintains. It seems, however, that rampant corruption within the judiciary has 
repeatedly scarred the image of the CCP, and the instances of corruption mentioned 
above and injustice in the judicial system as a whole have had a quite debilitating effect 
on the Party’s legitimacy. The corruption in the judicial realm apparently has shocked 
the supreme hierarchy of this country. President Jiang Zemin (who was also the 
Chairman of the CCP then) stated that “the [corruption] problem has seriously 
besmirched the image of our judicial staff and damaged the reputation of the [Chinese] 
Communist Party and the Government.”82  
 
3.3.1.2 Legitimacy Crisis Internationally  
ust faced by the courts, China’s entry 
into the WTO in 2001 has brought with it another big challenge to the judicial system 
of th
                                        
 
Apart from the widespread crisis in public tr
e country. Foreign investors have criticized China’s current justice system, saying 
that it is not able to satisfy the needs of foreign enterprises trying to do business or 
expand their business in the country. The criticisms that these foreign investors have 
raised include: (1) that the CCP remains supreme in China, not the law; (2) the lack of 
trained judges; and (3) the level of corruption.83 According to Oster, “China’s economy 
                
81 He Weifang, “Court Reforms and Judicial Independence in China – An Observer’s 
Insight and Speculations”, available at the official website of the Organisation of 
Elections in China, at http://www.chinaelections.org/NewsInfo.asp?NewsID=106989, 
last visited on 14 Dec 2007.   
82 Jiang Zemin (The President of the P. R. China then), “The Speech at the National 
 
Conference on Political and Legal Affairs in Beijing”, People’s Daily, 26 Dec 1997.   
83 See Zou Keyuan, “Judicial Reform in China: Recent Developments and Future
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will not mature until there is a judicial system that produces a modicum of 
accountability among government and party officials.”84  Although the CCP often 
resists criticisms from the West on the grounds of national particularities, it has 
recognised that in the interests of economic prosperity, the international view of 
China’s judicial system must be rehabilitated.85 
Further international political pressure for China to legitimise its judicial system 
has c
ndermine the 
legitimacy of its governance, the CCP brought forward the policy of “pushing judicial 
     
ome from its impending commitment to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR), which China signed in 1998, though there has been 
reluctance to ratify the Covenant since current judicial practice may not satisfy its 
specific provisions. For instance, Article 14(1) of the ICCPR provides that: “all persons 
shall be equal before the courts and tribunals. In the determination of any criminal 
charge against him, or of his rights and obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall be 
entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal 
established by law.” The CCP’s control over the judiciary 86  and the ubiquitous 
corruption in the judicial domain, have made it impossible for China to deliver “a 
competent, independent and impartial” justice system. Needless to say, China’s evasion 
of the commitments imposed by the ICCPR are seen from an international perspective 
as an acknowledgment of the illegitimacy of its justice system.87        
Understanding that a dysfunctional judicial system may severely u
                                                                                                                                                          
Prospects”, International Lawyer, Vol.36, No.3, 2002, at 1042.  
84 Shai Oster, “Jiang’s Biggest Gamble”, Asia Week, 19 Oct 2001, at 34.  
85 The Chinese authority has started to address the impacts of China’s entry to WTO on 
the judicial reform in this country, see, for example, Guan Baoquan, “China’s Entry 
into WTO and Its Innovations in the Judge System, People’s Judicature, No.12, 2000, 
at 29-32. 
86 See further discussion below. Also see Chapter 5 for more discussion.   
87 Protection of human rights in China has been widely and acutely criticised by the 
West, see, for example, Guo Luoji, “A Human Rights Critique of the Chinese Legal 
System”, Harvard Human Rights Journal, Vol. 9, 1996, at 1-14.   
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refor
y Reformed Mixed Tribunal rather than Jury?   
omestically and 
internationally, it would seem to be the wrong time to adopt the ideal of abandoning the 
mixe
                                                       
m” in its Fifteenth Party Plenary Meeting in 1999.88 Conforming to this party line, 
the Supreme Court of China presented the much-anticipated “Five-year Guidelines of 
Reform”, which claimed to “establish a fair, open, efficient, trustworthy, and sound 
judicial system” and in which the revival of the mixed tribunal system was placed on 




Given the criticism of China’s judicial system, both d
d tribunal system which, despite its failings, has been the only process to indicate 
that the common people’s voices are not totally excluded from the judicial process. 
Further, involving citizens in justice should enhance the openness and trustworthiness 
of the judiciary, which would in turn satisfy the aims of “the Five-year Guideline of 
Reform”. Moreover, facing increasingly unscrupulous judicial corruption, it seems true 
that the Chinese authorities need to have ordinary people in the courtroom to help with 
“overseeing the judiciary”,90 in an attempt to “discipline the judges to execute law 
seriously and handle cases impartially”.91 In a word, there exists an inherent impetus to 
preserve lay participation in China. On the other hand, as mentioned above, some right 
wing scholars have advocated the introduction of a jury system into China, though 
 
88  See, for example, Guo Chengwei and Song Yinghui (eds.), A Study on the 
Contemporary Judicial Systems (The Legal Publishing House, Beijing, 2002), at 
423-438. 
89 See, for example, The Supreme Court of China, “The 3rd Five-year Reform Plan of 
Chinese Courts (2009-2013)”, available at the official news website of the Chinese 
Government, see http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2009-03/26/content_11074127_4.htm, 
last visited on 10 Nov 2009.     
90 The Supreme Court of China, supra note 76.  
91 Ibid.   
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official documents have not responded favourably to this proposal. However, 
traditionally the CCP realizes its dominance over the judiciary via politically 
controlling the judges.92 As a matter of fact, the majority of the professional judges in 
China are CCP members who are believed to have so-called “political 
accountability”. 93  The introduction of juries would result in the devolution of a 
substantial amount of power in deciding guilt or innocence, to the common people. This 
would dramatically challenge the CCP’s dominant position in the judiciary and thus be 
too radical to be acceptable. Incorporating these concerns, the idea of reforming the 
current mixed tribunal system to a moderate degree would seem to be the most 
desirable solution.      
 
3.3.2 Assessing The LAA 2004  
n 28th August 2004, approximately five years since the Supreme Court of China 
subm
                                                       
 
O
itted The Motion of Reforming the Mixed tribunal system to the Chinese People’s 
Congress, The LAA 2004 was enacted. It was officially claimed that the Act heralded 
the beginning of a new era for judicial democratisation in China. For example, Xiao 
Yang, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of China as he then was, declared that 
“lay assessors’ participation in adjudicating cases, fully manifesting the judicial 
 
92 See more details in Chapter 5.  
93 The proportion of the judges politically affiliated to the CCP in the whole China has 
not been officially revealed. It nevertheless has been a prevalent phenomenon that CCP 
members have occupied most of the judge seats in China. For instance, I randomly 
looked over the official websites of three courts -- the Changzhou Intermediate Court, 
the Dehua County Court and the Xiamen Intermediate Court, where 83%, 80% and 
even 100% of the judges are politically affiliated to the CCP respectively. See the 
official websites of the three local governments, available at: 
www.jsczfy.gov.cn/plus/view.php?aid=15671, 
www.dhjgdj.gov.cn/news/show_dj_04.asp?id=634, and 
www.xmcourt.gov.cn/ShowArticle.asp?ArticleID=1149, last visited on 14 December 
2007.  
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democracy of socialism in our country, is an important aspect of the people’s 
involvement in the national administration”.94 The academic community in China also 
enthusiastically welcomed the reforms brought by the Act. According to Xiao, “the 
renewed [lay assessor] institution contributes to assure impartiality and democracy of 
the judiciary and deter judicial corruption”. 95  This positive evaluation has been 
reinforced by numerous reports and comments from the mass media.96 But is the new 
Act substantial or symbolic? The following sections will analyse the pros and cons of 
The LAA 2004 and present a conclusion.    
 
3.3.2.1 Major Changes Brought in by The LAA 2004  
he LAA 2004 contains only twenty principled articles relating to lay assessors 
and 
                                                       
 
T
remains ambiguous about some issues. As a remedy, the Supreme Court of China, 
in association with the Ministry of Justice, promulgated The Regulation of Selecting, 
Examining and Appointing Lay Assessors on 13th December 2004 (The RSEALA 2004) 
 
94  Xiao Yang (The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of China then), “The 
Interpretations of the Motion of Deliberating ‘the Resolution of Reforming the Mixed 
Tribunal System’”, quoted in Xu Xiaoqin, “A Review of the Mixed Tribunal System in 
China”, available at the united official website of China’s court 
http://www.chinacourt.org/html/article/200505/11/161087.shtml, last visited on 14 
December 2007.    
95 Xiao Tiancun, “The Reconstruction of the Mixed Tribunal System in the Context of 
Chinese Judges’ Professionalization”, Journal of Yunnan University (Law Edition), 
No.3 of 2005, at 122-123; for similar discussion, also see, for example, Zhao Xinghui, 
“The Reform of the Mixed Tribunal System: Establishing the ‘Mixed Model’ of the 
People’s Participation in Justice”, Journal of Southwest University of Political Sciences 
& Law, Vol.6 of 2005, at 88-94; Wang Yanhui, “An Analysis of the Mixed Tribunal 
System from the Constitutional Perspective”, Journal of Gansu Lianhe University 
(Social Sciences), Vol.22, No.4, September 2006, at 88-91; Li Chaoling and Zhong 
Hong, “The Value Review and Institutional Repair of the Mixed Tribunal System in 
China”, Legal System & Society, No. 4, 2006, at 167-168.   
96 See, for example, the news reports titled “27,000 Lay Assessors Will Take Their 
Posts to Try Cases with Judges Since 1st May” and “The People’s Lay Assessors”, 
respectively on The People’s Daily, 24 April 2005 and 17 August 2005.  
 175
while the Supreme Court of China promulgated The Provisional Regulation of 
Administration of Lay Assessors 2005 (The PRALA 2005) on 6th January 2005. These 
three legal documents embody the major changes discussed below.   
-- Encouraging the Use of Lay Assessors  
The Organisational Act of Chinese Courts 1983 placed the decision to use a mixed 
tribunal under the jurisdiction of each individual court in China, by providing that 
“cases of first instance shall be adjudicated by a collegial panel composed of judges or 
of judges and lay assessors; simple civil cases, minor criminal cases and cases 
otherwise prescribed by law shall be adjudicated by a single judge”.97 As a result, the 
use of lay assessors declined during the 1980s and 1990s. The LAA 2004 appears to 
promote the use of lay assessors by specifically providing two circumstances where a 
mixed tribunal must be used, unless otherwise provided by law and for those cases to be 
decided by summary procedure with a judge seated alone, as follows: 98  (1) 
first-instance criminal, civil and administrative cases with far-reaching social 
implications, and (2) any case in which the litigants request the application of a mixed 
tribunal. This provision seems significant in two respects. First, in contrast to the 
previous exclusive jurisdiction of the courts to initiate a mixed tribunal, this provision 
specifically requests the courts to employ mixed tribunals in particular cases, likely 
causing the courts to use lay assessors more regularly. Secondly, for the first time since 
the foundation of P. R. China, the litigants are entitled to apply for the use of mixed 
tribunals. This could be seen as a move by China towards principles of justice such as 
                                                        
97 Article 10 of The Organisational Act of Chinese Courts 1983, emphasis added.     
98 In China, simple civil litigations and minor criminal offences can be handled with 
the summary procedures where a single judge sits alone and applies the simplified 
procedures (for example, the litigants are allowed to be summoned by telephone by the 
judge in a civil case), see Article 142-146 of The Act of Civil Procedure 1991, and 
Article 174-179 of The Act of Criminal Procedure 1996.      
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“each citizen has the right to be judged by his peers”.99 Of all the major changes 
embodied in The LAA 2004, none are more fundamental than the above two.  
-- Promoting the Quality of Lay Assessors by Addressing Education and 
Training Needs  
Subsection 1 of Article 38 of The Organisational Act of Chinese Courts 1983 
simply provided that any qualified voter on the electoral register aged above 23 could 
serve as a lay assessor, except for those deprived of the political rights due to their 
criminal offences, regardless of educational achievement. Without a limitation on 
educational level, it was reported that some courts even hired illiterate citizens to act as 
lay assessors, simply to fill vacancies in collegial tribunals.100 Some scholarly materials 
suggested at the time that the education level of the lay assessors was in part to be 
blamed for their incompetence.101  The Chinese authorities, when considering the 
reform, also held that “because lay assessors have the jurisdiction equal to judges, their 
educational eligibility should not be much lower than that of judges; otherwise they 
may be unlikely to perform the duties well due to their unsound quality and ability.”102 
To address these problems, Article 4 of The LAA 2004 specifically sets forth the 
educational eligibility level, and situates it at a higher level than before by requiring the 
lay assessors to have at least a college diploma.   
No nationally applicable rules to regulate the training of lay assessors existed 
before The LAA 2004. Each court managed the training of lay assessors at its own 
discretion. Due to the shortage of funds and manpower, a number of courts were found 
largely to ignore the training of the lay assessors, which was believed to contribute to 
                                                        
99 Supra note 61, at 98. 
100 Supra note 58. 
101 See, for example, Shen Jungui, “A Negative Observation about the Mixed Tribunal 
System in China”, Chinese Lawyers, No.4, 1999, at 14. 
102 The Supreme Court of China, supra note 76.    
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their frequently reported incompetence and inactivity.103 In response to this, Article 15 
of The LAA 2004 specifically assigns the responsibility of training lay assessors to each 
individual court, as well as the local government’s Department of Justice at the same 
level. However, this one article does not specify the details as to how to execute the 
training. As a remedy for this, Article 10-14 of The RSEALA 2004 specifically 
commission each court to train the lay assessors and specifies that the training should 
involve legal knowledge, court rules, judicial moralities and disciplines. Since the 
courts are assigned the duty of training lay assessors, The PRALA 2005 promulgated 
by the Supreme Court of China establishes a whole chapter in which 8 articles are set 
out to further regulate the execution of this training.  
Clearly, the previous incompetence of lay assessors is expected to be overcome by 
enhanced educational eligibility and the provision of adequate training.   
-- Specifying Selection Procedures for Lay Assessors   
As stated above, prior to The LAA 2004, the courts were largely dominant in 
selecting lay assessors from the community. Chaotic practices grew up, such as the 
exclusive recruitment of pensioners and the unemployed as lay assessors. Meanwhile, 
there was no regulation as to how the courts should allocate the workload to each lay 
assessor, leaving the courts free to over-use one specific lay assessor and transform him 
or her into a full-time court employee. The LAA 2004 intends to resolve these problems 
by setting forth three articles.  
Articles 7 and 8 lay down a four-step process for selecting lay assessors. First, 
each court individually decides the number of the lay assessors it actually needs, 
followed by a process of approval by the standing committee of the local People’s 
Congress at the same level. Secondly, Article 8 sets-out three methods for each court to 
                                                        
103 See, for example, supra note 101, at 13. 
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use to identify candidates: (1) “self-nomination”, where a citizen who wants to be 
selected as a lay assessor is allowed to nominate himself/herself to the local court, (2) 
“employer-nomination” where employers are encouraged to nominate their employees 
to the courts for lay assessor selection, after obtaining the employees’ agreement, and (3) 
“nomination by grassroot organisation” where various “grassroot organisations”104 are 
permitted to nominate local residents to the courts as lay assessor candidates, after 
securing the consent of the nominees. These three nomination methods are intended to 
yield enough candidates for the courts’ selection. Third, these candidates are to be 
screened by each court jointly with the local government’s Department of Justice, so 
that a shortlist of suitable candidates can be produced, and fourthly, the candidates on 
the shortlist are appointed by the Standing Committee of the local People’s Congress at 
the same level. This four-step process prescribed by The LAA 2004 attempts to provide 
a clear routine and involve more parties, such as the Standing Committee of the local 
People’s Congress, and the Department of Justice of the local government level, to 
oversee the selection of lay assessors. In this way, courts are expected to help prevent 
discriminatory selection in favour of specific groups, such as pensioners or the 
unemployed.  
Further, Article 14 of The LAA 2004 provides that each court shall produce a 
roster of lay assessors and “randomly select” the specific lay assessor from the roster, 
then designate him or her to each specific case. This should serve to prevent the 
                                                        
104 To control and regulate the community from the very grassroot level, Chinese 
authorities have respectively established the so-called “The Committee of Urban 
Residents” in each town and city and “The Committee of Villagers” in each village of 
China since 1954. These two “committees” are often called “grassroots organisations” 
or “grassroots mass organisations”. “The Committee of Urban Residents” and “The 
Committee of Villagers” are respectively established in each block of a town, city and 
each village, enjoying the jurisdiction to tackle some local administrative affairs. See 
The Organisational Act of Urban Residents’ Committees 1998 and The Organisational 
Act of Villagers’ Committees 1998.   
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previous practice where some courts kept summoning one or several lay assessors 
repeatedly, then commissioned them all the workloads, eventually transforming them 
into the full-time court workers.  
-- Promoting the Welfare of Lay Assessors  
The LAA 2004 attempts to improve the benefits provided to lay assessors in three 
ways. First, Article 18 mandates that the courts will compensate lay assessors for their 
travel and accommodation expenses. Second, it is reaffirmed that employers of the lay 
assessors are forbidden to reduce or covertly reduce the assessors’ salaries, bonuses and 
other benefits during the period of their court service. Thirdly, Article 18 provides that 
any lay assessor without employment shall be paid an allowance calculated on the basis 
of multiplying that assessor’s serving days, with the average daily income of local 
workers over the last year. Article 14 of The RSEALA 2004 adds that lay assessors 
shall also be paid allowances and stipends during their training process. 
-- Addressing Local Governments’ Financial Support    
As discussed above, each of China’s courts is financially dependent upon the local 
government. During the two decades prior to The LAA 2004, some courts complained 
that their budgets for maintaining the lay assessors had been slashed or even totally 
rejected by the local governments, so that they had to reduce or discontinue the use of 
lay assessors.105 To address these complaints, Article 19 of The LAA 2004 prompts 
local governments to provide adequate financial support, specifying that each court is 
permitted to place the potential expenses for employing lay assessors into its normal 
annual budget, which should then be approved and duly provided for by the local 
                                                        
105 For example, The Court of Yuzhong District of Chongqing City and The Court of 
Jinshi County of Hunan Province have revealed this reality; see supra note 58; and the 
news report, “The Court of Jinshi County Emhpasizing the Application of Lay 
Assessors”, at the official website of the Court of Jinshi County, at 
http://zjfy.changde.gov.cn/zjfy/937312784843014144/20061010/165606.html, last 
visited on 14 December 2007.    
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government.     
 
3.3.2.2 Substantial Reform or Redesigned Political Token?  
 
In light of the changes discussed above, it seems that The LAA 2004 does 
introduce measures to address some of the defects of the old system and so is a 
departure from the previously vague attitude towards the mixed tribunal system. It is 
particularly striking that The LAA 2004 urges the courts to adopt lay assessors in cases 
with far-reaching social implications, grants defendants the right of selecting to be tried 
by mixed tribunals, and establishes a clearer process for lay assessor selection. These 
factors appear to demonstrate that the CCP is moving towards the abandonment of its 
absolute monopoly over justice, by shifting towards the use of a greater lay input into 
judicial decision making. However, before coming to this conclusion, more intensive 
analysis of The LAA 2004 needs to be undertaken.   
-- Democracy or Meritocracy    
It is generally agreed that lay participation is not only a legal but also a 
political/democratic system whereby citizens have democratic opportunities to become 
involved in justice – one of the most important of public affairs.106 Aristotle embraced 
the belief that sharing in the administration of justice should be a feature of citizenship 
and one of the particular features of democracy is indeed that “all men should sit in 
judgment, or that judges selected out of all should judge in all matters, or in most, or in 
the greatest and most important.”107 If participation in justice is to be enshrined as an 
                                                        
106 See, for example, Jeffery Abramson, We, the Jury: The Jury System and the Ideal of 
Democracy, (Basic Books, New York, 1994), at 1-2; and Martin Shapiro, Courts: A 
Comparative and Political Analysis (University of Chicago Press, Chicago1986), at 25 
and 26.    
107 John D. Jackson & Nikolay P. Kovalev, “Lay Adjudication and Human Rights in 
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essential democratic right deriving from citizenship, it ought, at least theoretically, to be 
granted to the majority of citizens or “all men” as stated by Aristotle, since 
“democracy…envisages rule by all of the people.”108 Acknowledging this, the first 
paragraph of The LAA 2004 states that the enactment of this Act aims to “ensure that 
citizens lawfully participate in the judiciary”. However, the subsequent provisions and 
the Act’s subsequent implementation seem to have departed from this declared 
legislative purpose.  
The LAA 2004 systematically encourages elitism in lay assessors. As mentioned 
above, according to Article 4, the educational level of each lay assessor should not be 
lower than college diploma level. According to the statistical data of the fifth national 
census, only 4.27% of the population aged above 25 have college diplomas or a higher 
education level. In other words, 95.73% of the citizenry in China in theory lose the 
opportunity to become a lay assessor if Article 4 is strictly implemented. 109   
Appreciating that the required educational eligibility could be hard to reach in practice, 
The RSEALA 2004 makes a concession, providing that the educational eligibility may 
be lowered for elderly candidates. Apparently, this concession only applies to a very 
specific group.  
Smooth running of trials certainly demands that lay assessors have basic abilities 
such as literacy. The LAA 2004 may have been driven by practical motives to address 
the educational level of lay assessors, but a question mark arises as to whether this 
justifies granting the well-educated minority the privilege of participating in justice, 
whilst denying the vast majority of people the equivalent right. In principle, the people 
                                                                                                                                                               
Europe”, The Columbia Journal of European Law, No.1 of Vol.13, 2006/2007, at 88. 
108  James Gobert, Justice, Democracy and the Jury (Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 
Dartmouth 1997), at 99.  
109  See the official website of the National Bureau of Statistics of China, at 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/renkoupucha/2000pucha/html/t0401.htm, last visited 
on 5 April, 2009.  
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retain political power through two basic means in a democracy: “representative 
democracy” whereby the people elect the representatives to manage public affairs, and 
“direct democracy” where the citizenry are directly involved in public decision-making. 
In theory, there should be equal political opportunity for citizens under both 
approaches.110 Lay participation is apparently an instance of the latter case. However, 
where the great majority of citizens are deprived of the right of access, it is unsafe to 
conclude that the use of lay participation serves a democratic function. Indeed, it could 
be argued that this particular example of lay participation more closely resembles a 
meritocracy or aristocracy, discriminating in favour of an elite minority.  
Furthermore, the educational criteria set out in The LAA 2004 also appear to 
conflict with China’s own constitutional doctrines. Subsection 2 of Article 33 of The 
Constitutional Law of China 1982 provides that the citizenry of the People’s Republic 
of China are equal before laws. Article 34 further mandates that each citizen aged above 
18 has the right to voting and stand for election regardless of their ethnic group, race, 
gender, occupation, family background, religion, education (emphasis added), property 
status and length of residence. The only exception is those deprived of political rights 
due to criminal offences. The LAA 2004 belongs to normal law, under which all the 
citizenry should at least theoretically be “equal”. Furthermore, it can be argued that the 
right of “standing for election” should be an integrated right, embodying being elected 
or selected to participate in the administration of national affairs including the judicial 
matters. Yet the Act explicitly excludes the great majority of the Chinese population on 
the grounds of inadequate education. 
As stated above, it appears that the Chinese authorities expect that the enhanced 
educational requirements will improve the ability of lay assessors. However, it is 
                                                        
110 Supra note 108, at 88. 
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questionable whether this solution will effectively resolve the incompetence of lay 
assessors.111 Without sufficient empirical evidence, it would be unreliable to conclude 
that a lay person with a university degree, compared with his or her peer with a high 
school diploma, would be significantly more competent in participating in trials, 
especially since neither have received a legal education. In other words, it is arguable 
that setting an overly high educational eligibility level at the cost of sacrificing the right 
of most citizens to participate is arbitrary rather than useful.   
-- Problematic Selection of Lay Assessors  
As mentioned above, Articles 7 and 8 of The LAA 2004 provide for the selection 
process of lay assessors, as follows: (1) each court individually decides the number of 
lay assessors and reports to the Standing Committee of the local People’s Congress for 
approval, (2) each court identifies the lay assessor candidates, through self-nomination 
by an individual citizen or from a nomination by the candidate’s employer or “grassroot 
organisation”, (3) the nominated candidates are to be scrutinized by each court in 
association with the Department of Justice of the local government, who will form a 
shortlist, and then (4) this shortlist will be approved by the Standing Committee of the 
local People’s Congress. This four-stage process involves three different national 
organs: the court, the local government’s Department of Justice and the Standing 
Committee of the local People’s Congress. In an attempt to further clarify their 
respective jurisdictions, Article 5 of The PRALA 2005 provides a quota of lay assessors 
for each court by articulating that the number of lay assessors at a court should be no 
less than one-half of the judges and no more than the total of the judges. Article 13 of 
The PRALA 2005 specifies that “each court should firstly screen the lay assessor 
candidates and produce a preliminary shortlist, together with the personal information 
                                                        
111 See Chapter 4 for further discussion.  
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materials of each candidate, to be submitted to the Department of Justice of the local 
government for the latter’s advice” (emphasis added). Apparently, the Department of 
Justice is excluded from the screening process and its role is circumscribed to that of an 
advisor rather than decision-maker. However, it is questionable that the Department of 
Justice takes this advisory job seriously, since the lay assessors work neither for the 
Department’s own use nor in its own interests. Moreover, even if the task is taken 
seriously, The PRALA 2005 does not specify on the basis of what criteria exactly the 
Department of Justice should “advise”. To further confirm the decisive position of 
courts, Article 14 of The PRALA 2005 states that “taking into account the advice of the 
Department of Justice of the local government and within the quota, each court decides 
the final shortlist.” Article 16 adds that “the final shortlist shall be approved by the 
court at the next higher level that only rechecks the eligibility qualification of each lay 
assessor”. In addition, Article 17 provides that the final shortlist shall be submitted to 
the Standing Committee of the local People’s Congress for appointment. This might 
actually be simply a final rubber-stamp of the process rather than an effective check, for 
the same reasons as apply to the Department of Justice.             
In light of above, it is unpersuasive to argue that a democratic and open process for 
selecting lay assessors has been established in China since The LAA 2004 was 
propagated, for the reasons outlined below:   
(1) Genuine Opportunity for Participation or ‘Ornament’ of Limited 
Accessibility   
Article 5 of The PRALA 2005 sets forth the quota of lay assessors at each court as 
one-half of or one-to-one with the judges at the same court. In light of this, lay 
assessors in China can never outnumber judges. Actually, as a minority among legal 
professionals, the number of judges is always very small, and so, circumscribed by this 
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quota, lay assessors in China are likely to remain a minority as well. By May 2008, 
there were 55,681 lay assessors in China,112 whilst the national population then was 
approximately 1.3 billion 113 . The percentage of lay assessors was therefore 
approximately 0.0004% of the total population, so there was, in effect, only one lay 
assessor for every 25,000 Chinese people. It therefore seems that the likelihood of a 
Chinese citizen being called-up is as small as winning the lotto. However, different 
from the lotto, which occurs regularly, according to Article 9 of The LAA 2004, the 
tenure of China’s lay assessors is five years, implying that this ‘lotto game’ will not 
reopen for another five years. What is worse, looking through The LAA 2004, The 
RSEALA 2004 and The PRALA 2005, there is no prohibition on the reappointment of 
lay assessors. It is therefore legislatively possible that a citizen will get no chance to be 
selected as a lay assessor, even after five years of waiting. In light of this tiny 
probability of being selected, acting as a lay assessor in China is more of an 
‘ornamental’ opportunity than a realistic option for the common people.        
(2) Problematic “Nomination” Model for Identifying Candidates  
In contrast with the procedures in other countries, such as that of compiling lists of 
prospective jurors from the electoral registers in England, Wales and the United 
States,114 Article 8 of The LAA 2004 provides that candidates for lay assessment be 
identified, either by self-nomination or by nomination from employers or a grassroots 
organisation. This “nomination” model is based upon the premise that the candidates 
                                                        
112 The Statistical Office of the Supreme Court of China, “Lay Assessors in the Last 
Three Years – An Investigation of the Implementation of the Mixed Tribunal System”, 
The People’s Court Daily, 6 May 2008. 
113 The National Statistical Bureau of China, “The Statistical Bulletin of National 
Economy and Social Development in China in 2008”, available at the official website 
of China’s government, http://finance.people.com.cn/GB/8876392.html, last visited on 
5 March 2008.   
114 Supra note 108, at 102; see also R. Gwynedd Parry, “Random Selection, Linguistic 
Rights and the Jury Trial in Wales”, Criminal Law Review, Oct 2002, at 807.    
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have the enthusiasm to nominate themselves and that employers or grassroots 
organisations are willing to nominate their employees or members. This dependence 
upon volunteering and nomination causes various problems. First, The LAA 2004 
provides for a five year tenure for each lay assessor and renders no limit to the 
maximum workload he or she can assume each year, which may scare away potential 
volunteers and lead to insufficient candidates. Secondly, it is questionable as to whether 
self-nomination can ensure diversity and representativeness in lay assessors, since 
probably only those who want to uphold the mixed tribunal system and also have 
sufficient spare time to take an extra court job, may be interested in nominating 
themselves. It is therefore much less likely for a person in full employment to nominate 
themselves, because once appointed, they will have to serve for five years and will have 
to respond to the court’s summons at any time. For this reason, the role of lay assessor 
seems more suitable for those without jobs such as the unemployed and pensioners, 
since they at least have more free time. However, where most of the nominated 
candidates are jobless, the level of diversity and representativeness of the lay assessors 
is at risk. Thirdly, in terms of nomination by employers, it is unlikely that an employer 
will be so unselfish as to lend its employees to the courts, whilst still having to pay 
them wages, and this point may, in actuality, largely nullify the likelihood of 
nomination by employers.   
Randomly selecting prospective jurors from a very general list of citizens such as 
the electoral register is widely acknowledged to have at least three democratic 
advantages. First, it helps to ensure the diversity and representativeness of the jury, 
since theoretically almost every citizen can be called and as a result a jury may be 
comprised of citizens from diverse social spectrums. Secondly, random selection 
protects against unfair priority being given to certain groups, which in turn promotes 
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democracy and fairness of the selection process. Thirdly, random selection combined 
with a mandatory summons makes citizens’ participation in justice not only a 
democratic right, but also an obligation under which those summoned are liable not 
only for realizing a defendant’s right to be judged by his peers but also for receiving 
democracy education.115 The nomination method adopted by The LAA 2004, coupled 
with the above-mentioned requirement in terms of the lay assessors’ educational level, 
is apt to restrict the breadth of candidates and to change the court service into an 
avocation enjoyed only by well-educated volunteers who feel happy to be nominated, 
rather than a democratic right and social responsibility enjoyed and assumed by all of 
the citizenry.      
(3) Courts’ Dominance without Substantial Check  
As mentioned above, The PRALA 2005 delivers de facto the substantive power of 
selecting lay assessors to the courts, whilst the input given by the Department of Justice 
and the final appointment by the Standing Committee of the local People’s Congresses, 
are largely a formality. A concern arising from this, is whether the selection procedure 
under the sway of the courts and without effective checks and balances can really 
guarantee an open and fair process. It would be naive to suppose that the Chinese 
authorities do not understand the virtues of randomly selecting lay assessors from a 
very general citizen list such as the electoral register. On the contrary, it is arguable that 
the courts are deliberately commissioned with the substantial administrative power of 
screening lay assessors, for the very purpose of ensuring the ruling party can oversee 
the selection of lay assessors.  
As a matter of fact, the CCP has established its own network within the judicial 
                                                        
115 See Gobert, supra note 108, at 102-103; Parry ibid, at 686; and supra note 98, at 
190.     
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organs. According to the CCP Charter,116 each court has established a so-called CCP 
Committee whose chairperson has to be the Chief Justice of the court; and the deputy 
chairperson and other committee members are normally the vice chief justice and the 
leading judges in the court respectively. The Party Committee is subject to the 
leadership of the Superior Committee and this hierarchical administration extends 
upward to the CCP headquarters. It is through the Party Committee in each court that 
the CCP has actually exercised its dominance over the courts, through the use of 
manpower and policy control, for example: (1) only those judges politically affiliated to 
the CCP and with sound political accountability will gain a seat on the Committee, 
whilst admittance to the Committee implies better career prospects since any promotion 
inside the court has to be approved by the Chief Justice (that is, the chairperson of the 
Committee) and any promotion to a superior court must be agreed by the Chief Justice, 
and (2) via the network that has been established at each court, the CCP headquarters is 
able to convey and execute its policies in various courts since, through controlling the 
career prospects of each judge, the CCP has little fear of its policy execution being 
frustrated. Once this is understood, it is no wonder that The LAA 2004 gives substantial 
powers to the courts to select lay assessors: the CCP can make the selection under close 
supervision by steering the various courts. In contrast, it will lose this control by 
adopting random selection from sources such as the electoral register.     
(4) Converted “Random Selection” of Lay Assessors  
Article 14 of The LAA 2004 provides that each court shall produce a working 
roster of the lay assessors and “randomly select” the specific lay assessor from its list, 
designating him or her to each specific mixed tribunal. This article, prima facie, 
introduces the “random selection” of lay assessors. However, this ‘randomness’ is very 
                                                        
116 See Article 46 of The Charter of Chinese Communist Party; see Chapter 5 for more 
discussion.   
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different from that applied to the juror selection process in common-law countries. As 
discussed above, randomness in juror selection, coupled with the very comprehensive 
list of candidates, aims to ensure that the overwhelming majority of citizens are 
endowed with an equal opportunity to democratically participate in justice, so as to 
avoid potential bias and influence that may lead to partiality and discrimination. Article 
14 is seemingly not designed to achieve similar objectives, since the stated 
“randomness” is not a random selection of lay assessors from the common people, but 
rather a random designation of incumbent lay assessors to specific cases. 
The ‘random selection’ set out in Article 14, according to the official interpretation 
of the Supreme Court of China, is expected to prevent the courts from ignoring the 
roster and repeatedly use the same lay assessors, effectively creating full-time lay 
assessors.117 However, this article does not set forth a specific method for implementing 
the random selection, for example, by computer or lot. Without any check and balance, 
it is impossible to say that the courts will not try to and be able to evade this provision 
in the interests of their own expediency.  
-- Substantial Participants or Insignificant Outsiders  
Article 1 of The LAA 2004 empowers lay assessors to decide both factual and 
legal issues and theoretically places lay assessors in a position equivalent to judges in 
mixed tribunals, with the only prohibition being that a lay assessor may not be 
appointed as the presiding judge in a mixed tribunal. However, the territory of lay 
assessors is actually fairly strictly limited in the following ways.  
(1) Lay Decision-making without Finality  
Article 1 of The LAA 2004 provides that lay assessors have equal jurisdiction with 
judges, while Article 2 of the Act immediately circumscribes mixed tribunals to be only 
                                                        
117 The Supreme Court of China, supra note 76.  
 190
applicable in first-instance cases. Further, according to Article 180 and 181 of The Act 
of Criminal Procedure 1996, a decision made by the collegial tribunal of first-instance 
in China (either all-judge or a mixed tribunal) is open to appeal, initiated either by the 
defendant or the public prosecutor. Article 186 of the Act further specifies that the court 
of appeal “shall conduct a complete review of the facts determined and the application 
of law in the judgment of first instance and shall not be limited by the scope of appeal”. 
In other words, the court of appeal may confirm, reverse or vary any part of the 
appealed first-instance decision, including the sentence, whether or not that has been 
appealed against. More remarkably, Article 190 provides that where a second instance 
has been triggered upon a defendant’s appeal, the judgement made by the court of 
appeal can never increase the punishment imposed by the trial court; though this limit is 
not applicable if the appeal has been launched by the public prosecutor.118 In other 
words, it is legislatively valid that the court of appeal overturns the acquittal made by a 
mixed tribunal of first instance, or increases the sentence handed-down by a mixed 
tribunal of first instance, as long as the public prosecutor has raised this appeal. With 
such a substantial power of appeal, even if a mixed tribunal makes a judgment in favour 
of the defendant in the first instance, the public prosecutor can extend an overzealous 
prosecution to the second instance where, without lay participation, the first-instance 
judgement may be overturned by a panel of judges. According to Article 197 of The 
Act of Criminal Procedure 1996, a two-tier trial system is applied in criminal cases in 
China. According to this, a decision made by the court of appeal, with lay participation 
excluded, is final. In light of the fact that the lay decision-making framework is highly 
vulnerable to appeal, and so has no finality at all, it is hard to conclude that lay input is 
on solid ground and genuinely significant.  
                                                        
118 See Article 190 of The Act of Criminal Procedure 1996.   
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It seems that although the public prosecutor and the defendant are both entitled to 
initiate an appeal, their respective appeal rights are very different. There has been no 
legitimate reason offered as to why such a substantial appeal right (the jargon actually 
is “right of protest complaint” in contrast to the “appeal right” of the defendant 
according to China’s procedural laws119) has been given to the public prosecutor. 
Exactly as in the courts, the CCP has also established its Party Committee in each of the 
local public prosecutors’ offices. A Public Prosecutor does not have to be a CCP 
member, but it is a good idea for him or her to be so, since promotion is in the hands of 
the Chief Public Prosecutor, who is certainly a Party member. For example, if two 
candidates compete for the same position, the Chief Public Prosecutor will normally 
favour the one who is his or her political peer and has sound political accountability. 
With Public Prosecutors as part of its leadership structure, it is desirable for the CCP to 
hand them a strong right of appeal, something which might be significant where an 
‘unsatisfactory’ decision given by a trial court conflicts with its political interests, 
though this happens very rarely.  
(2) Minority Position of Lay Assessors  
Article 3 of The LAA 2004 indirectly legitimises judges’ predominance in mixed 
tribunals by providing that “the proportion of lay assessors in a mixed tribunal shall not 
be less than one third”. It is noteworthy that the principle of voting applied in each 
collegial tribunal is simple a majority in China.120 When the lay assessors are in a 
minority position, it is impossible for them to dominate decision-making when 
outnumbered by judges. As a rule-of-thumb, the ratio of professional judges to lay 
assessors is extremely important in the courtroom. “When lay persons are in a minority, 
                                                        
119 See Article 180 and 181 of The Act of Criminal Procedure 1996.  
120 See Article 148 of The Act of Criminal Procedure 1996 and Article 43 of The Act 
of Civil Procedure 2007. 
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their influence diminishes”.121 According to the current procedural laws in China, a 
collegial tribunal in both civil and criminal cases is normally composed of three 
adjudicators.122 Where a mixed court is composed of only one lay assessor and two 
professional judges and the latter two hold the same view, it is questionable whether a 
single lay assessor would be confident enough to challenge his or her professional allies 
with technical, psychological and, more importantly, quantitative issues.    
-- Will the ‘Puppets’ Return?  
The passivism of the lay assessors which, as stated above, might be attributed to 
their incompetence and inappropriate checks on their impropriety, has raised 
widespread criticism, something which has apparently concerned the Chinese 
authorities.123 The LAA 2004, coupled with The RSEALA 2004 and The PRALA 2005 
include a number of few measures that attempt to resolve this problem, such as 
improving educational eligibility, addressing training issues and providing specific 
punishments for lay assessors. Besides the uncertainty over whether the overly 
emphasized educational level of lay assessors can pro rata enhance their competence 
and consequently catalyze their activity, it is also open to question as to what extent the 
fragmentary training standards contained in The LAA 2004, The RSEALA 2004 and 
The PRALA 2005 are able to resolve the entrenched incompetence and subsequent 
passivism of lay assessors. Likewise, it is debatable whether the specific but still 
inappropriate punishments can produce a substantial deterrence to impropriety by lay 
assessors.      
 
                                                        
121 See Stefan Machura, “Interaction between Lay Assessors and Professional Judges in 
German Mixed Courts”, International Review of Penal Law (Vol. 72), (Érès, 
Ramonville Sainte Agne 2001), at 465. 
122 See Article 147 of The Act of Criminal Procedure 1996 and Article 40 and 41 of 
The Act of Civil Procedure 2007.  
123 See, for example, The Supreme Court of China, supra note 76.   
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(1) Can Specific Training Create Competent Lay Assessors?   
The PRALA 2005 promulgated by the Supreme Court of China embodies a total of 
eight articles which set out the training framework for lay assessors, the aim being to 
improve their competence. Besides employing six articles to outline the training 
contents, undertakings and other administrative affairs, it is striking that Article 20 and 
26 provide that before being installed, each lay assessor should receive preliminary 
training of no less than 24 hours, whilst regular training of no less than sixteen hours 
per year being compulsory for each lay assessor during their five-year tenure. However, 
in spite of these provisions, it is self-evident that from these specified hours of training, 
lay assessors cannot hope to be transformed into adjudicators as competent as 
professional judges, who have had years or decades of legal education and practice, 
especially in terms of their ability to resolve legal problems. It is therefore doubtful that 
the incompetence of lay assessors, especially in terms of understanding legal issues, 
will be overcome. It is notable that in the past, lay assessors in Russia who assumed the 
exact same duties as their Chinese counterparts, also demonstrated incompetence in 
tackling legal issues. To resolve this problem, Russian legal scholars in the 1950s and 
1960s advocated commissioning lay assessors only for the purpose of fact finding and 
deciding on guilt.124 Likewise, prior to The LAA 2004, Chinese scholars proposed 
similar reforms so that lay assessors would be exempted from decisions on legal 
application.125 It is arguable whether allowing a lay person to decide on legal issues is 
the inherent weakness of a mixed tribunal system, a weakness which could have been 
carefully considered when framing the reform scheme. 126  However, the Chinese 
authorities apparently turned a blind eye to this issue.         
                                                        
124 Stephen C. Thaman, “The Resurrection of Trial by Jury in Russia”, Stanford 
Journal of International Law, Vol.31, 1995, at 68. 
125 Supra note 41, at 3. 
126 See further discussion in Chapter 6.  
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It seems that the current laws and regulations intend to frame a very ideal position 
where a lay person with a degree in anything other than law, after attending legal 
lectures for a week or so, is able to effectively participate in the trial in an even-handed 
way, such as revealing the facts, screening the evidence, tackling the legal disputes 
presented by both parties, and even arguing with the professional judges to defend his 
or her own legal theories, and to even prevail occasionally. Meanwhile, he or she must 
be good at criminal, civil or even administrative law, since he or she may be requested 
to participate in criminal, civil or even administrative cases according to Article 2 of 
LAA 2004.              
(2) No Stringent Check on the Impropriety of Lay Assessors as yet  
As stated above, before The LAA 2004, there was no law handed-down as to the 
punishments given to lay assessors. Practical measures such as oral warnings, the 
leveling of criticism and blacklisting, used in order to stop the use of particular lay 
assessors, were not enough of a deterrent to hold back some lay assessors’ from 
deliberately failing in their duties. To address this problem, The LAA 2004 includes 
Article 17, which sets forth punishments for lay assessors. According to this Article, 
where a lay assessor evades court service without a valid reason and affects the trial, the 
Chief Justice of the court can request the Standing Committee of the local People’s 
Congress to dismiss him or her. There are at least two weaknesses in this provision. 
First, this punishment is only applicable in circumstances where the lay assessor 
illegally evades his or her duty, and ignores other improprieties such as sleeping during 
the trial etc. Secondly, dismissal might be exactly what the lay assessor evading his or 
her duty wants. This punishment may not only be ineffective in deterring absentee lay 
assessors, but may actually encourage them, since evasion will incur nothing but the 
desired outcome of terminating their court service.        
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(3) Does the Lengthy Tenure and Unlimited Workload Undermine the 
Enthusiasm of Lay Assessors?  
As mentioned above, overwork was one reason responsible for the passivism of 
the lay assessors in the past.127 However, it is striking that The LAA 2004 extends the 
tenure of lay assessors from the original two years to the current five years, whilst it 
also renders no limitation on the caseload each lay assessor may encounter, such as 
serving a set number of days annually, or a maximum case load, leaving the door 
wide-open for the overuse of particular lay assessors and the erosion of their enthusiasm. 
Remarkably, the tenure of lay assessors in Russia in the past was five years as well.128 
Here, it was revealed that after the lay assessors had reported to the same courtroom for 
a long time, they “became dedicated to their respective judge in the same way grand 
juries are said to become dedicated to a prosecutor with whom they regularly work.”129 
This dedication was also believed to be responsible for the Russian lay assessors’ 
“simply nodding in agreement with the judge”.130 What is worse, The LAA 2004 does 
not circumscribe the reappointment of lay assessors. After working with the same judge 
for quite a few years, it is hard to say that the lay assessors in China will not become 
“dedicated to” the judges as well.  
-- Will Full-Time and Long-Serving Lay Assessors Recur?    
As discussed above, the occurrence of full-time lay assessors could be attributed to 
a series of interrelated facts: (1) poor benefits and the absence of appropriate 
punishment which encouraged some lay assessors to evade their court duties, (2) to 
                                                        
127 Supra note 58.  
128 Steven R. Plotkin, “The Jury Trial in Russia”, Tulane Journal of International & 
Comparative Law, Vol.2, 1994, at 2. 
129 John C. Coughenour “Reflections on Russia’s Revival of Trial by Jury: History 
Demands That We Ask Difficult Questions Regarding Terror Trials, Procedures to 
Combat Terrorism, and Our Federal Sentencing Regime”, Seattle University Law 
Review, Vol.26, 2002-2003, at 406.   
130 Ibid.  
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ensure the availability of lay assessors, some courts had unchecked powers to select lay 
assessors, exclusively selecting the unemployed and pensioners, (3) without a sufficient 
budget for maintaining many lay assessors, some courts employed only a few lay 
assessors and assigned them very heavy workloads, since there was no absolute 
prescription as to the maximum workload of each lay assessor. The combined result of 
the above factors was a situation where a lay assessor assumed a caseload equal to that 
of a judge and worked at the court on a full-time basis. Unfortunately, however, The 
LAA 2004 does not appear to have resolved the majority of the above problems, such 
as inappropriate punishments, the unlimited workload of lay assessors, and the courts’ 
unbounded power in terms of selecting lay assessors. It cannot be said that a court will 
not, for its administrative expediency, fall back on the old routine, since full-time lay 
assessors have some advantages, such as their availability, responsiveness and 
experience, having participated in more cases.  
In addition, without an established restriction on re-appointing lay assessors after 
each five-year tenure, the practice of long-serving lay assessors will probably continue. 
Compared with recruiting and training fresh blood every five years, simply 
reappointing the old hands who with their long experience can perform their duties 
more efficiently and competently must definitely seem convenient and cost-effective.    
 
3.4 Conclusion   
 
It appears that, after its nationwide establishment in 1949, the mixed tribunal 
system in China was more of an instrument for resolving the shortage of judges and 
propagandising the legitimacy of the regime, than a facility devised to genuinely realize 
democratisation of the judiciary. Subjecting lay assessors to strict control was enshrined 
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as an essential judicial principle, realized through a series of mechanisms, such as: (1) 
for the sake of ensuring political accountability of lay assessors, the lay assessor 
selection process was under the control of courts, in turn subject to the leadership of the 
CCP, and (2) lay participation was circumscribed to first-instance cases only, whilst any 
decision made by mixed tribunals had the potential to be completely overturned by the 
second-instance trial, where lay participation was excluded. Moreover, the 1980s and 
1990s saw a further decline in the interest of the Chinese authorities in lay participation, 
as witnessed by the increasing legislative circumscription on the application of lay 
assessment, including that: (1) the power to trigger a mixed tribunal was exclusively 
retained by the courts after 1983, and (2) the majority position of lay assessors in 
criminal mixed tribunals was acknowledged in 1979, but then abolished in 1996.  
Besides the strict controls and gradual legislative withdrawal, all of the laws 
regulating lay assessors were scattered across a series of acts and regulations prior to 
introduction of The LAA 2004. Their inherent indeterminacy and inappropriateness, 
coupled with the authorities’ declining interest in lay participation, resulted in a series 
of interrelated problems in practice through the final two decades of the last century, 
including a shortage of financial support for the use of lay assessment, a decreasing use 
of mixed tribunals, poor benefits provided for the lay assessors, serious passivism on 
the part of the lay assessors, and the appearance of full-time and long-serving assessors. 
These misuses of the system resulted in diffuse criticism from the academic community. 
Even though the Chinese authorities could ignore the academic criticism, they did 
envisage a crisis in trust in the judiciary, from both domestic and international 
observers, and this became increasingly critical in the 1990s, threatening the stability of 
the regime. It seems that there was a desperate need to initiate judicial reform to salvage 
the legitimacy of the judiciary, and in this context, the first Act specifically aimed at 
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regulating the use of lay assessors, The LAA 2004, was promulgated to revive the 
mixed tribunal system, a system that had been effective in flaunting “the people’s 
justice” since the revolutionary era.    
There is no denying that there are some significant breakthroughs in The LAA 
2004, not only in addressing the defendant’s right to be judged by a mixed tribunal, but 
also in its attempts to apply lay assessors to cases with far-reaching implications and 
promote their training and welfare. However, these innovations cannot overshadow the 
remaining unresolved problems.  
The LAA 2004 still places lay participation under close political control in three 
ways. First, the selection process for lay assessors is largely under the control of the 
courts, as steered by the CCP, in order to assure their political accountability. Secondly, 
the courts are given the discretionary jurisdiction of deciding the ratio of professional 
judges to lay assessors in a mixed tribunal, usually placing lay assessors in the minority 
position, and in this system the lay voice cannot prevail over the professional judges, 
who are very probably CCP members also. Thirdly, mixed tribunals are still only 
applicable to first-instance cases and any decision made by a mixed tribunal can be 
appealed by the public prosecutor (who is normally politically affiliated to the CCP) to 
the courts of appeal, which are also overseen by the CCP and can fully overturn the 
first-instance judgement. Seemingly, when compared with the past, the 
circumscriptions on lay participation have not been substantially reduced by The LAA 
2004. Therefore, one cannot be too optimistic that the new Act will significantly 
encourage lay participation, nor depoliticize and democratise the judiciary in China. On 
the contrary, it seems that the Act has steered clear of reallocating judicial power to the 
people; rather, the CCP has leant in the direction of safeguarding the judiciary’s 
dominance. The LAA 2004 is not a real change of direction but rather a subtle variance 
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on a theme of judicial instrumentalism, as embraced by the ruling party. In this context, 
it is questionable that the reformed mixed tribunal system will give people real 
“involvement in the national administration” 131 , or “assure…democracy of the 
judiciary”.132    
Not only does The LAA 2004 raise questions with respect to how the political 
interests of the ruling party overwhelm democracy in the judicial arena, but also in 
terms of a series of inherent defects in the revived mixed tribunal system, namely: (1) 
The candidates qualified to be lay assessors are basically limited to those who have 
received a higher education other than the ‘common citizens’, leading to lay 
participation in China being the privilege of an elite minority, instead of democracy for 
the populus, (2) the accessibility of lay participation is further restricted due to the very 
small quota of lay assessors and the five-year tenure often coupled with a potentially 
unlimited reappointment, all of which make the probability of being selected as a lay 
assessor as small as winning the lotto, (3) it is questionable whether identifying lay 
assessor candidates from a group of volunteers is effective and can ensure 
representativeness, (4) the revived institution intends to resolve the passivism of lay 
assessors; however, this problem might be entrenched through a series of weaknesses in 
the institution, such as the lengthy tenure, unlimited reappointment, unresolved 
incompetence, inappropriate punishments and the small potential numbers of lay 
assessors, (5) the lengthy tenure, unlimited reappointment and workload of lay 
                                                        
131  Xiao Yang (The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of China then), “The 
Interpretations of the Motion of Deliberating ‘the Resolution of Reforming the Mixed 
Tribunal System’”, quoted in Xu Xiaoqin, “A Review of the Mixed Tribunal System in 
China”, available at the united official website of China’s court 
http://www.chinacourt.org/html/article/200505/11/161087.shtml, last visited on 14 
December 2007.  
132 Xiao Tiancun, “The Reconstruction of the Mixed Tribunal System in the Context of 
Chinese Judges’ Professionalization”, Journal of Yunnan University (Law Edition), 
No.3 of 2005, at 122 and 123. 
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assessors, in association with the unchecked power of courts in terms of selecting them 
and designating them to specific cases, will probably revive the practice of having 
full-time and long-serving lay assessors.            
To sum up, the mixed tribunal system, as revived by The LAA 2004, enshrines the 
ruling party’s supremacy rather than truly embracing democracy and prioritising the 
rights of individuals over party interests in the administration of justice, making the 
institution similar to its old counterpart. Far from being a significant move towards 
genuine lay participation, the modern lay assessor can be said to be a political token, 
one which is meant to enhance the legitimacy of the judiciary. Meanwhile, a series of 
weaknesses that afflicted the old system seemingly remain, since the new Act brings 
illusory rather than real reforms. To be sure, my discussions thus far have leaned 
toward theoretical analysis. To reveal the practical situation with regard to how the 
mixed tribunal system operates under the new Act, field work should be carried out, 
and to this end, the next chapter will make an attempt in this regard, and will present the 





Lay Participation in China Today: Shadow or Substance (II)  
Empirical Research on the Implementation of Recent Reforms of the Mixed Tribunal 
System 
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
As revealed in the last chapter, the revived mixed tribunal system is by no means 
perfect, but raises further questions, not only in terms of whether the authenticity of lay 
participation has been sacrificed to facilitate control over the judiciary by the Chinese 
Communist Party (the CCP), but also with regard to various practical concerns revealed. 
First, does the selection process for lay assessors, under the control of the courts, ensure 
the appropriate diversity and representativeness of lay assessors? Secondly, does the 
much-anticipated mechanism for randomly designating lay assessors to cases, a 
mechanism that is subject to the unchecked administration of the courts, stop the 
notorious situation of full-time lay assessors evolving? Third, can the ‘common’ people, 
simply via improved educational eligibility and less fragmented training, be 
transformed into competent lay assessors responsible for deciding on questions of both 
fact and law? Fourth, will the long-term passivism and limited influence of lay 
assessors continue to be entrenched due to unresolved institutional weaknesses, such as 
their untested competence and a lack of checks on their improprieties? Based on 
theoretical analysis and the previous experience of lay participation in China, the last 
chapter presented a far from optimistic scenario.    
To be sure, as well as carrying out a theoretical analysis, it is imperative to review 
what empirical evidence reveals with regard to these questions and the way in which 
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the reformed mixed tribunal system has operated in practice, in order to present an 
accurate picture regarding this exclusive form of lay participation in China today. 
However, “despite the actual widespread use across…countries, existing empirical 
studies on mixed tribunals are relatively rare”1, a picture that holds true in China as 
well. Since 1st May 2005, when the much-anticipated LAA 2004 came into force, 
neither the Chinese authorities nor the academic community has published any 
systematic study to empirically evaluate the practical situation of the mixed tribunal 
system since the reforms. Meanwhile, it is striking that official propaganda material has 
been recently released to commend The LAA 2004 for the changes it has brought to 
China, claiming (1) lay assessors have worked effectively since The LAA 2004, and (2) 
lay assessors have been carefully selected and represent the community from which 
they come.2 These positive official conclusions contrast with the scepticism I described 
in the last chapter; however, they are not premised on relevant empirical evidence. For 
example, the claim for the alleged representativeness of lay assessors does not quote 
any actual statistics, such as the gender distribution, education levels, occupations, or 
political beliefs of those within the lay assessor pool. An empirical study would 
therefore seem to be both desirable and necessary.   
                                                       
In this context, between December 2006 and June 2007 I conducted fieldwork in 
China, in order to survey how the mixed tribunal system has been operating in practice 
since The LAA 2004 came into force, drawing particular attention to the following 
issues: (1) whether the courts have embraced the new Act and have abandoned previous 
 
1 Sanja Kutnjak Ivkovic, “An Inside View: Professional Judges’ and Lay Judges’ 
Support for Mixed Tribunals”, Law & Policy, Vol.25, No.2, 2003, at 101. 
2 See, for example, the news report, “Implementing The LAA 2004 and Carrying out 
the Mixed Tribunal System”, The People’s Court Daily, 21 April 2005; news report, 
“Interpreting the Working Report of the Supreme Court of China: Realising the 
Openness of Trials and Enhancing the Transparency of Judicial Process”, at the official 
website of the China’s central government, see 
http://www.gov.cn/2008lh/content_915415.htm, last visited on 24 March 2008. 
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practices, those now viewed as inappropriate, particularly given that their discretional 
jurisdiction has been largely preserved by the Act, (2) whether the selection of lay 
assessors with a higher educational level, together with some limited training has, as 
envisaged in the new Act, produced lay assessors competent to perform their dual role 
of both fact-finding and applying the law, (3) whether lay assessors recruited since 
2004 have escaped the role of “puppet”, one that trapped their predecessors, and thus 
have been able to effectively participate in judicial decision–making, and (4) whether 
the various legal actors involved in mixed tribunals, that is, judges and lay assessors, in 
practice uphold the reformed system. This chapter will report on my fieldwork, with 
three sections incorporated. Section 4.2 interprets the methodologies applied during the 
fieldwork, Section 4.3 illustrates the major findings of the field project and covers the 




Two sets of information were collected: (1) data was gathered from both official 
and restricted-circulation sources, in archives, libraries and from websites, and (2) 
original empirical data was gathered through a questionnaire survey across nine courts.  
 
4.2.1 Scope and Methods: Practical Considerations 
 
The methodology and scope of the study were constrained by practical limitations. 
The study was conducted by me, a self-financed lone researcher with limited time, and 
these time and resource constraints precluded a participant observation study, since “a 
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study based on participant observation usually requires at least two years”.3 Extensive 
interviews with court participants were similarly impractical and the scale and range of 
the questionnaire study restricted.  
The scope of the study was also limited by statutory restrictions. Some parties to 
the procedure, such as defence counsels, public prosecutors and defendants, are not 
permitted access to deliberations: these are open only to judges and lay assessors. To 
explore the inner workings of mixed tribunals, the insiders themselves, that is the 
judges and lay assessors, were therefore selected as the target population to be 
investigated.  
In order to produce results that could be generalized, I explored the possibility of 
drawing a random sample from all the judges and lay assessors in China. According to 
Oppenheim, in principle, “a representative sample of any population should be drawn 
that every member of that population has a specified non-zero probability of being 
included in the sample. Usually, this means that every member of the population has a 
statistically equal chance of being selected”.4 The best way of ensuring this, is by 
means of a completely random sample.5 In 2000, there were approximately 250,000 
judges practicing in China,6 and 55,681 lay assessors had been appointed up to 2006.7 
                                                        
3 Patrick McNeill, Research Methods (Routledge, London 1990), at 124.  
4 A. N. Oppenheim, Questionnaire Design, Interviewing and Attitude Measurement 
(Continuum, London, 1992), at 39.  
5 Ibid, at 40. 
6 See the news report, “Lay Assessors Have Adjudicated 644,723 Cases in More Than 
Two Years”, see the official website of Chinese courts, at 
http://www.chinacourt.org/html/article/200709/04/263019.shtml, last visited on 2 June 
2008.   
7 Chen Jianqing and Wang Ning, “Research on the Reform of the Judge System in 
China”, see the official website of the Intermediate Court of Jinhua City, at  Chen 
Jianqing and Wang Ning, “A Study on Reforms of the Chinese Judge System”, see the 
official website of the Intermediate Court of Jinhua City, at 
http://www.jhcourt.cn/wenhua/lunwen_detail.asp?id=112, last visited on 2 June 2008. 
(Please note: the exact number of judges in China has not been revealed by the Chinese 
Supreme Court).  
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After contacting the relevant departments, I was informed that list of names and contact 
details of these two groups would not be given to an individual for reasons of 
confidentiality. It was therefore not possible for me to draw a random sample from 
national lists of judges and lay assessors. 
Sampling on a court-by-court basis via a random selection of courts presented a 
possible alternative method. However, access to and co-operation with China’s courts is 
extremely difficult to obtain, principally because information about the internal 
operations of the courts is officially classified. Restrictions apply, in particular where 
information could be regarded as “politically sensitive information”. The Supreme 
Court of China enacted and circulated The Regulation for Safeguarding the 
Confidentiality of the Judicial Affairs on 5th September 1990, and Article 1 provides 
that “court staff shall not reveal any classified information to their relatives, friends, 
acquaintances or other outsiders.”8 In light of this Regulation, various courts have 
constituted detailed and strict rules to ensure the confidentiality of classified 
information. For example, Article 9 of The Secret-Protection Rules of the Intermediate 
Court of Jinchang District of Jiangsu Province, provides that “any statistical data on the 
court shall not be publicized unless an approval has been obtained in advance”, and 
Article 10 adds that “any department or employee of the court shall not accept any 
external interview or present, in the name of the court, any public speech unless 
approved in advance.”9 Perhaps not surprisingly, when I inquired of some courts 
                                                        
8  See http://www.shnotary.com/lawex/lawex.aspx?lawid=11806, last visited on 2 
March 2008.   
9 See The Intermediate Court of Jinchang District of Jiangsu Province, “Confidentiality 
Rules of the Intermediate Court of Jinchang District of Jiangsu Province”, at the official 
website of the court: 
http://fy.jinchang.gov.cn/index_Article_Content.asp?fID_ArticleContent=1016, last 
visited on 2 March 2008; similar provisions can be found in the internal rules of other 
courts, see, for example, The Court of Leishan County of Guizhou Province, 
“Confidentiality Rules of the Court of Leishan County of Guizhou Province”, at the 
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regarding the possibility of conducting a survey, as a researcher from a British 
academic institution, they almost unanimously showed hesitation. When further 
informed that the survey findings might be published, all either refused or put me off.    
Confronting these frustrations and the limitation in time and funds, I had to adapt 
the project to take advantage of the opportunities that arose through my personal 
contacts in the Research Department at the High Court of S Province (RDHCS). The 
results are therefore illustrative and exploratory. They cannot be generalized beyond the 
courts concerned. However, given the practical constraints, this was the only means I 
had to carry out the study. 
 
4.2.2 Procedure: A Compromise between Quality and Feasibility 
     
4.2.2.1 Sampling and Questionnaire Administration  
 
I asked the RDHCS to approve the circulation of the questionnaires in my own 
name and under my own administration. This request was rejected, probably because 
the RDHCS remained reluctant to see a survey in respect of a “politically sensitive” 
subject, especially one conducted without its close supervision. In addition, RDHCS 
warned me that, even with its approval, the response rate was likely to be low if the 
survey was conducted in my name, since respondents may be unwilling to cooperate 
with a stranger from a foreign institution. After further discussion, RDHCS agreed to 
cooperate with me and distribute the questionnaire, but insisted that the questionnaire 
                                                                                                                                                               
official website of the court: http://www.gzlsfy.org/typenews.asp?id=73, last visited on 
2 March 2008; and The Intermediate Court of Jiyuan City of Henan Province, 
“Confidentiality Rules of the Intermediate Court of Jiyuan City of Henan Province”, at 
the official website of the court: http://www.jyzy.org/show.aspx?id=260&cid=36, last 
visited on 2 March 2008.     
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survey would be in the name of the RDHCS, though the specific questions would be 
formulated by me and scrutinized by RDHCS. RDHCS, for the sake of closely 
monitoring the survey, said they would distribute and administrate the questionnaires, 
and all of the questionnaires returned to the RDHCS would be delivered to me, but it 
would preserve the right to copy and use them. As an additional condition, I had to 
assure the anonymity of the data obtained in the survey, when using it.   
Once the basic mode of the survey was confirmed, the focus returned to the 
specific sampling procedure to be used. Again, a compromise was needed between the 
ideal and the feasible. Random sampling among the provincial population of judges and 
lay assessors would have produced a sample scattered across a number of courts in the 
Province. There are over 200 courts in S Province, a territory double the size of the 
United Kingdom. Using this proposed sampling method would have meant the RDHSC 
had to circulate the questionnaires by mail among hundreds of individual respondents at 
widely dispersed addresses, with a significant administrative burden in terms of 
distributing, tracking and collecting the questionnaires. Furthermore, the response rate 
from a postal survey was likely to be low. Direct random sampling was therefore ruled 
out by the RDHSC. However, “sampling requires compromises between theoretical 
sampling requirements and practical limitations such as time and costs.”10 The RDHSC 
suggested cluster sampling a few courts in the Province. Taking into account the fact 
that a small-scale survey in only a few courts could not satisfy my requirements, the 
RDHSC provided me with the classified reports of two investigations conducted by the 
Intermediate Court of C City in S Province and the High Court of S Province in 2006. 
In the absence of a better alternative, I accepted this suggestion.  
Following negotiation with the RDHSC, random sampling across nine courts was 
                                                        
10 Supra note 4, at 43. 
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permitted. In contrast to direct sampling from judges and lay assessors in the Province, 
court-based sampling alleviated the administrative burden on the RDHSC. Each court 
in China has a research department in charge of internal research, surveys and statistical 
tasks. Research departments in smaller courts are subject to the leadership of their 
counterparts in larger courts. All of the research departments in the courts of S Province 
are subject to the leadership of the RDHSC, so the RDHSC simply forwarded the 
questionnaires to the research departments of the sampled courts, together with an 
instruction as to how the questionnaires should be circulated and administered. The 
workload of administering the questionnaires was therefore partly transferred to the 
individual research departments of the sampled courts.  Finally, the questionnaires 
were distributed to 63 professional judges serving at the nine sampled courts, and 172 
questionnaires were delivered to all of the lay assessors serving at the nine courts.    
 
4.2.2.2 Developing the Questionnaires  
 
A number of empirical studies on mixed tribunals have been conducted in other 
jurisdictions.11 These provided a starting point for my questionnaires, but could not 
simply be translated and adopted.12 Notwithstanding the similarities between China’s 
system and its counterparts in other countries, each jurisdiction has unique 
characteristics and legal institutions with far-reaching political and democratic 
implications. As well as being inspired by previous surveys in other jurisdictions, the 
formulation of the questionnaires drew on fifteen exploratory interviews with the judges, 
                                                        
11 See, for example, a series of research materials on mixed tribunals in Croatia, 
Germany, and Sweden, see generally International Review of Penal Law (Vol. 72) (Érès, 
Ramonville Sainte Agne 2001). 
12 Translation is in itself fraught with difficulty: “the translation of questionnaires from 
one language to another is akin to entering a series of minefields”. See supra note 4, at 
48. 
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lay assessors and administrative staff of the courts, together with two internal 
questionnaire surveys conducted by the Intermediate Court of C City of S Province and 
the High Court of S Province in 2006. The questionnaires were piloted at two courts 
before being finalized.  
-- The Judges’ Questionnaire  
The judges’ questionnaire consisted of four question modules.13 The first module 
explored how the courts have carried out the mixed tribunal system in practice, given 
that The LAA 2004 gives them wide discretion. The second module requested judges to 
evaluate the performance of lay assessors during trials. The third module asked judges’ 
opinions about the mixed tribunal system, and the fourth module contained a series of 
demographic questions about the respondents. This was at the end of the questionnaire, 
and was followed by a blank area for respondents to add any further comments.  
-- The Lay Assessors’ Questionnaire 
The questionnaire for lay assessors was similarly comprised four modules. The 
first explored how, in the experience of the lay assessors, the courts have exercised their 
discretion in implementing mixed tribunals. The second asked lay assessors about their 
own participation in trials, while the third asked about their attitudes towards the 
institution. The final question asked the lay assessors to provide their demographic 
information, followed again by a blank space for any further comments.  
The majority of the questions in the two questionnaires were closed questions that 
offered the respondents choices of alternative replies in Likert-type multi-item ordinal 
scales. Some questions were repeated in the two questionnaires, allowing answers by 
judges and lay assessors to be compared.  
 
                                                        
13 See the Appendix I and II for a copy of the survey questions for judges and lay 
assessors respectively.   
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4.2.3 Reliability, Validity and Sources of Bias  
 
In trying to assess how well a questionnaire does its job, the concepts of reliability 
and validity have to be introduced.14  Validity indicates “the degree to which an 
instrument measures what it is supposed or intended to measure”;15 or in other words, 
“the respondent telling us the truth”,16 or “whether the data collected is a true picture of 
what is being studied”. 17  Reliability “refers to the purity and consistency of a 
measure”.18 As seen above, circumscribed by the practical situation, a small-scale 
questionnaire survey among a few courts inside S Province and in the name of the 
provincial high court was my only available approach. It, however, has to be admitted 
that the restraints upon my survey may have invited the danger of bias and possible 
errors, issues that had the potential to undermine its validity and reliability.    
“The respondent may conjure up an image or a stereotype of the organisation 
which sent the questionnaire and of the kind of person who might be asking these 
questions”.19 In other words, “the respondents will interact with the questionnaires and 
may ‘project’ some kind of person or organisation ‘behind’ the questions, and this may 
bias their responses”.20 My survey, initiated in a superior court’s name, did have this 
potential problem. Since The LAA 2004 came into effect in 2005, the Chinese 
authorities have been urging its implementation nationwide. At the end of 2006, the 
Supreme Court of China even sent ten special panels to various local courts to inspect 
                                                        
14 Supra note 4, at 144. 
15 Ibid, at 160. 
16 Ibid, at 144. 
17 Supra note 3, at 15. 
18 Supra note 4, at 145. 
19 Ibid, at 103. 
20 Ibid.  
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the enforcement of the new Act. 21  Furthermore, in 2007, the first nationwide 
conference of lay assessors was held in Beijing. At this conference, Luo Gan, the 
Chairman of the Politics and Law Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, 
reemphasized the need to “boost the mixed tribunal system” in China.22 Since both the 
Supreme Court of China and the ruling party had previously declared support for the 
mixed tribunal system, some participants of the survey might have “conjure[d] up an 
image” that the survey too was initiated by an upholder of the mixed tribunal system, 
because the organizer of the survey was a superior court that was supposed to follow 
the lead of the ruling party and the Supreme Court. This might have inclined some 
respondents, both judges and lay assessor, to express opinions in support of the 
institution, and they might have therefore hesitated to report opposing views, especially 
if they did not fully trust that their views would remain completely anonymous.23  
More generally, Oppenheim suggests that answers to factual questions can be 
biased by the wish to present oneself in a favourable light: “some people will claim that 
they read more than they do, bathe more often than is strictly true and fill more pipes 
from an ounce of tobacco than would seem likely”.24 Similar influences might have 
operated in our survey, especially since the Chinese authorities have encouraged the 
revival of the mixed tribunal system. Respondents might have over-claimed “good” 
                                                        
21 See the news report, “Ten Inspection Teams Will Be Designated by the Supreme 
Court to Examine the Five Tasks”, see the united official website of the courts in China, 
at: http://www.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=212063, last visited on 2 March 
2008.   
22 See the news report, “Luo Gan Emphasized at the First Nationwide Conference of 
Lay Assessors: Endeavouring to Construct the Mixed Tribunal System with Chinese 
Characteristic and Promoting Judicial Democracy and Democratic Politics of 
Socialism”, at the official website of the Chinese government: 
http://www.gov.cn/ldhd/2007-09/03/content_735698.htm, last visited on 2 March 2008.  
23 Supra note 4, at 181. 
24 Supra note 4, at 138-139. 
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performances and under-reported less desirable behaviours in the courtroom.25     
In response to the above concerns, some preventive measures were adopted when 
developing the questionnaires. Notices in writing were sent to the nine sampled courts 
together with the questionnaires, emphasizing the neutral attitude of the survey 
organizer and mandating the courts to encourage the responding judges and lay 
assessors to answer the questionnaires honestly. Each questionnaire embodied a short 
introduction which again clarified the neutral standpoint of the survey organizer. 
Further, some questions were repeated across the two questionnaires, creating the 
possibility, albeit limited, to cross-check the accuracy of information provided by the 
two groups. 26  Additionally, confidentiality and anonymity were promised in the 
introduction part of the two questionnaires to stimulate the frankness of respondents.27    
The two sets of questionnaires comprised mainly factual questions. Respondents 
were used as informants and asked to report past events experienced by them. The 
method inevitably relies on respondents’ willingness and accuracy. In terms of either 
questionnaire or interview design “the skills…can only get us half-way, at best: from 
the researcher to the respondent and back. The second half- from the respondent to the 
required information and back – is entirely up to the respondent’s ability and 
willingness to retrieve.”28 “It seems almost inevitable that major problems of factual 
validity will remain.”29  
To sum up, circumscribed by the practical situation, it would have been 
impractical to provide an accurate panoramic overview of the operation of the mixed 
tribunal system in China. However, “there are times when a ‘quick and dirty’ approach 
                                                        
25 See further details below. 
26 See, for example, supra note 4, at 145. 
27 See, for example, ibid, at 105. 
28 Ibid, at 147. 
29 Ibid.  
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is the only way open to us.”30 In this particular context, I could only expect the survey, 
in association with the statistical data, as revealed by secondary sources, to provide a 
rough sketch of the operating institution of the mixed tribunal system in S Province. 
Generalisation with regards to its operation in the rest of China remains a matter of 
speculation. 
 
4.2.4 Advantages of Conducting a Survey under an Official Name   
 
It seems that the official name of my survey brought both advantages and 
disadvantages. “If the respondents believe that their responses will have a direct 
influence on policy, the questionnaires will often be completed successfully.”31 As a 
matter of fact, all the provincial high courts in china are entitled to submit reform 
proposals to the Supreme Court if they find any legal problems in practice. The latter 
then may enact provisional judicial regulations to rectify these problems or render 
motions to the legislative body to propose amendments of old laws or enactment of new 
laws.32 The official name of our survey and the potentiality of the high court using the 
findings of the survey suggested the superior court approval and appreciation of the 
institution, therefore encouraging the respondents to treat the survey seriously.  
The high response rate of my survey can probably be regarded as evidence of this. 
In Kutnjak Ivkovic and Stefan Machura’s empirical studies on the mixed tribunals in 
Croatia and Russia, they both commissioned clerks of the participant courts to distribute 
and collect the questionnaires.33 Though this method was reported as being successful 
                                                        
30 Ibid, at 229. 
31 Supra note 4, at 105. 
32 Subsection 3 of Article 10 of The Rules of Judicial Regulations 1997 promulgated 
by the Supreme Court of China” on 1 July 1997 and amended on 23 March 2007.  
33 Stefan Machura, “Interaction between Lay Assessors and Professional Judges in 
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in their studies, it is noteworthy that the response rates were comparatively low. 
Machura, for example, reported 37% on average in his research, and the lowest 18% 
due to the reasons such as the poor organisation of the court clerks.34 In contrast, in my 
survey the questionnaires were distributed to 63 professional judges serving at the nine 
sampled courts and 49 responded, giving a response rate of 77.8%. In all, 172 
questionnaires were delivered to all of the lay assessors serving at the nine courts and 
104 valid questionnaires were received,35 gaining a response rate of 60.5%.    
 
4.3 Data and Discussion  
 
The results of the survey are presented and discussed in six sections: 4.3.1, 4.3.2, 
4.3.3, 4.3.4, 4.3.5 and 4.3.6. These sections relate to each of the six questions about the 
operation of the mixed tribunal system: (1) have the courts been appropriately 
exercising their discretion in selecting lay assessors? (2) have the courts been using lay 
assessors appropriately to avoid “full-time lay assessors” developing? (3) have the lay 
assessors become fully competent in performing their adjudicative duties? (4) have the 
lay assessors been effectively participating in decision making? (5) have the judges 
been supporting the revived mixed tribunal system, and (6) have the lay assessors been 
pleased with their court duties? In each section, data will be presented first, followed by 




                                                                                                                                                               
German Mixed Courts”, International Review of Penal Law (Vol. 72), (Érès, 
Ramonville Sainte Agne 2001), at 132. 
34 Ibid, at 133. 
35 See below for further details.  
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4.3.1 Have the Courts Been Appropriately Exercising Their Discretion in 
Selecting Lay Assessors?  
 
As discussed in the preceding chapter, The LAA 2004 and subsequent regulations 
grant courts substantial discretion in implementing the mixed tribunal system. The 
selection of lay assessors is largely under the control of the courts; the advisory power 
of the Department of Justice and the final appointment by the Standing Committee of 
the local People’s Congress are largely a formality. A concern arising from the 
unchecked power of the courts in selecting lay assessors is whether the selection 
process will produce the appropriate lay assessors. The survey investigated the extent to 
which lay assessors are representative of the population from which they are drawn. 
Data from the survey was compared with statistics from the National Bureau of China. 
The results were also compared with findings from the two internal surveys conducted 
by the Intermediate Court of C City of S Province among 21 local courts in 2006 and by 
the High Court of S Province among all the courts in S Province in the same year. 
 
4.3.1.1 Gender Composition 
 
The gender of the lay assessors was investigated using Question 31 in the 
Questionnaire for Lay Assessors (See Appendix II). As displayed in Figure 1 below, out 
of 104 responding lay assessors, 67.31% (70) were male whilst females only occupied 
32.69% (34): less than one half that of the male lay assessors. According to the 
statistical data of the fifth national census revealed by the National Bureau of Statistics 
of China, males comprised 51.53% of the national population up to 2000, and in S 
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Province the percentage of males was 51.69%.36 In light of this data, the females are 







Figure 1: Gender Distribution of Lay Assessors 
 
Males were similarly found to be over-represented in the lay assessor pool by an 
internal survey conducted by the Intermediate Court of C City of S Province among 21 
local courts in 2006, where, among all of the 398 lay assessors in 21 courts, 248 were 
male, representing 64.32% of the total.37 
 
4.3.1.2 Occupational Distribution   
 
Question 28 in the Lay Assessor Questionnaire surveyed the occupational 
                                                        
36  See the official website of the National Bureau of Statistics of China, at 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/renkoupucha/2000pucha/html/t0301.htm, last visited 
on 2 March 2008.    
37 The Project Team of the Intermediate Court of C City, “The Present Reality and 
Realistic Resolution – An Empirical Survey and Analysis of the Implementation of the 
Mixed Tribunal System”, unpublished internal-circulated research report of the 
Intermediate Court of C City, at 2, file with the author. (The real name of the courts is 
omitted here for the sake of confidentiality.)   
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distribution of the lay assessors (See Appendix II). As shown in Figure 2 below, among 
the 104 responses, nearly one third (32.69%, 34) were civil servants working at 
Government departments; 27.88% (29) worked in public service functions such as 
hospitals and educational institutions, which in China are sponsored and administrated 
by the Government; 13.46% (14) were employed by profit-making enterprises, and 
18.27% (19), 4.81% (5) and 0.96% (1) were pensioners, self-employed and farmers 
respectively, with 4.81% (5) engaged in other occupations.  
According to the statistical data of the fifth national census revealed by the 
National Bureau of Statistics of China in 2000, only 0.80% of the population of S 
Province were civil servants.38 My findings therefore, where civil servants made up 
32.69% of the lay assessor pool, suggest that civil servants are extremely 
over-represented in mixed tribunals. The statistical data of the fifth national census did 
not revealed the proportion of people employed by Government undertakings in S 
Province. However, until the end of 2005, there were 1.25 million Government 
undertakings across the whole country, with approximately 30.35 million employees, 
amounting to approximately 2.3% of the national population.39 The 27.88% found in 
the lay assessor pool in my survey suggests they are greatly over-represented as well. 
According to the same fifth national census, approximately 0.26% of the population of 
S Province were pensioners.40 When looking at the proportion found within the lay 
                                                        
38 Zhang Yuling, “How Many Civil Servants Does China Need? — An Interview with 
Wang Jian”, Guang Ming Daily, 27 February 2006, at 
http://www.gmw.cn/01gmrb/2006-02/27/content_379861.htm, last visited on 3 
December 2007.   
39 Peng Yong and Tang Yaoguo, “Reforms of Government-sponsored Enterprises of 
Public-service in China: The Return to Their Original Roles of Public-service”, see the 
official website of “China Elections & Governance”, at 
http://www.chinaelections.org/NewsInfo.asp?NewsID=102801, last visited on 15 July 
2008. 
40  See the official website of the National Bureau of Statistics of China, at 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/TJGB/RKPCGB/qgrkpcgb/t20060316_402310923.htm, last 
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assessor pool, 18.27%, they would also seem to occupy too many seats. In contrast to 
these over-representations, it seems that there is a massive under-representation of 
farmers, since in the census they occupied 72.91% of the total population in S Province, 





















Figure 2: Occupational Distribution of Lay Assessors
 
The over-representation of civil servants was also revealed by an internal survey of 
the Intermediate Court of C City of S Province in 2006. Among 398 lay assessors 
sampled in 21 courts across S Province, there were 152 civil servants, amounting to 
38.19% of the total.42 Further, the High Court of S Province conducted an internal 
investigation as to the implementation of the mixed tribunal system in 2006. According 
to its report, in August 2006 there was a total of 2,122 lay assessors in S Province. Of 
these, 1,029 were civil servants and 402 were employees of Government undertakings, 
                                                                                                                                                               
visited on 5 April 5, 2009.  
41   See the official website of the National Bureau of Statistics of China, at 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/renkoupucha/2000pucha/html/t0107c.htm, last visited 
on 8 April 2009.  
42 Supra note 37, at 2. 
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taking-up 51.5% and 18.9% of the total number respectively.43 The survey data and 
these other sources of statistical data unanimously show an over-representation of this 
section of the population.  
As discussed by Chapter 3, The LAA 2004, for the sake of assuring the political 
accountability of lay assessors, sets the selection process for lay assessors under the 
jurisdiction of the courts that are in essence steered by the CCP. In light of the statistical 
data above, it appears that the courts have helped achieve this objective quite well. Civil 
servants, administratively affiliated to the CCP Government and thus with the desired 
accountability, irrespective of their minority position among the national and provincial 
population, have been given preference by the courts during the selection of lay 
assessors. Likewise, all of the public service Government undertakings in China are 
under the direct sponsorship and control of the CCP Government; therefore their 
employees, probably with an equally trustworthy accountability, have been given a 
similar preferential opportunity to be chosen as lay assessors. 
 
4.3.1.3 Political Affiliation  
 
The political affiliation of lay assessors was probed by Question 29 in the 
Questionnaire for Lay Assessors (See Appendix II). Figure 3 below displays that almost 
three-quarters (73.08%, 76) of the lay assessors were CCP members, almost triple the 
number of non-CCP lay assessors. The Central Organizational Department of the CCP 
would not reveal the number of CCP members in S Province, but did reveal that there 
                                                        
43 The High Court of S Province, “An Investigation Report about the Implementation 
of the Mixed Tribunal System in S Province”, unpublished internal-circulated document 
of the High Court of S Province, file with the author, at 3 and 4. (The real name of the 
courts is omitted here for the sake of confidentiality.)  
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were 72,391,000 CCP members in China in 2006,44 accounting for only 5.54% of the 
national population. In light of this statistical data, the CCP members seem extremely 







Figure 3: Political Affiliation of Lay Assessors 
This over-representation of CCP members in the lay assessor pool was also found 
by an internal survey carried out by the Intermediate Court of C City in S Province in 
2006. Among all of the 398 lay assessors across 21 courts: 265 (66.58%), were 
politically affiliated to the CCP.45  
 
4.3.1.4 Educational Level    
 
The educational level of lay assessors was investigated using Question 35 in the 
Questionnaire for Lay Assessors (See Appendix II). As illustrated by Figure 4 below, 
only 6% (6) of the lay assessors had an educational level lower than a college diploma, 
94% (88) had a college diploma or higher educational level, with 60% (60) holding 
                                                        
44  See the official website of the Chinese Communist Party, at 
http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/78779/86328/86927/5986458.html, last visited on 7 April 
2009. (The CCP has not revealed the amount of its party members in S Province.) 
45 Supra note 37, at 2. 
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university degrees (54%, 2%, 3% and 1% holding a bachelor’s degree, postgraduate 
diploma, master’s degree and even Ph.D, respectively). In stark contrast, up to 2005, 
only 3.4% of the population of S Province had an educational level up to college 
diploma level or above.46 Therefore, compared with the proportion of 94.0% found in 























Figure 4: Educational Level of Lay Assessors  
 
Likewise, an internal survey conducted by the Intermediate Court of C City of S 
Province in 2006 obtained a similar outcome: among 398 lay assessors in 21 courts in S 
Province, 359 (90.2%) had college diplomas or university degrees/diplomas. 47  
Moreover, an internal investigation by the High Court of S Province in 2006 indicated 
that among all of the 2,122 lay assessors in S Province up to August 2006, there were 
                                                        
46 The statistical data was from the official website of the Government of S Province; 
for the sake of anonymity, as requested, the source is omitted herewith.     
47 Supra note 37, at 2. 
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1891 lay assessors with college diplomas or higher degrees/diplomas, making up 
89.11% of the total.48  
 
4.3.1.5 Graduate Qualifications    
 
Question 35 in the Questionnaire for Lay Assessors (See Appendix II) also 
explored the subject of whether lay assessors had studied in college or university. 
Figure 5 below shows a surprising outcome: out of 83 lay assessors who specified their 
graduate qualifications, 29 (34.94%) had obtained a degree or diploma in law and 48 
(57.83%) had obtained degrees or diplomas in other majors. Six (7.23%) admitted that 
they had not received a higher education at all, so the question probing their graduate 








Figure 5: Graduate Qualifications of Lay Assessors     
 
A similar finding was reported by an internal survey of the Intermediate Court of 
C City of S Province in 2006. Among all of the 398 lay assessors across 21 courts in S 
                                                        
48 Supra note 43, at 3 and 4. 
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Province, 137 were law school graduates, amounting to 34.42% of the total.49           
 
4.3.1.6 Discussion  
 
In light of the statistical data above, covering six areas including gender, 
occupation, political beliefs, educational level and diploma/degree subjects of the lay 
assessors, it would be unsafe to conclude that the courts exercise their discretion in a 
fair and appropriate manner when selecting lay assessors.  
-- Sacrificing the Merits of Lay Participation to Enshrine Political 
Accountability  
As discussed in the previous chapter, The LAA 2004 places the lay assessor 
selection process firmly under the control of the courts, though guided by the CCP - 
probably for the sake of assuring the political accountability of the lay assessors. For 
example, Luo Gan, the Chairperson of the CCP Central Committee of Politics and Law, 
specially pointed out that “when building the mixed tribunal system with Chinese 
particularities…the appropriate political inclination of lay assessors must be assured.”50 
The statistical data above indicates that the courts put this objective into practice quite 
well. Civil servants who are administratively affiliated to the CCP Government are 
requested to uphold the CCP party line, 51  and thus have “appropriate political 
inclination”, irrespective of their minority position in the population, and are given 
preferential treatment by the courts during the selection process for lay assessors. 
Likewise, all of the public service government undertakings in China come under the 
direct sponsorship and control of the CCP Government. Their employees, in effect with 
                                                        
49 Supra note 37, at 2. 
50 See supra note 22. 
51 See Article 4 of The Act of Chinese Civil Servants 2005.  
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equally trustworthy accountability, are given a similar preferential opportunity to 
become lay assessors. Further, to strictly execute the CCP party line, and assure the 
political accountability of lay assessors, the courts, during the selection process, even, 
without disguising the fact, favour those CCP members who demonstrate the most 
unswerving supports for the party line,52 leading to the domination by communists of 
the lay assessor pool.   
As mentioned in the preceding chapter, an important value of lay participation is 
the check and balance function it brings. Lay judges are able to oversee and check any 
potential injustice meted out by professional judges, who are “bound by organisational 
restrictions” of courts that are a part of the national apparatus and thus “susceptible to 
the state’s direct influence.”53 In contrast, a lay judge from the community, and without 
administrative affiliation to the State may be free of these “organisational restrictions”. 
However, where a lay assessor works for the Government and lives on an income 
provided by it, he may bend to the interests of his employer, that is the Government, 
and also become “susceptible to the state’s direct influence”. This concern may arise 
especially where a case involves a matter of Government interest.  
-- Sacrificing the Merits of Lay Participation for Elitism  
Article 4 of The LAA 2004 provides that the minimum educational requirement 
for a lay assessor is a college diploma. According to the statistical data of the fifth 
national census in 2006, only 4.27% of the population aged above 25 had a college 
diploma or had reached a higher education level at that time. In other words, 95.73% of 
the citizenry in China lose the opportunity of becoming lay assessors if Article 4 is 
strictly enforced. 54  Acknowledging this conflict, The Regulation of Selecting, 
                                                        
52 See Article 3 of The Charter of the Chinese Communist Party.   
53 Supra note 1, at 95. 
54  See the official website of the National Bureau of Statistics of China, at 
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Examining and Appointing Lay Assessors promulgated by the Supreme Court of China 
and the Justice Ministry on 13th December 2004, made a concession by giving the 
courts discretion to ease the educational eligibility of lay assessors under two 
circumstances: (1) in those regions where it is difficult to implement this educational 
eligibility, and (2) for those elderly candidates with a lower educational level, but good 
reputation.55 This concession intentionally gives the courts, especially those located in 
rural areas where the residents generally have a comparatively lower educational level, 
discretion to recruit those lay assessors whose educational level does not reach college 
diploma. As a matter of fact, S Province is a province based on agriculture and has a 
large rural area. Among the nine courts sampled in my survey, six are situated in rural 
areas. However, the above statistical data illustrates that the majority of the lay 
assessors are still male, well-educated and middle-aged.  
As a matter of fact, with elitism within lay assessment legislatively encouraged by 
The LAA 2004, which prescribes a high educational eligibility which is out of step with 
the generally low educational level of the national population as a whole, the Chinese 
authorities would seem to appreciate such elitism. Cao Jianming, a former Vice Chief 
Justice of the Supreme Court of China, declared that: “when selecting lay assessors, the 
courts should give priority to the citizens with good educational background, social 
achievements, reputable personalities and sufficient legal knowledge.”56 Driven by 
these reasons, it is no wonder that the courts intentionally push the elitism of lay 
                                                                                                                                                               
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/renkoupucha/2000pucha/html/t0401.htm, last visited 
on 5 April, 2009.  
55 See Article 2 of The Regulation of Selecting, Training and Examining Lay Assessors, 
promulgated by the Supreme Court of China and the Justice Ministry of China on 13 
December 2004.   
56 Cao Jianming (the Deputy Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of China then), 
“Completing the Supplemental Selection and Replacement of Lay Assessors Well and 
Duly”, at the united official website of China’s courts, at 
http://www.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=263084, last visited on 14 December 
2007. 
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assessors. For example, the report of the internal survey conducted by the Intermediate 
Court of C City of S Province in 2006, commended the elitism of lay assessors and 
even flaunted the fact that 90.2% of lay assessors in the 21 courts at that time had an 
education level higher than college diploma, and that 86.93% had professional 
qualifications in such subjects as medicine and engineering.57 However, in spite of such 
acclaim, the elitism of lay assessors can bring a variety of problems.   
First, one of the democratic merits of lay participation is that lay judges from a 
wide cross-section of society allow the input of community values, morals, norms and 
customs into the judicial process, ensuring decision-making represents the people’s 
voice. However, where the lay assessor pool is dominated by male, middle-aged and 
well-educated state employees, it might be transformed into an elite club which 
represents the voice of the minority of upper class citizens, rather than that of the 
community.         
Secondly, as discussed in the previous chapter, in China the quota of lay assessors 
in each court is limited and cannot be over the quota of judges in the same court. 
Another democratic concern arising from the over-representation of this specific social 
spectrum in the Chinese lay assessor pool, is that their occupancy of an excessive 
number of lay assessor seats means other people’s chances of being selected are small, 
and thus they are being illegally deprived of their right to participate in the 
administration of justice. For example, where farmers, who occupy over 70% of the 
population, only obtain less than 1% of the seats in the lay assessor pool, it is 
disingenuous to claim that the opportunity to participate in the administration of justice 
is non-discriminatory and fair to all of the common people.    
Thirdly, lay people’s participation in the judiciary is expected to play an 
                                                        
57 Supra note 37, at 2.  
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educational function, one which has been portrayed by some scholars as a “democratic 
school” where common people can foster the idea of participating in politics and 
democracy.58 However, the very narrow cross-section of people within the lay assessor 
pool has the potential to impair this function, due to the very selective nature of the 
“students” in this “democratic school”.  
-- Sacrificing the Merits of Lay Participation to Professionalize Lay Assessors  
Both my questionnaire and the internal survey conducted by the Intermediate 
Court of C City of S Province in 2006 reveal that over one-third of the lay assessors 
were law school graduates. Apart from following the above-mentioned instructions 
from the high-ranking officials that “when selecting lay assessors, the courts should 
give priority to the citizens with…sufficient legal knowledge”,59 the overemphasis on 
the legal education of lay assessors is probably related to the tradition of regarding lay 
assessors simply as helpers to cope with the caseload.  
As discussed in Chapter 3, from the very beginning of the mixed tribunal system 
being established in China, it has been given two essential functions: legitimising the 
judicial process and providing the courts with extra pairs of hands. The re-employment 
of lay assessors by some courts during the 1980s and 1990s also could be attributed to 
their role in helping with an escalating caseload. Driven by this customary, pragmatic 
thinking, the courts today may even feel happy to see that a lay assessor has a degree in 
law and thus is competent to efficiently perform his court duties, without the court 
having to tackle any training issues or disturb the judge in his or her instructions, thus 
delaying the trial process.  
Although lay assessors with law degrees and diplomas may alleviate the training 
                                                        
58 Valerie P. Hans and Neil Vidmar, Judging the Jury (Plenum Press, New York 1986), 
at 249.  
59 Supra note 56.  
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and instruction burden of the courts and the judges, the professionalization of lay 
assessors might cause other, serious problems.      
Needless to say, if the proportion of the population with a higher education 
represents a minority of less than 5% within China, then those with a law degree or 
diploma will be an even greater minority. While this tiny minority occupies a strong 
one-third of the quota of lay assessors, it is unfair on other social spectrums, since their 
opportunity to participate in the administration is usurped.  
Further, as a form of lay participation, the mixed tribunal system helps introduce 
lay voices and public feelings into the courtroom, incorporating community values into 
the judicial decision-making process and counteracting the case-hardened adjudication 
of judges.60 However, when a lay assessor is a lawyer, his or her “lay” status would 
seem to be in doubt since he or she is more akin to a part-time judge representing the 
values of legal professionals, rather than those of lay people. Where these “part-time 
professional judges” pervade in the lay assessor pool, the objective of the mixed 
tribunal system, to encourage lay participation, is largely compromised. This 
over-emphasis on the legal educational background of lay assessors has also occurred in 
many other courts in China.61 The growing trend towards recruiting law graduates to 
serve as lay assessors has attracted the attention of the Supreme Court of China. Xiao 
Yang, the former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of China previously warned that 
“a lay assessor should not be requested to have the high level of legal knowledge; 
                                                        
60 See, for example, Duncan Deville, “Combating Russia Organized Crime: Russia’s 
Fledgling Jury System on Trial”, George Washington Journal of International Law and 
Economics, Vol.32, 1999-2000, at 81. 
61 See, for example, Xiao Yang, “The Speech on the First Conference of Chinese Lay 
Assessors”, see the official united website of China’s courts at 
http://www.chinacourt.org/html/article/200709/03/262886.shtml, last visited on 28 
September 2008, or the official website of the Chinese Communist Party of China, at 
http://cpc.people.com.cn/BIG5/64093/64094/6210478.html, last visited on 28 
September 2008.  
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otherwise the original objective of the mixed tribunal system cannot be achieved.”62   
To sum up, in contrast to the annual working report of the Supreme Court of China 
in 2008, that pointed out that “since 1st May 2005, various Chinese courts… have 
selected totally 55,681 lay assessors with [a] wide representativeness”, my survey in S 
Province indicates that the representativeness of lay assessors is still by and large 
problematic.     
 
4.3.2 Has the Presence of Full-Time Lay Assessors been Eliminated?  
 
As the preceding chapter discussed, The LAA 2004 establishes a so-called 
“random selection” of lay assessors, which is actually a method of randomly selecting 
each lay assessor from the working rota, and designating him or her to a specific case. 
In the meantime, however, the law commissions the courts themselves to execute this 
random selection and neglects to specify how to ensure such randomness, practically 
granting the courts an opportunity to evade this provision completely. Further, neither 
The LAA 2004 nor the subsequent two regulations impose any maximum limit on the 
workload of a lay assessor. When a court, by circumventing the random selection 
process, repeatedly summons a specific lay assessor and allocates him too much work, 
the ‘full-time’ lay assessor may be reborn. Our survey has attempted to probe this 
concern.    
 
4.3.2.1 Have the Courts Insisted on the Random Selection of Lay Assessors?   
 
Question 5 in my Questionnaire for Judges (See Appendix I) asked the judges 
                                                        
62 Ibid. 
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whether their courts had been selecting each lay assessor randomly from the working 
rota and designating them to a specific case. Surprisingly, only 10.4% (5) of the 
respondents reported that their courts had been strict in doing this in each case, whilst 
22.9% (11) confessed that their courts had not done this as yet.  
The internal survey conducted by the Intermediate Court of C City of S Province 
in 2006 presents an even more negative picture. The survey report states that “the 
random selection of lay assessors has not been strictly carried out yet in the 21 
courts”.63 A report published by the official website of China’s courts indicated a 
similar negative situation. Up to September 2007, 937 courts had strictly implemented 
the random selection of lay assessors in practice, accounting for only 31.8% of the total 
number of courts in China.64    
 
4.3.2.2 Have the Courts been Distributing Reasonable Caseloads to the Lay 
Assessors   
 
With random selection abandoned, a court will effectively have the opportunity to 
select a lay assessor from the working rota and allocate him or her a workload at its 
own discretion, and this might lead to an imbalanced workload allocation among lay 
assessors.  
Question 33 in the Questionnaire for Lay Assessors (See Appendix II) probed the 
caseload of lay assessors. As illustrated by Figure 6 below, from May 2005 when The 
LAA 2004 came into effect, to May 2007 when my survey was conducted, a weak 
                                                        
63 Supra note 37, at 8. 
64  The news report, “56,000 Lay Assessors Participating in Cases via Random 
Selection”, see the united official website of China’s courts at: 
http://www.chinacourt.org/html/article/200709/03/262877.shtml, last visited on 12 
April 2009.  
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one-third (33) of lay assessors had handled more than 50 cases, whilst in contrast, about 
one-fifth (22) had adjudicated on less than ten cases, and with 8.65% (nine) even below 
five. Further, my survey found that among the 104 responding lay assessors, there were 




































The internal survey conducted by the Intermediate Court of C City in 2006 
reported an even more radical workload imbalance among lay assessors. Within the 
nine months from 1st May 2005 to 1st February 2006, and among 398 lay assessors 
serving at 21 courts, eight (2%) of lay assessors had participated in over 100 cases, 
whilst 59 (14.8%) had not participated in any cases at all.65  
 
 
                                                        
65 Supra note 37, at 8. 
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4.3.2.3 Discussion  
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, The LAA 2004 expects a random selection 
of lay assessors to realize an even allocation of workload between lay assessors, in 
order to prevent the courts from summoning specific lay assessors repeatedly and 
transforming them into full-time court workers. It seems, however, that this institutional 
design has not been strictly adhered to in practice. The courts have evaded random 
selection as a process and thus have failed to allocate an appropriate workload among 
lay assessors. 
-- Why has Random Selection been Suspended?    
In order to ensure the effectiveness of the random selection process for jurors, in 
2000, England established a specific administrative body, the Jury Central Summoning 
Bureau, which is independent of the courts, to operate a computer system to execute the 
selection of jurors.66 In contrast, Article 14 of The LAA 2004 allows the courts to 
execute random selection, prescribing no third-party to oversee its execution, though it 
is the courts themselves who will use the lay assessors. This institutional design has 
already granted the courts an opportunity to carry out ‘random selection’ at their own 
free will. Further, the inherent ambiguity of Article 14 has at least three weaknesses. 
According to the internal survey of the Intermediate Court of C City of S Province, the 
courts, when enforcing random selection, feel confused about: (1) which department or 
person of a court shall be liable for the execution of the random selection, (2) how to 
ensure the randomness, by computer or lot, or using other solutions, and (3) who shall 
oversee execution of the process.67 These ambiguities provide the courts with further 
                                                        
66 Penny Darbyshire, “What Case We Learn From Published Jury Research? Findings 
for the Criminal Courts Review”, Criminal Law Review, Dec 2001, at 974.  
67 Supra note 37, at 9. 
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excuses to evade the random selection process.         
On the other hand, it appears that some courts have encountered practical 
difficulties in exercising random selection. The internal survey by the High Court of S 
Province in 2006 disclosed that “the conflict between the employment of some lay 
assessors and their court duties is very prominent”, and “some lay assessors who had 
been randomly selected from the working rota often asked for exemption or deferral of 
their court duties and caused the delay of the judicial process”.68 When this happens on 
a frequent basis, the court may lose patience with the process and replace random 
selection with manual selection, in order to avoid selecting unreliable lay assessors who 
are often busy with their employment.  
-- The Re-birth of Full-Time Lay Assessors  
As seen from the above survey data, among 104 lay assessors, nineteen were found 
to be pensioners, whilst sixteen of them (84.2%) had participated in more than 50 cases 
over two years. It is certainly not a coincidence that these pensioners assumed heavier 
workloads. A more reasonable explanation is that the courts, with random selection 
suspended, purposefully summon pensioners more frequently and assign them larger 
caseloads, due to their unemployed status, which increases their availability and 
responsiveness to court summons. The internal survey of the Intermediate Court of C 
City of S Province reveals more obviously the return of full-time lay assessors. Within 
the space of nine months, from 1st May 2005 to 1st February 2006, eight lay assessors 
participated in over 100 cases. In the previous chapter, to highlight the incidence of 
full-time lay assessors, I used Sun Bozhong, who participated in approximately ten 
cases each month, as an example.69 Remarkably, each of these eight lay assessors 
                                                        
68 Supra note 43, at 15. 
69 See the newsletter, “Lay Assessors Pay Out Both Labour and Money and Proceed 
Difficultly – the Phenomenon of Unbalanced Allocation of Caseloads Is Prominent”, 
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assumed an even heavier caseload than Sun.  
The above discussion illustrates how the courts have exercised their discretion 
within the process of implementing the revived mixed tribunal system. It appears that 
the situation is not satisfactory. First, the lay assessor pool is dominated by communists 
and the well-educated, ensuring the political accountability and elitist nature of lay 
assessors. Secondly, it seems that lay assessors are employed by the courts not to 
introduce democratic participation by the people into important cases with far-reaching 
social implications, but to increase the number of people used with professional 
knowledge, in order to tackle the escalating caseload, which in return has added to the 
elitist nature of the pool, as it is full of law graduates and other professionals. Thirdly, 
the much-anticipated “random selection” of lay assessors has been easily evaded by the 
courts and their manual selection has caused a great workload imbalance and given rise 
to the reoccurrence of full-time lay assessors.         
 
4.3.3 Have Lay Assessors Become Really Competent?   
 
As stated in the last chapter, the 1980s and 1990s saw great passivity among lay 
assessors, which was believed to be partly attributable to their incompetence.70 The 
LAA 2004, in association with The Regulation of Selecting, Examining and Appointing 
Lay Assessors 2004 and The Provisional Regulation of Administration of Lay 
                                                                                                                                                               
see the official news website of Chinese authority, at 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2005-11/14/content_3776737.htm, last visited on 27 
September 2008.    
70 See The Supreme Court of China, “The Interpretation of the Draft of The Lay 
Assessor Act 2004”, this Interpretation, together with the Draft of Lay Assessors Act 
2004, was submitted to the Standing Committee of the Chinese People’s Congress for 
the latter’s reference and deliberation on 2 April 2004, available at the official news 
website of China’s government: 
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/14576/28320/32776/32780/2445485.html, last visited 
on 3 March 2009.    
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Assessors 2005, has adopted a number of measures in an attempt to resolve this 
problem, such as improving the educational requirements for lay assessors and 
providing training. However, in the preceding chapter, based upon a theoretical analysis, 
I questioned the effectiveness of these solutions. To verify this analysis, my 
questionnaire survey employed a number of variables to briefly investigate the 
competence of lay assessors under The LAA 2004.  
 
4.3.3.1 The judges’ General Opinions on the Competence of Lay Assessors  
 
Question 12 in the Questionnaire for Judges (see Appendix I) asked judges 
whether they felt satisfied with the competence of lay assessors. The responses were 
fairly positive, albeit only 2% (1) of the judges presented a completely positive answer: 
“satisfactory”, the overwhelming majority (73.5%) came up with a moderately positive 
answer: “somewhat satisfactory”, whilst only 12.3% delivered negative evaluations by 
answering “somewhat unsatisfactory” (8.2%), or “unsatisfactory” (4.1%). 
 
4.3.3.2 The Competence of Lay Assessors in Terms of Understanding Case 
Facts 
 
To further probe the competence of lay assessors, the Questionnaire for Judges 
(see Appendix I) employed Questions 9-(3), 9-(4) and 9-(5) to request judges on their 
observations with regard to the frequency that lay assessors’ had difficulty in tackling 
factual, evidentiary and legal problems during deliberations. To cross-check the judges’ 
reports, Questions 5-(8), 5-(9) and 5-(10) in the Questionnaire for Lay Assessors (see 
Appendix II) asked the lay assessors to report their own views on the frequency that 
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they encountered difficulties in understanding factual, evidentiary and legal questions 
of their cases. The results are shown in the Table 1 below.  
 
          Table 1:  Perceived Competence of Lay Assessors 
 
Self-reports from Lay Assessors 
Themselves  






















issues in a 
case when 
deliberation 
begins?     























issues in a 
case when 
deliberation 

















































Variable 1 in Table 1 indicates the frequency that lay assessors encountered 
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difficulties in understanding factual questions. It seems that the lay assessors 
themselves were quite confident in their fact-finding competence: 9.6% (10) admitted 
that they only “occasionally” confronted difficulty in understanding fact questions, 
51.9% (54) reported “rarely”, and 38.5% (40) claimed “never”. In contrast, the 
responses from the judges were more negative, although over 80% of the judges 
reported a relatively low number of times that their lay colleagues had difficulty in 
understanding the factual issues of a case: 70.8% (34) and 12.4% (6) claiming 
“occasionally” and “rarely” respectively, and with 8.3% (4) acknowledging that the lay 
assessors were “often” unable to understand factual issues of cases. 
 
4.3.3.3 The Competence of Lay Assessors in Respect of Understanding 
Evidentiary Issues   
 
Variable 2 in Table 1 indicates the frequency that the lay assessors confronted 
difficulties in comprehending the evidentiary issues of cases. In all, 12.6% (13) of the 
lay assessors confessed that they “often” had problems in this regard, whilst 56.3% (58) 
claimed “occasionally” and 31.1% (32) reported “rarely”. Again, the evaluation of the 
judges seems more negative: almost double the number of judges (25%, 12) 
acknowledged that their lay colleagues “often” had difficulty in understanding 
evidential issues, followed by 47.9% (23) and 18.8% (9) reporting “occasionally” and 
“rarely” respectively. 
 
4.3.3.4 The Competence of Lay Assessors in Respect of Applying Law  
 
Article 1 of The LAA 2004 grants lay assessors in China exactly the same duty as  
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that of judges, including the duty to apply law to make judgments. Variable 3 in Table 1 
demonstrates whether the lay assessors were able to perform this duty, something which 
might prove difficult for lay people without a legal education. Compared with no lay 
assessors reporting they “often” have difficulty in understanding the factual questions 
of cases, 16.3% (17) admitted that they “often” face problems applying the law. In 
contrast to only 9.6% (10) reporting that they “occasionally” have difficulty in 
comprehending the facts of a case, this percentage rose sharply to 41.3% (43) when 
inquiring about difficulties in applying the law. While over 90% of the lay assessors 
acknowledging that they “rarely” or “never” have problems grasping case facts, only 
slightly over 40% (44) reported the same low frequencies in terms of legal application. 
Responses from the judges were more negative: 25% (12) of the judges reported that 
their lay fellows “often” became confused about law application, 54.2% (26) 





The statistical data above demonstrates four key features, as discussed below:  
-- The Prima Facie Self-contradictory Evaluations from the Judges 
As illustrated by the three variables in Table 1, in terms of the fact finding 
competence of lay assessors as well as their ability to evaluate evidence or apply the 
law, the evaluations of the judges, when compared with the evaluations of the lay 
assessors themselves, were more negative. In contrast, however, approximately 
three-quarters of the judges, when asked for their general opinions about the lay 
assessors’ competence, though in varying degrees, expressed their satisfaction with the 
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competence of their lay colleagues. It therefore appears that a self-contradiction existed 
therein, which might be attributed to two factors, as discussed below:  
First, Oppenheim points out that “people often prefer not to say negative, 
unpleasant or critical things unless they have specific complaints. They tend to say that 
most things are ‘all right’, and present a rather bland façade.”71 When inquired about 
their personal feelings as to the competence of lay assessors, some judges might have 
been affected by this “barrier of politeness”, giving positive answers.  
Secondly, the theory of “Status Characteristics” developed by Berger and his 
colleagues could serve as another factor accountable for the judges’ tolerant attitudes 
towards the competence or otherwise of lay assessors. “In a nutshell, the expectation is 
that neither the lay judges’ own expectations nor the professional judges’ expectations 
of the lay judges’ contributions – their frequency and importance – would be as high as 
the expectations concerning professional judges’ contributions.” 72  Driven by the 
relatively low expectation as to the competence of lay assessors, even if judges “have 
always been sceptical of the lay judges’ ability to evaluate evidences and apply the 
law”,73 they might be inclined to hold back their querulous voice. 
-- More Negative Evaluations from the Judges  
As seen above, in contrast to the self-evaluations of the lay assessors as to their 
competence at understanding factual, evidential and legal issues, the corresponding 
evaluations from the judges were more negative, which might be ascribed to the 
following:  
It is common for “two observers or two participants [to experience]…the same 
                                                        
71 Supra note 4, at 212. 
72 Supra note 1, at 107 and 108. 
73 Ibid, at 107. 
 240
action may yet report differently on it”.74 For example, a range of field studies indicate 
that respondents may see themselves more positively when inquired about issues such 
as their driving skills, ethics, managerial prowess, productivity and health.75 Ivkovic, in 
his research on mixed tribunals, found that “lay judges may tend to overestimate their 
own ability to participate, as well as the frequency and importance of their own 
participation.”76 He specially conceptualized these behaviours as “self-serving bias”,77 
which might be applicable to the situation in China, in which the lay assessors evaluate 
their competence to participate in trials in a more positive way.  
-- “Occasionally” became the Most Welcome Answer  
As illustrated by the Bar Chart 3, most of the lay assessors participating in my 
survey had performed their court duties for two to three years or even longer. It 
therefore was unrealistic to request them to remember their working situation during the 
previous few years with any degree of accuracy, for example, in how many cases they 
had encountered difficulties tackling factual or legal problems. Likert-type 
multiple-item ordinal scales, ranging from a high frequency such as “often” to a low 
frequency such as “never”, were adopted in the questionnaires for selection by the 
respondents. Remarkably, as indicated by the Table 1, the answer “occasionally”, 
indicating a moderate frequency, was the answer most frequently selected by the 
respondents.  
Oppenheim points out that “when asked for a numerical estimate, people tend to 
choose a figure near the average or near the middle of a series”.78 This might be the 
case in my survey. Compared with the answers “in each case” and “often”, that were 
                                                        
74 Supra note 4, at 146. 
75 Ibid. 
76 Supra note 1, at 107.  
77 Ibid.  
78 Supra note 4, at 125. 
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placed above “occasionally” to indicate high frequencies, and “rarely” and “never” 
which were placed below to indicate lower frequencies, the answer “occasionally” was 
exactly in the middle of the answer range, to indicate a moderate or average frequency. 
For the above-mentioned “self-serving bias”, even if a lay assessor “often” encountered 
difficulties during the trials, he may have been unwilling to acknowledge his 
incompetence and thus turned to the less uncompromising answer, “occasionally”. In 
addition, where a lay assessor “rarely” had difficulty in performing his court duty, he or 
she probably holds a modest or conservative attitude, and so was inclined to choose the 
more secure and average answer “occasionally”, rather than the more clear-cut “rarely”.  
-- Recruits under the New Act not as Competent as Expected     
In light of Table 1 above, the lay assessors displayed a comparatively stronger 
ability to understand factual questions of the cases; none of the lay assessors themselves 
and only 8.3% of the judges reported a high frequency of occasions where the lay 
assessors encountered difficulties in understanding factual issues of the cases. When it 
came to the more complex duties, such as evaluating the evidence and applying the law, 
both the lay assessors and the judges presented a much more negative evaluation: the 
majority of the lay assessors and judges both reported a high or medium frequency of 
times when the lay assessors confronted problems. Further, it is noteworthy that, as 
indicated by Figure 5 above, over one-third (34.94%) of the respondents in my survey 
were law school graduates with professional, legal training, so they may have already 
substantially promoted the average competence of those lay assessors participating in 
my survey. Taking into account this important factor and the frequent difficulties that 
the lay assessors encountered when evaluating evidence and applying the law, it would 
seem to be questionable as to whether The LAA 2004 has given rise to really competent 
lay assessors.  
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As discussed in the preceding chapter, The LAA 2004 expects to substantially 
improve the competence of lay assessor by enhancing their educational eligibility and 
providing them with fragmentary training. It seems that these two measures have not 
successfully transformed lay people into adjudicators as competent as professional 
judges, especially in terms of their ability to evaluate evidence and resolve legal 
problems. Question 19 in the Questionnaire for Judges (see Appendix I) inquired of the 
judges whether they found the competence of the lay assessors with higher education 
better than those without it. Remarkably, over half (56.3%, 27) gave a negative answer 
by saying “not apparently” (12.5%, 6), or “not very apparently” (43.8%, 21); whilst 
slightly over one-third presented a more positive view by stating “somewhat 
apparently” (35.4%, 17) and “apparently” (2.1%, 1). As seen in the last chapter, the 
very high educational eligibility of lay assessors has precluded over 95% of the Chinese 
people of their right to participate in the administration of justice, though the results of 
this reform seem to be far from convincing.  
 
4.3.4 Have the Lay Assessors Participated Effectively in Decision Making?   
 
The preceding chapter revealed that in the 1980s and 1990s, lay assessors behaved 
very passively and were reported to have often remained silent like puppets during trials 
and deliberations.79 Since the end of the 1990s, the old inquisitorial trial mode has been 
replaced by a new adversarial one, one that requests public prosecutors and defence 
counsels to be active speakers during trials, whilst the presiding judge of a mixed 
tribunal is only required to speak occasionally to conduct the trial, and other members 
                                                        
79 Newsletter, “The Mixed Tribunal System Faces Four Difficulties”, Legal Daily, 8 
May 2008.   
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of the tribunal only need to concentrate on listening.80 However, in contrast to their 
passive role during trials, lay assessors are not supposed to be passive during 
deliberations. On the contrary, they are meant to actively participate in deliberations 
and thus affect judicial decision making with their lay voice, exactly the legislative 
objective of The LAA 2004.81 My survey therefore formulated a number of variables to 
explore whether lay assessors in China under the new Act have been effectively 
participating in deliberations and affecting decision making, or have continued to be 
passive.   
 
4.3.4.1 Have Lay Assessors Participated Effectively During Deliberations and 
Exerted their Influence 
 
To measure whether lay assessors recruited under The LAA 2004 have effectively 
participated in deliberations and exerted their influence upon decision making, 
Questions 5-(12), 5-(13) and 5-(17) in the Questionnaire for Lay Assessors (see 
Appendix II) asked the lay assessors to report upon the frequency with which they 
presented arguments in general, with regard to a defendant’s conviction and with regard 
to the defendant’s penalty during deliberations. Again, to cross-check the lay assessors’ 
self-reports, Questions 9-(11), 9-(13) and 10 in the Questionnaire for Judges (see 
Appendix I) also asked judges to report their observations with regard to these aspects. 
The results are shown in Table 2 below. 
 
 
                                                        
80 He Bing, “Merits of the Mixed Tribunal System”, The People’s Court Daily, 25 
April 2005.    
81 See preamble of The LAA 2004.  
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     Table 2: Performance of Lay Assessors in Deliberations 
 
Self-reports from Lay Assessors  Reports from Judges  







1. How often have 
lay assessors 
presented dissents 
























































Variable 1 in Table 2 explored whether the lay assessors liked to act as dissidents 
during deliberations. Only 14.6% (7) of the judges admitted that their lay colleagues 
“often” contributed a different voice; 45.8% (22) answered “occasionally”; and 39.6% 
(19) reported “rarely”. Self-evaluations from the lay assessors themselves were not 
positive in this regard either: only 3.8% (4) of the respondents claimed that they “often” 
expressed dissent, though 71.2% (74) claimed “occasionally”, whilst 20.2% (21) 
reported “rarely” and 4.8% (5) answered “never”.  
Variable 2 and 3 in the Table 2 further explored what kind of different opinions the 
lay assessors normally presented. A domain where disputes often occur in collegial 
tribunals is agreeing the penalty which should be applied to a defendant, since The 
Criminal Code of China 1997 delivers considerable discretionary power to judges in 
this regard. It has been reported that the same offences with very comparable 
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circumstances may be handed very different penalties in China.82 Variable 2 surveyed 
whether the lay assessors ever proposed different penalities from the judges’. 
Remarkably, over one-third (36.9%, 38) of the lay assessors confessed that they had 
“never” or “rarely” done so whilst 43.8% (21) of the judges reported the same. Further, 
variable 3 explored whether the lay assessors ever dissented as to whether a defendant 
should be convicted or not. Approximately three-quarters of the lay assessors denied 
that they had ever done so, whilst about one-half of the judges claimed that they had 
never seen their lay colleagues dissent before.         
The limited contribution of lay assessors to the decision making process has was 
also verified by the internal survey conducted by the Intermediate Court of C City of S 
Province in 2006. That report revealed that “it was widely admitted by the judges 
participating in our interviews that the lay assessors [of the 21 courts] in most cases 
repeated the judges’, especially the presiding judges’ opinions rather than presented 
their own dissent.”83  
 
4.3.4.2 Discussion   
 
The three variables in Table 2 roughly explore the performance of the lay assessors 
in deliberations. It appears that the lay assessors’ opinions, as to the penalty or 
conviction handed to the defendants, were not so often different from those of the 
professional judges. As Machura states, “if there was a non-controversial decision in 
the majority of cases, this does not speak against lay participation since the day-to-day 
                                                        
82  Jian Guang, “The Discretionary Power of Chinese Judges Shall Not Be 
Inappropriately Big”, Commercial Perspective of China, 23 Sep 2004. 
83 Supra note 37, at 8-9.  
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routine of trials consists of more obvious cases.”84 In the meantime, however, it is 
arguable that the factors below might have been responsible, at least in part, for the 
seeming passivism of the lay assessors during deliberations.  
-- Lay Voices Probably Silenced by Lay Assessors’ Incompetence  
The unresolved lack of competence of lay assessors may more or less counteract 
their voice, because “better knowledge by lay judges pays off in the form of increased 
influence”,85 and vice versa. It would be unimaginable for a lay assessor to effectively 
participate in deliberation and decision making if he cannot fully understand the 
evidentiary and legal issues of the case.  
-- Lay Voices Probably Silenced by Judges’ Authority  
Further, it appears that the dominant status of professional judges in mixed 
tribunals might serve as another factor to prevent lay voices from being heard. Question 
17 in the Questionnaire for Lay Assessors (see Appendix II) asked the lay assessors 
whether they agreed with the opinion that “lay assessors should defer to judges’ 
opinions during deliberations since the latter has better legal knowledge and 
professional skills”. Slightly less than 60% of the lay assessors expressed the opposite 
thought and replied “disagree” 57.7% (60) and 3.8% (4) answered “strongly disagree”. 
In contrast, more than 20% approved of this proposition by responding “strongly agree” 
(4.8%, 5) and “agree” (16.3%, 17), with 17.3% (18) stating “uncertain”. Driven by this 
deference to judges, lay assessors may feel reluctant to present and defend their 
different opinions, in spite of “theoretically possessing rights and powers equal to those 
of the judge”.86 Likewise, findings in both Croatia and Russia also disclose that 
                                                        
84 Supra note 33, at 144.  
85 Ibid, at 145. 
86 Stephen C. Thaman, “The Resurrection of Trial by Jury in Russia”, Stanford Journal 
of International Law, Vol.31, 1995, at 67. 
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“integrated decision making tribunals may silence lay voices”,87 because professional 
judges in mixed tribunals “appear as an authority because of knowledge of law and 
judicial routines and because of the judge’s status in the hierarchy of the court 
system”.88 It seems my findings accord with this theory.    
-- Lay Voices Probably Silenced by Lay Assessors’ Minority Position  
As suggested by Landsman, when “the number of lay judges is small”, “there is 
limited likelihood that any one of them will stand up to the professionals with whom 
they work”.89 Also, according to Kalven and Zeisel’s findings in the USA, a juror’s 
lone stand rarely hangs a jury, because his or her absolute minority is too great; thus 
making him or her less courageous in challenging the majority.90 Landsman carries 
forward an analogy to this research and suggests that “this particular finding rings true 
for the mixed tribunal as well as other sorts of small group processes”.  
As mentioned in the last chapter, Article 3 of The LAA 2004 legitimises the 
minority position of lay assessors in mixed tribunals by articulating that “the proportion 
of lay assessors in a mixed tribunal shall not be less than one third”. According to 
current criminal procedural law in China, a collegial tribunal adjudicating criminal 
cases is normally composed of three members.91 Where a mixed court is composed of 
only one lay assessor and two professional judges, the lay minority has to confront the 
professional majority. Under this circumstance, it would be unlikely for a single lay 
assessor to become a “popular counterforce” to challenge the professional members 
                                                        
87 Valerie P. Hans, “Lay Participation in Legal Decision Making”, Law & Policy, 
Vol.25, No.2, 2003, at 89.  
88 Supra note 33, at 143. 
89 Stephan Landsman, “Commentary: Dispatches from the Front: Lay Participation in 
Legal Processes and the Development of Democracy”, Law & Policy, Vol.25, 2003, at 
176. 
90 Ibid, at 174. 
91 See Article 147 of The Act of Criminal Procedure 1996.  
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with technical, psychological and more importantly, quantitative issues.92  
To further verify these ideas, Question 25 of the Questionnaire for Lay Assessors 
(see Appendix II) inquired of the lay assessors as to whether they would feel more 
encouraged to participate in deliberations if they obtained a quantitative dominance in 
the mixed tribunal. Less than one-quarter (24.5%, 25) stated “disagree” to this, whilst 
over a half stated “agree” (52.0%, 53), followed by 20.6% (21) claiming “not sure” and 
2.9% (3) saying “strongly agree”. It seems that the proportionate split between 
professional judges and lay assessors can make sense in mixed tribunals.  
Xiao Yang, a former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of China, released a 
statement at the first nationwide conference of lay assessors on 4th September 2007, in 
which he stated that “the participant enthusiasm of lay assessors has been fully 
triggered” and “lay assessors have been expressing their opinions as to either fact 
finding or law application without hesitation”.93 However, in light of my survey, this 
proposal appears somewhat doubtful, since it is unconvincing to say there are only 
isolated instances of passivism among lay assessors, and that these should not be taken 
as the norm.  
 
4.3.5 Have Judges Supported the Revived Mixed Tribunal System?  
 
A series of studies in other jurisdictions have discovered that judges’ attitudes 
towards the mixed tribunal system can affect the effective participation of lay 
                                                        
92 Supra note 86, at 67. 
93 See the news report, “Lay Assessors Have Adjudicated 644,723 Cases in More Than 
Two Years”, see the official website of Chinese courts, at 
http://www.chinacourt.org/html/article/200709/04/263019.shtml, last visited on 2 June 
2008.    
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assessors.94 For example, according to Machura’s research in Russia, judges may frame 
the participation of lay assessors by deciding how much to grant them the opportunity 
of questioning or the time to deliberate. If judges are willing to do so, their lay 
colleagues can be “more active in the deliberation” and “the chances are higher that the 
lay assessor will be successful with an opinion which differs from that of the presiding 
judge”.95 Likewise, research in Germany indicated that judges’ behaviour can be 
decisive for the German Schöffen’s participation and influence.96 As indicated in the 
previous chapter, the mixed tribunal system in China experienced decades of decline 
before The LAA 2004. The institution was suspended or misused in a number of 
regions and drew criticism as a result. It is therefore uncertain whether the institution, 
revived though it is, will be able to obtain widespread support from Chinese judges. 
Taking into account the factors above, in association with China’s particular historical 
context, the support of judges is likely to become a critical issue for the current mixed 
tribunal system in China. In an attempt to survey this issue, Questions 14, 20, 21, 22 
and 23 of the Questionnaire for Judges (see Appendix I), by taking into account China’s 
particular situation that lay assessors were regarded as ‘extra’ court staff and used as a 
minority on mixed tribunals in the 1980s and 1990s,97 covered five variables. The 




                                                        
94  Supra note 33, at 125-127; supra note 87, at 89; also see Stefan Machura, 
“Interaction between Lay Assessors and Professional Judges in German Mixed Courts”, 
International Review of Penal Law (Vol. 72), (Érès, Ramonville Sainte Agne 2001), at 
452. 
95 Supra note 33, at 144.  
96 Ibid.  
97 See Chapter 3 for more discussion.  
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Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
Not sure 
1. Do you agree that the mixed 
tribunal system should be preserved 
in China? 




12.5 (6) 2.1% (1) 4.2% (2) 
2. Do you agree with the opinion 
that “One of the most important 
values of lay assessors is that they 










2.0% (1) -- 
3. Do you agree with the opinion 
that “It is desirable that lay 
assessors have a diploma or a 







2.0% (1) 2.0% (1) -- 
4. Excluding the consideration that 
lay assessors can alleviate the 
shortage of professional judges, do 
you prefer that collegial tribunals 
exclude lay assessors and 








-- 2.0% (1) 
5. Do you agree with the opinion 
that “In order to ensure the 
effectiveness of lay participation, 
lay assessors should outnumber 
judges in mixed tribunals”? 






6.3% (3) -- 
4.3.5.1 Judges’ General Attitudes Toward the Institution  
 
Variable 1 in Table 3 generally explores whether the judges agreed that the mixed 
tribunal system should be preserved in China. The overwhelming majority of the 
responding judges seemed to support the institution by answering “strongly agree” 
(2.1%, 1) and “agree” (68.8%, 33), whilst only 14.6% manifested their opposition by 
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replying “disagree” (12.5%, 6) and “strongly disagree” (2.1%, 1), and with 10.4% (5) 
holding a neutral standpoint and 4.2% (2) saying they were “uncertain”.  
According to Oppenheim, “attitude scales rely for their effectiveness on the 
cooperation and frankness of the respondent.”98 When analyzing the judges’ attitudes 
towards the mixed tribunal system, we must especially bear in mind, as observed by 
Oppenheim, the phenomenon of “response set”, which stems from “social desirability” 
of the judges, that is “the tendency to reply ‘agree’ to items that the respondents believe 
reflect socially desirable attitudes, in order to show themselves in a better light.”99 In 
terms of my survey, the “response set” driven by “social desirability” might be 
expressed in attitudes that favour the mixed tribunal system, stemming from the 
respondents’ belief that, in the context of The LAA 2004, upholding the existence of 
the mixed tribunal is the “socially desirable attitude” to reveal. In order to penetrate this 
possible “response set”, Oppenheim suggests that when measuring an important attitude, 
sets of questions or attitude scales rather than just a single question should be 
employed.100 The survey therefore included variables 2, 3, 4 and 5 in an attempt to 
explore the real attitudes of judges towards the mixed tribunal system.    
 
4.3.5.2 Do Judges Appreciate Lay Assessors for Alleviating the Shortage of 
Judges?  
 
Variable 2 in Table 3 shows whether the judges agreed with the proposition that 
“One of the most important values of lay assessors is that they will alleviate the 
shortage of professional judges”. Remarkably, the majority of the judges said they 
                                                        
98 Supra note 4, at 210.  
99 Ibid, at 181. 
100 Ibid, at 147. 
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“strongly agree” (12.2%, 6) and “agree” (55.1%, 27), whilst only 14.2% (7) of the 
judges opposed this proposition by saying “disagree” (12.2%, 6) and “strongly 
disagree” (2.0%, 1), with 18.4% (9) taking a neutral standpoint.  
Variable 3 inquired into the opinion of the judges regarding the proposition that “It 
is desirable that lay assessors have a diploma or a degree in law”. Surprisingly, 83.7% 
(41) of the responding judges presented the favourable opinion, replying “strongly 
agree” (10.2%, 5) or “agree” (73.5%, 36).  
Variable 4 further asked the judges whether, excluding the consideration that lay 
assessors can alleviate the shortage of professional judges, they would prefer all 
collegial tribunals to exclude lay assessors and be composed only of professional judges. 
As seen above, only 14.6% of the responding judges opposed the preservation of the 
mixed tribunal system in China, whilst (42.9%, 21) agreed that lay assessors should be 
excluded from courtrooms when excluding the consideration that lay assessors can 
alleviate the shortage of professional judges; though 69.3% of the judges manifested 
their support towards the mixed tribunal system, only 32.7% (16) still appreciated it if it 
has not helped alleviate the shortage of judges. In addition, 22.4% (11) held a neutral 
position and 2% (1) replied “uncertain”. 
 
4.3.5.3 Do Judges Prefer the Lay Assessors’ Minority Position?   
 
As revealed in the last chapter, The LAA 2004 legitimises the minority position of 
lay assessors in mixed tribunals. In other words, in Chinese practice, it is lawful for a 
mixed tribunal to be composed of two professional judges and only one lay assessor. To 
further explore to what extent judges support lay participation, Variable 5 in Table 3 
shows whether the judges agreed that lay assessors should outnumber them in mixed 
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tribunals. Impressively, despite 70.9% of the judges stating a favourable attitude 
towards the mixed tribunal system, only 20.9% (10) did not mind losing their 
quantitative dominance by replying “strongly agree” (4.2%, 2) or “agree” (16.7%, 8), 
whilst half (50.1%, 24) of the judges were resistant to this idea and answered “disagree” 
(43.8%, 21) or “strongly disagree” (6.3%, 3), and 29.2% (14) showed a neutral attitude.  
 
4.3.5.4 Discussion   
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the conflict between the high workload and shortage of 
professional judges has been a long-standing problem confronted by many courts in 
China. The mixed tribunal, compared with the collegial tribunal composed exclusively 
of judges, has therefore been appreciated by some judges, essentially because lay 
assessors can replace judges as members of collegial tribunals.101 In other words, lay 
assessors are welcome for the sake of spreading the caseload of judges between more 
people, rather than the wish to encourage lay participation. Probably to address this 
misuse, the preamble of The LAA 2004 specifically clarifies that the legislative purpose 
of the Act is to actualize the people’s democratic participation in the administration of 
justice. To remind the courts of moving away from the customary misuse of the 
tribunals, Xiao Yang, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of China, emphasized that 
“although lay assessors may practically help to resolve the shortage of judges…this use 
shall not be regarded as the major function of the mixed tribunal system.”102 However, 
in spite of this emphasis, the courts in China have actually struggled with a heavy 
                                                        
101 See, for example, See, for example, Cui Hailin and Wang Zhi, “A Survey Report on 
the Working Situation of Lay Assessors in Shangqiu City”, see the official website of 
China’s courts, at http://www.chinacourt.org/html/article/200806/06/306182.shtml, last 
visited on 26 September 2008.   
102 Supra note 61. 
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caseload and shortage of judges.103 It therefore remains questionable as to whether the 
customary misuse of lay assessors can be totally eliminated in practice. In light of 
Variables 2, 3 and 4 in Table 3 above, it seems that many judges welcome lay assessors, 
only for the more utilitarian and self-interested consideration that lay participants are 
able to increase the number of court staff and thus alleviate judges’ caseloads. When 
this value disappears, lay assessors may become unpopular, although Variable 1 
seemingly indicates that the majority of the judges uphold the mixed tribunal system. 
Moreover, Variable 5 indicates that the majority of those judges who uphold the mixed 
tribunal system premise their support on the condition that lay participation does not 
threaten their control over the courtroom.   
According to the statistical data above, it seems that although the majority of 
judges seemingly uphold the mixed tribunal system, they premise their support largely 
based upon the lay assessors’ ability to help with their caseloads, and that they do no 
harm to their dominant position in the courtroom. When these two premises disappear, 
their support might be reversed. This conditional support of judges raises at least two 
problems, as explored below.     
On the one hand, the over-emphasis on lay assessors’ function in helping with 
their caseload may lead judges to prefer those lay assessors who are competent at 
working efficiently and independently, rather than those who trouble the judges, asking 
them to spend time instructing them and hence slowing down the progress of trials. 
Probably driven by this perception, many judges appreciate lay assessors with a 
diploma or degree in law. As a result, as revealed by Figure 5, over one-third of the lay 
assessors who participated in my survey were law school graduates, since the judges 
lean toward law graduates who affect their courts in a positive way. It seems that the 
                                                        
103 Ibid.  
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judges’ conditional support for the mixed tribunal system has distorted its 
implementation in practice. 
On the other hand, Article 3 of The LAA 2004 only prescribes that the proportion 
of lay assessors in a mixed tribunal shall not be less than one-third, granting courts the 
discretion to determine the exact proportion of lay assessors. However, the resistance of 
judges to lay assessors’ quantitative dominance in mixed tribunals may mean that the 
courts staffed by these judges may strictly limit lay assessors to a minority position, in 
order to ensure the judges’ dominance. As discussed in the preceding chapter, “when 
lay persons are in a minority, their influence diminishes”.104  
 
4.3.6 Attitudes of Lay Assessors towards their Tenure and Caseload 
 
Chapter 3 questioned whether the lengthy tenure of five years and unlimited 
workload would bother lay assessors and undermine their enthusiasm. The 
Questionnaire for Lay Assessors therefore explored the attitudes of lay assessors 
towards their tenure and caseload.   
 
4.3.6.1 Are Lay Assessors Satisfied with their Tenure  
 
Question 32 of the Questionnaire for Lay Assessors (see Appendix II) investigated 
the serving period for lay assessors. As illustrated in Figure 7 below, the overwhelming 
majority (88.9%, 80) of the lay assessors had served for two or three years up until May 
2007 when my survey was conducted. Question 6 inquired whether the lay assessors 
                                                        
104 See Stefan Machura, “Interaction between Lay Assessors and Professional Judges in 
German Mixed Courts”, International Review of Penal Law (Vol. 72), (Érès, 
Ramonville Sainte Agne 2001), at 465. 
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were willing to continue their court service, and for this only 4.8% (5) of the lay 
assessors showed a resistance to their court duty, by replying “not very willing” (3.8%, 
4) and “unwilling” (1.0%, 1). In contrast, the overwhelming majority (92.3%, 96) 
rendered positive answers, replying “very willing” (39.4%, 41) or “willing” (52.9%, 55), 
with 2.9% (3) holding a neutral standpoint. Question 15 further explored the lay 
assessors’ attitudes towards their five-year tenure. Again, I received very favourable 
replies: only 5.8% (6) of the lay assessors complained that the length of the tenure was 
“too long”; 71.2% (74) held that it was “reasonable”, whilst 10.6% (11) even thought 













Figure 7: Serving Years of Lay






4.3.6.2 Are Lay Assessors Satisfied with their Caseloads  
 
As indicated by Figure 6 above, within the two years from May 2005 when The 
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LAA 2004 came into effect, and up until May 2007 when my survey was conducted, 
the overwhelming majority (75%) of the lay assessors had participated in over ten cases: 
22.12% had participated in ten to twenty cases, 21.15% had taken part in twenty to 50 
cases, and 31.73% had even served more than 50 cases. However, when Question 16 of 
the Questionnaire for Lay Assessors (see Appendix II) inquired about the lay assessors’ 
attitudes towards their caseloads, only 2.9% (3) of the lay assessors complained that 
their caseloads were “heavy” (1.9%, 2) or “somewhat heavy” (1%, 1); 65.4% (68) rated 
their caseloads as “reasonable”; and 26.0% (27) and 5.8% (6) respectively opined that 
their caseloads were “somewhat easy” and “easy”.  
 
4.3.6.3 Discussion   
 
As mentioned above, “attitude scales rely for their effectiveness on the cooperation 
and frankness of the respondent.”105 If the lay assessors participating in my survey 
answered the questions frankly rather than being affected by the official name of the 
survey and only pretending to uphold the mixed tribunal system, it seems that the 
overwhelming majority of them enjoyed their court job. This discovery can be 
supported by findings in other countries whereby, “once they have been lay judges, men 
and women apparently like the work”.106  
 
4.4 Conclusion   
 
The preceding chapter, on the basis of critical analyses, questioned whether the 
revived mixed tribunal system can work effectively and especially raised a few 
                                                        
105 Supra note 4, at 210.  
106 Supra note 33, at 133.  
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practical concerns, including whether the courts can appropriately exercise their 
discretion as to the selection, use and administration of lay assessors, whether the 
incompetence of lay assessors can be successfully tackled via the requirement for an 
enhanced educational level and the implementation of training, and whether lay 
assessors can effectively participate in trials and affect decision making. To be sure, the 
last chapter was based on untested assumptions which awaited verification by the 
empirical evidence presented in this chapter.  
However, carrying out a single-handed, self-financed and short-term survey on a 
politically sensitive subject, in a country without open access to academic research and 
criticism, set substantial constraints on the design of my research. The design of the 
survey was so circumscribed by the practical situation, that I had to adopt time- and 
cost-efficient questionnaires, and also cooperate with an official body, and an ideal 
simple sampling technique carried out on a nationwide scale, was replaced by a more 
realistic cluster-sampling survey undertaken locally in S Province. In the context that 
the Chinese authorities have been trying to revive the mixed tribunal system and have 
flaunted the progress already made, a survey in the name of an official body might have 
made respondents believe that upholding the institution was a “socially desirable 
attitude” to take,107 and thus might have concealed their negative voices. In spite of this 
concern, however, the respondents participating in our survey still reported a variety of 
practical problems, partly verifying the analyses presented in the previous chapter. If 
there was an expectation that The LAA 2004 would move China towards common 
people’s effective participation in the administration of justice, thus democratizing the 
judicial process, then the practical situation revealed by my survey stands in stark 
contrast to such expectations.   
                                                        
107 Supra note 4, at 181. 
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It seems that the opportunity to participate in justice is far removed from most 
Chinese citizens. The educational eligibility imposed by The LAA 2004 plays a 
significant role in creating a very skewed lay assessor representation, through the 
exclusion of a large proportion of prospective lay assessors who do not have a higher 
education. In addition, another practice that has seriously compounded this 
representation problem is that Chinese courts, to ensure the political accountability of 
lay assessors, have preferentially recruited government employees and CCP members 
during the process of selecting lay assessors, leaving the lay assessor pool dominated by 
these political activists. The LAA 2004 declares that the mixed tribunal system aims to 
introduce democratic civic participation into the administration of justice. However, at 
least in terms of the composition of the lay assessor pool, it is not certain that this 
objective has been practically achieved, because Chinese lay assessors are not 
representative of the general population, but largely well-educated activists, politically 
affiliated to the CCP and the Government. Meanwhile, by utilizing lay assessors merely 
to handle the overloaded docket, rather than to democratise juridical proceedings, has 
given rise to distorted practices such as specially recruiting law graduates to serve as 
lay assessors in order to enhance working efficiency, further adding to the problem of 
skewed representation and conflicting with the original intention of encouraging lay 
participation.  
Another striking finding of my survey was that the so-called “random selection of 
lay assessors”, a process which is meant to randomly designate each lay assessor to a 
specific case in order to prevent the courts from using certain lay assessors repeatedly 
and turning them into a full-time court employees, has been easily circumvented by the 
courts and has not taken hold within actual court practice. This failure, in association 
with the unlimited caseload of lay assessors, has engendered the re-occurring practice 
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whereby a lay assessor is allocated a very heavy caseload and acts like a full-time court 
worker.  
Moreover, although the revived institution has substantially improved the 
educational eligibility of lay assessors at the cost of depriving the overwhelming 
majority of Chinese citizenry the right to be appointed, it is yet to be seen whether lay 
assessors have been transformed into competent judges who are able to handle both 
fact-finding and application of the law, in light of the fact that they have frequently 
struggled with evidentiary and legal problems in trials.  
In addition, it is also questionable as to whether the passiveness of lay assessors 
during deliberations has been totally eliminated by the revived system. Probably due to 
their incompetence, psychological obedience to judges and minority position, it seems 
that the lay assessors have neither very vigorously participated in deliberations, nor 
affected decision making. Hans points out that “if we want to protect and promote the 
community’s voice, it seems critical to ensure a certain degree of separation and 
independence between the legally trained decision maker and the lay participant.”108 
Inspired by this theory and our findings, it would seem appropriate to conduct more 
intensive studies on the behaviour and psychology of lay assessors in China, and to 
reconsider the current working mechanisms in mixed tribunals.         
Also, according to Hans, judges’ attitudes toward lay participation can influence 
the very functioning of the mixed tribunal system.109 However, as shown by my survey, 
it seems that Chinese judges only welcome lay assessors on the condition that they help 
tackle the overloaded dockets, but at the same time do not jeopardize the judges’ 
quantitative dominance in mixed tribunals. These self-centred considerations, rather 
than sincere support for lay participation as an activity, have distorted the 
                                                        
108 Supra note 87, at 90.  
109 Ibid, at 88. 
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implementation of the institution, for example, by only recruiting law graduates to serve 
as lay assessors, in order to accelerate judicial proceedings, and minimize the 
proportion of lay assessors and to ensure the dominance of judges, at the cost of 
undermining the significance and influence of lay participation.  
In contrast with the judges’ conditional supports for lay participation, the lay 
assessors themselves, irrespective of their lengthy tenure, heavy workload and 
unsatisfactory benefits, manifest their clear-cut appreciation of their court duty, 
probably verifying the opinion that “laymen are far more enthusiastic about citizen 
participation, suggesting that democratic stirrings may be making some headway 
among the populace but are not being warmly embraced by professionals.”110      
To sum up, according to my survey, one cannot expect the revived institution to 
mark a turning point and to bring about sweeping changes to China’s legal system. A 
series of observable problems that impacted upon the old system have yet to be 
eliminated successfully through the new Act, which has been characterized by the 
inappropriate selection and use of lay assessors and their lack of competence, activity 
and influence during deliberations. In light of the stored-up problems revealed by my 
survey, there is room for scepticism with regard to those assertive and positive official 
reports mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, which highlight the 
representativeness of lay assessment and the lay assessor’s improved ability to 
discharge their court duties revealing them to be no more than convenient rhetoric and 
political propaganda. To be sure, based on a small-scale questionnaire survey that 
collected data locally in an official name, this chapter cannot give a fully precise and 
rounded picture as to how the reformed mixed tribunal system is working in China. 
                                                        
110 Stephan Landsman, “Commentary: Dispatches from the Front: Lay Participation in 
Legal Processes and the Development of Democracy”, Law & Policy, Vol.25, 2003, at 
175.  
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However, in association with some second-hand material, it can be expected to serve as 
exploratory research with regard to some unresolved problems in practice, and can 
provide ideas and an impetus for further empirical studies on lay participation in China 
today.     
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Chapter 5   
Should China Continue with Lay Participation? 
The Potential Value of Lay Participation in Transitional China 
 
5.1 Introduction  
 
As demonstrated in Chapters 1 and 2, it is possible to challenge the allegation that 
the revival of lay participation in China is inappropriate because historically the country 
has no cultural basis for civic legal participation, and also because the use of lay 
participation is in decline worldwide. However, in spite of the historical reality which 
shows that China has in fact never stopped practicing and experimenting with diverse 
forms of lay participation, and that lay participation has not completely lost its vitality 
on a worldwide scale, it is undeniable that the information presented in Chapters 3 and 
4, based on theoretical and empirical analysis, confirm the fact that the mixed tribunal 
system, as the main instance of lay participation in China today, faces problems in 
practice, despite recent innovations. As mentioned previously, opponents have based 
their objections to lay participation in China on three counts: the declining trend in lay 
participation worldwide, the lack of historical tradition in China and the unsuccessful 
use of mixed tribunals. It appears that although the first two arguments can be 
challenged, the detractors have, at the very least, partly won the third argument. Given 
such a context, should China continue its recent move towards reforming and 
resuscitating lay participation? Before answering this question, it is necessary to 
speculate whether lay participation has a potential value in transitional China.  
As discussed in Chapter 1, a number of those countries that have demonstrated a 
growing interest in resuscitating lay participation, have also experienced a transition 
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from authoritarianism to democracy. These countries include some post-communist 
states such as Russia, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Ukraine. Likewise, 
following the collapse of the former Soviet Union and the Communist bloc at the end of 
the 1980s, and as one of the successor countries to the former Soviet Union, China has 
entered the post-communist era and so must confront the related social transition as 
well.1   
Since 1992 the market economy has gradually taken root in China.2 With the rapid 
rise of the market economy, the relationship between individual citizens and the 
Chinese Government has undergone tremendous change. The Government’s autocratic 
role, one established during the Communist era when most citizens had few personal 
assets and a generally weak understanding of human rights, has steadily eroded, and 
China has since evolved into a much more rights-oriented society than it was ten or 
twenty years ago, as Chinese citizens have gradually realized the importance of 
protecting the increased number of personal assets obtained under the market 
economy.3 Also, during this economic rise, a new power bloc, the bourgeoisie, has 
come into being in China, and they have critical demands in terms of the recognition 
and protection of their private property,4 especially when they realize that absolute 
                                                        
1 John C. Reitz, “Export of the Rule of Law”, Transactional Law & Contemporary 
Problems, Vol.13, 2003, at 432. 
2  Sun Zhongqin, From “Plan” to “Market”: The Study on China’s Economic 
Transition (The Shehui Press of China, Beijing, 2009), at 3. 
3 See, for example, Xia Yong, The Era Envisaging Rights: A Study on Chinese 
Citizens’ Rights (The Press of Social Sciences Literature, Beijing 2007), at 39; and Xu 
Xianming, “Human Rights -- The Essence of Rule of Law”, originally published at the 
official website of China courts, 16 Sep 2002, see 
http://jwjc.ujn.edu.cn/construct/article/fzdzdsrq.htm, last visited on 27 Dec 2009.  
4 In March 2003, for example, the All-China Industrial and Commercial Alliance, the 
officially recognized national chamber of commerce and virtually the whole political 
association of China’s burgeoning bourgeoisie, for the third time proposed to amend the 
Constitution of China to add a provision on the protection of private property (the same 
proposal was presented as well in 1998 and 2002). See the news report, “The Third 
Proposal about Amending the Constitutional Law to Include Provision of Protecting 
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power without checks and balances engenders corruption and that the corruption of 
senior government officials has begun to take the form of abusing their powers to seize 
profits from local businesses.5 As one scholar points out, the rising market economy in 
China requires a new type of government with the following features: “its functions 
must be limited; its conduct must be in compliance with the laws; its centralized power 
must be fragmented, based on self-rule; its operation must be institutionalised and open 
to the public; and its legitimacy must be based on popular elections or laws”.6 Weidong 
Ji, a specialist in Chinese law, calls this an opportunity for an “historical compromise” 
in China, meaning that the Chinese Government, ruled by the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP), to avoid the risk of its demise via a bottom-up revolution, will have to 
make a gradual and painstaking top-down reform, accepting what it has historically 
regarded as fundamentally “bourgeois” or “Western” concepts, such as democratization 
and liberalization.7 In response to these requests, the Chinese Government has already 
amended the Constitution, adding a provision that “the People’s Republic of China 
governs the country according to law to establish a socialist country of rule-of-law”.8 
Moreover, the CCP, in 2004, vowed to establish a “Harmonious Society of Socialism” 
that features, along with other attributes, democracy, rule of law, fairness and justice.9   
A transitional society “refers to a major political transformation, such as regime 
                                                                                                                                                               
Private Properties”, The People’s Daily, 3 Mar 2003. 
5 The Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) and Tsinghua University’s Studies of 
National Affaires Centre, “Ten Megatrends about the Corruption of Chinese Senior 
Officials: A Survey Report on Features and Transformation of Senior Officials’ 
Corruption in China Between 1978 and 2002”, China Economic Times, 2 Jun 2003. 
6 See Mao Shoulong, “The Road Toward Constitutionalism: Starting from the Respect 
for the Constitution”, Nanfang Weekend, 13 Mar 2003, website version, see 
http://www.nanfangdaily.com.cn/zm/20030313/, last visited on 29 December 2009. 
7 Ibid.  
8 See Subsection 1 of Article 5 of The Constitutional Law of China 1999.  
9 See the editorial, “A Basic Task of Building Socialism with Chinese Characteristics – 
Penetratingly Understanding the Momentous Significance of Building a Socialist 
Harmonious Society”, Seeking Truth (the CCP’s official newspaper), 1 Mar 2005. 
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change from authoritarian or repressive rule to democratic or electoral rule, or a 
transition from conflict to peace or stability”.10 In light of the growing demands for 
democratisation following the rapid growth of the market economy, it appears that 
Chinese society, where the legacy of totalitarian Communism such as the CCP’s 
single-party rule has not been totally removed, must inevitably confront the transition 
from authoritarianism to democracy. As Hans points out, “the social and political 
context affects the functioning of lay participation”.11 So what contributions could lay 
participation make to China’s transitional society? “The study of Chinese 
jurisprudence…may be of assistance in understanding the judicial problems now 
confronting China”.12 This chapter will, by looking at the status quo of China’s justice 
system along with its unique peculiarities, discuss the potential role lay participation 
might play in transforming “a dysfunctional and confusing judicial system into a 
coherent system based on the rule of law”.13   
Rather than attempt to cover every facet, this chapter will be selective in exploring 
those values essential to lay participation working effectively in China’s transitional 
society. Borrowing Anderson and Nolan’s method of classifying the functions of lay 
participation,14 the main body of this chapter will be divided into two parts. The first 
looks at the value of lay participation in producing better justice, while the second 
                                                        
10  Dana Michael Hollywood, “The Search for Post-Conflict Justice in Iraq: A 
Comparative Study of Transitional Justice Mechanisms and Their Applicability to 
Post-Saddam Iraq”, Brook Journal of International Law, Vol. 33, 2007-2008, at 64. 
11 Valerie P. Hans, “Lay Participation in Legal Decision Making”, Law & Policy, 
Vol.25, No.2, 2003, at 87. 
12 M.Ulric Killion, “Post-WTO China and Independent Judicial Review”, Houston 
Journal of International Law, Vol. 26, No.3, 2004, at 522.     
13 J. David Yeager, “The Human Rights Chamber for Bosnia and Herzegovina – A 
Case Study in Transitional Justice”, International Legal Perspectives, Vol.14, 2004, at 
53. 
14 Kent Anderson and Mark Nolan, “Lay Participation in the Japanese Justice System: 
A Few Preliminary Thoughts Regarding the Mixed Tribunal System (saiban-in seido) 
from Domestic Historical and International Psychological Perspective”, Vanderbilt 
Journal of Transnational Law, Vol. 37, 2004, at 941. 
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discusses its potential function in terms of promoting a more democratic society.   
 
5.2 Producing Better Justice    
 
The potential role of lay participation in creating better justice in China embodies 
four aspects: to improve judicial independence, to reduce the level of corruption within 
the judiciary, to alleviate court congestion, and to balance the severity of criminal 
justice.     
 
5.2.1 To Promote Judicial independence  
 
First of all, lay participation may play a significant role in enhancing judicial 
independence in China.  
 
5.2.1.1 Factors Undermining Judicial Independence 
 
“In short, judicial independence can be generally defined in terms of freedom – 
indeed responsibility – to rule based on the facts and the law, and thus free from undue 
external restraints”.15 The Constitutional Law of China, as amended in 2004, enshrines 
the principle of judicial independence by specifically providing that “the courts exercise 
judicial power independently, in accordance with the provisions of the law, and are not 
subject to interference by any administrative organs, public organization or 
                                                        
15 Brian K. Landsberg, “The Role of Judicial Independence”, Pacific McGeorge Global 
Business & Development Law Journal, Vol.19, 2006, at 335. For more discussion about 
the definition of judicial independence, see this article at 331-335. 
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individual”.16 However, judicial independence has not been practically realized in 
China, as there is still a “blurring of the line between the state and the ruling party” and 
“the judiciary…is typically cowed, as part of the one-sided grip on power”.17 In 
practice, judicial independence has often been undermined by, inter alia, the factors 
below.   
-- Judges Subject to the Control of the CCP   
In contrast to the system in England, where “appointments of [judges] are made on 
professional merit alone, assessed as objectively as possible” and “party political 
considerations have long been completely banished”,18 under China’s current law, the 
selection, promotion and removal of Chinese judges largely remain under the control of 
the CCP.   
On one hand, in contrast to some common-law countries where law-school 
graduates first work as lawyers and the experienced and outstanding ones might then be 
selected as professional judges,19 in civil law countries, there is normally a career 
judiciary and “most judges are recruited for the ordinary courts soon after university 
graduation and specifically trained for a judicial life”.20 This is the case in China, where 
law-school graduates are employed by courts of all levels directly after their graduation. 
They normally start their legal career at the courts as a judge’s secretary, clerk or 
recorder. After years of service and having successfully passed the National Bar 
                                                        
16 See Article 126 of The Constitutional Law of China, amended in 2004. 
17 Cynthia Alkon, “The Cookie Cutter Syndrome: Legal Reform Assistance under 
Post-Communist Democratization Programs”, Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2002, 
Issue 2, 2002, at 343-344.  
18 Thomas Legg, “Judges for the New Century”, Public Law, Spr 2001, at 65. 
19 Catherine Elliott and Frances Quinn, English Legal System (Pearson Education 
Limited, Harlow, 2000), at100. 
20 Michael Kirby, “Judicial Dissent -- Common Law and Civil Law Traditions”, Law 
Quarterly Review, Vol.123, Jul 2007, at 388-389. 
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Examination, they can then be appointed as professional judges.21 Moreover, much like 
governmental departments, each court in China is organized on a hierarchical basis, as 
follows: (1) each court is divided into different specialist divisions such as the criminal, 
civil and administrative division, where the judges are normally seated in a fixed 
position to handle different categories of cases, (2) each division has its “head-justice” 
and “vice head-justice” who are in charge of administrative affairs and oversee the 
other staff in the division, (3) each court has its “chief justice (court president)” and 
“vice chief justices (vice court presidents)” who manage the whole court, and (4) all 
common judges and other employees of the court are subject to the leadership of these 
division (vice) head-justices and (vice) chief justices, who are selected from those 
experienced and skilled common judges of the court. As a result, the successful career 
of a law-school graduate working in a Chinese court means being appointed as a 
professional judge and then being promoted to the position of head-justice or chief 
justice; the more rapidly, the better. However, according to Article 11 of The Act of 
Chinese Judges 1995 (amended in 2001), each judge, (vice) head-justice, vice chief 
justice of all levels of courts in China, shall be nominated by the chief justice of each 
individual court and then be appointed by the corresponding local Standing Committee 
of the People’s Congress, although the latter procedure is no more than a rubber 
stamp.22 In other words, each judge’s appointment and promotion are largely controlled 
                                                        
21 According to subsection 6 of Article 9 of The Act of Chinese Judges 1995 (amended 
in 2001), law-school graduates with bachelor’s degree, master’s degree and doctoral 
degree, could be appointed as judges after working at the court for two years and one 
years respectively; and the law-school graduates with a bachelor’s degree, master’s and 
doctoral degree could be appointed as judges of the provincial high courts and the 
Supreme Court after working at the courts for three and two years respectively. Article 
12 of The Act of Chinese Judges 1995 (amended in 2001) provides that a judge shall 
pass the National Bar Examination before his or her appointment.   
22 The People’s Congress and its standing committee of all levels are virtually under 
the control the CCP as well. See Marie Seong-Hak Kim, “A Distant Premise: Judicial 
Independence in the People’s Republic of China”, Korean Journal of Comparative Law, 
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by the chief justice of the court where the judge serves.   
As stated in Chapter 3, the CCP has established a Party Committee in each court 
and the chairperson of the Committee is appointed by the Superior Party Committee 
which extends hierarchically upward to CCP headquarters. The chief justice of each 
court has to be staffed by the chairperson of the Party Committee thereat.23 The CCP 
thus, via the hands of the chief justices who are virtually appointed by it, is able to 
exercise control over the judiciary by affecting the careers of all Chinese judges.   
On the other hand, Chapter 8 of The Act of Chinese Judges 1995 (amended in 
2001) establishes an annual assessment of Chinese judges. Article 40 of this Act further 
provides that a judge will be removed from his/her post if the result of his/her annual 
assessment is rated as “disqualified” for two successive years. Article 48 further 
provides that each court institutes its own Committee of the Examination and Appraisal 
of Judges, in order to manage the judges’ annual assessment, while Article 49 adds that 
the chief justice of a court chairs this Committee. Moreover, this Act does not 
specifically spell out the standards of defining a “disqualified” judge. The removal of a 
judge is hence largely based on the discretion of the Committee, and subject to the 
leadership of the chief justice who is politically affiliated to and virtually appointed by 
the CCP. “Arbitrary and opaque procedures for disciplining and removing judges could 
easily undermine the independence of the courts”,24 and it appears that this is the case 
in China.   
-- Judges Vulnerable to Interference from Local Governments   
Different from the English practice where local authorities recoup 80% of the net 
                                                                                                                                                               
Vol. 24, 1996, at 33. 
23 See Article 46 of The Charter of Chinese Communist Party; and see Chapter 6 for 
more discussion.   
24 Charles Manga Fombad, “A Preliminary Assessment of the Prospects for Judicial 
Independence in Post -1990 African Constitutions”, Public Law, Sum 2007, at 248. 
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costs expended by local magistrates’ courts from the Lord Chancellor’s Department in 
the form of a specific grant,25 a particular feature in China is that each court is entirely 
financed by its corresponding local government. In practice, each court presents its 
annual budget report to the local government for the latter’s approval and from where 
all the expenses of a court, including the judges’ salaries and benefits, are drawn.26 
Controlling the courts’ finances “gives local politicians substantial leverage over the 
judges”.27 If the judges of a court refuse to yield to instructions from the local 
government, the latter might subvert the approval process of the budget report 
submitted by the court. For example, reported practices include instances where local 
governments have delayed the payment of money to the courts and even refused to 
finance some items listed in the courts’ budget reports.28 “Without adequate resources, 
it is unlikely that a judiciary can function with any degree of independence and 
impartiality”.29 As Nicholson points out, “the preparation of judicial estimates by 
anyone not acting under the direction of the judiciary and the exercise of control by the 
government over the way in which the courts expend the funds granted to them 
necessarily poses a potential threat to judicial independence”.30   
-- Judges under the Sway of their Political Beliefs 
As stated above, the CCP has recently sworn to establish a “harmonious society” 
                                                        
25 Gary Slapper and David Kelly, The English Legal System (Tenth Edition) 
(Routledge-Cavendish, London 2009), at 142. 
26  Laifan Lin, “Judicial Independence in Japan: A Re-investigation for China”, 
Columbia Journal of Asian Law, Vol.13, No.2, 1999, at 198. For more discussions 
about the courts’ financial dependence upon the local governments, see Xia, supra note 
870, at 179-250. 
27 Stephan Landsman and Jing Zhang, “Lay Participation Comes to Japanese and 
Chinese Courts”, UCLA Pacific Basin Law Journal, Vol.25, 2007-2008, at 199. 
28 Wei Min, “Shall the Mixed tribunal System Be Suspended: The Developmental 
Direction of the Mixed Tribunal System, Gansu Social Sciences, Vol.4, 2001, at 31 and 
32. 
29 Supra note 24, at 239. 
30 Ibid. 
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featuring democracy, rule of law, fairness and justice.31 “The Rule of Law and the 
principles of equity, objectivity, and fairness dictate the need for a judiciary free to 
make decisions without regard to political influence, fleeting public opinion, or special 
interests”.32 If the CCP chooses to seriously execute this policy of establishing a 
“harmonious society”, it might gradually have to release its strict control over the 
judiciary to ensure judicial independence in the future. However, even if substantial 
reforms are undertaken to abolish the aforesaid mechanisms, which are designed to 
subject judges to CCP and local government ‘guidance’, such as the judges’ careers and 
the court budgets being dominated by the party and local governments, the fact remains 
that 95% of Chinese judges are members of the CCP “who are carefully selected for 
being politically loyal to the Party line”,33 something that the CCP has intentionally 
fostered throughout its 60-year rule.34 This situation is unlikely to change for decades to 
come, until these judges’ retirement. 
Different from some democracies such as the United States, where “judges are 
constrained from political activity” and “even judges who are elected typically are 
constrained from partisan political activity”, 35  China does not have any similar 
prohibitions. In direct contrast, according to the CCP Charter, each judge politically 
affiliated to the Party shall “strictly observe and execute the party’s guidelines and 
policies”.36 “Common sense and the available research suggest that judges are at least 
                                                        
31 Supra note 9.  
32 Julie A. Robinson, “Judicial Independence: The Need for Education About the Role 
of the Judiciary”, Washburn Law Journal, Vol.46, 2006-2007, at 544. 
33 Xin Ren, The Legal Tradition and Traditional Law: The Law, State and Social 
Control in China, (1997), at 60, quoted in Zou Keyuan, “Judicial Reform in China: 
Recent Developments and Future Prospects”, International Lawyer, Vol.36, No.3, 2002, 
at 1036.  
34 Supra note 27, at 210. 
35 Julie A. Robinson, “Judicial Independence: The Need for Education About the Role 
of the Judiciary”, Washburn Law Journal, Vol.46, 2006-2007, at 539. 
36 See Article 3 of The Charter of the CCP; and Zou Keyuan, “Judicial Reform in 
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potentially influenced by a mixture of two motives – a desire for personal benefit, 
including pecuniary gain, career advancement, social standing and recognition on [the] 
one hand, and policy preferences…on the other”.37 Policy preference may include 
“preferences about particular legal rules as well as broader, more ‘political’ 
preferences”.38 Research in the United States has demonstrated that “a judge’s party 
affiliation may have a feedback, reinforcement loop which impacts on his value system 
and in turn determines his decisional propensities.”39 Jerome Cohen also points out that 
“the membership of [Chinese] judges in the [Chinese] Communist Party means that 
their judgements are significantly influenced by party policy”.40 Therefore, so long as 
most of Chinese judges are politically affiliated to and brainwashed by the CCP, they 
may be inclined to devotion to or be biased in support of the party, affected by the party 
organization and policies, even if institutional arrangements and financial arrangements 
for “keeping the positions and the salaries of judges beyond the reach of external 
forces”41 may become a reality in the future with the progression of democratisation 




                                                                                                                                                               
China: Recent Developments and Future Prospects”, International Lawyer, Vol.36, 
No.3, 2002, at 1049. 
37 Daniel Brinks, “Judicial Reform and Independence in Brazil and Argentina: The 
Beginning of a New Millennium?”, Texas International Law Journal, Vol.40, 
2004-2005, at 602. 
38 Ibid, at 603. 
39 Stuart S. Nagel, “The Relationship Between the Political and Ethnic Affiliation of 
Judges, and Their Decision-Making”, Glendon Schubert (et al.), Judicial Behaviour: A 
Reader in the Theory and Research (Rand McNally, Chicago, 1964), at 246.  
40 See Jerome A. Cohen, “Reforming China’s Civil Procedure: Judging the Courts”, 
American Journal of Comparative Law, Vol.45, 1997, at 794-795 and 797. 
41 Sandra Day O’ Connor, “Vindicating the Rule of Law: The Role of the Judiciary”, 
Chinese Journal of International Law, Vol.2, 2003, at 3. 
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5.2.1.2 Interference in Judicial Independence: “Telephone Justice” in China  
 
With their established political and financial control over the judiciary, the CCP 
and local governments can easily interfere in each individual case in practice, as 
illustrated by so-called “telephone justice”. Telephone justice, in which judges abstain 
from ruling until they receive telephone instructions from the state authorities such as 
the Communist Party, has been reported from a number of countries, such as the former 
Soviet Union,42 Brazil and Bolivia.43 A similar practice is not scarce in China. The 
CCP and local governmental authorities can use their power over judges’ careers and 
court budgets to exercise pressure on the courts, especially in cases where the CCP and 
the Government’s own interests are involved, ensuring the decision made is in their 
favour.44 The standard practice is that in a case where the CCP’s interests are involved, 
the Party may, via telephone or some other form of communication, “issue instructions 
or less formal suggestions highly likely to determine the outcome of the matter”.45 The 
CCP’s interference is “less direct and prescriptive for cases which are not politically 
sensitive”,46 but in sensitive trials, the party could still issue instructions to “authorizes 
judges to create legal fictions to secure politically acceptable outcomes”.47 Moreover, 
in a recent survey, Chinese judges acknowledged that they have confronted illegal 
interference from local governments when they handle cases involving the interests of 
                                                        
42  Michael B. Hyman, “The Judiciary’s Role in Preserving Democracy”, Judges 
Journal, Vol.47, 2008, at 22; and Duncan Deville, “Combating Russia Organized 
Crime: Russia’s Fledgling Jury System on Trial”, George Washington Journal of 
International Law and Economics, Vol.32, 1999-2000, at 77. 
43 Supra note 37, at 599. 
44 Supra note 27, at 202. 
45 Ibid, at 199. 
46 John Gillespie, “Rethinking the Role of Judicial Independence in 
Socialist-transforming East Asia”, International & Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol.56, 
No.4, 2007, at 852. 
47 Ibid. 
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these local governments, or even governmental departments.48  
“The traditional view has been that there is no system of promotion of judges, on 
the grounds that holders of judicial office might allow their promotion prospects to 
affect their decision-making”.49 This view has been proved to be justified in China. I 
once worked as a law clerk and then as a judge at a local court in China for five years, 
but never saw or heard of a case where a judge disobeyed the ‘instruction’ from the 
CCP or local government, although occasionally some judges did voice their 
complaints. It seems that, after taking into account their career prospects, the 
“temptation is naturally great for the judges to defer [to] the Party’s will, rather than 
administering justice independently according to law”.50  
 
5.2.1.3 The Role of Lay Participation in Improving the Independence of the 
Judiciary  
 
According to the UN Basic Principles on the Judiciary, “it is the duty of all 
governmental and other institutions to respect and observe the independence of the 
judiciary”; the judiciary shall decide matters “without any restrictions, improper 
influences, inducements, pressures, threats or interference, direct or indirect from any 
quarter of for any reasons”; the method for selecting judges should be free of “improper 
motives”, and judges should be suspended or removed only for actions that make them 
                                                        
48 Gao Qicai (et al.), “Procedure, Judges and Adjudicating Impartiality”, Chinese Legal 
Science, No.8, 2000, at 9, quoted in Zou Keyuan, “Judicial Reform in China: Recent 
Developments and Future Prospects”, International Lawyer, Vol.36, No.3, 2002, at 
1047-1048. 
49 Supra note 19, at102. 
50 Marie Seong-Hak Kim, “A Distant Premise: Judicial Independence in the People’s 
Republic of China”, Korean Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 24, 1996, at 37. 
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unable to discharge their duties.51 Seemingly, China’s current situation conflicts with 
all of these principles. A judiciary beholden to a political party and governmental 
leaders “would be enslaved and would thereby enslave those who come for resolution 
of cases and controversies”.52 As suggested by Lin, “China still needs long term effort 
in order to realize judicial independence”.53 In this process, China needs to “first focus 
on the independence of the judicial organ from other state organs, and then to putting 
the issue of the independence of judges’ individual authority onto the historical 
agenda”.54 It could be argued that lay participation will help to achieve this first 
objective.   
“The influence of politics on the judiciary has long been acknowledged”,55 even in 
established democracies such as the USA. In the US, “judgeships…are still a major 
plum of patronage and thus the political process at times interferes with selection on 
merits”.56 “The result of all this is a comfortable margin of preference for trial by jury 
among the people at large, among the Bar, and, most interestingly perhaps, also among 
the Bench”.57 According to Lempert, the jury plays an important role in securing the 
independence of the judiciary from state authorities in, inter alia, three respects, first: 
                                                        
51 See Article 1, 2 and 10 of the Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, 
G.A.Res.40/32, 7th Cong., at 59, U.N. Doc. A/CONF, 121/22.Rev. 1 (1985), quoted in 
“Presumed Guilty?: Criminal Justice and Human Rights in Mexico -- Reports of the 
Joseph R. Crowley Program in International Human Rights/Centro De Derechos 
Humanos Miguel Agustin Pro Juarez (“PRODH”): Joint 2000 Mission in Mexico”, 
Fordham International Law Journal, Vol.24, 2000-2001, at 874. 
52 John C. Reitz, “Export of the Rule of Law”, Transactional Law & Contemporary 
Problems, Vol.13, 2003, at 437. 
53 Supra note 26, at 200. 
54 Ibid. 
55 McNollgast, “Politics and the Courts: A Positive Theory of Judicial Doctrine and the 
Rule of Law”, South California Law Review, Vol. 68, 1994-1995, at 1635. 
56 Hans Zeisel, “Jury Research in the United States”, Nigel Walker and Annette 
Pearson (ed.). The British Jury System (The Institute of Criminology, Cambridge, 1975), 
at 42; For more discussion about the politicians’ control over the judges in America, see 
Harold R. Medina, “Improving the Administration of Justice – Evolution or 
Revolution”, Journal of the American Judicature Society, Vol.47, 1963-1964, at 56. 
57 Zeisel, ibid, at 42. 
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“juries are one-shot decision-makers, concerned only with justice in a particular case”, 
and “as such, juries interpose a non-bureaucratic element, beyond the direct control of 
state authorities, into criminal conviction processes”,58 secondly, jurors “do not make a 
career of jury duty” and this “allows jurors to return unpopular verdicts without fear of 
government retribution”,59 and thirdly, “jurors also work to shield judges from politics 
because judges cannot be held responsible for jurors’ decisions, and the presence of 
jury trial reduces incentives to buy or pressure judges”.60 Besides the jury, other 
authentic and viable forms of lay participation such as lay assessors, genuinely from the 
community, may arguably play a similar role in strengthening the independence of the 
judiciary. Certainly lay participants, either jurors or lay assessors who “do not make a 
career of juror duty”, are “beyond the direct control of state authorities”, “without fear 
of government retribution”, and “shield judges from politics” are valuable new blood 
with which to strengthen the independence of the judiciary, an institution currently 
subject to administrative and political interference from the CCP.  
Moreover, in contrast to each Chinese judge’s salary, including bonuses and other 
benefits, and having to remain within the budget of the respective court which is 
commonly appropriated by the local government, the participation of lay judges in the 
adjudication process is by no means a profitable exercise, although they do receive 
remuneration to cover expenditures incurred or economic losses suffered due to the 
performance of their court duties. Lay judges are therefore less vulnerable to 
manipulation by the local governments, something that judges might experience due to 
                                                        
58 Richard O. Lempert, “The Internationalization of Lay Legal Decision-Making: Jury 
Resurgence and Jury Research”, Cornell International Law Journal, Vol.40, 2007, at 
481. 
59 Richard O. Lempert, “Citizen Participation In Judicial Decision Making: Juries, Lay 
Judges and Japan”, Saint Louis-Warsaw Transatlantic Law Journal, Vol.2001-2002, at 
8. 
60 Supra note 58, at 481. 
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economic concerns. 
In addition, while CCP members occupy most of the judges’ positions, they only 
account for 5.54 % of the total population in China.61 If lay judges really are randomly 
selected from the community and genuinely represent common citizens, the proportion 
of lay judges politically affiliated to the CCP is therefore likely to be very small. As a 
whole, they, unlike professional judges with party affiliation, would thus be far less 
susceptible to “political preference” in favour of the CCP.  
To sum up, lay judges in China, as “a group of people who are not part of the 
ordinary judicial bureaucracy”,62 could act “as a sort of lightning rod” for interference 
from both the ruling party and local governments “which otherwise might centre on 
more permanent judges”63 who, in China’s practice, have to be “responsive to the voice 
of higher authority”, 64  especially in important cases with far-reaching social 
implications. Needless to say, “constitutionalising judicial independence in this way is 
certainly no guarantee that there will be no unwarranted interference by the executive 






                                                        
61  See the official website of the Chinese Communist Party, at 
http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/78779/86328/86927/5986458.html, last visited on 7 April 
2009. The CCP has not revealed the amount of the CCP members in S Province.  
62 Supra note 59, at 14. 
63  Harry Kalven and Hans Zeisel, The American Jury (Phoenix Edition) (The 
University of Chicago Press, Ltd., London 1971), at 8. 
64 Lester W. Kiss, “Reviving the Criminal Jury in Japan”, Law and Contemporary 
Problems, Vol.62, No.2 of 1999, 265. 
65 Supra note 24, at 257. 
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5.2.2 To Check on the Corruption of the Judiciary  
 
5.2.2.1 Features of Judicial Corruption in China   
 
“Yet corruption and chronic court inefficiency continue to plague the legal systems 
in many post-communist nations”.66 This is the case in China.67 As mentioned in 
Chapter 3, China’s transition from a planned to a market economy has caused a rush for 
money in all walks of life, something that even the judicial organs have been unable to 
escape from, and this has led to a huge number of corruption cases occurring within the 
judiciary. Between 1993 and 1997, over 17,000 Chinese judges and other court 
personnel were punished for corruption-related offences,68 whilst between 1998 and 
2003, the number was 7,500. 69  Among these cases involving the judiciary, two 
remarkable trends can be discerned.  
First is an increase in the instances of corrupt senior judges.70 Recent major cases 
have included, among others, Huang Songyou, the Vice Chief Justice (Vice-President) 
of the Supreme Court of China, Sun Xiaohong, the Chief Justice (President) of the High 
Court of Yunnan Province, Li Yongqing, the Vice Chief Justice (Vice President) of the 
Intermediate Court of Lhasa City in Tibet, and Cheng Guiqing, the Chief Justice 
                                                        
66 Supra note 17, at 328. 
67 For details about the entire corruption situation in China, see The Transparency 
International, National Integrity System Transparency International Country Study 
Report -- China 2006, at 11-12, available at 
http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/nis/nis_reports_by_country, last visited 
on 6 November 2009. 
68 See Huai Xiaofen and Sun Benpeng, Research on People’s Assessor System (2005), 
at 155, quoted in supra note 27, at 201. 
69 See Vernon Mei-Ying Hung, “China’s WTO Commitment on Independent Judicial 
Review: Impact on Legal and Political Reform”, American Journal of Comparative 
Law, Vol.52, 1999, at 77, quoted in supra note 27, at 201. 
70 Sun Shaobin, A Study on Judicial Corruption in China and the Possible Solutions 
(The Qunzhong Press, Beijing 2006), section 3 of chapter 1, at 53. 
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(President) of Qiaoxi District Court, Zhang Jiakou City in Hebei Province.71 It appears 
that those seeking to exploit corruption in China are gradually coming to understand 
that it is more cost-effective and efficient to bribe the chief justice of a court than to buy 
the judges individually. On the one hand, as seen above, the chief justice of a court 
controls virtually all of the judges of that court by dominating the appointment, 
promotion and removal processes, and so bribing the chief justice and using him or her 
as a pawn, effectively achieves the objective of influencing those judges who handle 
specific cases. Compared with buying one chief justice, to bribe all or the majority of 
judges on a collegial tribunal is more expensive and less efficient.72        
Second is the increase in the number of corruption cases involving lawyers.73 
Compared with a litigant who only appears at the court very occasionally when his 
litigation occurs, an experienced lawyer may appear at the same court day after day for 
decades. The latter may thus have become well-acquainted with some of the judges. 
Coupled with their common legal background (for example they may graduate from the 
same law school), they can easily form a variety of personal liaisons, such being a 
member of the same golf club. Some lawyers even make a concerted effort to foster 
these personal contacts since, as a rule of thumb, a good relationship with the judges 
will never harm their cause.74 Knowing of this relationship, some litigants, especially 
those with deep-pockets, may tempt their lawyers, or their agents, to buy the judges. In 
practice, some lawyers anxious to take a big cut of the bribery money, are actually 
                                                        
71 For the report about the case of Huang Songyou, see the news report, “The Vice 
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court – Huang Songyou Has Been Removed for 
Committing Bribery of 400 Million”, at the official website of the CCP, at 
http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/41223/8247606.html, last visited on 5 November 2009; 
for other cases, see Zou Keyuan, “Judicial Reform in China: Recent Developments and 
Future Prospects”, International Lawyer, Vol.36, No.3, 2002, at 1057.  
72 Supra note 70, at 53-55. 
73 Ibid, at 69. 
74 Ibid, at 70 and 71. 
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delighted to work as agents of corruption, while the judges may be more than willing to 
accept bribes from lawyers, rather than directly from litigants, due to the former two 
parties’ mutual credibility based on a long-term personal liaison. This invisible “interest 
group” composed of corrupt lawyers and judges is largely responsible for boosting 
corruption within the judiciary in China.75  
 
5.2.2.2 The Potential Role of Lay Participation in Checking Judicial 
Corruption   
 
In response to the above instances of judicial corruption, it could be argued that lay 
participation may provide a significant check on the activity, from two standpoints.  
-- The Incorruptibility of Lay Judges 
As previously mentioned, a corrupt chief justice may exercise illegal influence 
upon specific judges who handle cases, in order to make them arrive at biased decisions, 
since the latter normally dare not risk their career to challenge the authority of the chief 
justice. However, lay judges, without such career concerns, do not have to follow the 
hidden rules of office politics such as obeying the chief justice’s orders and thus “can 
only be persuaded by the facts and evidence, which could establish a powerful check on 
the clandestine case works in the courtrooms”.76  
It is undeniable, however, that lay judges are at similar risk of being bribed. 
However, if they serve at the courts only as ‘one-shot’ judges or for a few days each 
year, it would be much less possible for them to form personal contacts or even 
“interest groups” with corrupt lawyers. The latter’s important role in bribery would thus 
                                                        
75 Ibid, at 71. 
76  Li Shuning, “The Evaluation of China’s Mixed Tribunal System and Its 
Reconstruction”, Gansu Social Sciences, No.2, 2004, at 177. 
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be disposed of. Needless to say, the litigants may still seek to buy these unknown 
temporary judges, but their success rate might be lower and the exposure risk might be 
higher when they have to attempt to buy a number of lay judges directly in a mixed 
tribunal, at least compared with the situation where they only need buy a single chief 
justice or one or two professional judges via a “money-hunting” lawyer, who probably 
enjoys a good relationship with those he or she is bribing. It is interesting that, after 
looking through hundreds of official reports and academic articles about the corruption 
of the judiciary in China, I did not read even one case of a lay assessor’s corruption, in 
contrast with the very frequent corruption stories for professional judges. This might be 
partial evidence of the higher level of incorruptibility of lay participants.  
Moreover, it has been widely acknowledged that the jury trial is a product 
“designed to minimise the influence of corruptible judges by the establishment of an 
independent fact finding forum”.77 Taking the current criminal jury in England as an 
example, if the person offering a bribe wishes to acquire a direct acquittal verdict, he or 
she has to buy ten jurors, or at least quite a few of them, to secure their influence and to 
sway the others in the group. In contrast to the Chinese practice of bribing a chief 
justice or two judges on a three-judge bench, the former would seem to be much more 
difficult.78 Furthermore, the rule that states that “a jury must not separate for any reason 
– not even to have a meal – once it has been instructed by the judge and has retired to 
the jury room to reach its verdict” may create a further deterrence to interference with 
jurors. In addition, limits can be placed on the availability of the jury panel, for example, 
“before the trial the panel of names should be available only to counsel and solicitors, 
with the parties having the right to see it immediately before the ballot”. Probably due 
to the extreme difficulty involved, “the number of known cases [of trying to bribe jurors] 
                                                        
77 John Carruthers, “Are Juries Safe?”, Scottish Law Times, Vol.25, 2001, at 219. 
78 W. R. Cornish, The Jury (Allen Lane The Penguin Press, London, 1968), at 145. 
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was small” whist the successful instances were even more rarely reported.79 If China 
were to introduce the jury trial, it would likely serve as a powerful deterrent against the 
corruption of the judiciary.  
-- Lay Participants’ Watching over Judges   
Lay judges’ presence in courtrooms can serve as watchdogs to protect against the 
potential for corruption among judges. As discussed in the previous chapters, it has 
been a phenomenon prevalent in China and other countries for lay judges in mixed 
tribunals to “only occasionally exert [a] direct influence on the decision”.80 However, 
Ivkovic argues that “the mere presence of lay judges may deter professional judges 
from being arbitrary, corrupt, or biased”, since their presence may “compel professional 
judges to disclose the reasoning behind their decisions and discuss these reasons with 
the lay judges” and “keep professional judges ‘on their toes’”.81 This argument has 
been verified by Doran and Glenn who observe that “the very presence of the lay 
members may in itself influence the stance adopted by the professional”.82 Podgorecki 
also points out that lay judges in mixed tribunals have “more of a watchdog role than 
active influence”.83  He added that “the judge cannot be unaware of the vigilant 
attention of his two monitors [lay judges] and must be quite conscious of the limitations 
imposed upon him by their very presence”.84 These arguments have also been partly 
                                                        
79 For the discussion about the jury’s function in holding back corruption, see ibid, at 
145 and 146. 
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81 Ibid, at 451. 
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verified by Xiao’s recent survey in China, which indicates that “compared with sitting 
alone in the single-judge panel, Chinese professional judges normally pay attention to 
their behavior more carefully when sitting in the collegial panels with their professional 
colleagues seated; while they sit side by side with outsiders [lay assessors] in the mixed 
tribunals, they generally act even more scrupulously”.85  
It is undeniable that there are a number of complex reasons jointly accountable for 
judicial corruption in China, including “a lack of personal independence of the judges” 
and “judges’ low salaries”.86 However, as Zou points out, another important reason is 
“the lack of institutions established to monitor the judiciary”.87 In light of the above 
studies in both China and other countries, it could be argued that lay input in 
courtrooms may play a supervisory role and put a check on judges’ misbehaviour in 
China, as long as these lay participants are genuinely selected from the community to 
represent the interests of common people, rather than those of the corrupt public 
officials themselves.   
“Judges will never win the respect and trust of the citizens if they are subject to 
corrupt influences”,88 while “maintaining the public’s confidence in the impartiality 
and fairness of the judiciary is, in turn, indispensable for upholding the Rule of Law”.89 
Now that lay judges can potentially check on judicial corruption, it may be advisable to 
sharpen their focus on those Chinese courtrooms where corruption still exists.        
 
                                                        
85 See Xiao Tiancun, “The Reconstruction of the Mixed Tribunal System in the 
Context of Chinese Judges’ Professionalization”, Journal of Yunnan University (Law 
Edition), No.3 of 2005, at 123. 
86 Zou, supra note 36, at 1057. 
87 Zou Keyuan, as a specialist in researching China’s judicial system, suggests six 
reasons outside the judiciary and nine factors within the judiciary which have caused 
the corruption of the judiciary in China, see ibid, at 1057-1058. 
88 Supra note 41, at 5. 
89 Ibid, at 5. 
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5.2.3 To Mitigate Harsh Criminal Justice  
 
In established democracies, “the need for juries to act as a check on politically 
repressive and overly harsh laws declined or disappeared with the adoption of 
increasingly just laws”.90 For example, “[Once] Americans no long[er] had unjust laws 
foisted on them by a foreign power across of the sea. American legislators were elected 
by the people. The Revolutionary power of the musket had given way to the electoral 
power of the ballot. The intervening power of the jury was considered to be less 
imperative, now that Americans were free to vote the rascals out”.91 In contrast; 
however, civic participation in criminal justice may still play a significant part in this 
regard within China, from two respects: on the one hand, to soften those overly-harsh 
punishments dispensed by Chinese judges, and two, to check the very high conviction 
rates rendered by the judges.   
 
5.2.3.1 To Mitigate Harsh Punishments   
 
Unlike in the United States, Chinese legislators are in practice not “elected by the 
people”. The Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (SCNPC), as the 
main legislative body, is under the control of the CCP. The Chairman Board of the 
SCNPC is the managerial body of the SCNPC, which is composed of a few special 
commissions including the Legislative Commission. Remarkably, the Chairman Board 
of the SCNPC can decide whether a legal draft proposed by the Legislative 
                                                        
90 Juan Castaneda, “The Jury’s Dilemma: Playing God in Solving the Problems 
Lurking in America’s Courtrooms”, Defence Counsel Journal, Vol.72, 2005, at 395. 
91 Ibid.  
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Commission should be submitted to the SCNPC for a vote.92 Perhaps even more 
remarkably, from 1982 to 2008, 58.5% of the members of the Chairman Board of the 
SCNPC were politically affiliated to the CCP on average.93 By politically controlling 
this key legislative body, many laws in China embody the interests and policies of the 
CCP rather than those of the people. With regard to the criminal law, the CCP has been 
accustomed to promoting the embodiment of its policy, which is “striking crimes 
rigorously and quickly”.94 As a result, for example, the death penalty which “is a highly 
symbolic issue and a template of political power”95 has been widely used. The Criminal 
Code of China 1997 prescribes 413 offences, of which there 68 carry the death 
penalty,96 accounting for 16.5% of the total. “With an astounding 68 capital offenses, 
China perennially remains the world leader in executions”.97  
The stringent criminal law has provoked acute criticism from both the international 
and domestic communities.98 However, it remains uncertain whether the CCP will give 
                                                        
92 See Article 24 of The Legislative Law of China 2000.  
93 Ji Ye, “The Organization and Power Operation of the Chairman Board of the 
Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress”; author’s thesis for a master’s 
degree - the thesis collection of the Law School of Beijing University, available at the 
official website of legal information of the Law School of Beijing University, see 
http://article.chinalawinfo.com/Article_Detail.asp?ArticleID=47958, last visited on 12 
Nov 2009. For more discussion about the CCP’s control over the National People’s 
Congress, see, for example, supra note 25, at 33. 
94 Yang Chunxi, China’s Criminal Policies (The Beijing University Press, Beijing 
1994), at 84.  
95 Stefan Machura, “Fairness, Justice, and Legitimacy: Experiences of People’s Judges 
in South Russia”, Law & Policy, Vol.25, No.2, 2003, at 137. 
96 See Article 102, 103, 104, 108, 110, 111, 112, 115, 119, 121, 125, 127, 141, 144, 
151, 153, 170, 199, 205, 206, 232, 234, 236, 239, 240, 263, 264, 295, 317, 328, 347, 
358, 369, 370, 383, 386, 421, 422, 423, 424, 426, 430, 431, 433, 438, 439, and 446 of 
The Criminal Law of China 1997.   
97 Ryan Florio, “The [Capital] Punishment Fits the Crime: A Comparative Analysis of 
the Death Penalty and Proportionality in the United States of America and the People’s 
Republic of China”, University of Miami International & Comparative Law, Vol.16, 
Issue 1, 2008-2009, at 43. 
98 See, for example, Andrew Scobell, “Strung Up or Shot Down?: The Death Penalty in 
Hong Kong and China and Implications for Post-1997”, Case Western Reserve Journal 
of International Law, Vol. 20, 1988, at 147-168; Florio, ibid, 43-89; Chen Xingliang, 
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up its longstanding policy of putting a premium on stringent criminal penalties in the 
near future.99 In this context, it could be argued that lay participation may serve as a 
potential check.  
The experiences in a number of countries have proved that “lay participation in the 
criminal trial has the function of mitigating excessive punishment” since lay judges’ 
leniency and perception of equity can serve “as mitigators of the length or severity of 
criminal penalties”.100 This has been partly verified by China’s practice. Within the past 
a few years, since the promulgation of The LAA 2004, a number of courts have 
reported many cases in which lay assessors have played a role in mitigating the 
punishment.    
On 8th May 2005, one week after The LAA 2004 came into effect, Shwei was tried 
by the Local Court of Wenjiang District of Sichuan Province for making black powder 
without license. Shwei was a self-employed farmer dwelling in a village in Wenjiang 
District. Besides agricultural planting, he also made firecrackers as a part-time job, 
since the local villages had the custom of setting off firecrackers when holding funerals 
and marriage ceremonies. Shwei and his forefathers had been engaged in this business 
for many generations. At the beginning of 2005, the local police found 150 kilogram of 
black powder in Shwei’s house and arrested him. Shwei confessed that he produced it 
                                                                                                                                                               
“The Abolition of Death Penalty in China”, Criminal Law Sciences, No.7, 2003, at 39; 
Qu Xinjiu, “Pushing The Abolition of Death Penalty: A Responsibility of Criminal Law 
Experts”, Criminal Law Sciences, No.7, 2003, at 45.    
99 For example, the working reports of the Supreme Court of China in past five years 
(between 2004 and 2008) have unexceptionally emphasizing the Party’s policy of 
“punishing crimes severely”, available at the official website of the Chinese 




http://www.court.gov.cn/work/200503180013.htm,  last visited on 19 November 09.    
100  Edmundo Hendler, “Lay Participation in Argentina: Old History, Recent 
Experience”, South-western Journal of Law&Trade in the Americas, Vol.15, 2008, at 
20. 
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by himself as the main raw material for making firecrackers, and was therefore accused 
of the offence of “unlawfully making explosives”, according to Article 125 of The 
Criminal Code of China 1997. During the trial, the presiding judge of the mixed 
tribunal suggested that the fact that Shwei had made a large amount of black powder 
should be regarded as an aggravated circumstance, and that Shwei should be sentenced 
to imprisonment of at least ten years, since Article 125 of The Criminal Code of China 
1997 specifically provides that aggravated explosives production will carry a sentence 
of no less than ten years imprisonment, life imprisonment or death. In sharp contrast; 
however, the two lay assessors at the mixed tribunal, both from the local community, 
strongly opposed the judge’s proposal. They argued that it had been a long-standing 
local custom that some villagers made firecrackers by themselves. Although Shwei had 
made a large amount of black powder, he neither had vicious intent, nor had known the 
law and deliberately broken it. Following the lay assessors’ opinions, the mixed tribunal 
eventually convicted Shwei, but exempted his punishment and set him free, taking into 
account the special mitigating circumstances, that he had been making firecrackers in 
line with both the local custom and his ancestral business.101             
In Shwei’s case, the lay participants in the mixed tribunal apparently relied less 
heavily on legal doctrines and in contrast placed more emphasis on justice and equity. It 
appears that their interpretation of the law was far less formal and starched, and the 
verdict more demotic than strictly legalistic. In contrast, Shwei would very likely have 
been sentenced to imprisonment for at least ten year in a corrective labour camp, if the 
case had been decided solely by the judge and his professional colleagues. Moreover, 
Shwei’s case also partly verifies the argument that with “a wide range of practical 
                                                        
101 The duplicate copy of the judgement of the case, the file with the author; for the 
brief information of the case, see the news report, “The Survey on the Newly Selected 
Lay Assessors”, The People’s Court Daily, 24 May 2005;   
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experience and background[s]”, a group of lay judges are “best placed to understand 
and appreciate a defendant’s criminality and the appropriate response”.102  
Furthermore, professional judges might be less capable adjudicators in certain 
cases, because “they hold narrower life experiences, are disconnected from popular 
society, over-represent certain segments of society, and either have or develop an 
institutional bias in favour of prosecution or the state”.103 To sum up, this case confirms 
the fact that “what they [the lay assessors] lose in professionalism they gain in local 
knowledge. What they lose in speed they gain in the added humanity of having three 
quite differently constituted human beings putting their heads together”.104   
The above case in which the lay assessors contributed significantly to “soften the 
harshness of the formal law in particular circumstances”105 is not unique, and has been 
widely reported by various courts since The LAA 2004 came into force.106 Although 
lay assessors in China, as seen in Chapter 4, do not often play the role of dissidents in 
the courtroom, probably because most cases are too ordinary to raise their dissent, it 
appears that they at least on occasion, driven by their life experience, common sense, 
conscience or perception of equity, rise up when they believe that the law is manifestly 
unfair.      
Lay participants’ leniency has also been confirmed by Russia’s recent experiment 
with the jury trial. Among 114 cases initially tried by juries in Russia, 102 were 
potentially capital cases. However, only three defendants were eventually sentenced to 
                                                        
102 Supra note 14, at 941-942. 
103 Ibid, at 942. 
104 Irving F. Reichert, “The Magistrates’ Courts: Lay Cornerstone of English Justice”, 
Judicature, Vol.57, 1973-1974, at 139. 
105 Supra note 59, at 9. 
106 For more cases about the lay assessors’ function in mitigating the harshness of 
criminal punishment in China, also see, for example, supra note 968; the news report, 
“The Lay Assessors Who have Participated in Their First Cases: Their Opinions Were 
Affecting Judges”, Beijing Youth Daily, 29 April 2005. 
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death, with 22, 67, 31 and eight receiving imprisonment of: no more than fifteen years, 
from eight to fourteen years, up to eight years and no jail time at all, respectively.107 A 
number of verdicts and sentences made by the newly introduced juries in Russia “are a 
striking contrast to the severity of those handed down under the Soviet system”.108  
This largely verifies the allegation that “given the survival of severe punishments 
(including the death penalty), the…jury may well be a crucial corrective tool against the 
abuse of state power”.109 In the context that China “remains the world leader in 
executions”,110 it would be advisable to preserve lay judges’ leniency in courtrooms by 
encouraging the use of mixed tribunals, or even experimenting with the introduction of 
the jury trial, especially in cases involving serious offences where capital punishment 
may be applicable.    
 
5.2.3.2 To Correct the Extremely High Conviction Rate  
 
It has been a longstanding tradition that the CCP advocates very strict “crime 
control” to secure the stability of its regime.111 This harsh policy still continues to cast a 
shadow over criminal justice. Besides the aforementioned severe penalties, another 
remarkable consequence of this legacy is the extremely rare instance of acquittals in 
China. For example, in 2005 China’s courts at all levels handled 684,442 criminal cases, 
within which the number of cases where the defendants were acquitted amounted to 
                                                        
107 Stephen C. Thaman, “The Resurrection of Trial by Jury in Russia”, Stanford 
Journal of International Law, Vol.31, 1995, at 135. 
108 Ibid, at 64. 
109 Ibid, at 65. 
110 Supra note 97, at 43. 
111 See David W. Change, “Government and Crime Control in China: Its Relevance to 
U.S. Criminal Justice”, Police Studies: International Review of Police Development, 
Vol.7, 1984, at 94-111. 
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only 2,162, leading to an extremely low acquittal rate of 0.003%.112  
It is not convincing to attribute the extremely high conviction rate to the perfect 
working quality of the prosecution, but rather gives rise to concerns with regard to 
wrongful convictions.  
The number of miscarriages of justice reflects a country’s quality of justice. After 
looking through China’s official resources, I was not able to find official statistics in 
this regard, statistics which might, for the Chinese Government, be too sensitive to be 
disclosed. However, I did find statistics regarding cases of national compensation, 
figures which may indirectly reflect instances of the miscarriage of justice, since 
according to Chapter 3 of The Law of National Compensation of China 1995, any 
victim of a miscarriage of justice may claim compensation from the State. Although I 
again failed to obtain official data, Chunlong Chen, the Chairman of the National 
Compensation Committee of China reveals some useful information in one of his 
academic articles. According to Chen, between 1995 and 2005, there were 6,968 
national compensation cases in which the claimants succeeded. According to Article 21 
of The Law of National Compensation of China 1995, a court where a potential 
miscarriage of justice has occurred should handle the victim’s claim for national 
compensation, and if the claimant wins, that court will be liable for the resulting 
compensation. Chen then points out that this is the reason why the courts in China 
usually resist receiving and filing national compensation cases in practice, and that the 
actual number of filed claims should be at least 20,000 each year in his estimation. Also, 
according to Chen, among these claims a large proportion will have been raised by 
                                                        
112 Xiao Yang (the Chief Justice and President of the Supreme Court of China, as he 
was then), “The Working Report for the 4th Conference of the 10th National People’s 
Congress”, see The People’s Court Daily, 12 March 2006.  
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victims who were wrongly convicted.113 If Chen’s estimates are reliable, thousands of 
problematic convictions per year will be the resulting, very astonishing number. 
“Wrongful convictions are a double failure of abstract justice in a system aimed at 
crime control tempered by due process. Not only do the real culprits go free, as in a 
wrongful acquittal, defeating crime control, but there is an overwhelming loss of due 
process to the innocents convicted”.114 
Thaman argues that “when the application of the law gives rise to more horror than 
the commission of the crime – if the defendant is convicted despite his innocence, if 
society is not able to stand aside and trust the state to make decisions – that is the place 
for the jury”. 115  Arguably, the jury or other alternative authentic forms of lay 
participation may function as a corrective mechanism to hold back the unreasonably 
high conviction rate in China from, among other things, the aspects outlined below.  
--To Check the Judge’s Bias toward Prosecution  
An important reason for the very high conviction rates in China is linked to 
Chinese judges’ bias in favour of the prosecution.  
    Professional judges’ bias in favour of the police and the act of prosecution has 
been verified by judicial practice in countries such as Japan, Russia and Spain.116 This 
is actually the case in China today. In the old inquisitorial criminal process, Chinese 
judges, as their counterparts in other communist countries did, “had to play willy-nilly 
the roles of investigating, charging, prosecuting, defending, and punishing 
                                                        
113 Chen Chunlong, “Right Solutions to Disputes About Miscarriage of Justice and 
How to Improve the National Compensation Law”, see the official website of the Legal 
Study Institution of the Academy of Social Sciences of China, at 
http://www.iolaw.org.cn/showarticle.asp?id=2288, last visited on 6 November 2009.  
114 Penny Darbyshire, “The Lamp that Shows that Freedom Lives - Is It Worth the 
Candle?”, Criminal Law Review, Oct 1991, at 750-751. 
115 Supra note 107, at 61. 
116 Supra note 14, at 942; Stephan C. Thaman, “Europe’s New Jury Systems: The 
Cases of Spain and Russia”, Law & Contemporary Problems, Spring 1999, at 235. 
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authority”.117 Since the 1990s, “there is even growing interest in adversarial criminal 
process in China, where the conspicuous absence of important procedural rights…has 
excited considerable academic criticism”.118 The new criminal justice system has freed 
the judges of these prosecutorial functions and has asked them to be more neutral 
arbiters in criminal proceedings. However, in spite of the reforms aimed at introducing 
more adversarial features into criminal proceedings, the criminal justice system in 
China “retains many vestiges of its inquisitorial past”.119  
An entrenched tradition fostered by the long-standing inquisitorial process in 
Chin
                                        
a, is the view that the police, prosecutors and judges are all members of the 
“judicial family” which is no more than a line divided into three branches, these being 
investigation, prosecution and trial,120 all of which shoulder the same responsibility of 
“punishing crimes and ensuring social stability”.121 The historical link between judges 
and prosecution (police) survives and has been embodied in, among other things, three 
aspects in practice. First, this link is “physically manifest in buildings”.122 For example, 
the district court where I worked even shares the same building with the district police 
station and the District Public Prosecutor’s Office, while the three organizations only 
occupy different floors. Secondly, the three professions normally have good liaisons 
and frequent personal communications.123 Thirdly and more importantly, the judges 
                
117 Supra note 107, at 130. 
118 Paul Roberts, “Comparative Criminal Justice Goes Global”, Oxford Journal of 
 2008, at 372-373. 
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Beijing, 1997) at 64-65. 
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123 See the news report, “Female Employees of the Police, Prosecutor Office and Court 
of Rudong County 
Get-together”,http://www.rudong.gov.cn/rudong/infodetail/?infoid=8b4366e4-efb5-45c
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may be inclined to show bias in favour of the prosecutors in practice. For example, a 
frequently-reported practice is that where the judges realize that the evidence presented 
by the prosecutors is too weak to convict the defendants, the judges either adjourn the 
proceedings and remind the prosecutors of the need to collect more evidence rather than 
directly acquit the defendants, or alternatively still convict the defendants but mitigate 
the sentence.124 This bias jeopardizes the principle of fair trial and is accountable for 
the extremely high conviction rates in China.   
In contrast, “lay people…who are not subject to pressures to assimilate, and who 
have no personal political stake in court proceedings, will be less constrained in making 
judicial decisions against the police and prosecutors”.125 For example, it has been 
reported in Russia that before the introduction of the jury trial, “if the prosecution has 
done a poor job of preparing its case, the court usually sends the case back for ‘further’ 
investigation, thereby giving the prosecution two (or more) bites at the apple”.126 
However, “this practice is less frequently employed when a jury is present”.127 In 
contrast to the long-standing inquisitorial tradition, the newly introduced jury “does not 
tend to swallow uncritically the testimony of police officers”, which has forced 
prosecutors to “send back poorly investigated cases for further investigation or more 
realistic charging, or amend the charges during the trial to conform with the proof or 
with realistic expectations drawn from the evidence”.128 This has again proved the 
allegation that “the jury prevents liaisons between judges and the police”.129 Even in a 
                                                                                                                                                               
9-b412-4b9cb52e5871, last visited on 4 Nov 2009. 
124 Ma Guixiang, “An Analysis on the Formalization of China’s Criminal Procedure 
at 106. 
, supra note 78, at 130. 
from the Perspective of ‘Due Process’”, Law and Business Studies, No.5, 2002, at 
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125 Supra note 14, at 943. 
126 Deville, supra note 42, 
127 Ibid.  
128 Cornish
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mixed tribunal, the judge will have to explain to the lay participants – the outsiders - his 
biased actions in favour of the prosecution such as reminding the prosecutor to 
withdraw the case. In contrast, it may be much easier for a judge to explain this to his 
professional colleagues, who probably have a similar bias. Therefore, with the 
participation and supervision of lay participants with “a popular perspective and 
common sense”,130 the fairness of the criminal justice in China would be improved, by 
excluding the narrow focus or prejudice growing from the “judicial family” tradition.  
-- To Check Judges’ Readiness to Convict  
In addition, the high conviction rates in China arguably derive from Chinese 
judg
ntroducing adversarial features into the criminal justice 
syste
experience as a result of the aforementioned context of very high conviction rates. 
                                                       
es’ readiness to convict.   
In spite of moves toward i
m, the criminal courts in China cannot escape from their affection for the 
long-standing inquisitorial tradition. Assuming the role of “crime punisher” for 
decades,131 Chinese judges have been raised with “certain attitudes and prejudices, and 
with time these may become deeply ingrained”.132 Besides the inclination towards 
believing other crime punishers such as the police and prosecution, “there may be an 
over-readiness to discount a defence”.133 As suggested by Cornish, “the danger of an 
experienced judge responding ‘I’ve heard that one before’ to a case of genuine 
innocence is one of the very real problems of any system of criminal justice”.134 This 
case-hardened problem may be even more serious in China because most “crime 
punishers” [judges] in this country have probably had little previous acquittal 
 
130 Supra note 14, at 943. 
131 Wang Haiyan, How Has China’s Selected Its Criminal Procedure Models (The 
Beijing University Press, Beijing 2008), at 121.  
132 Cornish, supra note 78, at 159. 
133 Ibid. 
134 Ibid, at 160. 
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Influenced by the perception that “most of defendants are guilty” or “it [acquittal] is not 
one that is regularly offered”,135 many judges would rather in practice follow the old 
routine, persuading the prosecutor to withdraw the case for further investigation, or 
mitigating the punishment, than directly acquit the defendant, especially taking into 
account the ruling party’s policy of “crime control”. 
In contrast with Chinese judges’ case-hardened presumption of guilt and hesitance 
to acquit, the cohesiveness of lay participants, either jurors or lay judges, is “limited by 
their
                                                       
 part-time nature – most of their time is spent within the locality and not on the 
bench”.136 “Where they exist, they are the one non-bureaucratic element in the system 
of administering justice. The presence of decision-makers for whom cases are not 
routine means that each case is addressed individually with fresh eyes and is not 
decided on the basis of superficial resemblances to prior decided cases”.137 “This may 
be an important safeguard against the formation of a clique and the development of 
case-hardening”.138 Moreover, according to Kalven and Zeisel, jurors probably apply “a 
more stringent test of what it means to prove some guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt”.139 “Such a bias towards leniency may be truer to the law’s standards than the 
standards of judges who are so used to seeing mainly guilty defendants that they start 
 
135 For discussions about the difficulty in implementing presumption of innocence and 
obtaining acquittals in China’s practice, see, for example, Lai Yuedong, “The Principle 
of Presumption of Innocence and Its Application in China’s Criminal Justice”, Lai’s 
thesis for the LLM degree granted by the Institution of Political Sciences & Law of 
China, at 25-27, file with the author; Qiu Xinhua, “Holding A Tolerant Attitude Toward 
Acquittal Verdicts”, Daily of Prosecutors, 13 August 2009; and Yao Xiaoyan, “A Study 
on Acquittal Verdicts in China”, Knowledge and Economy, No.10, 2009, at 27-29. 
136 Peter J. Seago, “The Development of the Professional Magistracy in England and 
Wales”, Criminal Law Review, Aug, 2000, at 648. 
137 Supra note 59, at 8. 
138 Supra note 136, at 648. 
139 Harry Kalven, JR. and Hans Zeisel, The American Jury (1986), at 58-59, quoted in 
supra note 59, at 4. 
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with a presumption of guilt other than a presumption of innocence”.140 Likewise, it is 
believed that “lay assessors today tend to be more tolerant [toward the accused], and 
less trustful of government, than judges and so less likely to convict”.141 There is reason 
to believe that lay participants, either jurors or lay judges who are immune to the 
coerciveness of repelling acquittals and presumption of guilt, may be significant in 
impeding the unreasonably high conviction rates in China.  
For example, in spite of the findings of my fieldwork outlined in Chapter 4, that 
lay a
                                                       
ssessors in China not very frequently challenge professional judges with regard to 
the conviction of defendants, 25.2% of the lay assessors admitted that they did have this 
experience and almost one half (49.0%) of the judges ever witnessed this. Moreover, 
there have been examples, sporadic though they may be, to confirm lay assessors’ 
“leniency”. Li Junde, a lay assessor interviewed by the China Youth Daily in 2007 
revealed his experience of acquittal. Li and the other lay assessor participated in a 
mixed tribunal to adjudicate a case in which two defendants were accused of “attempt 
to robbery”. The two defendants were stopped by the police when they were smoking in 
the street at around two o’clock in the morning. When the police found that each of 
them carried a dagger, they were detained immediately. At the police station, they 
confessed that they intended to commit a robbery and had prepared the daggers. Based 
on their confessions, they were accused of “attempt to robbery”. During the trial, the 
two defendants revoked their confessions and claimed that they were beaten by the 
police and forced to confess. Li and the other lay assessors, during the deliberation, 
convinced the professional judge to acquit the defendants, since they believed that the 
only evidence to justify the charge were the doubtful confessions taken whilst carrying 
the daggers, which did not constitute a criminal offence according to the Regulation and 
 
140 Supra note 59, at 4.  
141 Deville, supra note 42, at 81. 
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Punishment Rules of Public Security of China 1986 (amended in 1994).142          
As discussed in Chapter 1, lay participants, either jurors or lay assessors, are 
empi
.2.4 To Relieve Court Congestion   
Many developing countries find…that their judiciary is not consistent in its 
conf
                                                       
rically inclined to render more acquittals. For example, very remarkably, even in 
Japan which, the same as China, has reported a “…near 100% conviction rate in recent 
judge-tried criminal cases”, experienced a significantly lower conviction rate of 84% 
while the country adopted the jury trial in criminal cases between 1928 and 1943.143 In 
Russia, in contrast with the general acquittal rates of 1.3% in 1994 and 1.4% in 1995, 
the acquittal rates for jury trials between 1994 and 1997 were 18.2%, 14.3%, 19.1% and 
22.9% respectively, indicating, as suggested by Thaman, the relative lenience of 
Russian juries “as a reaction to an excessively severe Soviet criminal justice system”.144  
The inclination towards acquittal on the part of jurors or lay assessors is probably what 
China needs to mitigate the very high conviction rates entrenched by both Chinese 





lict resolution and that it carries a large backlog of cases, causing the erosion of 
individual and property rights”.145 In China this is indeed the case. The fast-developing 
economy and quickly increasing personal assets of citizens have brought rising 
instances of disputes and civil litigations. Since the 1980s, the courts at all levels in 
 
142 Li Junde, “My Experience of Being A Lay Assessor”, China Youth Daily, 25 April 
2007, available at http://zqb.cyol.com/content/2007-04/25/content_1744346.htm, last 
visited on 7 Dec 2009. 
143 Sabrina Shizue McKenna, “Proposal for Judicial Reform in Japan: An Overview”, 
Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal, Vol.2, Issue 2, Spring 2001, at 130. 
144 Thaman, supra note 116, at 257. 
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Reform Process”, Fordham International Law Journal, Vol.24, 2000-2001, at 527.  
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China have been confronted with a “litigation explosion”, “an unprecedented, dramatic 
upsurge of civil litigation”.146 For example, the number of cases adjudicated by all 
Chinese courts in 2008 was 10,711,275, 19.5 times of that in 1978.147 The “litigation 
explosion” has heavily increased the courts’ caseloads and caused the prevalent court 
congestion.148 “Delays affect both the fairness and the efficiency of the system”.149 To 
handle the very crowded docket, various courts have had to increase the number of 
personnel. However, in contrast to the very sharp increase in caseloads, the budgets of 
most courts have only modestly increased. 150  The limited budget and increased 
numbers of court employees have led directly to poor salaries and benefits for judges in 
some courts, which has, as suggested by some authors, fostered an incentive towards 
                                                        
146 Stephen Daniels, “The Question of Jury Competence and the Politics of Civil 
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of China), “The Working Report of the Supreme Court of China for the 2nd Conference 
of the 11th National People’s Congress”, available at the official website of the Chinese 
Government, see http://www.gov.cn/test/2009-03/17/content_1261386.htm, last visited 
on 8 November 2009. 
148 See, for example, Chen Weidong, The Judicial Reform and the Judiciary’s Justice 
(The Jiancha Press, Beijing, 2002), at 151-159; also see the news report, “Rescuing the 
Short-Handed Local Courts”, available at the official website of Jiangmen City of 
Guangdong Province, see 
http://www.jiangmen.gov.cn:8080/was40/detail?record=1&channelid=59722&searchw
ord=PROPOSALID%3D%27803%27, last visited on 9 November 2009; and news 
report, “Improving the Infrastructure Construction to Create a Bright Future for the 
Local Courts”, available at the official website of the High Court of Hainan Province, 
see http://www.hicourt.gov.cn/theory/artilce_list.asp?id=2379, last visited on 9 
November 2009. 
149 Maria Dakolias, “Legal and Judicial Development: The Role of Civil Society in the 
Reform Process”, Fordham International Law Journal, Vol.24, 2000-2001, at 527.  
150 See, for example, Wang Jun and Zhou Running, “How to Realize the Courts’ 
Financial Independence – The Proposals Based on the Empirical Study”, Financial and 
Trade Studies, No.5, 2004, at 51-52; also see Wang Jiaqian, “The Establishment of the 
Reasonable Court Budget System”, available at the united official website of China’s 
courts, see http://www.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=108891, last visited on 9 
November 2009, and news report, “The Deputy of the National People’s Congress in 
Dezhou City Proposing to Resolve the Budget Shortage of the Local Court”, available 
at the united official website of China’s courts, see 
http://www.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=243159, last visited on 9 Nov 2009.  
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judicial corruption in return.151 How to reconcile overloaded courts with the limited 
number of personnel and sizes of budget on offer has become a dilemma that has had to 
be confronted by the courts in China over recent years. Remarkably, it appears that lay 
participation may play an effective role in helping to alleviate this dilemma, from at 




5.2.4.1 Alleviating Judges’ Workloads through Participation in Collegial 
Pane
lthough some courts, as discussed in Chapter 3 and 4, have so emphasized the 
impo
ure 1979 (amended in 1996) and Article 
40 o




rtance of lay assessors in alleviating the shortage of court personnel so as to 
engender some misuses, such as preferentially or even exclusively selecting the 
unemployed as lay assessors, it is undeniable that lay assessors could significantly 
contribute to alleviating judges’ workloads.   
Article 147 of The Act of Criminal Proced
f The Act of Civil Procedure 1991 (amended in 2007), provide that any 
first-instance criminal and civil case other than a simple one shall be adjudicated by 
collegial panels normally composed of three judges, one judge and two lay assessors, or 
two judges and one lay assessor. According to official statistics revealed by the 
Supreme Court of China, 68.13% of the first-instance criminal cases in 2006 were tried 
by collegial panels, while the proportion in terms of first-instance civil cases was 
 
151 Supra note 70, at 164. 
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28.74%.152 If a greater proportion of first-instance cases are to be tried by collegial 
panels in China, the courts will need to have more professional judges if each collegial 
panel is to be composed of three professional judges exclusively. In contrast, where 
each collegial panel comprises only one judge and two lay assessors, the requested 
number of professional judges will be significantly reduced. On the one hand, this 
might alleviate the current professional judges’ caseloads, since they will be liberated 
from the task of being seated on more collegial panels. With this saved time, the 
professional judges could then sit on more mixed tribunals, in association with lay 
assessors, and handle a bigger caseload. In other words, it could be argued that in 
contrast to a mixed tribunal with only one judge seated, a collegial tribunal composed 
of three judges is a waste of judicial resources. On the other hand, with lay assessors 
partially taking over judges’ workloads, the courts’ pressure to recruit more 
professional judges, at the risk of increasing the budget, might be alleviated. For 
example, the Supreme Court of China had revealed that between 2005 and 2009, lay 
assessors participated in 1,715,412 cases.153  These millions of cases would have 
worsened court congestion significantly if they had been imposed on professional 
judges exclusively.  
Needless to say, to fill the two seats in a collegial panel with lay assessors rather 
                                                        
152 Xiao Yang (the Chief Justice and President of the Supreme Court of China, as he 
was then), “The Working Report for the 5th Conference of the 10th National People’s 
Congress”, available at the official website of the Chinese Government, see 
http://www.gov.cn/2007lh/content_556959.htm, last visited on 11 Nov 2009.  
153 See Wang Shengjun (the present Chief-Justice and President of the Supreme Court 
of China), “The Working Report of the Supreme Court of China for the 2nd Conference 
of the 11th National People’s Congress”, available at the official website of the Chinese 
Government, see http://www.gov.cn/test/2009-03/17/content_1261386.htm, last visited 
on 8 November 2009, and Xiao Yang (the former Chief Justice and President of the 
Supreme Court of China), “The Working Report for the 1st Conference of the 11th 
National People’s Congress”, available at the official website of the Chinese 
Government, see http://www.gov.cn/2008lh/content_926191.htm, last visited on 11 
Nov 2009.  
 302
than professional judges, also gives rise to concerns over the costs necessary for 
selecting, training, administrating and paying lay assessors. This chapter might not be 
the right place to conduct an intensive and systematic analysis of the economics of 
replacing professional judges with lay assessors, which has to be based on an in-depth 
survey and economic analysis. However, there is reason to believe that mixed tribunals 
composed of one judge and two lay assessors, compared with the counterpart of three 
judges, might be a less expensive option in practice. For example, the official report 
provided by the Intermediate Court of C City of S Province, revealed that the local 
courts in C City paid the lay assessors remunerations according to their finished 
caseloads until 2007, and that on average a lay assessor received RMB 56.7 Yuan (GBP 
5.2) for participating in each criminal case.154 In contrast, a local judge’s average 
income for handling each criminal case in the same year was approximately RMB 270 
Yuan (GBP 24.5), almost five times a lay assessor’s income.155 To be sure, besides 
remuneration, the cost of employing lay assessors involves the expenses of selecting, 
training and administrating them. However, it could be argued that similar expenses 
exist on the part of professional judges, who enjoy additional benefits such as housing, 
medical care, and pensions, which lay assessors do not enjoy.     
 
5.2.4.2 To Alleviate Judges’ Workload in Handling “Court Conciliations”  
 
In response to the dilemma of an explosion in the number of litigations and a 
                                                        
154 The Project Team of the Intermediate Court of C City, “The Present Reality and 
Realistic Resolution – An Empirical Survey and Analysis of the Implementation of the 
Mixed Tribunal System”, unpublished internal-circulated research report of the 
Intermediate Court of C City, at 2, file with the author. (The real name of the courts is 
omitted here for the sake of confidentiality.)  
155 Record of an interview with the Director of the Research Department of the 
Intermediate Court of C City of S Province, file with the author.   
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shortage in the number of court personnel, it is noteworthy that some courts in China 
have experimented with utilizing lay participation to alleviate court congestion. For 
example, after The Lay Assessor Act 2004 came into effect in 2005, some courts started 
to commission lay assessors to preside over “court conciliation”.  
Court conciliation is a method of judicial decision-making with Chinese 
peculiarities. In any civil case, as long as the judge has not made the judgment yet, 
he/she may on his/her own ask the litigants to reach an agreement, and either party of 
the litigants may ask the judge to initiate conciliation before, during and even after the 
trial.156 Different from mediation prior to litigation, once the court conciliation has 
reached a successful conclusion, the agreement reached by the litigants will be 
sanctioned by the judge, who will issue a so-called “Conciliation Writ” to record the 
conciliation process and the agreement.157 Remarkably, the “Conciliation Writ” has 
exactly the same effect as a judgment. The litigants may thus request the court to 
enforce it.158 In practice, court conciliation has, over the years, been an important 
method of resolving disputes and ending civil litigations prematurely in China, since it 
may end the litigation process more quickly and produce a result with judicial effect 
equivalent to a judgment. Furthermore, the Supreme Court of China also encourages 
court conciliation since it is believed that compared with a judgment distinguishing a 
“winner” and “loser”, reaching a conciliation agreement between the two disputing 
parties may better “mitigate the conflicts” and “restore the social harmony and 
stableness”.159  In 2008, 58.86% (3,167,107) of all the civil cases received and filed by 
                                                        
156 Article 85 of The Act of Civil Procedure 1991 (amended in 2007).  
157 Article 89 of The Act of Civil Procedure 1991 (amended in 2007). 
158 Article 89 of The Act of Civil Procedure 1991 (amended in 2007). 
159 See, for example, news report. “The Supreme Court Emphasizing the Preference for 
Resolving Disputes by Court Conciliation ”, available at the united official website of 
China’s courts, see http://www.chinacourt.org/html/article/200907/31/367568.shtml, 
last visited on 9 Nov 2009.   
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courts of all levels in China were handled by court conciliation.160  
Confronting the shortage of professional judges, some courts have started to 
experiment with commissioning lay assessors to preside over the court conciliation 
process, especially since 2005 when The LAA 2004 came into force. This experiment 
has obtained largely positive results.  
For example, some courts have found that an older, married lay assessor, 
compared with a young and single judge, may obtain a higher success rate in 
conciliating marital and family cases, since the lay assessor, with rich personal 
experience in marriage and family matters, can better understand the situation of the 
litigants and propose a more appropriate agreement which the litigants are more willing 
to accept.161 Some courts have also reported that lay assessors are better at conciliating 
neighbourhood disputes than professional judges, because the litigants trust the lay 
assessors who come from the same community and know the local situation better.162 
Some courts have even suggested that lay assessors with professional knowledge can be 
very successful in conciliating cases with that particular area of expert knowledge 
involved, since the litigants respect the lay assessors for their expertise.163 Besides the 
reported high efficiency of the lay assessors in conciliating cases, also according to 
                                                        
160 Wang Shengjun (the present Chief-Justice and President of the Supreme Court of 
China), “The Working Report of the Supreme Court of China for the 2nd Conference of 
the 11th National People’s Congress”, available at the official website of the Chinese 
Government, see http://www.gov.cn/test/2009-03/17/content_1261386.htm, last visited 
on 8 Nov 2009.  
161 See news report, “The Lay Assessors of the Gulou Court Made 100% Successful 
Rate in Court Conciliations”, Xuzhou Daily, 27 May 2006. 
162 See news report, “The Changting Court Actively Employing Lay Assessors in Court 
Conciliations”, available at the united official website of China’s courts, see 
http://www.chinacourt.org/html/article/200904/14/352898.shtml, last visited on 9 Nov 
2009. 
163 See news report, “Envisaging Lay Assessors’ Advantage in Court Conciliation and 
Improving the Social Harmony”, available at the official website of the courts in Hebei 
Province, see http://www.hbsfy.org/ReadNews.asp?NewsID=5995, last visited on 9 
Nov 2009. 
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reports from a number of regional courts, employing lay assessors to handle court 
conciliation is more economic than commissioning judges to do the same job, since the 
lay assessors only collect very modest remuneration from the courts.164 To sum up, the 
accumulated experience of various courts suggests that lay assessors can be competent 
and cost-effective personnel when helping the courts to handle civil cases using court 
conciliation.     
However, neither The Act of Civil Procedure 1991 (amended in 2007) nor The 
LAA 2004 grants lay assessors the power to conciliate civil cases alone. Confronting 
this legislative block, in practice, although some courts allow the lay assessors to handle 
court conciliation alone, the “Conciliation Writs” can only be produced and issued in 
the name of a professional judge. The Supreme Court of China has recently drawn 
attention to this problem and the effectiveness of employing lay assessors to handle 
court conciliation, and has been considering a nationwide experiment. 165  If this 
experiment is successful, China might see a situation where lay assessors lawfully 
handle most, or even all court conciliations in the future. Taking into account the 
aforementioned fact that the majority of civil cases are conciliated in China, these lay 
                                                        
164 See, for example, Wang Deyong, “Employing Lay Assessors in Court Conciliations 
to Improve the Harmony”, available at the official website of the courts in Anhui 
Province, see 
http://www.ahcourt.gov.cn/gb/ahgy_2004/yzzc/yzlt/userobject1ai13913.html, last 
visited on 9 Nov 2009; news report, “Chenghua Court Experimenting with Conciliation 
by Lay Assessors in Commercial Disputes”, available at the official website of the 
Court of Chenghua District of Chengdu City Sichuan Province, see 
http://cdfy.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=12067, last visited on 10 Nov 2009;  
and  news report, “Dongtai Court Proving the Effectiveness of Employing Lay 
Assessors to Conciliate Cases”, available at the united official website of the courts in 
China, see http://www.chinacourt.org/html/article/200804/21/297510.shtml, last visited 
on 10 Nov 2009.      
165 See, for example, supra note 714; and Li Quan, “Making Lay Assessors Bridge the 
Connection Between the Judiciary and the People”, available at the united official 
website of China’s courts, see 
http://www.chinacourt.org/html/article/200505/16/161760.shtml, last visited on 10 Nov 
2009.     
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participants might significantly help remedy court congestion at a relatively low cost 
when compared with simply increasing the number of professional judges. Furthermore, 
without the pressure to increase the number of judges, the courts may be able to use 
these saved costs to improve judges’ salaries and benefits, protecting against corruption. 
In addition, another advantage of allowing lay assessors to handle the court conciliation 
process is its “flexibility in the sittings of the courts”.166 Compared with the very strict 
and time-consuming judicial selection procedure for recruiting professional judges, the 
selection of lay assessors has no such limitations. If there is court congestion, additional 
lay assessors may be added quickly, the only problem being the need to increase the 
number of lay assessors’ offices.      
 
5.3 Promoting a More Democratic Society in China  
 
Besides the aforementioned value of producing better justice for China, the other 
value of lay participation is its potential to promote a more democratic Chinese society, 
which could be embodied in the two aspects below.  
 
5.3.1 Providing Chinese Citizens with Direct Democracy  
 
As discussed in Chapter 1, lay participation can promote direct democracy, as 
embodied through two aspects: (1) making judicial decisions with regard to granting or 
depriving citizens of their property, freedom or even life, is an important 
state-governance activity, whilst allowing individual citizens to make these decisions 
perfectly reflects the spirit of direct democracy, just decisions made directly by the 
                                                        
166 Irving F. Reichert, “The Magistrates’ Courts: Lay Cornerstone of English Justice”, 
Judicature, Vol.57, 1973-1974, at 140. 
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people,167 and (2) by applying specific laws to individual cases, lay judges or jurors 
participating in trials have the opportunity to scrutinize or even nullify legal norms as 
devised by the Government, an activity which could be regarded as another form of 
direct government by the people, with people directly screening unjust laws.168 In 
China’s particular political context, it appears that this direct democracy may play a 
more realistically important role.   
Whether direct civic participation in justice and direct democracy as a whole will 
be supported or not, is largely a controversial ideological issue, one which will continue 
“both to attract and to repel us precisely because it exposes the full range of democratic 
vices and virtues”.169 Opponents argue that since citizens have already elected their 
representatives to compose the Government and to realise representative democracy, 
democratic rights “need not be extended to the judicial branch of the government”.170 
Proponents contend that “the justification for citizen participation is the basic principle 
of our democracy – that government is based on ‘the consent of the governed’ and that 
all citizens should have the opportunity to participate in the governmental decisions that 
affect their lives”.171 However, if it is justifiable that representative democracy based on 
sound general elections works well in western democracies and makes direct 
                                                        
167 John D. Jackson & Nikolay P. Kovalev, “Lay Adjudication and Human Rights in 
Europe”, The Columbia Journal of European Law, No.1 of Vol.13, 2006/2007, at 
87-88. 
168 Supra note 14, at 944. 
169 Jeffery Abramson, We, the Jury: The Jury System and the Ideal of Democracy, 
(Basic Books, New York, 1994), at 1-2. 
170 See supra note 167, at 90.  
171 Florence R. Rubin, “Citizen Participation in the State Courts”, The Justice System 
Journal, Vol. 10, No.3, 1985, at 295. For more arguments supporting the direct 
democracy embodied by lay participation, see, for example, Milton Seligson, “Lay 
Participation in South Africa from Apartheid to Majority Rule”, International Review 
of Penal Law (Vol. 72), at 279; Jonathan H. Siegelbaum, “The Right Amount of Rights: 
Calibrating Criminal Law and Procedure in Post-Communist Central and Eastern 
Europe”, Boston University International Law Journal, Vol.20, 2002, at 84; and Kevin 
K. Washburn, “Restoring the Grand Jury”, Fordham Law Review, Vol.76, 2007-2008, 
at 2335.  
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democracy in the judicial domain unnecessary, this is actually not the case in China.  
Howard portrayed the picture of elections in communist countries including China:  
“The [communist] party decided who could stand for office. Elections 
were, in a sense, like white primaries in the American South in the early 
decades of the twentieth century – nomination being tantamount to election – 
except that the process in the communist system was even more rigidly 
controlled, leaving nothing to doubt. The party prepared lists of candidates, 
allowing no competition from others”.172   
Unfortunately, China still faces this situation even today.173 Lacking an authentic 
election system, the immediate consequence is that representatives of the party rather 
than the people occupy positions in the Government, especially key positions. As seen 
above, Chinese judges are appointed by those party representatives working in the 
Government and they are unavoidably inclined to serve the latter’s interests, and 
Chinese legislators screened by the party can hardly resist enacting ill-judged laws 
where the people’s interests are ignored. There is therefore no guarantee in this country 
that legal decisions will be made by independent judges according to just laws. 
According to the analysis above, lay people’s direct participation in legal 
decision-making could play an important role in dispensing a more independent and 
incorruptible justice, helping realize the first value of direct democracy in the judicial 
                                                        
172 A. E. Dick Howard, “After Communism: Devolution in Central and Eastern 
Europe”, South Texas Law Review, Vol.40, 1999, at 664. 
173 There have been many attacks on the ineffectiveness of China’s election system, see, 
for example, Yuan Dayi, “Methods of Improving the Election System in China”, 
available at the official website of the NGO – China Elections and Governance, see 
http://www.chinaelections.org/PrintNews.asp?NewsID=81730, last visited on 23 Nov 
2009; and Zhou Pingxue, An Empirical Study on the Reform of China’s Representative 
System (The Chongqing Press, Chongqing 2005), the electronic version available at the 
official website of the NGO – China Elections and Governance, see 
http://www.chinaelections.org/newsinfo.asp?newsid=99983 and 
http://www.chinaelections.org/newsinfo.asp?newsid=99984, last visited on 23 Nov 
2009.  
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domain, that is, making just decisions directly by the people. Moreover, Roy Amlot, a 
former Chairman of the Criminal Bar Association writes, “parliament enacts and a 
powerful Government with a strong whip may enact harsh laws. But no jury can be 
forced to implement what it considers to be a harsh law. In this way a jury plays a vital 
part in the democratic process”.174 Lay assessors in China, as seen above, have proved 
to have similar merits in such regards as well, potentially being able to achieve the 
second goal of providing direct democracy in the judicial domain by checking unjust 
laws. To sum up, without a sound representative democracy, one that ensures an 
appropriate administration of the law, direct democracy in the judicial arena would 
seem critical for China.   
As a matter of fact, even in western democracies, scholars have been drawing 
attention to “democratic traditions which are under threat”175 and putting a premium on 
the direct democracy brought by the jury system, which “can be adapted to revitalize 
Anglo-American democratic traditions that have fallen into decline.”176 As Gobert 
argues:  
Their centuries-old democratic institutions are creaking. Opinion poll 
after opinion poll suggests that the people have lost confidence in the 
government’s ability to solve social problems. There is a growing sense that 
important decisions can no longer be left to the politicians and that the people 
                                                        
174 Roy Amlot, “Leave the Jury Alone”, the paper presented at a seminar on 10 Dec 
1997, at Gray’s Inn, London, entitled “The Effectiveness of Juries and the Use of the 
Civil Courts in the Control of Crime”. The seminar was chaired by the Lord Chief 
Justice Lord Bingham, organised by the British Academy of Forensic Sciences and 
jointly sponsored by the Criminal Bar Association, the Administrative Law Bar 
Association, and the Law Society. This sentence is quoted in Sally Lloyd-Bostock and 
Cheryl Thomas, “Decline of the ‘Little Parliament’: Juries and Jury Reform in England 
and Wales”, Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol. 62, at 10.  
175  James Gobert, Justice, Democracy and the Jury (Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 
Dartmouth 1997), at 194. 
176 Ibid, at 200 and 201. 
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themselves have to assume a greater share of the responsibility for 
decision-making. But how are the people to become involved? The answer 
does not lie in the proliferation of opinion polls or demagogic “talk radio” 
programmes. A more effective means needs to obtain the informed and 
reflective judgments of responsible citizens. The jury offers a model that has 
proved effective in the legal context and which, with appropriate 
modifications, can be put to use in a social and political context.177  
In light of the above allegation, in China, “a more complex and fast-moving 
society, irregular general elections are no longer an adequate means…for the people to 
make themselves heard.”178 “For a democracy to thrive, the people must become 
actively involved in its operation” and lay participation “provides a model for allowing 
them to reclaim their democratic heritage and play a more constructive role in 
government.”179 More specifically, citizens serving as lay judges or jurors may “take 
responsibility for government action in a more involving, immediate, and consequential 
way than they do as voters in free elections, that other quintessentially democratic 
institution”.180 With regard to this concern, it would be advisable for China, having no 
established representative democracy, to experiment with authentic forms of lay 
participation such as the jury, which, by screening unjust law or acquitting 
pro-democracy activists whatsoever, “is important realistically because it makes 
decisions that affect major institutions and that may affect you and me.”181  
In addition, according to Landsman’s study in post-communist Russia, “if 
democracy needs to have roots in a society and is more than a technique to confirm 
                                                        
177 Ibid, at 194. 
178 Ibid, at 223. 
179 Ibid, at 223. 
180 Supra note 59, at 10. 
181 Rita James Simon, The Jury and the Defense of Insanity (Little, Brown and 
Company, London, 1967), at 5. 
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political elites, it calls for public participation in the administration, including the 
administration of law. More than that, it requires that rights of others are taken into 
account. All this is important for the discussion on the rule of law and the universality 
of human rights”.182 This theory may also be applicable to China, which has a similar 
communist legacy. While it remains uncertain when the CCP’s hegemony in terms of 
the national apparatus will totally disappear, lay participation under the circumstance of 
a centralized administration of the law could gain substantial significance with regard to 
generating democracy, supporting the interests of the community, hearing the voices of 
the unprivileged groups and opposing the ruling party in the courtrooms.  
 
5.3.2 To Foster Chinese People’s Citizenship   
 
As discussed in Chapter 1, besides encouraging direct democracy, the other thread 
of lay participation which promotes a more democratic society is its function within 
civic education. The claim that “direct democracy may promote civic education or civic 
virtue by encouraging and providing an opportunity for political participation and 
engagement with public life” has a long history, and has been widely acknowledged by 
scholars.183 A more recent study has further confirmed that “direct democracy might 
perform the function of civic education and ‘maturation’ that once may have been 
performed by institutions like the jury and the militia”.184 It could be argued that the 
civic education function of lay participation may play an important role in helping with 
                                                        
182 Stephan Landsman, “Commentary: Dispatches from the Front: Lay Participation in 
Legal Processes and the Development of Democracy”, Law & Policy, Vol.25, 2003, at 
174. 
183 Sherman J. Clark, “The Character of Direct Democracy”, Journal of Contemporary 
Legal Issues, Vol.13, 2003-2004, at 342. 
184  See Alan Hirsch, “Direct Democracy and Civic Maturation”, Hastings 
Constitutional Law Quarterly, Vol.29, 2001, at 185, and 209-217, quoted in ibid, at 
342. 
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China’s democratic transition. 
 
5.3.2.1 To Enhance Chinese Citizens’ Commitment to the Community 
 
Some Chinese scholars argue that China’s move towards a market economy has 
fostered a “money-rush” and “self-centred” consciousness which has become prevalent 
among Chinese civilians. Accompanying this consciousness is an indifference to public 
affairs and an absence of commitment to the community, moves which may impede the 
implementation of lay participation, whether the jury or the mixed tribunal system, as 
this will involve a citizen sacrificing his or her own benefits to serve the community as 
a whole. In order to prove this argument, they make reference to empirical evidence 
which shows that although The LAA 2004 provides for the self-nomination of citizens 
as one method of finding lay assessor candidates, there have been few such cases in 
practice. Taking this into account, pessimistic scholars even contend that without a 
history of civic voluntary participation in community affairs, lay participation must be 
avoided in China.185 However, it might also be argued that it is the very absence of 
citizens’ commitment to the community that makes the need for lay participation more 
vital in China, because of its educational function.  
Howard argues that “a special task of post-communist societies is to build 
communities in which there is a concern for the common good”. He adds that “in the 
ideal society, to be sure, individuals would have the same level of concern about the 
welfare of others, wherever they might live, nearby or far away.”186 “For most people, 
however, community begins with those who are nearest – family, of course, but also 
                                                        
185 Wei Min, “Shall the Mixed tribunal System Be Suspended: The Developmental 
Direction of the Mixed Tribunal System, Gansu Social Sciences, Vol.4, 2001, at 31, 32. 
186 Supra note 172, at 684. 
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those who live close enough to be seen daily or at least frequently. On local beginnings 
are attachments to be a larger community built”.187 Being selected as either a lay judge 
or a juror to serve at the local court and to adjudicate on offences that occurred locally, 
may grant the citizen an opportunity to become educated about his or her commitment 
to the community from at least three respects.  
First, by personally experiencing the whole criminal process and imposing the 
punishment on the offender him or herself, a lay judge or juror is taught a face-to-face 
lesson that any harm to the community’s “common good” whether driven by an 
offender’s “money-rush” or “self-centred” thoughts, will be punished as part of due 
process. In contrast, for a citizen reading trial reports in newspapers, the experience of 
sending his peers or even neighbours into prison is much more direct and impressive, 
which may strengthen a citizen’s law-abiding commitment to obey community norms.  
Second, sitting as a judge dispensing local justice may cultivate a citizen’s 
perception that he is not only a passive, governed object but also an associate governor 
of the community. This decision-making experience, acting as an authority figure, may 
make citizens believe that the community belongs to them and their neighbours. 
Serving the community affairs to secure the common good of the community is 
therefore for their own good. As suggested by Edmund Burke, “to be attached to the 
subdivision, to love the little platoon we belong to in society, is the first principle (the 
germ as it were) of public affections. It is the first link in the series by which we 
proceed to a love of our country, and to mankind.”188 To sum up, “without the spark of 
community at the local level, it is hard to see how a healthy spirit of civic engagement 
                                                        
187 Ibid.  
188 Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France (2nd ed. 1790), at 68, 
quoted in supra note 172, at 684. 
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on the larger scene can be kindled”.189   
Third, by sitting as lay judges dispensing local justice, “citizens exercise power, 
yes, but not unconstrained power, and in a context where they are encouraged to 
understand themselves as acting on behalf of the community as a whole.”190 In other 
words, authentic and viable forms of lay participation “are or can be constructed in 
ways that encourage people to take a certain ownership and responsibility for their 
actions”.191 As Clark summarises, lay participation “can help construct a particular 
vision of citizenship – one keyed to responsibility and service, and in which there is a 
crucial relationship between rights and duties, and between authority and obligation”.192  
To sum up, in contrast with western democracies, “no challenge is more daunting 
than that of civic education [in post-communism countries]”. 193  “An enduring 
constitutional democracy requires that ordinary citizens understand and live by the 
constraints and values that make possible ordered liberty. The legacy of the communist 
years…does not create fertile soil for civic values. There is no, one formula for their 
inculcation; whereas a healthy democracy at the grassroots…is surely a promising step 
toward that reality”.194     
 
5.3.2.2 To Inspire Chinese Citizens’ Democratic Consciousness   
 
“Even in democratic societies, it is important that ordinary citizens have the 
opportunity to deliberate together, to engage in ready debate over the issues of the day. 
It is such occasions that make for reflection, not only on the problems being debated, 
                                                        
189 Supra note 172, at 684. 
190 Supra note 183. 
191 Ibid.  
192 Ibid.  
193 Supra note 172, at 688. 
194 Ibid.  
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but also on larger questions about governance, democracy, society, and the common 
good. The essence of citizenship is being able, not only to elect those who make the 
laws, but also to have one’s place in open and informed discussion about how 
government’s decisions are made”.195 As suggested by Alexis de Tocqueville, the juror  
Takes a part in every occurrence in the place; he practices the art of 
government in the small sphere within his reach; he accustoms himself to 
those forms without which liberty can only advance by revolutions; he imbibes 
their spirit; he acquires a taste for order, comprehends the balance of powers, 
and collects clear practical notions on the nature of his duties and the extent 
of his rights. 196   
Lay participation thus “becomes, in effect, a classroom, an ongoing seminar about 
the democratic process.”197    
In contrast with the situation in western democracies, post-communist China may 
be in more need of a “classroom” to teach its civilians about “the democratic process”. 
Since 1949 when the CCP established its regime, authoritarianism has prevailed in 
China. Representative democracy, as mentioned above, does not come into being 
without an authentic election system. 198  With few opportunities to participate in 
democratic activities, most Chinese citizens, as pointed out by many scholars, lack 
“democratic consciousness”.199 As described by Howard, “life under communism bred 
                                                        
195 Ibid, at 683. 
196 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (Henry Reeve trans., 1963), at 68, 
quoted in ibid, at 683. 
197 Supra note 172, at 683. 
198 For detailed discussion about China’s democracy, see, for example, Bradley Klein, 
“Democracy Optional: China and the Developing World’s Challenge to the Washington 
Consensus”, UCLA Pacific Basin Law Journal, Vol.22, 2004, at 89-149; and John L. 
Thornton, “Long Time Coming – The Prospects for Democracy in China”, Foreign 
Affairs, Vol.87, 2008, at 2-22.  
199  See, for example, Xu Boyuan, “Strengthening Chinese Citizens’ Democratic 
Consciousness – A National Issue”, available at the official news website of the 
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a sense of loneliness, a distrust of one’s neighbours, a Hobbesian kind of 
disengagement from public life. Retreat into the privacy of one’s self and one’s family 
was safer than venturing into the public square”.200 Moreover, a particular problem 
China faces is that the overwhelming majority of the national population lives in rural 
areas.201 “The mass of rural people are either smallholders, or they are tenants or 
landless agrarian workers. Not only do they lack material resources, but, they have 
historically lacked power to control their physical and social environments: they are the 
victims of political exclusion as well as economic repression or neglect”.202 Compared 
with urban residents, they may lack the consciousness of participating in democratic 
activities to an even greater degree. 
Interestingly, it appears that my empirical study in China partly verifies the role of 
lay participation in educating citizens. As mentioned in Chapter 4, I circulated a 
questionnaire among some lay assessors serving at the courts in S Province. In these 
questionnaires, four questions were formulated to look into the educational effects of 
the lay assessor system which had been implemented in 2005, the questions formed in 
order to ascertain: (1) whether the lay assessors’ legal knowledge had increased since 
their court service, (2) whether the lay assessors’ legal consciousness had been 
strengthened after their court service, (3) whether the lay assessors were willing to 
                                                                                                                                                               
Chinese Government, see 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/comments/2006-05/24/content_4592221.htm, last visited on 
24 Nov 2009; and Hu Honghong, “The Definition and Implication of the Citizenship 
Consciousness”, available at the official of the NGO – China Elections and Governance, 
see http://www.chinaelections.org/newsinfo.asp?newsid=116655, last visited on 24 Nov 
2009. 
200 Supra note 172, at 684. 
201 For example, the agricultural population in China up to 2000 occupied 63.94% of 
the total population, see Zhang Yi, “A Data Analysis of the 5th National Census in 
China”, available at the official website of the Chinese Government, see 
http://www.china.com.cn/chinese/society/89666.htm, last visited on 24 Nov 2009.    
202  James C. N. Paul, “Introduction: Law, Socialism, and the Human Right to 
Development in Third World Countries”, Review of Socialist Law, Vol.7, 1981, at 237. 
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continue their court service; and (4) whether the lay assessors felt more interested in 
participating in other democratic activities. It is noteworthy that 99%, 99%, 92.3% and 
89.3% of the respondents returned positive answers to the four questions respectively. 
My findings, that in China most lay participants after service are willing to serve again 
and have stronger legal and participatory consciousness, also conform to recent findings 
made in other countries such as Japan, the USA203 and Russia.204 According to E.P. 
Thompson’s (1975) theory, the rule of law evolved over a period of centuries in 
England, with the local citizenry gradually becoming engaged more in governance and 
courtroom matters.205 Landsman holds that “the British citizenry learned democratic 
habits, at least in part, by sitting on juries charged with ever greater responsibility to 
decide issues critical to local governance.” 206  It remains to be seen whether 
encouraging lay participation in China will illuminate the same sort of path and develop 
“a greater democratic consciousness in the general population”.207 However, at least in 
light of my empirical survey and other countries’ experience, it appears that lay 
participation could more or less generate this kind of development in China. 
 
5. 4 
                                                       
Conclusion  
 
The above discussion espouses the fact that transitional China, in spite of having 
made remarkable economic progress, still faces the legacy of totalitarian communism, 
embodied as a status-quo with a very problematic judicial system and an 
 
203 Hiroshi Fukurai, “The Rebirth of Japan’s Petit Quasi-Jury and Grand Jury Systems: 
A Cross-National Analysis of Legal Consciousness and the Lay Participation 
Experience in Japan and the U.S.”, Cornell International Law Journal, Vol.40, 2007, at 
317. 
204 Deville, supra note 42, at 116. 
205 Supra note 182, at 174. 
206 Ibid. 
207 Supra note 14, at 944. 
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under-developed democracy. Judicial independence is undermined by the judiciary 
being subject to the ruling party’s political affectation and by local government 
financial control. Citizens’ right to a fair trial is thus vulnerable to the entrenched 
severity of criminal justice and the rampant corruption of the judiciary. The limited size 
of budgets and lack of personnel mean courts struggle with heavy caseloads. In addition, 
the long-term absence of an authentic election system deprives civilians of the 
opportunity to express their free-will, which, in turn, diminishes their democratic 
consciousness. As revealed in Chapter 1, the extent to which lay participation is critical 
depends upon a country’s political and legal context, rather than a general assessment. 
It appears that lay participation, within China’s particular context, may play an 
important role in producing better justice and promoting a more democratic society.   
The theory that “a judge alone is a better creature of justice”208 apparently does not 
apply in China, where judges are not be immune to exterior interference, since their 
careers are subject to CCP control and their salaries and benefits are under the financial 
sway of the local government, and for the same reason, a collegial panel composed 
exclusively of professional judges cannot escape a similar fate. In contrast, lay 
participation, by introducing the voice of the common citizen, is less likely to yield to 
political or financial pressure from the State, and so can serve as a shield against 
interference from the Party or the administrative powers.  
The jury trial was “filled two centuries ago as a corrective to the corruption and 
partiality of the judges”.209 A number of modern transitional countries have also 
                                                        
208  Peter Thornton, “Trial by jury: 50 years of change”, Criminal Law Review, 
September, 2004, at 698.  
209 Sir Patrick Devlin, “Blackstone Lecture”, Oxford, 18 November 1978, quoted from 
John Hostettler, The Criminal Jury Old and New: Jury Power From Early Times to the 
Present Day (Waterside Press, Sheffield, 2004), at 154. 
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resuscitated lay participation “as a check on state corruption”. 210  Likewise, lay 
participants, as outsiders serving transitorily, can potentially curb corruption of the 
judiciary since they yield less to instructions from corrupt senior judges and are 
unlikely to be absorbed into the interest groups composed of corrupt legal professionals 
such as judges and lawyers. In addition, they may also serve as watchdogs to oversee 
judges’ delinquencies.  
The traditional severity of criminal justice in China has been left intact, as 
characterised by stringent punishments and very high conviction rates. Lay participants 
in the courtrooms may, out of a perception of equity, conscience or common sense, 
serve as a check on the execution of cruel or oppressive laws, or even repeal or modify 
the law itself, which Chinese judges “would have administered with exact severity, and 
defended with professional bigotry”.211 China’s experience in employing lay assessors 
partly lends support to this view. Moreover, lay participants, either jurors who “come 
together to hear one case” or lay assessors who serve at the courts for only a short 
period of time each year, are “unlikely to be tainted by the sorts of predispositions 
judges may develop over the course of their careers”.212 This makes sense in China, 
where the particular “predispositions” Chinese judges have after decades of the 
prevailing inquisitorial process, has resulted in both their readiness to convict and their 
“ongoing experiences or relationships with other justice system ‘regulars’, such as the 
police and prosecutors”. Their “blind faith in the ability of these other justice system 
actors or a need to get along with them”213, and their “traditional guilt-confirmation 
                                                        
210 Deville, supra note 42, at 110. 
211 Casteneda, supra note 90, at396. 
212 Stephan Landsman, “The Civil Jury in America”, Law and Contemporary Problems, 
Vol.62, 1999, at 288.  
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function”214 has led to the overly high conviction rates in China.   
Lay participation in China could serve as a way to alleviate the backlog of court 
cases, though “Popular participation is not necessarily an end in itself. The goal of the 
courts is the fair and fast resolution of matters brought for adjudication.”215 However, 
appropriate forms of lay participation, such as the lay magistracy and administrative 
tribunals used in the UK, have been proved to alleviate the caseloads of courts in an 
efficient and economic way. A similar reality has also been demonstrated by Chinese 
lay assessors’ visible efficacy in sitting on collegial panels and saving the need for 
professional judges, and replacing judges in order to effectively handle court 
conciliations. 
The retreat of Communism in China has “brought commitments to new ways of 
thinking about society”.216 “Key among those post-communist aspirations is the search 
for democratic government, constitutionalism, political pluralism, and the rule of 
law.”217 In the context of a lack of authentic representative democracy, one based on a 
sound election system, appropriate forms of lay participation may become “the best 
ways for citizens to participate directly in their government”218 and provide Chinese 
civilians with an important arena to voice their political dissent. In addition, even in 
western democracies, scholars have emphasized the cultivation of citizens’ democratic 
consciousness via the “democratic school” – the jury trial, “that holds the potential for 
reviving democracy within society and empowering the people on a wide range of 
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issues of public concern.” 219  In contrast, after having experienced long-term 
authoritarian rule, post-Communist China may even more critically require the jury or a 
counterpart, to realize “regular citizen participation”220 and to enlighten and “bolster 
civic democratic commitments”.221 My empirical study in China also partly confirms 
the education function of lay participation. To sum up, viable and authentic lay 
participation may offer “important opportunities to nurture citizenship and grass-roots 
democracy.” 222   
To be sure, the values of lay participation may not be certain and may not remove 
the faults which have plagued the judicial system in China for such a long time. For 
example, to enhance Chinese judges’ independence and incorruptibility, they need to 
“be adequately compensated, with fair retirement benefits, widow’s pension rights and 
security of tenure”.223  However, as long as lay participation can potentially “help 
reform an ailing and faulty system”, 224  it deserves to be preserved and further 
experimented with in China, at least before other substantial reforms are undertaken and 
take root. It is worthwhile pointing out that it is the combined effect of a series of 
reforms which have included lay participation, rather than a reform program developed 
in isolation, that may better resolve the deep-seated problems plaguing China’s legal 
system.   
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Chapter 6  The Future for Lay Participation in China  
-- Prospects and Recommendations 
 
6.1 Introduction  
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, Chinese scholars’ opinions with regard to lay 
participation can be grouped into three schools. The opponents of lay participation 
openly oppose lay participation on three main premises, namely the declining 
worldwide trend, the absence of historical tradition in China and the unsuccessful 
practice of mixed tribunals today. The jury supporters embrace the view that lay 
participation should be preserved in China but believe that the problematic mixed 
tribunal system should be replaced with the jury trial. The advocates of lay assessors 
adopt the more moderate view that the mixed tribunal should be preserved but that 
improvements are needed. Based on the discussions in previous chapters, the opinion of 
the first school hardly seems justified since lay participation is neither declining 
worldwide nor is there an absence of an historical tradition in China. Furthermore, in 
spite of problems with the current mixed tribunal system, lay participation has the 
potential to produce better justice and promote a more democratic society in China, as 
discussed in Chapter 5, and therefore deserves to be preserved and further experimented 
with in China. Whilst the proposal to abolish lay participation altogether has proved to 
be inappropriate, questions as to the future developmental direction of lay participation 
in China have to be raised, namely: should China adopt the proposal of the second 
school, to replace the current mixed tribunal system with a jury system, or that of the 
third school, i.e. to further polish the mixed tribunal system?   
This chapter attempts to answer these questions by exploring the prospects for lay 
 323
participation in China. Taking into account the fact that “the social and political context 
affects the functioning of lay participation”,1 Part 6.2 will first look into the current 
political context in China which may impact upon the reform of lay participation into 
the future. After the current political context has been explained and understood, Part 
6.3 will present a realistic proposal for further improving the current mixed tribunal 
system in light of the blueprint of reforming lay participation in China, as provided by 
the Supreme Court of China. Part 6.4 considers a few recommendations which may be 
beyond the current reform agenda, but which deserve attention and research effort when 
formulating a model for lay participation in China further into the future. 
 
6.2 Understanding the Current Political Context for Lay Participation  
 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the extent to which lay participation can thrive in a 
country is inextricably linked to the relevant political circumstances. In China’s case, 
this issue involves two threads. 
 
6.2.1 An Historical Opportunity for Developing Lay Participation in China  
 
On the one hand, as indicated in Chapter 3, China’s move toward resuscitating lay 
participation by enacting The LAA 2004 has been mainly driven by the trust crisis 
which China’s judicial system faced at the end of the last century. As a matter of fact, 
the crisis has not yet been resolved, but has in fact got worse in recent years. Since the 
beginning of this century, a series of large-scale riots and demonstrations 
unprecedented in communist China’s history have broken out, signalling people’s 
                                                        
1 Valerie P. Hans, “Lay Participation in Legal Decision Making”, Law & Policy, 
Vol.25, No.2, 2003, at 87. 
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extreme disappointment with the justice system.   
In 2004, the local government of Hanyuan County of Sichuan Province initiated 
the construction of a large power station, a project which necessitated the relocation of 
over 100,000 local residents. Instead of reaching fair compensation agreements with the 
local residents, the local government arbitrarily enacted a unilateral compensation 
standard in June 2004, forcing the local residents to accept it and to vacate their 
properties quickly. The compensation standard, based on the local economic situation 
fourteen years previously irritated the local residents who therefore submitted a 
collective complaint to the local government. However, the local government ignored it 
and refused to reconsider the unreasonable compensation standard. Realizing that the 
local court was under the sway of the local government and so unable to judge the 
dispute fairly and independently, approximately 60,000 angry local residents initiated a 
demonstration which eventually turned into a riot after a violent conflict erupted 
between the demonstrators and the armed police. This riot was the largest since 1949 
when the CCP had taken power.2 Other similar riots and demonstrations deriving from 
people’s doubts regarding the fairness and integrity of local courts and other judicial 
departments then took place include a 40-day demonstration involving thousands of 
workers in Xianyang City between September and October 2004,3 a riot initiated by 
                                                        
2 Although this riot is well known in China and has been named the “Hanyuan Event”, 
the mass media in China has been prohibited from reporting it. For information about it, 
see personal blogs of some pro-democracy activists in China, for example, 
http://topic.csdn.net/t/20041101/14/3510461.html, 
http://news.ifeng.com/opinion/200806/0630_23_624507.shtml, and 
http://rechtsstaat.fyfz.cn/blog/rechtsstaat/index.aspx?blogid=142162, all last visited on 
16 Dec 2009.    
3  Likewise, the mass media in China has been prohibited from reporting this 
demonstration, for details about this, see the website forum 
http://warmrian.home.sunbo.net/show_hdr.php?xname=0UREA01&dname=CQFAL01
&xpos=35, last visited on 16 Dec 2009.   
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thousands of local residents in Wengan County on 28th June 2008,4 and a demonstration 
involving the participation of over 10,000 people in Shishou City on 19th June 2009.5 
“The right to a fair trial is perhaps the most fundamental tenet of constitutional 
democracy and has been recognized as a universal human right. It is central to a 
Nation’s search for social equilibrium and justice because all of the rights guaranteed 
by a constitution mean nothing if citizens do not have the right to a fair trial. Without 
securing the right to a fair trial, citizens might resort to extra means to secure their 
interests and protect their rights.”6 This could account for the frequent demonstrations 
and outbreaks of violence in China recently. When courts which “are generally the last 
State institution to gain power over political decision-making”7 become unreliable, 
Chinese citizens have to “resort to extra means to secure their interests and protect their 
rights”, in this case demonstrations or even riots.   
“In the post-communist countries…there has been widespread consensus for … 
their transition towards a market economy, a democratic political system, and the rule 
of law”.8 This is the case in China. Whilst the transition toward a market economy has 
been successfully accomplished, the task of political reform, aimed at democratization 
and the law is likely to be more painstaking, but is something that must be done not 
only to legitimise and sustain the CCP regime, but also support the people’s will in 
terms of securing their human rights. “The existence of an independent judiciary is one 
                                                        
4  See, for example, http://news.163.com/08/0701/19/4FPS2U2R0001124J.html and 
http://www.34law.com/blog/article_6077.html, last visited on 16 December 2009.  
5  See, for example, http://news.sohu.com/20090620/n264644016.shtml, and 
http://www.huanqiu.com/zhuanti/china/shishou/, last visited on 16 Dec 2009.  
6 Okechukwu Oko, “Seeking Justice in Transitional Societies: An Analysis of the 
Problems and Failures of the Judiciary in Nigeria”, Brook Journal of International Law, 
Vol.31, 2005-2006, at 12. 
7 John Gillespie, “Rethinking the Role of Judicial Independence in 
Socialist-transforming East Asia”, International & Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol.56, 
No.4, 2007, at 869. 
8 John C. Reitz, “Export of the Rule of Law”, Transactional Law & Contemporary 
Problems, Vol.13, 2003, at 448 and 449. 
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of the core elements of modern constitutionalism and a cornerstone of democracy and 
good governance”.9 These riots and demonstrations signal Chinese people’s desperate 
desire for an independent, just and trustworthy justice system to remedy their infringed 
human rights and protect their property. The CCP will no longer enjoy the popular 
support necessary to remain in power and will see further such radical movements 
initiated by the people, if the Government does not initiate substantial judicial and 
political reform to legitimise the justice system and satisfy Chinese people’s critical 
needs. In other words, the Party will have to choose between a top-down resolution or a 
bottom-up revolution.  
It appears that the CCP has not turned a blind eye to the increasing numbers of 
riots and demonstrations which have shaken its regime. The ruling party held its 17th 
Nationwide Congress in October 2007, at which the supreme party and national leader, 
Chairman Hu Jintao, stated the CCP’s basic policy for the next decade. In his report of 
approximately 28,000 words, Chairman Hu employed a 3000-word chapter titled 
“Persisting with Democracy in China” to lay down China’s blueprint for political 
reform up to 2020. Hu specifically enshrines three supreme principles to instruct the 
forthcoming political reform in China, including: (1) “enlarging the people’s 
democratic participation [in government] and ensuring China is being governed by the 
people”, (2) “promoting democracy at [the] grass-roots level and ensuring the people 
enjoy more tangible democratic rights”, and (3) “fulfilling the policy of rule of law and 
establishing a rule-of-law society”.10 In terms of either the clear-cut attitude toward 
democracy (for example the word democracy appears over 60 times in the report) or the 
report’s length in addressing political reform, Hu’s report is record-breaking in terms of 
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Independence in Post -1990 African Constitutions”, Public Law, Sum 2007, at 234. 
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the CCPs’ history. The Chinese media even made such comments as “the CCP initiates 
a new era of political reform”.11 It remains to be seen to what extent the CCP will keep 
its promise to push political reform without hesitation, extending liberties and freedoms 
to its citizens, since “the legacy of Communism creates unique challenges to creating 
democracy and rule of law”12 and political reform relates to “alteration of power in the 
foreseeable future”.13 It seems certain, however, that “ongoing reform – including 
political reform – appears unavoidable in states like China…”. 14  To ensure the 
legitimacy of the regime, the Chinese authorities will have to promote democratization 
and liberalization, something that may provide legal reform, including lay participation, 
with a greater opportunity of new developments since “legal reform is always a part of 
democratization programs”.15  
“Public contempt for the justice system can be overcome only by providing fair 
and efficient machinery for the administration of justice. A fair, efficient and accessible 
judicial system is necessary not just to protect citizens’ rights but also to consolidate 
and deepen the democratic process”.16 It appears that the Chinese authorities have 
realized this and have thus continued to place a premium on lay participation, which 
may make the judicial process more socially legitimate even after the promulgation of 
The LAA 2004. Xiao Yang, the former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of China, 
                                                        
11 See the news report, “The CCP Initiates A New Era of Political Reform”, see the 
official news website of the Chinese Government, at 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2007-10/17/content_6896712.htm, last visited 
on 15 Dec 2009. 
12 Cynthia Alkon, “The Cookie Cutter Syndrome: Legal Reform Assistance Under 
Post-Communist Democratization Programs”, Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2002, 
Issue 2, 2002, at 333. 
13 Ibid, at 343. 
14 Bradley Klein, “Democracy Optional: China and the Developing World’s Challenge 
to the Washington Consensus”, UCLA Pacific Basin Law Journal, Vol.22, 2004, at 148.   
15 Supra note 12, at 345.  
16 Okechukwu Oko, “Seeking Justice in Transitional Societies: An Analysis of the 
Problems and Failures of the Judiciary in Nigeria”, Brook Journal of International Law, 
Vol.31, 2005-2006, at 20. 
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for example, specifically pointed out in 2006 that “insisting on and improving lay 
participation is indispensable for establishing democratic politics, strengthening the 
people’s overseeing of the judiciary and securing the fairness of the [judicial] 
system.”17 Moreover, in September 2007, the Nationwide Conference of Lay Assessors 
was held in Beijing for the first time in China’s history. Hundreds of lay assessors from 
courts of all levels attended the conference and were interviewed by the supreme 
leaders of the CCP and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of China. At this 
conference, Luo Gan, the Chairman of the CCP Central Committee of Politics and Law 
(the virtual supreme leader of the CCP who administrates the legal affairs of the 
country) declared that “China will make every effort to ensure the people’s 
participation in the administration of justice both now and in the future to push judicial 
democratization, promote fair justice, and accelerate political reform for strengthening 
democracy”.18  
Certainly China’s problems with the judiciary are “systemic, deeply rooted and 
intertwined; cosmetic and superficial changes will not work”.19 “There must be a 
wholesale restructuring of the justice system to cleanse the judiciary of corruption and 
free the judiciary from the overseeing grip of the executive”.20 However, to the context 
that the Chinese authorities have supported lay participation for its potential value in 
promoting democratization and hence the legitimacy of the judiciary, the system has an 
historic opportunity to grow and develop in China.  
                                                        
17 Xiao Yang, “The Speech on the First Nationwide Conference of Lay Assessors”, 
Law & Institution Daily, 5 June 2006, at 1 and 4.  
18 See the news report, “Luo Gan Emphasized at the First Nationwide Conference of 
Lay Assessors: Endeavoring to Construct the Mixed Tribunal System with Chinese 
Characteristic and Promoting Judicial Democracy and Democratic Politics of 
Socialism”, at the official website of the Chinese government: 
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6.2.2 Choosing a Realistic Method for Reforming Lay Participation in China   
 
While “the movement from repressive regimes to democratic societies has become 
a worldwide phenomenon”, 21  “worldwide experience suggests such [democratic] 
transitions are neither smooth nor easy”.22 This rule seems especially true in China with 
such a long history of overbearing political control over the judiciary, as discussed in 
Chapter 5. It must be remembered that while both domestic and international 
dissatisfaction with the judiciary in China has been the main impetus for resuscitating 
lay participation, through reform of the mixed tribunal system in 2004, the reforms 
embodied in The LAA 2004, as seen above, have been very conservative and have not 
brought forward many real changes. It is uncertain yet to what extent lay participation 
will “remain a peculiar appurtenance”23 to the CCP’s supremacy in the judicial domain 
in the future, though the Party has to respect its commitment to establish a legitimate 
judicial system in order to save itself. It is certain, however, that the Chinese authorities, 
at least at present are still reluctant to initiate sweeping reform with regard to lay 
participation, such as by introducing a jury system.  
Luo Gan, the Chairman of the CCP Central Committee of Politics and Law, at the 
Nationwide Conference of Lay Assessors in 2007, specifically emphasized that “China 
should insist on and improve the mixed tribunal system” which “accords with China’s 
national particularities and judicial practicalities”, again implying the Chinese 
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22 Stephan Landsman, “Commentary: Dispatches from the Front: Lay Participation in 
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authorities’ preference for the mixed tribunal system rather than the jury trial.24  
Moreover, in March 2009, the Supreme Court of China enacted the Third Reform Plan 
of Chinese Courts (2009-2013), framing the blueprint for China’s judicial reform over 
the next five years. This Reform Plan enshrines seven principles with regard to judicial 
reforms in the future, and the third principle specifies that “China’s judicial reforms 
shall be based on the national situation and avoid blindly duplicating judicial 
institutions and systems of foreign countries”.25 Furthermore, it is remarkable that the 
Third Reform Plan of Chinese Courts (2009-2013) states that its aims are “to further 
improve the mixed tribunal system by enlarging the cross-section of lay assessors, 
extending lay assessors’ participant range in trials, regularizing lay assessors’ activities 
in trials, enhancing lay assessors’ administration, and improving and ensuring lay 
assessors’ welfare and benefits”.26 It appears that Chinese authorities have realized not 
only the potential value of lay participation in promoting the legitimacy of the justice 
system and the regime, but also the unresolved weaknesses of the current mixed 
tribunal system. However, they have also specifically circumscribed the reforms 
required within lay participation, in order to continue improvements to the mixed 
tribunal system, further indicating that more sweeping reform, such as the introduction 
of a jury system, is not the first choice of the Chinese authorities. 
It appears that “in addition to taking time, legal reform rarely travels a straight 
                                                        
24 Supra note 18.  
25  The Supreme Court of China, “The Third Reform Plan of Chinese Courts 
(2009-2013)”, see Chinese government’s official news website, at 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2009-03/26/content_11074127_1.htm, last visited on 
15 Dec 2009. 
26 The Supreme Court of China, “The 3rd Five-year Reform Plan of Chinese Courts 
(2009-2013)”, available at the official news website of the Chinese Government, see 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2009-03/26/content_11074127_4.htm, last visited on 
10 Nov 2009.  
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road”.27 Incorporating long-standing authoritarianism and the undeniable impetus to 
establish a legitimate and democratized justice system, a more likely direction in the 
near future is that the CCP will continue to make every effort to maintain the current 
compromise between pushing the unavoidable political reform toward democratization 
and preserving the traditional systems. The extent to which lay participation is likely to 
flourish will depend upon the outcome of the compromise. 
In terms of opting for the specific reform model which China’s lay participation in 
the future should follow, the jury supporters, as revealed in the Introduction, has 
proposed a shift from the mixed tribunal system, a more collaborative model involving 
both citizens and professional judges, to an all-citizen jury model. To be sure, “lay 
assessor systems…compare poorly to juries as institutions that democratize 
participation in the administration of justice”. 28  Although these proposals are 
undeniably forward-looking, taking into account China’s political context above, the 
eventual model choice has to be adjusted to the realistic channel characterized by 
gradualism and facile innovations, otherwise it may face strong resistance and even 
rejection from the Chinese authorities. One must remember that the recent reforms 
initiated by The LAA 2004 rejected the proposal of introducing a jury system in China 
and instead replaced it with a more moderate reform, that is, extending the use of lay 
assessors. It would be unrealistic to expect a 180-degree shift in the Chinese authorities’ 
attitude toward the introduction of the jury trial in the near future, since the temptation 
to only moderately adjust the current system rather than introduce a jury system will be 
strong for the authorities, as “the mixed tribunal system is a compromise”29 and “a far 
                                                        
27 Supra note 12, at 344. 
28 Richard O. Lempert, “Citizen Participation In Judicial Decision Making: Juries, Lay 
Judges and Japan”, Saint Louis-Warsaw Transatlantic Law Journal, Vol.2001-2002, at 
11. 
29 Ibid, at 13. 
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smaller step and one less disruptive to current procedures than a move to a jury 
system”.30 Although “to invest in a jury system is to invest in democracy”,31 it seems 
that the Chinese Government is not yet ready to invest to such an extent. In a word, in 
light of Chinese authorities’ explicit appreciation of the mixed tribunal system, 
improving the current mixed tribunal system is the most appropriate path for reforming 
lay participation in China.   
 
6.3 Improving the Mixed Tribunal System by Infusing more Democratic 
Elements 
     
In spite of the many unresolved problems left by The LAA 2004, as seen above, there is 
irreversible momentum towards a democratic society in China. China’s attempt to 
reform the mixed tribunal system, as embodied in this Act, and the subsequent 
declarations of China’s superior leaders are more or less emblematic of the Chinese 
Government’s desire to further develop lay participation in this country. How lay 
participation is structured and processed in the judicial system reflects “power 
dynamics between judge and lay people, and ultimately, the relationship between the 
citizens and the state”.32 To what extent the Chinese Government could tolerate lay 
participation, perhaps only time will tell. However, in light of the blueprint framed by 
the Third Reform Plan of Chinese Courts (2009-2013), that declares “further improving 
the mixed tribunal system by enlarging the cross-section of lay assessors, extending lay 
                                                        
30 Ibid, at 13; for more discussions about the incompatibility of the jury trial with 
inquisitorial criminal procedures of civil law countries including China, see Stephan C. 
Thaman, “Europe’s New Jury Systems: The Cases of Spain and Russia”, Law & 
Contemporary Problems, Spring 1999, at 234-235. 
31 Supra note 28, at 10. 
32  Martin Shapiro, Courts: A Comparative and Political Analysis (University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago1986), at 25 and 26.  
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assessors’ participant range in trials, regularizing lay assessors’ activities in trials, 
enhancing lay assessors’ administration, improving and ensuring lay assessors’ welfare 
and benefits”,33 I recommend that consideration be given to the following reform 
solutions in regard of the mixed tribunal system, and in the form of gradual progress, if 
grassroots reform such as the introduction of a jury system is not forthcoming.  
 
6.3.1 How to “Enlarge the Cross-section of Lay Assessors”  
 
To grant courts greater discretion in selecting lay assessors, including 
hand-picking lay assessors, as initiated by The LAA 2004, has given rise to various 
misuses in practice, such as courts’ preference for selecting the well-educated, the 
unemployed and political activists, something that has seriously undermined the 
representativeness of lay assessors as revealed in Chapter 4. In response to this, there 
might be three effective solutions.  
 
6.3.1.1 Establish a Real Random Selection Process for Lay Assessors 
 
It is generally acknowledged that the random selection of jurors is critically 
important to ensure the diversity and representativeness of a jury, while “a jury that is 
representative of the whole community is also more likely to be collegially independent 
and impartial, and thus more likely to render the process fair and beyond contamination 
and bias.”34. It has even been alleged that “the whole essence of the jury system was 
                                                        
33  The Supreme Court of China, “The Third Reform Plan of Chinese Courts 
(2009-2013)”, see Chinese government’s official news website, at 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2009-03/26/content_11074127_1.htm, last visited on 
15 Dec 2009.  
34 R. Gwynedd Parry, “Random Selection, Linguistic Rights and the Jury Trial in 
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random selection”.35 Borrowing from this experience, to realize the reform objective of 
“enlarging the cross-section of lay assessors”, the lay assessors, first of all, should be 
randomly selected from the community.  
Besides the establishment of random selection, lay assessors should “be selected at 
random from sources which will furnish a representative cross-section of the 
community.”36 The electoral roll, according to some countries’ experience,37 is a 
suitable source reflecting a wide cross-section of the national population. However, it 
has been suggested by Western scholars that exclusive “selection from the electoral roll 
is a flawed system”.38 They add that “research as long ago as the 1960s, in the USA, 
showed electoral lists are not representative of communities and this has since been 
confirmed in Australia and New Zealand.”39 Borrowing from the US experience, it 
might be advisable to supplement the “list of registered voters and licensed 
drivers/identification cardholders with welfare lists, unemployment lists, and other 
sources”.40 
Furthermore, the actual jurisdiction of randomly selecting lay assessors should not 
remain within the gift of the courts themselves, in order to protect against their potential 
avoidance of random selection, as occurs now. “If the jury system is really to protect 
against future oppressors, the rules ought to provide a procedure by which Government 
                                                                                                                                                               
Wales”, Criminal Law Review, Oct 2002, at 807. 
35  Peter Thornton, “Trial by jury: 50 years of change”, Criminal Law Review, 
September, 2004, at 125. 
36 Mary Catherine Campbell, “Black, White, and Grey: The American Jury Project and 
Representative Juries”, The Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics, Vol.18, 2004-2005, at 
628. 
37 See, for example, supra note 35, at 686.  
38 Penny Darbyshire, “What Case We Learn From Published Jury Research? Findings 
for the Criminal Courts Review”, Criminal Law Review, Dec 2001, at 972. 
39 Ibid.  
40 Supra note 36, at 629.  
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officials are prevented from making an unsupervised selection of jurors”.41 In terms of 
the specific selection method, the rule that “the more insulated juror selection processes 
are from authority, the more independent jurors are of judges”42 should be followed, 
whist the successful experience of England could be borrowed: the Jury Central 
Summoning Bureau has been established there since 2001 and has “standardised the 
entire juror summoning process and computerised the random summoning of all 
jurors”,43 while “the process of computerised random summoning from the electoral 
lists provided by local authorities is successfully reaching an ethnically representative 
group of potential jurors in almost every court”.44  
 
6.3.1.2 Lowering the Required Educational Qualifications of Lay Assessors 
 
As seen in Chapters 3 and 4, the current qualification requirements for enrolling 
lay assessors, which require them to have a college diploma, have proved unduly 
restrictive for those candidates with limited education and have undermined the 
development of a true cross-section of lay assessors. Even compared with other 
post-communist countries, the general education requirement for Chinese lay assessors 
is extremely high, for instance, in contrast with my survey finding that 94% of the lay 
assessors in S Province have a college diploma or higher educational level, only 8% of 
Russian lay assessors have received a university education while in Croatia, this 
                                                        
41 W. R. Cornish, The Jury (Allen Lane The Penguin Press, London, 1968), at 136.  
42 Richard O. Lempert, “The Internationalization of Lay Legal Decision-Making: Jury 
Resurgence and Jury Research”, Cornell International Law Journal, Vol.40, 2007, at 
483.  
43 Cheryl Thomas, “Exposing the Myths of Jury Service”, Criminal Law Review, No. 6, 
2008, at 418.   
44 Ibid, at 421. 
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percentage is only about 1%.45 “Eliminating jurors because of their education or 
employment may lead to an artificial selection of the jury.”46 To avoid important 
segments of the society being systematically underrepresented in the lay assessor pool, 
the automatic exemption from lay assessor duty should be lowered to a minimum level. 
Borrowing other countries’ experience,47 automatic exemptions based on the education 
level of lay assessor candidates may be removed; Chinese citizens should be only 
exempted from serving as lay assessors if they are unable to read and write in 
Chinese.48  
 
6.3.1.3 Other Necessary Changes for Coordinating the Random Selection  
 
If a real random selection system is to be introduced in China, the current five-year 
tenure and unlimited workload of the lay assessors needs to be reconsidered as well. 
Although lay assessors’ current tenure period allegedly allows them to “accumulate 
enough legal sophistication to achieve the self-confidence necessary to disagree with a 
judicial professional”,49 the current lengthy tenure and unlimited workload causes a 
                                                        
45 Sanja Kutnjak Ivkovic, “An Inside View: Professional Judges’ and Lay Judges’ 
Support for Mixed Tribunals”, Law & Policy, Vol.25, No.2, 2003, at 109. 
46 Robert F. “Julian Judicial perspectives in Serious Fraud Cases - the Present Status of 
and Problems Posed by Case Management Practices, Jury Selection Rules, Juror 
Expertise, Plea Bargaining and Choice of Mode of Trial”, Criminal Law Review, No. 10, 
2008, at 773. 
47 For example, in England, there is no academic qualification requirement for either 
lay magistrates or jurors, see Catherine Elliott and Frances Quinn, English Legal System 
(Pearson Education Limited, Harlow, 2000), at 179; France only requests jurors to be 
able to read and write French, see, for example, Articles 255 of The Code of Criminal 
Procedure of France 1959. 
48 Some Chinese scholars have proposed this, see, for example, He Bing, “ Merits of 
the Mixed Tribunal System”, The People’s Court Daily, 25 April 2005.  
49 Kent Anderson and Mark Nolan, “Lay Participation in the Japanese Justice System: 
A Few Preliminary Thoughts Regarding the Mixed Tribunal System (saiban-in seido) 
from Domestic Historical and International Psychological Perspective”, Vanderbilt 
Journal of Transnational Law, Vol. 37, 2004, at 974. 
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series of problems as well. Russia has reported that if “a lay assessor reports to the same 
courtroom…for the term of his service (which can last months)”, “naturally, he 
develops relationships with the judge and prosecutor who appear regularly there”.50 
Cornish also points out that “one advantage of a regularly changing membership of 
such a [mixed] court is that the legal chairman is constantly sitting with different 
laymen and so cannot rely on being able to get his own way, as he might if he 
constantly sat with the same group of colleagues. The chance to build up a spirit of 
comradeship in which everything is left to the chairman is thus avoided”.51 This might 
be the case in China as well. The close liaison between lay assessors and professional 
judges may make lay assessors, for face-saving reasons or such like, hesitate to check 
their professional colleagues’ improprieties, or even make them become a member of 
the corrupt interest group as indicated in Chapter 5, eventually compromising their 
supervisory role in trials. Secondly, the random selection of lay assessors from a 
resource offering a wide cross-section, such as the electoral rolls, will create a group of 
lay assessors from every segment of the community, including those busy with their 
employment. To request them to serve for five years without limiting their workload is 
unlikely to ever gain their full support, and this may continue to undermine participant 
enthusiasm and even lead to a resistance to perform court duty. Thirdly, a lengthy 
tenure for lay assessors may give rise to case-hardened actors or the so-called 
“professional juror syndrome”, whereby lay assessors, “unconsciously perhaps, 
compare arguments from a previous trial with the one they [are] currently hearing”.52 
Thus, the potential effectiveness of lay participation, introducing fresh lay voices to 
                                                        
50 Duncan Deville, “Combating Russia Organized Crime: Russia’s Fledgling Jury 
System on Trial”, George Washington Journal of International Law and Economics, 
Vol.32, 1999-2000, at 81. 
51 W. R. Cornish, The Jury (Allen Lane The Penguin Press, London, 1968), at 272-273. 
52 David E. Kasunic, “One Day/One Trial: A Major Improvement in the Jury System”, 
Judicature, Vol.67, 1983-1984, at 80. 
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check the stereotypical behaviour of professional judges, will be reduced.   
Many countries where the mixed tribunal system is adopted have undertaken 
measures to reasonably allocate lay assessors’ workload. For example, in Denmark, the 
average frequency that a layman serves in a mixed tribunal is once or twice a year.53 
“German lay assessors at the criminal court of Bochum were found to serve eight times 
and in Frankfurt at the Main four times a year”.54 In Russia, lay assessors only served 
for fourteen days once in a year, 55 whilst in Cuba, lay assessors “are elected for terms 
of five years and serve a maximum of thirty days per year”.56 Japan, in a recent move 
toward introducing a mixed tribunal system, has established a one-time appointment 
system, according to which the lay assessors in a mixed tribunal are dismissed once 
they finish one trial.57 In England and Wales, approximately 480,000 people (about 
0.9% of the total population58) are summoned to serve as jurors each year by the Jury 
Central Summoning Bureau set up in London.59 Compared with China’s situation 
where 55,681 lay assessors60 (approximately 0.0004% of the national population61) 
have to serve at least five years and are able to continue their tenure without limitation, 
                                                        
53 Supra note 51, at 270. 
54 Stefan Machura, “Fairness, Justice, and Legitimacy: Experiences of People’s Judges 
in South Russia”, Law & Policy, Vol.25, No.2, 2003, at 128. 
55 Ibid.  
56  Edmundo Hendler, “Lay Participation in Argentina: Old History, Recent 
Experience”, Southwestern Journal of Law&Trade in the Americas, Vol.15, 2008, at 6. 
57 Supra note 49, at 974; also see Setsuo Miyazawa, “The Politics of Judicial Reform in 
Japan: The Rule of Law at Last”, Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal, Vol.2, Issue 2, 
Spring 2001, at 120. 
58 See the data of the Census 2001 in England and Wales, available at 
http://www.statistics.gov.uk/census2001/pyramids/pages/727.asp, last visited on 18 Dec 
2009.  
59 Supra note 35, at 686. 
60 The Statistical Office of the Supreme Court of China, “Lay Assessors in the Last 
Three Years – An Investigation of the Implementation of the Mixed Tribunal System”, 
The People’s Court Daily, 6 May 2008.   
61 The National Statistical Bureau of China, “The Statistical Bulletin of National 
Economy and Social Development in China in 2008”, available at the official website 
of China’s government, http://finance.people.com.cn/GB/8876392.html, last visited on 
5 March 2008.  
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the British practice is apparently much more adept at allocating the opportunity to 
participate in trials among all its eligible citizens.   
Japan’s preference for a one-time appointment of lay assessors, which has been 
borrowed from the practice of the jury trial, is not necessarily the best solution for 
China. One of reasons for this may be financial, since selecting and training lay 
assessors is costly in terms of both money and time, so using them only once will be a 
waste of resources. However, too a tenure that is too lengthy and caseloads that are too 
heavy will be neither fair to the incumbent lay assessors who wish to finish their court 
service and get back to their employment as soon as possible, nor for lay assessor 
candidates who wish to exercise their right to participate in trials, but whose 
opportunity to do so is restricted by the presence of an incumbent lay assessor over a 
long period.     
 
6.3.2 How to “Extend Lay Assessors’ Participant Range”  
 
The Supreme Court of China, in the Third Reform Plan of Chinese Courts 
(2009-2013), simply proposes to “extend lay assessors’ participant range” rather than 
specifying how exactly this will be accomplished. In the author’s opinion, at least two 
measures deserve to be placed on the agenda.  
 
6.3.2.1 Ensuring Lay Assessors Can Legally Participate in More Cases    
 
Notwithstanding Article 2 of The LAA 2004 which enables defendants to request 
trials by mixed tribunals, it has been reported that in practice defendants rarely do this. 
For example, there are seven local courts and one intermediate regional court in Dazhou 
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District, Sichuan Province, and the eight courts collectively employed mixed tribunals 
to try 643 cases between1st May 2005 and 1st May 2006. However, all of the mixed 
tribunals were initiated by the courts themselves at their discretion while no defendants 
raised their own application to be adjudicated by a mixed tribunal.62 The report from 
the courts in Dazhou District of Sichuan Province does not reveal why the defendants 
did not exercise their right to select mixed tribunals. However, according to the survey 
by the Intermediate Court of C City of S Province, it seems that the defendants’ failure 
to request trial by mixed tribunals did not arise from their dislike of lay assessors. The 
Intermediate Court circulated 183 questionnaires to investigate whether defendants 
were willing to have their cases be adjudicated by a mixed tribunal with the 
participation of lay assessors. In total 124 (67.8%) respondents gave a positive response 
and presented reasons such as “lay assessors having close contact with the local 
community”, “lay assessors reflecting the people’s voice” and “lay assessors being 
trustworthy”.63 Based on this, it could be speculated that the defendants tried by the 
eight courts in Dazhou District of Sichuan Province were probably not aware of the 
reformed law and their right to select a mixed tribunal with the participation of their 
peers.  
Article 2 of The LAA 2004 also provides that even without a defendants’ request, 
courts can adopt mixed tribunals to try cases with “comparatively far-reaching social 
implications”. However, defining “comparatively far reaching implications” is difficult 
                                                        
62 See Qiu Sufang, “An Investigative Report of the Implemental Situation of the Mixed 
Tribunal System”, available at the governmental official website of Dazhou District of 
Sichuan Province, at http://www.dz818.gov.cn/zwxw/ShowArticle.asp?ArticleID=2097, 
last visited on 15 Dec 2007.  
63 The Project Team of the Intermediate Court of C City, “The Present Reality and 
Realistic Resolution – An Empirical Survey and Analysis of the Implementation of the 
Mixed Tribunal System”, unpublished internal-circulated research report of the 
Intermediate Court of C City, at 2, file with the author. (The real name of the courts is 
omitted here for the sake of confidentiality.) 
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in practice, and this has left a lacuna and effectively granted courts wide discretion to 
decide themselves whether to adopt mixed tribunals or not.  
In order to “extend lay assessors’ participant range”, as proposed by the Third 
Reform Plan of Chinese Courts (2009-2013), there are two possible solutions. On the 
one hand, those case categories involving “comparatively far-reaching social 
implications” should be specifically clarified by law. For example, it would be possible 
to provide that all political offences, all offences with a potential sentence of no less 
than five years imprisonment and all administrative disputes, have to be adjudicated by 
mixed tribunals, without exception. Serious criminal offences, especially political ones 
and administrative disputes, involve “the state benefit”.64 Under the current situation 
where Chinese judges are largely under the sway of the ruling party and local 
governments, inputting lay voices into these cases, as seen in Chapter 5, may better 
ensure the independence of the judiciary and protect against interventions from the 
party and local governments. On the other hand, in terms of other cases, the law should 
specifically obligate courts to inform defendants and civil litigants in written form and 
in a timely manner of their right to select mixed tribunals, in order to avoid a failure in 
their right to choose mixed tribunals, simply due to a lack of knowledge.  
As discussed in Chapter 3, lay participation, such as serving as either a lay 
assessor or juror is not only a citizens’ right, but also their responsibility. Chapter 5 has 
shown that in transitional China, this participation is important for educating and 
fostering Chinese people’s citizenship, their commitment to the community and their 
democratic consciousness. The extended use of mixed tribunals across more cases will 
increase Chinese citizens’ opportunities to participate in the administration of justice, 
and enable them to receive a greater level of citizenship education.    
                                                        
64 Supra note 7 at 868. 
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6.3.2.2 To Extend Lay Assessors’ Participation in Appeal Courts  
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, mixed tribunals in China are only applicable in first 
instance trials and are totally excluded from appeal courts. Furthermore, public 
prosecutors have the power to appeal acquittals made by the trial courts. In this case, 
any decision made by a mixed tribunal can be overturned by the appeal court without 
lay participation. Soldwedel has seriously criticized the exclusion of lay participation in 
appellate proceedings, and according to him,   
Second-guessing lay judges’ determinations threatens to undermine the 
legitimacy of citizen participation in criminal trials. At the very least, if the 
government’s power to appeal an acquittal is to remain in place, lay judges 
should be allowed to participate at that level as well. This is particularly true 
where appellate courts opt for de novo review. Excluding lay judges from 
appellate proceedings would signal that the lay judges arrived at the wrong 
verdict the first time around, and that citizen participation is neither valid nor 
respected. The government's power to appeal criminal acquittals plainly 
undermines the authority of the lay judge system. The power to appeal 
criminal acquittals only enhances the government’s power. It also indicates 
that the government does not trust lay judge panels with the power to render 
final decisions. 65  
In other words, nowhere are constraints on lay participation more significant than 
when preventing lay judges from reaching a final decision. “The broader the questions 
                                                        
65 Arne F. Soldwedel, “Testing Japan’s Convictions: The Lay Judge System and the 
Rights of Criminal Defendants”, Vanderbilt Journal of Transactional Law, Vol.41, 
2008, at 1472 and 1473. 
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entrusted to jurors and the more limited the grounds for overturning jury verdicts, the 
more power jurors will have vis-à-vis other institutions of government.”66 If Chinese 
authorities do not grant finality to decisions made by mixed tribunals in trials of first 
instance, but genuinely wish to extend lay participation, the experience of other 
countries such as Germany and Denmark, which extend the use of mixed tribunals to 
appeal courts,67 should be followed.   
 
6.3.2.3 To Legally Grant Lay Assessors the Jurisdiction of Presiding over 
Court Conciliations   
 
As discussed in Chapter 5, some courts’ use of lay assessors to conciliate on civil 
cases has been a great success. However, according to the current law, lay assessors 
actually do not have the power to conciliate civil cases alone. The current law should 
therefore be amended to legitimise lay assessors’ status in presiding over court 
conciliation, which will be beneficial, not only to lawfully alleviate judges’ workload, 
but also in the extension of lay assessors’ participant range. 
 
6.3.3 How to “Regularize Lay Assessors’ Activities” and “Enhance Lay 
Assessors’ Administration”  
 
Disciplining lay assessors’ poor behaviour by introducing a code of ethics and 
disciplinary rules will be critical measures to “regularize lay assessors’ activities”.  
Although The LAA 2004 provides that lay assessors have the same powers and 
                                                        
66 Supra note 42, at 483. 
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Lessons from Mixed Tribunals”, Cornell International Law Journal, Vol. 40, 2007, at 
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duties as professional judges, the provision is too simple and general, and provides no 
guidelines to regularize and discipline lay assessors’ behaviour in many areas. For 
example, there is no effective rule regarding the punishment of lay assessors’ 
delinquency. Although Article 17 of The LAA 2004 provides that where a lay assessor 
evades court service without valid reason, and this adversely affects the trial, the Chief 
Justice of the court can request the Standing Committee of the local People’s Congress 
to dismiss him or her, there are at least two weaknesses in this provision. First, this 
punishment is only applicable to circumstances where the lay assessor illegally refuses 
to show up for court service, and ignores other improprieties such as sleeping during the 
trial. Secondly, the punishment of dismissal might be exactly what the lay assessor 
evading his or her duty is hoping for. This punishment may not only be ineffective in 
deterring runaway lay assessors, but might actually encourage them to do so, since their 
evasion will incur nothing desired outcome of ending their court service. The role of an 
appropriate punishment in checking lay participants’ misconduct has been verified by 
the practices carried out in several countries. For example, when Arizona increased the 
potential fine for absenteeism from 100 US to 500 US Dollars, the number of jurors 
complying with their summons doubled.68 Borrowing from this experience, detailed 
and applicable discipline and punishments such as fines and detention, which may 
effectively prevent a spectrum of improprieties by lay assessors such as evading court 
duty and even passivism in trials, should be provided for by law. In addition, discipline 
and punishment should be applicable not only for lay assessors, but also for employers 
who refuse to provide time off work and ensure the income of those employees who 
perform lay assessor duty, since The LAA 2004 fails to provide any punishment to 
deter employers’ from misbehaving in this way.  
                                                        
68 G. Thomas Munsterman and Cary Silverman, “Jury Reforms in Arizona: The First 
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6.3.4 How to “Improve and Ensure Lay Assessors’ Welfare and Benefits”  
 
As discussed in Chapter 5, local governments financially control all courts in 
China. As a result, the expenses incurred when a court implements the mixed tribunal 
system have to be approved and appropriated by the local government. As revealed in 
Chapter 4, some local governments have failed to provide sufficient financial support 
for the courts to employ lay assessors, and as suggested in Chapter 5, local governments 
may affect judges’ decisions by utilizing their financial control over local courts, 
including the provision of judges’ incomes and benefits. However, with little economic 
interest in the court where they serve, those lay assessors immune from local 
government financial control may be more inclined to make a decision not welcomed 
by the local government, compared with those cases where the local government is 
involved. In this situation lay participants in courtrooms may be less welcomed by local 
governments, which might be one important reason why some local governments have 
not provided the local courts with sufficient financial support to employ lay assessors 
thus far. It remains uncertain whether courts in China will realize complete financial 
independence in the near future. However, before this becomes fact, considering the 
provision of partial financial independence in order to ensure the implementation of lay 
participation should be placed on the agenda. For example, to prevent local 
governments from creating financial barriers to the execution of the mixed tribunal 
system, the lay assessment budget for each local court should be approved by the 




6.4 Other Recommendations beyond the Third Reform Plan of Chinese 
Courts (2009-2013)  
 
Besides the above recommendations for improving the mixed tribunal system, 
within the framework provided for by the Third Reform Plan of Chinese Courts 
(2009-2013), there are many other unexplored issues with regard to the reform of lay 
participation in China which deserve attention and study in the future. This is not the 
place to enter into detail, but a few points should be mentioned. 
 
6.4.1 Further Improvements to the Mixed Tribunal System  
 
The Third Reform Plan of Chinese Courts (2009-2013), as seen above, has 
circumscribed the reform of the mixed tribunal system from four respects moving 
forward. However, if the Chinese authorities insist on preserving the mixed tribunal 
system rather than introducing a jury system, borrowing from other countries’ 
experience, more measures in addition to those mentioned above need to be 
implemented in order to improve the current mixed tribunal system. 
 
6.4.1.1 Strengthening the Independence of Lay Assessors  
 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the experiences of a number of countries have proved 
that the collaborative relationship between judges and lay assessors in mixed tribunals 
may silence lay voices. On the one hand, an “authoritative judge”, presiding over mixed 
tribunals, “can easily silence his or her lay colleagues”,69 because he or she may refuse 
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to “create the ‘deliberative atmosphere’ favourable to lay assessors”,70 “grant enough 
opportunity for questions”,71 or “give enough time to deliberate”.72 Some scholars even 
contend that “the deliberation should be done among the people without the judges’ 
being present. If a judge sits there – even one, he is going to influence them….”73 The 
idea that professional judges may exercise a negative impact upon lay participation has 
also been reported in China.74 On the other hand, other reasons for the possible 
weakness of lay voices during mixed tribunals may derive also from the lay assessors 
themselves. There are three key stages to the process whereby lay assessors outvote 
professional judges during deliberations: “the lay judge forms a different opinion from 
that of the professional judge, the lay judge expresses the disagreement, and the lay 
judge must convince the majority of tribunal members to outvote the professional 
judge”.75 However, research indicates that lay assessors’ deference to judges out of 
their respect for their higher procedural (judges normally preside over the judicial 
process) and academic (judges normally have superior legal knowledge and experience) 
status, may create barriers to this three-stage process. Lay assessors neither regularly 
disagree with judges in deliberations nor exercise their right to outvote judges, even if 
they disagree with them.76 As revealed in Chapter 4, lay assessors’ deference towards 
judges can be found in China.  
Berger and his colleagues have created the “status characteristics theory” to 
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explain interactions in small task-oriented groups. According to this theory, 
“individuals in task-oriented groups develop expectations about the potential 
contributions of group members toward the resolution of the task” while “the bases for 
these expectations are status characteristics, attributes whose culturally specified 
meaning makes them potentially relevant to the performance of the group’s task”.77 
Those status characteristics directly relevant to the successful completion of the task are 
called “specific status characteristics”. Mixed tribunals aimed at making judicial 
decisions are task-oriented groups. In the context of mixed tribunals, specific status 
characteristics include knowledge and experience in legal decision-making. 
Professional judges with systematic legal training and a certain number of years trial 
experience have specific status characteristics which will have a strong impact on lay 
assessors’ “expectations surrounding judges’ ability to decide legal cases”. 78  
Furthermore, “an important caveat is that the professional judge’s status is partially 
predetermined by law, which requires that presiding professional judges lead and 
coordinate trials.”79 Also according to “status characteristics theory”, “members with 
high status in a group”, such as the professional judges in a mixed tribunal, “will be 
given more opportunities to contribute, and their contributions are more likely to 
receive favorable reactions from other.”80 This can explain lay assessors’ deference to 
professional judges. To sum up, “high status members in small groups, such as 
professional judges in mixed tribunals, are more influential than low status members”81 
such as lay assessors in mixed tribunals, while judges’ influence can direct the 
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resolution of disagreements between themselves and the lay assessors in their favour.82     
Even the well-known Chicago project on jury study indicates that, “at least where 
the evidence is clear one way or the other in the judge’s view, the jury very rarely 
comes to a different conclusion in those states where the judge is permitted to 
summarize and comment on the evidence, and does so; whereas variations between 
judge and jury do occur even in clear cases, if there is no summary and comment by the 
judge”.83 Based on these findings, it has been concluded by scholars that “separation 
and independence in decision-making may be essential for fully effective lay 
participation”.84 In terms of mixed tribunals, two methods blow could be experimented 
with.  
--The Separation of Deliberation  
A possible solution to judges’ unavoidable impact on lay assessors in collaborative 
mixed tribunals, is to separate judges and lay assessors during the deliberations. On the 
one hand, separation might prevent judges from exerting an adverse affect on lay 
participation, such as refusing to “create the ‘deliberation atmosphere’ favourable to lay 
assessors” or giving them “…enough time to deliberate”. Lay assessors, without the 
presence of judges and hence the psychology of deferring to them, may feel free to 
express their lay opinions to one another. Lempert has proposed an experiment with a 
new deliberation model that “requires lay judges on mixed tribunals to deliberate on 
their own until they reach a tentative verdict, and only then to involve the professional 
judge or judges in the discussion”. He added that “such a system might stiffen the 
spines of a tribunal’s lay members, and would preclude the perception of a professional 
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judge’s factual characterization as an ‘of course’ truth”.85  
-- The Creation of the Position of Lay Assessors’ Clerks (Legal Counsel) 
It is true that lay assessors without professional legal education and trial 
experience may need assistance with regard to legal issues during deliberations. In these 
circumstances, professional judges do play a significant role in mixed tribunals, which 
is one alleged advantage of mixed tribunals over juries. However, to assist lay assessors 
to understand legal issues, and borrowing from the experience of the lay magistracy in 
England, legal counsels could be employed to act as lay assessors’ assistants during 
deliberations. Legal counsels must be independent of the courts, have no interest in the 
case, and only answer legal questions presented by the lay assessors. In contrast to 
professional judges who preside over mixed tribunals and hence attain a virtual 
leadership position, legal counsels do not have a similar status which lay assessors may 
subconsciously show deference to. Moreover, in contrast to the fact that professional 
judges may use the opportunity of answering lay assessors’ questions to further 
consolidate their leadership or exercise an impact upon the lay opinions, independent 
legal counsels, without any interest in the case whatsoever would not have the same 
tendencies. To ensure legal counsels’ independence and integrity, they would need to 
be randomly selected from a list of registered lawyers and serve on an obligatory basis.    
 
6.4.1.2 Improving Lay Assessors’ Competence  
 
In order to ensure the effectiveness of lay participation, lay assessors should be 
competent enough to perform their adjudicative duties. However, as revealed in Chapter 
4, Chinese the lack of competence of lay assessors has not been fully resolved by the 
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recent reforms initiated by The LAA 2004; they still frequently face difficulties when 
resolving legal issues during trials. It seems unrealistic to expect a lay assessor, after 
only a short period of training, to be as knowledgeable and skilled as a professional 
judge, one who has obtained a law degree and had years of experience in the legal 
profession. It is therefore questionable to ask lay assessors to perform exactly the same 
adjudicative duties as professional judges, including deciding on all legal issues. It is 
interesting that Argentina, in a recent reform, has created a new form of mixed tribunal. 
Here, a mixed court is composed of three professional judges and eight lay assessors. 
The mixed court deliberates and decides issues of fact jointly using a majority vote 
system. However, only the professional judges are eligible to vote regarding issues of 
law and to pronounce sentences and impose punishment.86 As a matter of fact, in the 
1950s, the Soviet jurist R. D. Rakhunov, borrowing the practice of the classic jury, 
suggested that lay assessors should only be obliged to decide on the guilt or innocence 
of the defendant.87 In addition, according to Section 48 of The Supreme Courts Act 
1981 in England, two to four lay assessors sit with a professional judge in the Crown 
Court to adjudicate appeals against decisions coming from the magistrates’ court. 
However, the lay assessors are only permitted to decide on questions of fact together 
with the judge, who will decide on questions of law alone.88 These experiences could 
be taken into account in China’s future reforms. By exempting them from the task of 
deciding on legal issues, lay assessors’ competence could be improved significantly.89  
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6.4.1.3 Enshrining Lay Assessors’ Majority Position in Mixed Tribunals 
 
Article 3 of The LAA 2004 prescribes that the proportion of lay assessors in a 
mixed tribunal shall not be less than one-third, granting courts the discretion of 
determining the specific proportion. However, as indicated by my survey in Chapter 4, 
judges’ resistance to see lay assessors obtain a quantitative dominance in mixed 
tribunals may mean that courts staffed by such judges will circumscribe lay assessors to 
a minority status, so as to ensure the judges’ dominance, as “when lay persons are in a 
minority, their influence diminishes”.90 “Giving lay judges the right to outvote the 
professional judges establishes them as important players in the courtroom.”91 If the 
Chinese authorities really want to encourage lay participation, then following-on from 
the experiences of various countries such as France,92 Germany,93 Norway94 and 
Finland 95  where the majority position of lay assessors has been established, lay 
assessors in China should be elevated to a majority position, so as to ensure at least the 
theoretical possibility of them outvoting judges in mixed tribunals. Otherwise, a lay 
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voice, no matter how loud it is, will be nothing but window-dressing.   
 
6.4.1.4 Non-Unanimous or Unanimous Mixed Tribunal?  
 
Reid Hastie and his colleagues found that non-unanimous juries do not function as 
well as unanimous ones, since majority rule juries are actually inclined to cease 
deliberations once they have reached the required majority for a valid decision and the 
smaller the size of the required majority, the faster the deliberations. 96  Jeffrey 
Abramson further suggests that what could be lost under a non-unanimous rule is a 
serious desire for genuine and effective deliberations, as well as a commitment to seek 
real consensus. The viewpoints of minority dissidents and their contributions might be 
easily marginalized or even totally ignored under a majority rule regime.97 These 
arguments may be even more applicable to the mixed tribunal system in China. Where a 
twelve-member jury applies the majority rule of two-thirds, the minority dissidents may 
theoretically include up to four persons – a “team” which may still have the potential to 
support each other and influence the majority to change their minds, with a collective 
impact. In contrast, in China’s three-member mixed tribunal, with the majority rule of 
two-thirds applied, a minority dissident is a single person who, without any support, 
may be less likely to struggle to change the viewpoint of the majority. As summarized 
by Nemeth, “unanimity rules increase the quality of the decision making process and 
the psychological rigor of deliberations”.98 Based upon these findings, the current 
non-unanimous rule for mixed tribunals in China needs to be reconsidered.  
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“Determining the effect of any interaction between voting rules and court 
composition is important and could be determined by further analysis”.99 More detailed 
empirical research and experiments will be needed to look into the specific deliberation 
dynamics in China’s mixed tribunals and to consider which deliberation and voting 
model will be most suitable.  
 
6.4.1.5 Distinguishing Expert Assessors from Lay Assessors  
 
As discussed in Chapter 4, some courts in China have been inclined to select 
people with professional expertise as lay assessors, a fact which has further undermined 
the cross-sectional nature of the lay assessor team. However, to select experts with 
professional knowledge and skills to be lay assessors may not necessarily be a bad thing 
in itself. On the contrary, lay assessors’ expertise may play an important role in 
adjudicating cases with difficult technical questions involved. For example, regional 
courts in Germany, taking into account the fact that “the use of expert lay judges 
promotes ‘real-life’ decisions and thereby makes it more likely that parties will be 
prepared to accept judicial decisions”,100 employ a mixed tribunal composed of one 
professional judge and two “honorary judges” when deciding on commercial matters. 
These “honorary judges” are recommended by the Industry and Commerce Chambers 
and help the professional judge with the professional knowledge.101 Other countries 
such as Croatia and Norway also have experience in employing expert lay judges on 
certain types of case.102 Furthermore, as seen in Chapter 1, lay adjudicators with 
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expertise have been widely used in various administrative tribunals in the UK. Learning 
from these experiences, courts in China may be allowed to employ expert assessors to 
assist professional judges to handle cases involving issues which require expertise. 
However, the selection and use of expert assessors should be distinguished from that of 
ordinary lay assessors. Employing expert assessors in ordinary cases is a waste of 
human resources. More importantly, allowing discrimination to take place the process 
of selecting ordinary lay assessors, in favour of those candidates with expertise, will 
undermine common citizens’ right to participate in the administration of justice. A 
possible solution to this problem is to create a position of “expert (blue-ribbon) 
assessors” whose selection, use and administration should follow a routine separate 
from the current LAA 2004 model used for administrating ordinary lay assessors. In this 
regard, the experience of administrative tribunals in the UK, where expert assessors are 
widely used, could be further researched and drawn-upon.   
 
6.4.1.6 Pushing Lay Participation by Strengthening Civic Education  
 
Before the Japanese Government enacted The Act Concerning Participation of 
Quasi-jurors in Criminal Trials in May 2004, Japan had experienced over twenty years’ 
since 1982, when “the first organized civic movement to introduce the jury trial in 
Japan, the Baishin Saiban o Kangaeru Kai (‘the Research Group on Jury Trial’), was 
formed in Hitotsubashi, Tokyo.103 For more than two years, various efforts had been 
made to influence the Government and market the jury system to the public.104 For 
example, the Japanese Federation of Bar Associations (JFBA) and its local bar 
association members played a very active role in pushing the resuscitation of lay 
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participation in Japan. At the time it was said that they “have conducted many 
grassroots initiatives to educate citizens regarding the background and need for judicial 
reforms, including conducting information sessions, disseminating pamphlets, and 
providing information via the media”.105 When the JFBA’s proposal to introduce a jury 
system in Japan was declined by the authorities and replaced by a mixed tribunal 
system, it was said that the JFBA “intends to continue its efforts to achieve future 
realization of these reforms and to continue its grass roots initiatives to further public 
awareness, understanding, and interest in these reforms”.106  
Although China does not lack an historical tradition of civic participation in 
dispensing justice, the mixed tribunal system in modern China, as shown in Chapter 3, 
has experienced a very problematic implementation, one which has undermined the 
reputation of the system and even may have compromised citizens’ confidence in lay 
participation altogether. Borrowing from Japan’s experience, fostering the people’s 
enthusiasm and commitment to participate in the administration of justice through 
diverse educational measures and propaganda at the grassroots level, should be placed 
on the agenda. More organizations other than government departments, such as local 
bar associations and other non-governmental organisations, need to participate in the 
process of civic education and make a contribution. For example, on the one hand, as 
revealed by my fieldwork in China, many judges still hold a conservative attitude 
toward the use of lay assessors, and this leads to the latter’s misuse. Professional judges, 
therefore, need to be educated so as to view citizen participation in a more positive light, 
as well as realize the benefits that properly structured lay involvement could bring to 
the currently problematic administration of justice. In this regard, “rather than fearing 
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the public, the courts should enlist its support” since “responsible citizens do not expect 
to influence a judge’s decisions about the facts in a case or how the law is applied” but 
“protecting the integrity and independence of the judiciary is important for all 
citizens”.107 On the other hand, citizens should be educated about their new right to be 
tried by their peers, thus preventing the phenomenon whereby most defendants are 
ignorant of this right, as happened in the courts in Dazhou District, Sichuan Province. 
 
6.4.2 Researching the Feasibility of Further Extending the Use of Lay 
Assessors  
 
Besides the aforementioned proposals for widening the use of lay assessors 
according to the Third Reform Plan of Chinese Courts (2009-2013), a plan that 
proposes to “extend lay assessors’ participant range”, more measures may be adopted to 
experiment with the further use of lay assessors, by borrowing the experiences of lay 
magistracy and administrative tribunals which have been widely used in the United 
Kingdom.   
As mentioned in Chapter 5, China’s courts have been struggling with overloaded 
dockets as a result of the limited quantity of judges and money available to them, whilst 
a large proportion of first-instance cases (approximately one-third of the first-instance 
criminal cases and over two-thirds of the first-instance civil cases in 2006108) have been 
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minor criminal offences and simple civil cases adjudicated by professional judges 
sitting alone in a variety of local courts. Therefore, it appears that a significant 
proportion of the Chinese judges’ time has been spent on minor criminal offences and 
simple civil litigations. If this part of their workload could be allocated to lay assessors, 
the judges’ workload would be significantly reduced. Also, according to my study in 
Chapter 5, in contrast to professional judges, lay assessors could be a more economical 
use of human resources in China. A greater use of lay assessors and replacing 
professional judges with lay assessors for minor offences and simple civil cases, might 
be a feasible solution to the dilemma of court congestion, limited court personnel and a 
limited budget. Moreover, in light of the discussion in Chapter 5, lay assessors in China 
have been proved effective at replacing professional judges to conciliate civil cases. 
Inspired by this experience, it might be advisable to experiment with further extension 
of the jurisdiction of lay assessors, to replace professional judges when adjudicating on 
certain categories of minor criminal offences and simple civil cases, which is 
comparable to what the British practice by employing lay magistrates to decide on 
minor offences and simple civil cases, as discussed in Chapter 1. However, how to 
borrow the successful experience England has obtained through employing lay 
magistrates and extending it to the use of Chinese lay assessors will require further 
study by Chinese reformers.  
In accordance with Article 2 of The LAA 2004, lay assessors could be employed 
to sit with professional judges together when forming mixed tribunals to try 
administrative cases in China. However, as discussed in Chapter 3, whether lay 
assessors outnumber judges in mixed tribunals is currently subject to the discretion of 
various courts. Furthermore, although Article 2 of The LAA 2004 provides that courts 
shall use mixed tribunals to try administrative cases with “comparatively far-reaching 
 359
social implications”, this latter category is hard to define and thus effectively grants 
courts substantial discretion when employing mixed tribunals. Administrative cases 
involve interest conflicts between the government and civilians. As a result, Chinese 
judges may be more vulnerable to pressure and intervention from the Government due 
to the reasons discussed in Chapter 5. Extending the use of lay assessors in 
administrative cases by providing that they shall be employed in all administrative 
cases, and guaranteeing their majority position on mixed tribunals will then become a 
potentially effective solution to the problem of the lack of independence of adjudicators. 
As discussed in Chapter 1, England has established an administrative tribunal system 
distinct from the court system, realizing a more cost-effective, speedy, less intimidating 
and litigant-friendly dispute resolution process for administrative disputes. In contrast, 
China’s practice of commissioning ordinary courts to adjudicate on all administrative 
cases further increases the workload of judges, and worsens the problem of court 
congestion. How to draw upon the British experience when employing administrative 
tribunals to alleviate ordinary court caseloads in China deserves further research by 
Chinese scholars.     
 
6.4.3 Researching the Feasibility of Introducing a Jury System in China 
 
It has been widely acknowledged that “citizen participation in mixed tribunals 
lacks some of the advantages that come with citizen participation through jury 
systems.” 109  Besides the weakness that “mixed tribunals are dominated by their 
professional judges”,110 in contrast with the jury trial, the disadvantages of the mixed 
tribunals still include (1) that lay assessors “serve for extended periods of time” and 
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thus “many of the advantages that accrue from the non-bureaucratic aspects of citizen 
involvement diminish over time”,111 (2) that unlike the jury’s secret and general 
verdicts without having to give reasons, mixed tribunals have to make reasoned verdicts 
and hence lose the opportunity to nullify faulty laws, as juries have the ability to do, 
and that (3) different from the finality of juries’ verdicts, mixed tribunals’ decisions are 
normally open to appeal and thus become vulnerable to a second attack by a determined 
and possibly overzealous prosecution. However, as seen above, the proposal to 
introduce the jury trial into China to replace the current mixed tribunal system is strong 
in terms of aspiration but weak in terms of reality, since Chinese authorities refuse to 
support it. Taking into account the advantages of the jury trial, when the time is ripe, 
and with the gradual progress of democratization and liberalization in China, the 
country may one day experiment with the introduction of a jury system, since “the 
adoption of an all-layperson jury system…would create the largest chance for full 
participation of all jurors”.112 Taking into account the fact that “mixed courts are much 
cheaper than juries”, then “maybe, good advice would be to have the criminal jury for 
the most serious cases and to have mixed courts for the less prominent 
constellations.”113 However, before the project to introduce a jury system in China is 
initiated, further research needs to be carried out.  
For example, “the adoption of one adjudication arrangement as against another is 
so much a part of historical development and cultural tradition that any evaluation 
would be difficult to conduct and the lessons would be unlikely to be straightforwardly 
translatable. What is acceptable and works well in one environment may not in 
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another”.114 This theory, if justifiable, raises an issue as to whether Chinese society is 
culturally ready for a jury system. However, it is remarkable that Hong Kong, as a 
former British colony but a totally Chinese society with a traditional Chinese culture, 
has had a successful jury system since 1845.115 Before introducing a jury system into 
mainland China, Hong Kong’s jury system could be regarded as an example for further 
study, to reveal why and how it has been able to run well within Chinese society.  
Moreover, Jearey, based upon his research on African systems, proposes that three 
conditions are necessary for the effective functioning of a jury system. The members of 
the society must be sufficiently educated to understand their responsibilities, including 
having the willingness to set aside prejudices that they may otherwise hold and the 
jurors must agree with the basic laws that they are required to enforce.116 More recently, 
Lester Kiss has added three further conditions, including: (1) the culture of the society 
must be such that it is supportive of the idea of citizen participation in the legal system, 
(2) the country must be able to afford the costs of a jury system, and (3) the legal 
culture itself, including judges and other members of the legal profession, must support 
the idea of lay participation.117 It is arguable that some of these conditions are, to a 
certain extent, plausible in China. The first condition as suggested by Jearey, for 
instance, is that the citizens of a country must be sufficiently educated to understand 
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their responsibilities. However, as discussed in Chapter 5, one important role of the jury 
trial itself is to educate civilians and foster their commitment to citizenship, such as 
shouldering the social responsibility burden. It thus becomes debateable whether the 
jury trial should be introduced into a society only where the civilians thereof have 
already been educated enough to “understand their responsibilities”, or alternatively, 
whether it is actually into a society where the civilians do not “understand their 
responsibilities” that the jury trial should be introduced, in order to enlighten civilians 
so as to “understand their responsibilities”. Likewise, should we expect the culture of a 
society to be fully ready for “the idea of citizen participation in the legal system” before 
the introduction of a jury system, or alternatively that the culture of a society can be 
gradually changed to accept and appreciate “the idea of citizen participation in the legal 
system” by introducing a jury system? It seems that the sine qua non for introducing a 
jury system into a country deserves further study, to reveal when it may be feasible to 
introduce a jury system in China. 
 
6.5 Conclusion  
 
“The prospects for lay participation are bound up with globalization and progress 
toward democracy”.118 In China, it appears that there is both the top-down impetus to 
democratize and legitimise the judicial system and the regime, together with a 
bottom-up appeal to establish a more democratized justice system and society, which 
may provide China with a promising prospect for developing lay participation. In the 
meantime, however, Chinese authorities still value the current mixed tribunal system, 
one which seems “conducive to achieving a balance between democratic involvement 
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in criminal justice on the one hand, and judicial control over lay participants on the 
other”,119 in spite of the system’s weaknesses. We therefore cannot be too optimistic 
about the prospect that the Chinese authorities will introduce a jury system in the near 
future, as a replacement for the current mixed tribunal. Although Chinese authorities 
refuse to adopt a jury system, they welcome, as least seemingly, continued reform with 
regard to the mixed tribunal system. Following on from the gradual reform of lay 
participation in China, as provided for by the reform plan framed by the Third Reform 
Plan of Chinese Courts (2009-2013), more attention needs to be paid to the 
establishment of random selection for lay assessors, the extension of lay assessors’ 
participation to more cases and to the appeal courts, the strengthening of the discipline 
of lay assessors, and to ensuring the financial independence of courts when employing 
lay assessors in the future. Besides, the mixed tribunal system in China, if aiming to 
provide better justice and greater levels of democracy, also needs to improve the 
independence and competence of lay assessors, as well as the deliberation process that 
takes place between lay assessors and professional judges, all of which, although 
beyond the framework of the Third Reform Plan of Chinese Courts (2009-2013), should 
be placed on the reform agenda at the next stage. In addition, in order to pave the way 
for further far-reaching reform, such as introducing a jury system in China, the 
feasibility of introducing a jury system in this country also demands future research 
effort.  
To be sure, my recommendations above attempt to respond to the two main 
proposals with regard to the reform of lay participation in China, as advocated by 
Chinese scholars, that is: improving the current mixed tribunal system in line with the 
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proposals made by conservative reformers, and introducing a jury system, as embraced 
by the more radical jury supporters. Besides these recommendations, many other 
studies regarding how to optimize lay participation in China need to be conducted, the 
“nuts and bolts” details of which this thesis has been unable to convey, but which may 
include conducting a more intensive analysis of the deliberation dynamics within mixed 
tribunals from a psychological research perspective, something long overdue in 
China,120 conducting painstaking empirical research, including mock-trial research or 
modelling studies, in order to compare the effects of mixed tribunals and juries in 
China,121 conducting studies about how to draw-upon the successful experiences of 
other forms of lay participation, those other than the mixed tribunal system and the jury 
trial, in Western countries, 122  and conducting research about how to have lay 
participation work in coordination with other judicial reforms and thus become a step 
towards the strengthening of judicial reform in China.  
“There is no magic pill or quick road to legal and judicial reform in the 
post-Communist world. Bringing change to these societies, as to any society, will take 
time, patience, and consistency”.123 This is especially the case in terms of the reform of 
lay participation in China, an activity which may weaken the State’s control over the 
                                                        
120 “Many jury reforms began not in trial courts, but in psychology laboratories where 
researchers systematically explored the implications of different jury sizes, different 
decision rules, … and other rules and procedures that might affect jury decision 
making” (see supra note 42, at 484). However, China’s reforms have never been based 
on similar psychological researches.   
121 “New [trial] ways need to be found by experimentation”, (See Roger W. Kirst, 
“Finding A Role for the Civil Jury in Modern Litigation”, Judicature, Vol. 69, 
1985-1986, at 338.), but China’s reforms have rarely been based on intensive 
experimentations. 
122 For example, it merits discussion whether lay assessors could be employed as part 
of lay assessor panels to adjudicate on minor criminal offences and simple civil cases, 
by borrowing the experience of the lay magistracy in the UK, and whether 
administrative tribunals in the UK could be borrowed to adjudicate administrative 
litigations in China.   
123 Brian K. Landsberg, “The Role of Judicial Independence”, Pacific McGeorge 
Global Business & Development Law Journal, Vol.19, 2006, at 365. 
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judiciary, since “transition from a system predicated on the unity of state power is a 
deep challenge”.124  
                                                        
124  Ruti Teitel, “Post-Communist Constitutionalism: A Transitional Perspective”, 
Columbia Human Rights Law Review, Vol.26, 1994-1995, at 178.  
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Conclusion and Epilogue 
 
As stated in the Introduction, the impetus for writing this thesis has come in 
response to two factors. On the one hand, Chinese scholars’ opinions with regard to lay 
participation in China can be grouped into three schools. The opponents of lay 
participation openly oppose lay participation on three main counts: (1) the system has 
by and large lost its vitality worldwide, (2) the traditional culture necessary for 
developing the system is absent in China, and (3) experimentation with lay participation 
in China today, namely the mixed tribunal system, has proved ineffective over the past 
half-century or so. The jury supporters embrace the view that lay participation should 
be preserved in China, but believe that the problematic mixed tribunal system should be 
replaced with the jury trial. The lay assessor advocates adopt a more moderate view that 
the mixed tribunal system should be preserved, but that improvements are needed. The 
thesis has attempted, within the framework of the worldwide development of lay 
participation, to comprehensively study the history and status quo of, and the prospects 
for lay participation in China, in order to respond to the views of the three schools 
above. In contrast with the numerous researches carried out on the diverse approaches 
to lay participation in western countries, academic projects on lay participation in China, 
as initiated by western scholars, have been very scarce. My thesis has conducted a 
comparatively comprehensive review of lay participation in China, and thus presents a 
referential report in English to enrich and inspire academic studies in this regard.  
 
1. The Worldwide Context: Mixed Trends but still Effective Lay Participation  
 
China’s recent move toward resuscitating the mixed tribunal system, through 
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enactment of The Lay Assessor Act of China 2004 (The LAA 2004) has also been 
criticized by those who contend that lay participation in general has in recent years 
experienced a worldwide decline and that the promulgation of this Act is therefore at 
odds with mainstream legal development and so is ill-advised. If it is true that lay 
participation has lost its vitality in general and is dying-out worldwide, then China’s 
recent return to lay participation would seem to be the wrong choice, and so any 
subsequent research into promoting the system in China would seem to be inadvisable. 
In other words, only after the global position of lay participation has been analysed and 
understood, can we evaluate and correctly position the current practice and prospective 
development of the system in China. In order to ensure this took place in my thesis, I 
first reviewed the worldwide situation in terms of lay participation. 
In general, a series of threads exist with regard to the worldwide development of 
lay participation up to the present day, as follows: (1) while certain forms of lay 
participation, such as the jury trial and lay magistracy, have faced academic criticism 
pointing to the incompetence, irrationality, bias or leniency of lay participants, 
proponents of lay participation have largely succeeded in guarding the system by 
developing sound arguments, and presenting empirical evidence, to prove that lay 
participants are generally competent, unbiased and diligent, and that other alternative 
adjudicative bodies such as professional judges do not necessarily decide cases 
differently or more competently than lay participants, (2) while certain forms of lay 
participation, such as juries, have experienced only a sparing use and have changed in 
structure due to their alleged “expensive and time consuming”1 nature and lower 
conviction rates, their decline has arguably been politically driven and can be largely 
                                                        
1 Sally Lloyd-Bostock and Cheryl Thomas, “Decline of the ‘Little Parliament’: Juries 
and Jury Reform in England and Wales”, Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol. 62, 
Issue 2, Spring 1999, at 17. 
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attributed to governments’ value choices in favour of “crime control” and “managerial 
justice”, both of which “are not labelled as “Is” and “Ought”, but are discussible,2 (3) 
while some weaknesses of certain forms of lay participation cannot be denied, such as: 
the un-representativeness of jurors, lay magistrates and lay assessors, the occasional 
incompetence of jurors and lay assessors, and lay assessors’ impotence and limited 
contribution, most of these can be largely attributed to problematic trial administration, 
something which is by no means insuperable but rather is resolvable “by modification 
of existing legal procedures”,3 (4) while some approaches to lay participation in law, 
such as the jury trial and the mixed tribunal system, have faced sparing or problematic 
use in practice, it is unlikely we will witness their complete removal, because of their 
undeniable value and also citizens’ diffuse support for them, and other approaches such 
as lay magistracy and administrative tribunals still work well in practice, and (5) while 
there is a “trend towards replacing amateurs with professionals”4 in some democracies 
with a withering desire for the particular functions of lay participation, such as the 
promotion of justice and a democratic society, a threat already established in some 
places, the trend has not been uniform and overwhelming, and has been intertwined 
with an opposing trend, embodied not only in the preservation of lay participation in a 
number of established democracies5 but also the reinstatement of lay participation in 
                                                        
2 Packer H., The Limits of the Criminal Sanction (Oxford University Press, 1968), at 
153, quoted from Nicola Padfield, Text and Materials On the Criminal Justice Process 
(Fourth Edition) (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008), at 32. 
3 Valerie P. Hans and Neil Vidmar, Judging the Jury (Plenum Press, New York 1986), 
at 246. 
4 Irving F. Reichert, “The Magistrates’ Courts: Lay Cornerstone of English Justice”, 
Judicature, Vol.57, 1973-1974, at 138. 
5 According to Skyrme, “in one way or another, a vast of amount of judicial work in 
the Commonwealth was, and still is, performed by non-legally qualified people. In most 
African and Pacific countries 90% of cases are dealt with in this way.” See Thomas 
Skyrme, The Changing Image of the Magistracy, (2nd edition, Macmillan Press, London 
1983), at 223. The situation of lay participation in the developing African and 
Asia-Pacific jurisdictions is not so clear since accessible materials are limited. However, 
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many transitional countries, those with relatively undeveloped political/judicial systems 
and with eager expectations regarding the political and democratic virtues of lay 
participation.   
As a matter of fact, “the dilemma of whether justice should be administered by 
highly formalized and professional legal bodies or by informal peer proceedings” has 
bothered “both western industrial democracies and developing societies”6 while they 
“have been struggling for years with the issue and have had mixed results”.7 Taking 
into account all of the above threads, it appears that my review has obtained mixed 
results as well, but there is definitely scope for challenging the argument that the 
worldwide trend in lay participation is one of universal decline. As summarized by 
Frank Munger recently:  
“Today, developed democracies have institutionalized many different 
forms of citizen participation in governance, although they do not share all of 
them. Different forms of participation in governance have different origins, 
different effects, and depend on different clusters of perceptions and practices 
                                                                                                                                                               
certain forms of lay participation have been reportedly rooted in these jurisdictions and 
retained to help to decide various criminal charges. For example, in the South Pacific 
area, the jury has disappeared in Tuvalu, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu’s Island, Samoa, 
and Fiji; however, the lay assessor system, as a substitutive system, has been introduced 
and survived for a long time. In African countries such as Botswana, Gambia, Ghana, 
Kenya, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia, 
lay assessors or lay magistrates are employed in criminal cases, though certain 
limitations have been put on the application of lay assessors such as only for capital 
cases (in Kenya), not binding (in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda), only on matters of 
custom (in Lesotho), in an advisory capacity (in Botswana.), and determining questions 
of fact only (in Zimbabwe). For details, see Neil Vidmar, “Juries and Lay Assessors in 
the Commonwealth: A Contemporary Survey”, Criminal Law Forum, Vol. 13, No.4, 
2002, at 392-400. The criminal jury in serious cases appears alive and mostly well not 
only in the main western countries, but also in over 40 other countries and dependencies 
around the globe. See Neil J. Vidmar, “A Historical and Comparative Perspective On 
the Common Law Jury”, Neil Vidmar (ed.), The World Jury System (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2000), at 3. 
6 Maria Los, “The Myth of Popular Justice Under Communism: A Comparative View 
of the USSR and Poland”, Justice Quarterly, Vol.2, No.4, December 1985, at 447.  
7 Ibid.  
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to support them. Instead of a general model, there are many particular forms 
of participation in particular locations. Although not all of them are 
successful, the idea of participation remains powerful and influential because 
we trust it”.8  
Borrowing this argument and incorporating the threads mentioned above, 
especially the recent trend of introducing lay participation into transitional countries, it 
seems simplistic to say that lay participation is in decline worldwide. In contrast, it 
appears that recent developments in lay participation across the world have displayed a 
range of trends, from preservation, to reform and even revival of the system, and these 
trends reaffirm the rationalities of lay participation. Moreover, the resuscitation of lay 
participation in some transitional countries is a remarkable converse trend toward the 
increasingly sparing use of the classic jury9 and the development of “a… justice system 
operated by technicians and administered by professionals whose major concerns are 
efficiency, cost and expedition”10 in some established democracies. This may inspire us 
to look into the “new energy and expectations in traditional settings [of lay 
participation]”11 by distinguishing different political contexts within which they work. 
For example, it appears that the jury trial is facing its demise in a number of established 
democracies, those which “have undergone their anti-feudal, bourgeois revolutions and 
have successfully established independent judiciaries”.12 In contrast with people in 
                                                        
8 Frank Munger, “Constitutional Reform, Legal Consciousness, and Citizen 
Participation in Thailand”, Cornell International Law Journal, Vol.40, 2007, at 461.  
9 Stephan C. Thaman, “Europe’s New Jury Systems: The Cases of Spain and Russia”, 
Law & Contemporary Problems, Spring 1999, at 237. 
10 Mark Findlay and Peter Duff, “The Politics of Jury Reform”, Mark Findlay and Peter 
Duff (ed.), The Jury Under Attack, (Butterworths, Sydney, 1988), at 224. 
11 Stephan Landsman, “Commentary: Dispatches from the Front: Lay Participation in 
Legal Processes and the Development of Democracy”, Law & Policy, Vol.25, 2003, at 
177. 
12 Stephen C. Thaman, “The Resurrection of Trial by Jury in Russia”, Stanford Journal 
of International Law, Vol.31, 1995, at 65. 
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western democracies who “have enjoyed, very substantially, the fruits of justice”,13 
some transitional countries which have recently resuscitated lay participation, “much 
like Continental Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries”, are “in the process 
of establishing an independent judicial system following the collapse of 
totalitarianism”.14 It is reasonable that these transitional countries perceive the jury 
system, or other similar lay participation modes, as an effective tool in this process,15 
by taking into account the historical functions of the jury trial in promoting independent 
and fair justice and a democratic society fighting against tyranny, as in the world’s 
established democracies. Furthermore, it is remarkable that some transitional countries 
have returned positive reports in order to verify the effects of lay participation in this 
regard.  
The recent developments in lay participation across the world have generated a 
considerable body of literature, which is concerned with the ways in which different 
forms of lay participation actually work in practice, as well as the legal and political 
functions of lay participation. The attempt to write-off lay participation across the world 
is simply over-ambitious. In light of the facts above, “the verdict should be that the 
people’s justice is here to stay, hopefully for a few more hundred years”.16 It would be 
therefore arbitrary and simplistic to advocate that China’s moves toward resuscitating 
lay participation collide with its global decline and are therefore ill-advised. On the 
contrary, also as a transitional country expects a more democratic society and improved 
justice, it is time, to situate China’s experience of lay participation firmly within the 
global developmental framework, so as to correctly scrutinize China’s current situation 
                                                        
13 Henry R. Luce “The Rule of Law and the Administration of Justice”, Journal of 
American Judicature Society, Vol. 45, 1961-1962, at 87. 
14 Supra note 12, at 65. 
15 Ibid.  
16 Peter Thornton, “Trial by Jury: 50 Years of Change”, Criminal Law Review, 
September, 2004, at 683. 
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and unearth what worldwide lessons China can learn from.  
 
2. The Historical Context: A Country with a Tradition for Lay Participation  
 
In response to the second argument presented by the opponents of lay participation, 
that lay participation has been absent in China over the years, my thesis conducted a 
historical review with regard to the various forms of and experimentations with lay 
participation in China, something also necessary to fully understand lay participation in 
this country, one with a history of civilization covering thousands of years.   
The opponents of lay participation in China argue that Chinese people have been 
historically devoid of the tradition and consciousness in participating in politics, display 
idolatry towards professional authority, and are reluctant to judge and punish their 
neighbours, all of which provide infertile ground for the recognition of lay participation 
in China today. However, my historical review tells otherwise. Looking anew at 
China’s legal history, it seems that China’s history abounds with the practice of and 
experimentations with lay participation. Besides the jury-like approach of the “Three 
Deliberations” process in ancient China, it appears that in China, from the inception of 
its feudal history in 221 BC to the emergence of communism in 1949, lay participation 
did not thoroughly eschew the civilians’ participation in justice. Although the royal 
justice system excluded lay participation, numerous clan courts situated in villages and 
exclusively staffed by villagers provided a setting for local residents to resolve their 
disputes and to police themselves, according to clan custom or common sense, if not in 
law. What underpinned the popularity of clan justice was actually the legal pluralism 
that existed in ancient China, that is the recognition and legitimization of ‘folk law’ by 
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the state.17 It is undeniable that sitting on clan courts to adjudicate their own disputes 
arguably fostered an historical tradition of Chinese people participating in local justice 
and politics, and accepting decision making by their peers. Moreover, after the 
beginning of the last century, other experimentations aimed at introducing the 
Anglo-American jury and the mixed tribunal system from Germany, in association with 
the successful introduction of commercial arbitration courts, also added to China’s 
practice of lay participation throughout its history. The different forms of lay 
participation at different historical stages have exerted a significant impact upon the 
legal system, such as legitimising judicial proceedings, ensuring just decision-making, 
inspiring people’s democratic spirit, alleviating the caseloads of professional judges, 
cutting judicial costs and promoting the incorruptibility of the judiciary. My historical 
review, to a certain extent, has challenged the argument advocated by the opponents of 
lay participation that China lacks an indigenous culture of lay participation, or that lay 
participation is antithetical to Chinese culture.  
Besides the fact that the traditional culture in China is not so ill-suited to the idea 
of lay participation, it is plausible in itself whether the absence of cultural tradition 
could be used to justify the argument that lay participation should not be continued in 
China since cultural tradition of a country is arguably changeable rather than immutable, 
especially in the current context of speeding globalisation. Incorporating the facts above, 
it would be unconvincing to deny the rationality of preserving lay participation in China 
in the excuse of absent traditional culture.    
 
3. The Status Quo: The Exclusive but Problematic Mixed Tribunal System    
                                                        
17 Lin Duan, Confucian Ethics and Legal Culture – A Discovery from the Sociological 
Perspective (The Press of the College of Political Sciences & Law of China, Beijing, 
2002), at 379.  
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Since 1949, when the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) seized power nationally 
the mixed tribunal system has become the only use of lay participation for Chinese 
people. As seen above, the opponents of lay participation premise their objections to the 
preservation of lay participation in China on the basis that the experimentation with lay 
participation in China today, the mixed tribunal system, has proved ineffective over the 
past half-century or so. It appears that although this thesis has challenged the 
allegations of the opponents of lay participation that lay participation is in decline 
worldwide and is alien to Chinese culture, they have largely won in terms of their 
attacks on the current lay participation framework in Chin:, the mixed tribunal system. 
Before the promulgation of The LAA 2004, the mixed tribunal system in China 
was more of an instrument for resolving the shortage of judges and for propagandising 
the legitimacy of the communist regime, than a facility devised to genuinely realize 
democratisation within the judiciary. Subjecting lay assessors to strict control has been 
enshrined as an essential judicial principle, one which has been realized through a series 
of mechanisms such as giving the discretion to select lay assessors to courts under the 
leadership of the CCP, circumscribing lay participation to first-instance cases only, 
granting no finality to any decisions made by mixed tribunals, granting the power to 
trigger mixed tribunals to the courts, and refusing to enshrine the majority position of 
lay assessors within the tribunals themselves. Mixed-in with the strict control of lay 
participation are a series of interrelated, practical problems, including a shortage of 
financial support for the use of lay assessors, the decreasing use of mixed tribunals, the 
poor level of benefits provided to lay assessors, serious passivism on the part of lay 
assessors and the appearance of ‘full-time’ and ‘long-serving’ lay assessors. It was in 
this context, and in association with the crisis of trust with respect to China’s judiciary 
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from both domestic and international observers, that the first act to specifically regulate 
lay assessors, The LAA 2004 was promulgated to revive lay participation in China and 
improve the mixed tribunal system.   
There is no denying that there are some significant breakthroughs within The LAA 
2004, not only in addressing the defendant’s right to be judged by a mixed tribunal, but 
also in its attempts to apply the use of lay assessors in cases with far-reaching 
implications and to promote their training and welfare. However, these innovations 
cannot overshadow the remaining unresolved problems. The LAA 2004 places lay 
participation under close political control in three ways. First, the selection process for 
lay assessors is still largely under the control of the courts, as steered by the CCP which 
ensures their political accountability. Secondly, the courts are given the discretionary 
jurisdiction to decide upon the proportion of professional judges and lay assessors in a 
mixed tribunal. Thirdly, mixed tribunals are still only applicable to first-instance cases 
and any decision made by a mixed tribunal can be appealed by the public prosecutor 
(who is normally politically affiliated to the CCP) to the Courts of Appeal, which are 
also overseen by the CCP and can completely overturn the first-instance judgement. It 
seems that the Act has steered clear of reallocating judicial power between the people 
and the CCP, and has leant in the direction of safeguarding the latter’s dominance. The 
LAA 2004 is not a real change of direction but rather a subtler variant of a continuation 
of judicial instrumentalism, as embraced by the ruling party.  
Not only does The LAA 2004 raise questions in respect of how the political 
interests of the ruling party overwhelm democracy in the judicial arena, but also with 
regard to a series of inherent defects in the revived mixed tribunal system, these being: 
(1) the qualifying candidates for lay assessment are basically limited to those who have 
received a higher education; the process excludes ‘ordinary’ citizens, (2) the level of 
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access to lay participation is further decreased due to the very small quota of lay 
assessors, the five-year tenure and the potentially unlimited reappointment process, (3) 
it is questionable whether identifying lay assessor candidates from a group of 
volunteers is effective and ensures the representativeness of lay assessors, (4) the 
passivism of lay assessors might potentially have been entrenched through a series of 
weaknesses in the institution, such as the lengthy tenures, unlimited reappointments, 
unresolved incompetence of the lay assessors, inappropriate disciplinary norms and the 
lay assessors’ minority position on the tribunals, and (5) the lengthy tenure, unlimited 
reappointment process and heavy workload of lay assessors, in association with the 
unchecked power of courts in selecting and designating them to specific cases, will 
probably revive the practice of having “full-time” and “long-serving” lay assessors.            
It therefore seems that the mixed tribunal system, as revived by The LAA 2004, 
still enshrines the ruling party’s supremacy rather than truly embracing democracy and 
prioritising the rights of individuals over party interests in the administration of justice, 
making the institution similar to its old counterpart.  
As well as drawing the above conclusions by utilizing a theoretical analysis, to 
find out in practice how the mixed tribunal system operates under the new Act, I 
conducted fieldwork in China. Circumscribed by limited resources and time, I was not 
able to complete a fully comprehensive empirical project to shed light on the reformed 
system. However, to scrutinize the CCP’s official propaganda, which states that 
Chinese lay assessors have been carefully selected, have represented the community 
well and have worked effectively since The LAA 2004 was introduced, my fieldwork 
was designed to draw attention to such issues as: (1) whether the courts have embraced 
the new Act and abandoned their inappropriate old routines, routines which led to the 
un-representativeness of lay assessors, the existence of ‘full-time’ lay assessors, the 
 377
provision of poor benefits, and the use of lay assessors as low-cost court staff, (2) 
whether lay assessors with a higher educational level and fragmented training have, as 
expected by the new Act, become competent at performing their twin duties of both 
finding out the facts and applying the law, (3) whether lay assessors recruited since 
2004 have escaped from being a “puppet” of the authorities, a fate which befell their 
predecessors, and have effectively participated in and impacted  upon judicial 
decision-making, and (4) whether the ‘insiders’ of mixed tribunals, that is, the judges 
and lay assessors, have practically upheld the reformed system.  
By incorporating data provided by the lay assessors and judges who participated in 
my questionnaire survey conducted in S Province, China, and the second-hand data 
obtained during my fieldwork in China, my thesis has attempted to make an inference 
with regard to some practical aspects of the mixed tribunal system in China, as 
resuscitated by The Lay Assessor Act 2004. However, my findings, contrary to the 
compliments published by the CCP official media coverage, are largely negative. First, 
the courts are not selecting and using lay assessors in an appropriate manner, which has 
led to them being far from representative of the cross-section of the community (for 
example, some groups such as communists, civil servants and the well-educated are 
significantly over-represented) and other problems have occurred such as the return of 
‘full-time’ lay assessors. Secondly, it appears that the improved educational eligibility 
and training of lay assessors has been brought in at the cost of depriving the 
overwhelming majority of Chinese citizenry of the right to participate in trials, and has 
largely failed to transform lay assessors into adjudicators totally competent to handle 
both their fact-finding and legal application duties. Thirdly, the passiveness of lay 
assessors has not been totally eliminated and they neither participate very vigorously in 
deliberations nor affect judicial decision-making, probably due to their still unchanged 
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lack of competence, psychological obedience to judges and minority position. Fourthly, 
the judges base their support for lay assessors on the assumption that they can help 
them reduce the caseload, without jeopardizing the judges’ quantitative dominance, 
leading to regular problems such as the recruitment of law graduates to serve as lay 
assessors, and ensuring judges have a comfortable majority in the tribunals.  
It must be kept in mind that my district-wide study in S Province, China, was 
based on self-reported data and it is thus subject to all the problems inherent in this type 
of data retrieval process. However, my theoretical discussion and inferences from the 
modest survey have helped me to establish that, in contrast to expectations, that The 
LAA 2004 would reveal the authorities’ “benevolence” and deliver a greater level of 
democracy to Chinese citizenry in the judicial field, the reformed lay assessor 
institution in China, in theory as well as in practice appears to have been largely unable 
to satisfy the demand to introduce more democracy into the courtrooms. This can be 
deduced from a whole series of facts, but none are more fundamental than the following: 
(1) the selection of lay assessors has remained a monopolistic activity under the 
manipulation of a number of courts, and as commanded by the governing party, and 
through which the majority of Chinese lay assessors are politically affiliated to the CCP 
or governmental organs, and thus may have strong political accountability, as is the 
authorities’ wish, (2) lay assessors have been maintained as a minority in mixed 
tribunals, and (3i) lay participation is still only applied for first-instance trials, and lacks 
finality in terms of decision-making. Based on my findings, it might be concluded that 
if there was an expectation that the direction of the reformed mixed tribunal system in 
China would move towards the common people’s effective participation in the 
administration of justice, democratising judicial proceedings, then the situation in 
practice stands in stark contrast to such an expectation. One rationale to account for the 
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current practice in China is probably the entrenched continuity of a totalitarian past 
mixed with “some signs of greater democratic aspirations”.18 In other words, the key 
may be the authorities’ persistent hesitation to abandon their monopoly over judicial 
power and deliver greater democracy to the “restive” lay assessors from the community, 
those without any administrative or political affiliation to the CCP Government. 
Post-communist China is at the frontline of the struggle to push the development of 
democratic institutions, but the country’s experience suggests that such a transition will 
be neither smooth nor easy.   
 
4. The Prospects: China needs Lay Participation but a Carefully Restructured 
One   
 
Among the lay participation opponents’ attacks on the preservation of lay 
participation in China, with reasons given such as the declining trend for lay 
participation worldwide, the absence of an historical tradition in China and the 
unsuccessful practice of mixed tribunals today, then although the first two little to 
support them, the third argument is by and large justifiable in light of the fact that the 
current mixed tribunal system is plagued by a huge array of theoretical and practical 
problems. Given such a context, should China continue its recent moves towards 
reforming and resuscitating lay participation? To answer this question, the thesis 
speculated whether and to what extent lay participation has potential value within a 
transitional, modern China.  
“Whatever the approach, a number of justifications for lay participation in the law 
have been advanced. Advocates claim many salutary effects: It improves decision 
                                                        
18 Supra note 11, at 173. 
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making, reduces the effect of biased or corrupt judges, keeps the legal system in touch 
with community values, represents the diversity of citizen perspectives and experiences, 
and enhances the legal system’s overall legitimacy”.19 However, as indicated above, the 
extent to which lay participation is valuable and critical for a country will arguably 
depend upon that country’s particular political and legal context, rather than being a 
general measure. A number of transitional countries with a totalitarian tradition and 
comparatively less developed political and legal systems have revealed a growing 
interest in lay participation, and expect its potential “to promote a sense of fairness, to 
assure integrity in the legal system, to create and protect the independence of the court, 
to control the power of the courts and judges, to promote citizen participation in the 
administration of justice and to create respect for the administration of justice both 
domestically and internationally”. 20  Remarkably, China shares some structural 
similarities with these transitional countries in terms of its legacy of totalitarian 
communism, embodied in the form of a very problematic judicial system and an 
undeveloped democracy. To be more specific, in China, judicial independence is 
undermined by the fact that the financial and personnel arrangements of the Chinese 
courts are tightly controlled by local government and the CCP; the citizens’ right to a 
fair trial is also vulnerable to an entrenched severity within the criminal justice system 
and the rampant corruption of the judiciary; and the long-term absence of an authentic 
election system deprives civilians of opportunities to express their free-will, which, in 
return, undermines their democratic consciousness. In this context, my thesis has 
looked into whether lay participation has the potential to play an effective role in 
promoting fair justice and a democratic society in China, as well as it does in other 
                                                        
19 Valerie P. Hans, “U.S. Jury Reform: The Active Jury and the Adversarial Ideal”, 
Saint Louis University Public Law Review, Vol.21, 2002, at 85.  
20 Steven R. Plotkin, “The Jury Trial in Russia”, Tulane Journal of International & 
Comparative Law, Vol.2, 1994, at 2. 
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transitional countries.   
On the one hand, my thesis, by analysing the current Chinese judicial system and 
certain of the functions (though occasional or piecemeal) that Chinese lay assessors 
have already demonstrated in practice, reveals that lay participation could potentially 
produce better justice in China from three respects: (1) the lay participation process, by 
introducing the voice of the common citizen, is less likely to yield to political or 
financial pressure from the State, and might help courts to keep a distance “…from 
politics and other branches of government”21 and thus improve judicial independence, 
something which cannot currently be ensured in China due to “the institutional and 
procedural constraints that had made the courts mere executors of the policies of the 
Communist Party”, 22  (2) lay participants, as outsiders serving transitorily, could 
potentially curb the corruption of the judiciary, since they are less likely to yield to 
instructions from corrupt senior judges, and are unlikely to be absorbed into the interest 
groups composed of corrupt judges and lawyers, plus they would be able to monitor 
judges’ potential delinquencies, (3) lay participation may serve as a remedy to alleviate 
the backlog of court cases, since, under this system, lay judges could sit on collegial 
panels and replace the judges to effectively handle court conciliations, and (4) lay 
participants, serving as a check-and-balance mechanism, may mitigate the punitive 
nature of criminal justice in China, such as the wide application of the death penalty, by 
introducing community norms and values to provide a brake on the execution of cruel 
or oppressive laws, as well as professional judges’ readiness to convict.  
Lay participation also has the potential to promote a more democratic society in 
China. First, with China lacking an authentic representative democracy, lay 
                                                        
21 John Gillespie, “Rethinking the Role of Judicial Independence in Socialist-transforming 
East Asia”, International & Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol.56, No.4, 2007, at 839. 
22 Supra note 14, at 63. 
 382
participation may provide the people with an opportunity to participate directly in 
Government. Secondly, after experiencing long-term authoritarianism, a transitional 
China needs to use lay participation as a vehicle to bring legal and democratic 
consciousness to the Chinese masses, since it is by making judicial decisions or voicing 
their dissidence regarding the existing legal norms, that those citizens called to perform 
their court duty will “learn about and become interested in the judicial system” and then 
probably other public affairs.23.  
To be sure, lay participation may not be a substitute for the complete overhaul of 
China’s judicial and political system. For instance, judicial independence cannot be 
realized without the presence of a series of traits such as security of tenure and fiscal 
independence on the part of professional judges. Likewise, “democratic consolidation 
requires serious and continuous effort over a long period; it does not result from a 
single grand gesture, nor is it the task of a single administration”.24 Furthermore, it 
remains to be seen whether and to what extent lay participation can practically serve as 
“an institution capable of helping to solve the problems plaguing the administration of 
justice”.25 However, “a search for the best uses for laymen is likely to produce 
far-reaching changes on many aspects of the law and its administration that are bound 
to contribute to the common good”.26 In light of its potential functions in China, as 
outlined above, lay participation may serve as a forerunner to subsequent judicial 
reforms, and thus deserves to be continued and further experimented with in this 
                                                        
23 Kent Anderson and Mark Nolan, “Lay Participation in the Japanese Justice System: 
A Few Preliminary Thoughts Regarding the Mixed Tribunal System (saiban-in seido) 
from Domestic Historical and International Psychological Perspective”, Vanderbilt 
Journal of Transnational Law, Vol. 37, 2004, at 944. 
24 Christopher J. Walker, “Toward Democratic Consolidation? The Argentine Supreme 
Court, Judicial Independence, and the Rule of Law”, High Court Quarterly Review, 
Vol.4, 2008, at 54. 
25 Supra note 9, at 257. 
26 W. R. Cornish, The Jury (Allen Lane The Penguin Press, London, 1968), at 275. 
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country.  
Based on the fact that lay participation has not really entered a worldwide decline, 
nor is there really any absence of an historical tradition with regard to lay participation 
in China, then in association with its potential to produce better justice and promote a 
more democratic society in China, the key arguments of the opponents of lay 
participation, who wish to abolish or curtail lay participation in China, would seem to 
lack justification. Although the current mixed tribunal system has an array of problems, 
their proposal to abolish lay participation altogether in China seems a little like 
‘throwing the baby out with the bathwater’. While the proposal to abolish lay 
participation altogether has been proved here to be inappropriate, the question of the 
future developmental direction of lay participation in China must be raised.  
“Lay participation is not, in itself…a necessarily democratic institution.”27 As seen 
above, the very problematic mixed tribunal system in China today appears ill-suited to 
effectively realize the function of either promoting fair justice, or creating a more 
democratic society. While it is certain that lay participation in China today is imperfect 
and needs further reform, it remains to be seen whether China should adopt the proposal 
of the jury supporters and replace the current mixed tribunal system with a jury system, 
or that of the lay assessor advocates who wish to further polish the mixed tribunal 
system. The thesis thus firstly looked at the current political context in China, which 
may impact upon any lay participation reforms in the future, as “The demise or 
resurrection of democracy appears sometimes to lead to the introduction of lay 
participation in an attempt, symbolically or otherwise, to legitimate the…court 
system.” 28  This is the case in China, where “The government must follow fair 
                                                        
27 Supra note 11, at 173. 
28 For detailed discussion about cost of lay and stipendiary magistrates, see Rod 
Morgan and Neil Russell, “The Judiciary in the Magistrates’ Courts”, 
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procedures in depriving a person of life, liberty, or property”.29 Some recent practices 
in China have apparently violated this rule, while Chinese courts controlled by local 
governments have played no check and balance role in the process, which has aroused 
the people’s outrage, leading to them pointing accusatory fingers at the ineffective 
judicial system. “The legitimacy of the Judicial Branch ultimately depends on its 
reputation for impartiality and non-partisanship”. 30  It appears that the Chinese 
authorities have realized this and are expecting the contribution of lay participation to 
develop and grow, providing the country with a historic opportunity to develop this area. 
In the meantime, however, Chinese authorities still value the current mixed tribunal 
system and therefore there is little prospect that China will introduce a jury system in 
the near future to replace it. According to the latest reform plan enacted by the Chinese 
Government – the Third Reform Plan of Chinese Courts (2009-2013), a series of 
realistic recommendations aimed at improving the current mixed tribunal system 
include: establishing the random selection of lay assessors to resolve the problem that 
Chinese lay assessors “are far from being either a random or a representative section of 
the population”,31 abolishing the courts’ discretion at initiating a mixed tribunal ex 
officio, allowing lay assessors to participate in more cases including appeal cases, better 
disciplining lay assessors’ improprieties, and ensuring financial independence of the 
courts when employing lay assessors. Beyond the framework prescribed by the Third 
Reform Plan of Chinese Courts (2009-2013), more forward-looking proposals with 
regard to the reform of lay participation in China include improving the independence 
                                                                                                                                                               
http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs/occ-judiciary.pdf, at 100, last visited on 27 
December 2008. 
29 Erwin Chemnerinsky, “Toward A Practical Definition of the Rule of Law”, Judges 
Journal, Vol.46, 2007, at 7. 
30 Paul L. Friedman, “Civility, Judicial Independence and the Role of the Bar in 
Promoting Both”, Federal Courts Law Review, Vol.1, 2006, at 519.  
31 Penny Darbyshire, “The Lamp that Shows that Freedom Lives - Is It Worth the 
Candle?”, Criminal Law Review, Oct 1991, at 746. 
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and competence of lay assessors, improving the deliberation dynamics between lay 
assessors and professional judges, and researching the feasibility of further extending 
the use of lay assessors and introducing a jury system in China.  
 
5. Epilogue: To Open New Vistas for Researching Lay Participation in China  
 
Based on the ongoing discussions taking place, it could be concluded that lay 
participation deserves a place in China’s legal system, but needs to be carefully 
restructured through further reasonable and realistic reforms. Nonetheless, this thesis is 
far from an exhaustive piece of work and there are still many stones left unturned.  
For instance, as Richard Lempert, the current President of the Law & Society 
Association in U.S.A., cautioned in a recent working paper, “nothing is so helpful as 
good empirical research and nothing can be so bad as poor research that becomes 
influential”.32 However, empirical research on lay participation in China has been 
gravely neglected thus far.33 For example, in contrast with the United States, where 
“new data sets have allowed sophisticated quantitative research into jury verdict 
patterns” and “other research has led to and tested the results of jury reforms”,34 an 
important but unfinished item on the agenda for studying lay participation in China is 
the an intensive empirical study on the dynamics between Chinese lay assessors and 
                                                        
32 See Richard Lempert, Empirical Research for Public Policy: With Examples from 
Family Law and Advice on Securing Funding (University of Michigan Law School & 
Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 95, June 
2007), at 3, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1000700, quoted in Elizabeth 
Chambliss, “When Do Facts Persuade? Some Thoughts on the Market for ‘Empirical 
Legal Studies’”, Law & Contemporary Problems, Vol.71, 2008, at 37. 
33 Landsman and Zhang criticized this problem in their co-authored paper, see Stephan 
Landsman and Jing Zhang, “Lay Participation Comes to Japanese and Chinese Courts”, 
UCLA Pacific Basin Law Journal, Vol.25, 2007-2008, at220.  
34 Richard O. Lempert, “The Internationalization of Lay Legal Decision-Making: Jury 
Resurgence and Jury Research”, Cornell International Law Journal, Vol.40, 2007, at 
487.  
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judges during trials and deliberations. I readily concede that the empirical work in this 
thesis is no more than a preliminary attempt at conducting empirical research on lay 
participation in China, and that my survey may only give readers a glimpse of the 
mixed tribunal system in China after the recent reforms. However, the intended legacy 
of my thesis is to provide an empirical and theoretical framework for others to adopt or 
even attack, and inspire forthcoming empirical research and experimentation with 
regard to lay participation in China. Not only Chinese scholars, but also western jurists 
specialized in lay participation should be at the forefront of continuing this endeavour, 
though I also intend to carry out additional work in this regard. These joint, tangible 
efforts could have a significant impact upon the manner in which future lay 
participation in China will be conducted.  
Moreover, “the cross-national study of juries and other institutions that provide for 
lay input into legal decisions is a research frontier”.35 However, comparative research 
with regard to lay participation is in its infancy in China, and I, who have received a 
legal education and acted as a judge in China and thus know the Chinese legal system 
well, am by no means an expert on western legal systems. The fragmentary 
cross-national study in this thesis is at most an attempt to provide a view from the 
perspective of a Chinese scholar, while to carry out studies in other, western countries 
should be completed by western jurists who understand the legal systems in their 
respective home countries much better than I do. As such, I expect this thesis to attract 
interest beyond. In addition, Hans states that “there are some good reasons to expect 
that lay participation in the legal arena will promote democracy. But we know very 
little about the way to maximize such a relationship. How does the social and political 
context affect the functioning of lay participation? What are the best approaches to 
                                                        
35 Ibid.  
 387
including lay people as legal decision makers? Are certain methods of lay involvement 
better at incorporating the community’s values and attitudes about justice while 
promoting competent decision making? Are lay people best suited to particular types of 
decisions, and which have the most substantial impact on justice? What are the negative 
consequences, if any, of lay participation in legal processes?”36  Researching the 
questions alluded to above from a Chinese viewpoint and from a political and 
sociological perspective might be fascinating activities that deserve more academic 
attention in the future. 
The current political context indicates that democratic desires are in the air in 
China. As Woodrow Wilson once wrote, “for the individual…who stands at the center 
of every definition of liberty, the struggle for constitutional government is a struggle for 
good laws, indeed, but also for intelligent, independent, and impartial courts”.37 Taking 
into account the potential value of lay participation in China, it is probably the time “for 
[a] careful exploration of the whole problem of constituting courts so as to give a 
reasonable share of power to ordinary laymen and to non-lawyers”.38 However, despite 
China having the impetus to establish a more responsive and democratized judicial 
system, there might be many oscillations between “continuity with a non-democratic 
past” and “greater democratic aspirations”,39 a fact evidenced by the conservative route 
undertaken by the Chinese authorities when publishing The LAA 2004.  
Combining the two factors above, while this thesis has to come to a conclusion, it 
is certain that the political debate about lay participation in China will not be concluded 
                                                        
36 Valerie P. Hans, “Lay Participation in Legal Decision Making”, Law & Policy, 
Vol.25, No.2, 2003, at 87.   
37 Woodrow Wilson, Constitutional Government in the United States (1908), at 17, 
quoted in Sandra Day O’ Connor, “Vindicating the Rule of Law: The Role of the 
Judiciary”, Chinese Journal of International Law, Vol.2, 2003, at 1. 
38 Supra note 26, at 275. 
39 Supra note 11, at 175.  
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in this country in the near future; neither will be the academic debate and research 
required.   
Stephan Landsman and his colleagues evaluate China’s recent move toward 
resuscitating the mixed tribunal system as follows:  
“There is something analogous to the English jury story in Chinese 
developments [of lay assessors]. Over time, jurors of the middling sort in 
the English countryside came to be given a great deal of responsibility for 
making critical decisions in both civil and criminal matters. Their 
participation provided experience in self-governance that grew into political 
independence and democracy. E. P. Thompson, the great English historian 
of a Marxist orientation, saw in this the establishment and expansion of the 
rule of law. It eventually produced social attitudes stronger than the 
interests of the rich and powerful. These developments came about slowly 
and regularly suffered significant setbacks. However, the process begun in 
assize jury rooms paid real democratic dividends. While we cannot say that 
anything remotely similar is afoot in China, the conjunction of lay assessors, 
the need for citizen assistance in running the justice system, and the infusion 
of China’s middling sort (with their new views about fairness and 
opportunity) offer prospects for improvement. China is vast and complex. 
There will be all sorts of reactions to the people’s [lay] assessor initiative. 
But the potential for improvement over the present unreliable and corrupted 
[judicial] system deserves to be recognized, applauded, and assisted.40  
I could extend Landsman’s evaluation to a wider scope and end the thesis by 
stating that, in light of China’s particular political context, one that critically requires 
                                                        
40 Supra note 33, at 221 and 222.  
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a reliable judicial system to secure the people’s human rights, both academic and 
practical efforts aimed at researching, resuscitating and reforming lay participation 
in this transitional country with the largest population in the world, though likely 
taking a non-linear and piecemeal route, probably “deserve to be recognized, 









































Appendix I: Translation of Questionnaire for Judges 
 
The purposes of this questionnaire survey are to find out the pros and cons of the 
mixed tribunal system reformed by the Lay Assessor Act 2004 and to provide the 
potential future reforms with information and references. The information you will 
provide therefore may offer important clues and impetus for the future development 
and innovations of the mixed tribunal system. You may note that this questionnaire is 
anonymous and will not disclose your ID information. We sincerely thank you for 
your kind cooperation and very important contribution.      
 
I．Questions for judges of criminal divisions (Please put a cross in the bracket 
behind the answer you choose.) 
 
1. Has the court where you work been persisting in notifying each defendant of his 
right to ask for a trial by a mixed tribunal?  
A. Yes（ ） B. No（ ） C. Not sure（ ）   
2. How often have you experienced the circumstances that the defendant asked for a 
trial by a mixed tribunal?  
A. Often（ ） B. Occasionally （ ） C. Seldom（ ） D. Never（ ） 
3. At the court where you work, if without the application of defendants, who has 
been deciding on the employment of mixed tribunals?    
A. The judge himself （ ） B. The Head Justice of the Criminal Division（ ） C. The 
Department of Case Receiving and Filing（ ） D. The President of the Court（ ） E. 
Others （Please specify:                                   ）  
4. At the court where you work, if without the application of defendants, what has 
been the most often reason for the initiation of mixed tribunals?  (Please mark “1” 
behind the most often reason, “2” behind the less often reason, and “3” behind the 
least often reason etc.)  
A. Lay assessors were needed to alleviate the shortage of professional judges（ ） B. 
the case had far-reaching social implications（ ） C. The expert lay assessors were 
needed to improve the trial quality （ ） D. Other reasons (please 
specify:                                            )                                  
5. How often has the court where you work randomly picked lay assessors from the 
rota?  
A. Always （ ） B. Often （ ） C. Occasionally （ ） D. Rarely（ ）E. Never
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（ ） F. Uncertain（ ）   
6. How often have you encountered the circumstance that the lay assessor was absent 
for the trial because of his employment?   
A. Often（ ） B. Occasionally （ ） C. Seldom（ ） D. Never（ ） 
7. Has the court where you work been delivering lay assessors any materials helpful 
for them to understand cases before the trials (such as case abstracts, judges’ notes, or 
trial syllabuses etc., if any)?  
A. Always （ ） B. Often （ ） C. Occasionally （ ） D. Seldom （ ） E. Never
（ ） F. Uncertain（ ）  
8. How often has the court where you work informed lay assessors of reading case 
dossiers before trials? 
A. Always（ ） B. Often（ ） C. Occasionally （ ） D. Seldom（ ） E. Never
（ ） F. Uncertain（ ）  
9. How often have the circumstances below occurred in trials: 
(1). How often have the lay assessors read case dossiers before trials in the cases you 
have participated in?  
A. Always（ ） B. Often（ ） C. Occasionally （ ） D. Seldom（ ） E. Never
（ ）   
(2). How often have the lay assessors been able to understand your sum-ups before 
the deliberations in the cases you have participated in?  
A. Always（ ） B. Often（ ） C. Occasionally （ ） D. Seldom（ ） E. Never (  )  
F. Uncertain (  ) 
(3). How often have the lay assessors felt difficult in understanding evidential issues 
of the cases you have tried? 
A. Often（ ） B. Occasionally （ ） C. Seldom（ ） D. Never（ ）E. Uncertain
（ ）  
(4). How often have the lay assessors felt difficult in understanding factual issues of 
the cases you have participated in? 
A. Often（ ） B. Occasionally （ ） C. Seldom（ ） D. Never（ ）E. Uncertain
（ ）   
(5). How often have the lay assessors felt difficult in understanding legal issues of the 
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cases you have participated in? 
A. Often（ ） B. Occasionally （ ） C. Seldom（ ） D. Never（ ）E. Uncertain
（ ） 
(6). How often have the lay assessors on their own initiative asked you any questions 
in the cases you have participated in?  
A. Often（ ） B. Occasionally （ ） C. Seldom（ ） D. Never（ ）  
(7). How often have the lay assessors read the trial records in the cases you have 
participated in?   
A. Often（ ） B. Occasionally （ ） C. Seldom（ ） D. Never（ ）E. Uncertain
（ ）   
(8). How often have the lay assessors borrowed any referential materials from the 
court library to resolve their questions in the cases you have participated in?  
A. Often（ ） B. Occasionally （ ） C. Seldom（ ） D. Never（ ）E. Uncertain
（ ）   
(9). How often have you encouraged the lay assessors to speak in deliberations in the 
cases you have participated in? 
A. Always (  )  B. Often（ ） C. Occasionally （ ） D. Seldom（ ） E. Never
（ ） 
(10). Have the lay assessors ever spoke actively in deliberations in the cases you have 
participated in?  
A. Often（ ） B. Occasionally （ ） C. Seldom（ ） D. Never（ ） 
(11). How often have the lay assessors presented any dissidents in the deliberations in 
the cases you participated in?  
A. Often（ ） B. Occasionally （ ） C. Seldom（ ） D. Never（ ） 
(12). How often have the lay assessors insisted on their dissidents and led the mixed 
tribunals unable to reach the unanimous verdicts in the cases you have participated 
in？ 
A. Often（ ） B. Occasionally （ ） C. Seldom（ ） D. Never（ ） 
(13). Have the lay assessors ever had dissidents about penalty measuring in the cases 
you have participated in?  
A. Often（ ） B. Occasionally （ ） C. Seldom（ ） D. Never（ ） 
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(14). How often have the lay assessors’ dissidents influenced the verdicts of the cases 
you have participated in?  
A. Often（ ） B. Occasionally （ ） C. Seldom（ ） D. Never（ ）   
(15). How often have you asked for the lay assessors’ opinions when you were 
drafting the judgements？ 
A. Often（ ） B. Occasionally （ ） C. Seldom（ ） D. Never（ ） 
(16). How often have the lay assessors proposed to revise the judgments drafted by 
you？ 
A. Often（ ） B. Occasionally （ ） C. Seldom（ ） D. Never（ ） 
10. Have the lay assessors ever had dissidents about guilty/not guilty in the cases you 
have participated in? 
A. Yes (  )   B. No (  ) 
11. Have you ever encountered the circumstance that the lay assessor had dissident 
about the sort of the offence of the defendant?  
A. Yes (  )   B. No (  ) 
12. What is your general opinion about the competence of the lay assessors whom you 
have worked with? 
A. Very satisfactory （ ）B. Satisfactory （ ） C. Unsatisfactory （ ） D. Very 
unsatisfactory （ ） E. Uncertain（ ） 
13. What is your general opinion about the activity of the lay assessors in the cases 
you have participated in? 
A. Very active (  )  B. Active（ ） C. Relatively active（ ） D. Relatively inactive
（ ） E. Inactive（ ） 
14. One of the most important significances of lay assessors is that they will alleviate 
the shortage of professional judges.  
A. Strongly agree（） B. Agree（） C. Disagree（） D. Strongly disagree（） E. Neutral 
（） 
15. One of the most important significances of lay assessors is that lay assessors’ life 
experience and common sense could be helpful for trials. 
A. Strongly agree（） B. Agree（） C. Disagree（） D. Strongly disagree（） E. Neutral
（）  
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16.One of the most important significances of lay assessors is that they could improve 
the fairness of trials.  
A. Strongly agree（） B. Agree（） C. Disagree（） D. Strongly disagree（） E. Neutral
（）  
17. Generally speaking, mixed tribunals can improve the efficiency of trials.  
A. Strongly agree（） B. Agree（） C. Disagree（） D. Strongly disagree（） E. Neutral 
（）   
18. Generally speaking, by contrast with mixed tribunals, collegial panels composed 
of judges exclusively can better ensure the quality of trials. 
A. Strongly agree（） B. Agree（） C. Disagree（） D. Strongly disagree（） E. Neutral 
（）  
19. To what extent have you found that the lay assessors with higher educational level 
are apparently more competent than those with lower educational level.  
A. Unapparently（ ） B. Not very apparently（ ） C. Apparently（ ） D. Very 
apparently（ ）E. Uncertain（ ）  
20. It would be desirable that lay assessors have diplomas or degrees in law.  
A. Strongly agree（） B. Agree（） C. Disagree（） D. Strongly disagree（） E. Neutral
（）      
21. If without the consideration that lay assessors can alleviate the shortage of 
professional judges, do you prefer that collegial tribunals exclude lay assessors and 
comprise professional judges exclusively? 
A. Yes（ ） B. No（ ） C. Neutral（ ） D. Uncertain （ ）   
22. In order to ensure the effectiveness of lay participation, lay assessors should 
overnumber judges in mixed tribunals? 
A. Strongly agree（） B. Agree（） C. Disagree（） D. Strongly disagree（） E. Neutral
（）   
23. Do you agree that the mixed tribunal system should be preserved in China? 
A. Strongly agree（） B. Agree（） C. Disagree（） D. Strongly disagree（ ） E. 
Neutral (  )  F. Uncertain（ ）  
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24. A number of countries have been adopting the jury trial in criminal cases, i.e. a 
few citizens compose a jury to produce a verdict to decide on whether the defendant is 
guilty or not while the professional judge applies laws to impose the punishment. Do 
you agree to introduce this system in China?  
A. Strongly agree（） B. Agree（） C. Disagree（） D. Strongly disagree（ ） E. 
Neutral (  )  F. Uncertain（ ）  
 
II．Demographic information  
 
25. Your political affiliation: A. The Chinese Communist Party（ ） B. Other party（ ） C. Nonparty 
（ ）  
26.Your gender: A. Male_______ B. Female_________ 
27. You were bore in: 19 ______ 
28. You highest educational level is (please put a cross behind the answer you choose and specify 
your major):   
A. Below college diploma______  
B. College diploma______ and your major was______ 
C. Bachelor’s degree______and your major was______ 
D. Postgraduate diploma______and your major was______ 
E. Master’s degree______ and your major was______ 
F. PhD______ and your major was______   
29. How many years have you been appointed as a judge? 
A. Below 5 years（ ） B. 5-10 years（ ） C. 10-20 years（ ） D. 20 years（ ）  
30. Before you were appointed as a judge, what had been your occupation or status?  
A. Student（ ） B. Military staff（ ） C. Enterprise staff（ ） D. Civil servant（ ） E. Other （Please 
specify:        ） 
31. How many cases do you handle approximately in each year? 
A. Below100（ ） B. 100-200（ ） C. 200-500（ ） D. Above 500（ ） 
32. Please add any comments about the mixed tribunal system (Please use the blank 






Appendix II: Translation of Questionnaire for Lay Assessors  
 
The purposes of this questionnaire survey are to find out the pros and cons of the 
mixed tribunal system reformed by the Lay Assessor Act 2004 and to provide the 
potential future reforms with information and references. The information you will 
provide therefore may offer important clues and impetus for the future development 
and innovations of the mixed tribunal system in our country. You may note that this 
questionnaire is anonymous and will not disclose your ID information. We sincerely 
thank you for your kind cooperation and very important contribution.      
 
I．Questions for lay assessors (Please put a cross in the bracket behind the answer 
you choose.)   
 
1.How often have you experienced the circumstances as follows before the trials:  
(1) The frequency that you received the referential materials about the cases (e.g. the 
indictment, the judges’ notes, or the trial syllabuses etc., if any) before the trials:  
A. In each case（） B. Often（） C. Occasionally（） D. Seldom（） E. Never（） 
(2). The frequency that the court informed you of reading the case dossiers：  
A. In each case（） B. Often（） C. Occasionally（） D. Seldom（） E. Never（） 
3）The frequency that you read the case dossiers before the trials: 
A. In each case（） B. Often（） C. Occasionally（） D. Seldom（） E. Never（） 
2．How many times have you received lay assessor training by far?  
A. Below three-times（） B. 3-10 times（） C.10-20 times（） D. Above 20 times 
（）   
3．Do you think that the lay assessor training is useful or not? 
A. Very useful（） B. Useful（）C. Not very useful（） D. Not useful（） E. Uncertain
（）   
4．Are you familiar with the trial procedure? 
A. Familiar（）B. Relatively familiar（） C. Not very familiar（） D. Unfamiliar
（）  
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5．How often have you encountered the circumstances below： 
(1). The frequency that you were able to understand the judges’ sum-ups before 
deliberation：  
A. In each case（） B. Often（） C. Occasionally（） D. Seldom（） E. Never（）  
(2). How often have you asked the judges questions in the trials：  
A. Often（） B. Occasionally（） C. Seldom（） D. Never（）  
(3). How often have the judges have on their own initiative helped you participate in 
trials by such as interpreting difficult issues in the trials:   
A. Often（） B. Occasionally（） C. Seldom（） D. Never（）   
(4). How often have you questioned prosecutors or defendants questions in the trials:   
A. Often（） B. Occasionally（） C. Seldom（） D. Never（）    
(5). How often have you read the trial records:  
A. Never（） B. Seldom（） C. Occasionally（） D. Often（） E. In each case（）    
(6). How often have you took notes in the trials： 
A. Never（） B. Seldom（） C. Occasionally（） D. Often（） E. In each case（）   
(7). How often have you got access to the library resources of the court to resolve 
your questions in the trials： 
A. Never（） B. Seldom（） C. Occasionally（） D. Often（） E. In each case（） 
(8). How often have you were unable to understand the evidential issues in the trials： 
A. Often（） B. Occasionally（） C. Seldom（） D. Never（） E. Uncertain ( )  
(9). How often have you had totally understood the case fact before the deliberation 
began:  
A. Always （） B. Often（） C. Occasionally（） D. Seldom（）    
(10). How often have you felt confused about legal issues in trials： 
A. Often（） B. Occasionally（） C. Seldom（） D. Never（） E. Uncertain（）   
(11). How often have the judges encouraged you to present your opinions in 
deliberation： 
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A. In each case（） B. Often（） C. Occasionally（） D. Seldom（） E. Never（）  
(12). How often have you had dissidents in deliberation： 
A. Often（） B. Occasionally（） C. Seldom（） D. Never（）  
(13). How often have you had dissidents about penalty measuring in deliberation：  
A. Often（） B. Occasionally（） C. Seldom（） D. Never（）  
(14). How often have you raised debates with the judge(s) in deliberation:  
A. Never（） B. Seldom （） C. Occasionally（） D. Often（）    
(15). How often have the judge adopted your opinions in deliberations： 
A. Never（） B. Seldom（） C. Occasionally（） D. Often（）   
(16). Have you ever had any dissidents about the conviction of defendants？ 
A. Yes（） B. No（）    
(17).Have you ever had any dissidents about the sort of the defendant’s offence？  
A. Yes（） B. No（） 
6. Are you willing to continue your lay assessor service?   
A. Very willing（） B. Willing（） C. Not very willing（） D. Unwilling（） E. Neutral 
（）   
7．Are you satisfied with the subsidies the court paid you?  
A. Very satisfied（） B. Satisfied （） C. Not very satisfied（）  D. Unsatisfied at 
all（） E. Neutral（） 
8．Are you satisfied with the conditions of your office provided by the court？ 
A. Very satisfied（） B. Satisfied（） C. Not very satisfied（）  D. Unsatisfied at all
（） E. Neutral（）  
9．To what extent have you felt that your status was equal with the judges in the cases 
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you have participated in?   
A. Very equal（） B. Equal（） C. Not very equal（） D. Not equal at all（） E. Uncertain
（） 
10．To what extent have you felt that you were respected by the judges in the cases 
you have participated in?  
A. Very respected（） B. Respected（） C. Not very respected（） D. Not respected 
（） E. Uncertain（）   
11．In many cases, the function of lay assessors is no more than a decoration in mixed 
tribunals.  
A. Strongly agree（） B. Agree（） C. Disagree（） D. Strongly disagree（） E. 
Uncertain（） 
12．To what extent has your employer been supportive of your lay assessor job? 
（Pensioners and the self-employed please ignore this item）  
A. Very supportive（） B. Supportive（） C. Not very supportive（） D. Not supportive 
at all（）    
13．How often has your lay assessor job conflicted with your employment? 
(Pensioners and the self-employed please ignore this item)  
A. Often（） B. Occasionally（） C. Seldom（） 
14．Have you ever been worried about any revenge because of your lay assessor job?  
A. Often（） B. Occasionally（） C. Seldom（） D. Never（）     
15．What do you think of the 5-year tenure of lay assessors? 
A. Too long（） B. Too short（） C. Appropriate（） D. Neutral（） E. Uncertain
（）  
16．Do you think that your caseload is heavy or not? 
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A. Heavy（） B. Somewhat heavy（） C. Reasonable（） D. Somewhat easy（） E. 
Easy（）          
17. “Lay assessors should defer to judges’ opinions during deliberations since the 
latter has better legal knowledge and professional skills”. 
A. Strongly agree（） B. Agree（） C. Disagree（） D. Strongly disagree（） E. 
Uncertain（）    
18．“Serving as lay assessors is a democratic right through which common citizens 
can participate in administration of national affairs"  
A. Strongly agree（） B. Agree（） C. Disagree（） D. Strongly disagree（） E. 
Uncertain（）  
19．“Your experience of acting as a lay assessor has made you feel more interested in 
participating in other democratic activities”. 
A. Strongly agree（） B. Agree（） C. Disagree（） D. Strongly disagree（） E. 
Uncertain（） 
20．“Your lay assessor experience has increased your legal knowledge”. 
A. Strongly agree（） B. Agree（） C. Disagree（） D. Strongly disagree（） E. 
Uncertain（）   
21．“Your lay assessor experience has strengthened your legal consciousness”.  
A. Strongly agree（） B. Agree（） C. Disagree（） D. Strongly disagree（） E. 
Uncertain（） 
22．How often have you ever talked about your lay assessor experience with others?  
A. Often（） B. Occasionally（） C. Seldom（） D. Never（） 
23．To what extent has your trust in the judiciary been improved after serving as a lay 
assessor?  
A. Very much improved（） B. Relatively improved（） C. No change（）  D. Not 
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improved but descended（）  E. Uncertain（）   
24．“If a lay assessor finds any misconduct of judges, she should reveal it without 
hesitation”. 
A. It depends on（） B. Strongly agree（） C. Agree（） D. Disagree（） E. Strongly 
disagree（） F. Uncertain（）   
25．“You would feel more encouraged to participate in the deliberation if the lay 
assessors outnumber the judge(s) in a mixed tribunal”. 
A. Strongly agree（） B. Agree（） C. Disagree（） D. Strongly disagree（） E. 
Uncertain（） 
26．If your intimate relative or friend committed a crime, would you be willing to see 
his case to be adjudicated by a mixed tribunal?  
A. Very willing（） B. Willing（） C. Unwilling（） D. Very unwilling（） E. Uncertain
（） F. Neutral（）   
27．A number of countries have been adopting the jury trial in criminal cases, i.e. a 
few citizens compose a jury to produce a verdict to decide on whether the defendant is 
guilty or not while the professional judge applies laws to impose the punishment. Do 
you agree to introduce this system in China? 
A. Strongly agree ( )  B. Agree（ ） C. Disagree（ ） D. Strongly disagree（ ） E. 




28．Your occupation is： 
A. Civil servant（ ） B. Enterprise employee（ ） C. State-owned enterprise employee
（ ） D. Pensioner（ ） E. Self-employed（ ） F. Farmer ( ) G. Other (Please 
specify:       )    
29．Are you a Chinese Communist Party member? 
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A. Yes（） B. No（）  
30．Your ethnicity is： 
A. Han（） B. Other ethnic minority（）    
31．Your gender is:    
A. Male（） B. Female（）  
32．When have you started to be a lay assessor？ ___Month___Year  
33．How many cases have your participated in by far？ 
A. Below 5（） B.  5-10（） C. 10-20（） D. 20-50（） E. Above 50 (  )    
34．You were born in：19 ______ 
35．Your highest education level is (please put a cross behind the answer you choose and specify 
your major):   
A Below college diploma______  
B College diploma______ and your major was______ 
C Bachelor’s degree______and your major was______ 
D Postgraduate diploma______and your major was______ 
E Master’s degree______ and your major was______ 
F PhD______ and your major was______   
36．Please add any comments about the mixed tribunal system (Please use the blank 
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